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Abstract 
This thesis is made up of nine chapters. The introduction offers some preliminary 
discussion of the subject of the period as a whole, and some consideration of existing 
modem sources upon it. 
Our modem concept of the ancient world is necessarily constructed from materials 
derived from reports, and from the various other sources which have survived to us. 
The purpose of Chapter I is to establish how the reports and sources which pertain to 
the fifth century BC will be evaluated and used in the following thesis. To this end, the 
work of the three main contemporary historians for fifth century Greece are examined 
and some concluding comments regarding our use of them for the study of fifth century 
Macedon are made. 
Alexander I of Macedon faced circumstances which were almost completely 
incomparable to those faced by any other king during the period covered by this thesis. 
The fact that he not only preserved the integrity of his kingdom during the titanic 
Persian Wars but went on to gain territory, increase trade and improve the Macedonian 
army to an extent that it could conquer and maintain a vast tract of land, displays a 
commitment to the wellbeing of his country and a level of patriotism which Chapter 2, 
alone amongst modem studies, identifies and explores. 
In his commentary on Thucydides, A. W. Gomme has this to say about Perdiccas' 
frequent changes of allegiance: " he chopped and changed all his life, as far as we can 
see to no very good purpose, except that he kept his kingdom intact and his own 
throne. " (p201) From Perdiccas' point of view, and in the context of the Peloponnesian 
war, during which Macedon itself became, at times, a military objective, keeping his 
throne and kingdom intact was, in fact, a "very good purpose, " and indeed no small 
achievement. Chapter 3 explores the dramatic fluctuations in Perdiccas' foreign policy 
which allowed him to do this, and considers modern viewpoints upon it. 
The period spanned by the rule of Archelaus I was one of dramatic change in Greece, 
covering the last years of the fifth century and witnessing the defeat of Athens in the 
Peloponnesian war and Sparta's brief period of control. The fact that Athens' role in the 
war became increasingly limited to defence meant that she was unable to intervene in 
Macedon, thus eliminating the necessity of defence by Macedon against Athens which 
had so dominated Perdiccas' reign. As a result of the increased stability for Macedon 
which this development brought, Archelaus was able to implement some far reaching 
internal changes in Macedon, besides, in the latter years of his reign, making a serious 
intervention into Thessaly, probably on behalf of his allies in Larissa. These actions, 
and their impact upon the conduct of foreign policy during his reign, are discussed in 
Chapter 4. In conclusion an examination of Archelaus' death, its connection with his 
foreign policy, and a brief discussion of the reigns of his immediate successors is 
provided. 
Our sources on the fourth century are no less complex than those on the fifth, and offer 
new challenges to the historian hoping, to use, them to construct a comprehensive view 
of Macedon during this period. The fact that Macedon became more influential in Z: ) 
Greece in the middle of the fourth century introduces a new set of problems to a study 
of the sources upon it, because while the amount of information available to us 
massively increases, so does the controversy surrounding Macedon's position with 
regard to Greece, thus muddying the waters of how her foreign policy should be 
viewed. Chapter 5 attempts, through a discussion of the sources available to Diodorus 
and Justin and through a consideration of the agenda of these authors and those of the 
orators, to establish our position on the use of these sources in the remainder of our 
discussion. 
The accession of Amyntas III following the assassination of Pausanias brought a 
welcome period of stability to the Argead dynasty following the turbulent years after 
Archelaus' death. However, Macedon, at this moment, was caught between the 
ascending stars of three new powers - Illyna, Olynthus, and Thessaly, all three of 
which had interests in Macedon, whether malignant or benign. The defensive system 
set up by Archelaus collapsed during Amyntas' rule as the prospect of Macedonian 
plunder attracted at least two massive invasions and forced a return to an almost 
exclusively defensive foreign policy which contained echoes of that followed by 
Perdiccas, with frequent changes of alliance according to the specifics of the current 
crisis and almost total dependence upon foreign military strength. Chapter 6 examines 
how Amyntas ultimately managed to pilot his kingdom through the dangerous waters of 
the early fourth century and how in spite of the difficulties faced by his reign, he was 
ultimately able to hand over his kingdom and throne to his heirs. 
The decade between the death of Amyntas III and the accession of Philip 11 saw a 
period of immense instability in the royal house, during which assassination of one king 
and the seizing of control by the assassin again became the typical manner of accession, 
and this lack of political equilibrium allowed foreign states to intervene in Macedon to 
an unprecedented degree. In spite of this insecurity, certain strands of foreign policy 
began to develop during the reigns of Ptolemy of Alorus and of Perdiccas III which 
were to have a profound influence upon the reign of Philip 11. This chapter discusses 
these and examines how Macedon once again managed to retain its autonomy, to a 
greater or lesser degree, during a time when its political instability and military 
weakness made it an easy target for any state with an interest in the area. 
When Philip acceded to the throne in 360/59 BC there was no indication that within a 
few short years Macedon would be transformed from a weak and peripheral state into 
one of the leading powers on the Greek stage. Chapter 8 examines the various stages of 
metamorphosis which Macedon underwent to reach this point, and considers how these 
changes were reflected in Philip's foreign policy during the early years of his reign. 
The Peace of Philocrates of 346BC marked only a brief pause in the hostilities between 
Philip and Athens which had been in place since his accession. Its making, however, 
representative as it was of the extent to which Philip's influence was now felt in Greece 
and specifically in Athens, serves as a useful yardstick by which to measure the 
progress Philip had made since the lean times of his accession. Our final chapter charts 
his progress to this point, delineating the gradual rise of his fortunes, counterbalanced 
by a moment of crisis following the only serious defeat of his reign. Our discussion of 
the making of the Peace of Philocrates concludes the chronological period covered by 
this thesis, marking as it does the arrival of a unique moment in relations between 
Athens and Greece. 
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Introduction 
The period between the late sixth century BC and 346 BC was a fascinating one in 
Macedonian history, spanning our knowledge of the foreign policy of that kingdom 
from its earliest documented time through to the meteoric rise of Philip II until a point 
at which his kingdom could be described as one of the leading powers of the Greek 
world. This thesis attempts a thorough re-examination of Macedonian foreign policy 
during this period, considering how its kings managed to negotiate moments of crisis 
such as the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, survive moments of weakness and 
profound vulnerability which saw large scale invasions by neighbouring states, and 
ultimately make the shift from defensive to aggressive foreign policy which expresses 
the essence of Philip's reign. 
Although much modem scholarship on Macedon has focused on its most famous king, 
Alexander the Great, some has centred upon his father Philip and a few authors have 
offered some detailed studies of the period and subject matter covered by this thesis. Of 
these, the definitive work is the three volume treatment by N. G. L. Hammond along with 
G. T. Griffith and F. W. Walbank, who co-authored Volumes 11 and Ill respectively. Of 
these, Volume 11, published in 1979., deals specifically with the period 550-336, thereby 
embracing the period covered by this thesis. 
This collaboration between Hammond and Griffith produced an extremely scholarly 
work, which presents an unrivalled degree of discussion of ancient sources on the 
period and a highly detailed narrative of their concept of it. In spite of a recognition of 
the usefulness of their work, however, we might also suggest that certain flaws within it 
leave room for further discussion on various points. 
Consideration of specific occasions on which we might question the position of either 
Hammond or Griffith will be reserved for discussion in the course of our narrative of 
the years c513 - 346. Two general points which will be kept in mind throughout this 
study with regard to their work, however, might be briefly raised here. Firstly, we might 
note that, during the twenty five years which have passed between the publication of 
their work and the writing of this thesis, many modem authors have focused their 
attention on Macedon or sources relating to it, producing books or articles which 
provide useful and interesting observations and points for discussion. The works of 
Borza ( 1999 and 1990 especially), Greenwalt (1999,1994,1989 and 1988) and Carney 
(2000,1996,1991 and 1983) have been especially useful to the writing of this thesis, for 
example and Errington's large scale study on Macedon (1981) has been translated into 
English, often proving a contrast to the standpoints taken by Hammond and Griffith. 
The advantages offered by the wealth of modem sources on this period is fully 
exploited by this thesis, which attempts to offer discussions both of the modem sources 
which have become available during this twenty five year period and those which, 
although in existence at the time of Hammond and Griffith's work, were not 
commented upon by them. 
Carney (1991), writing about Hammond's book The Macedonian State: The Origins, 
Institutions and History (1989), raises some queries regardlnzc--, workinZc-,! methods and 
I 
in attitude towards Macedon as a whole. With reference to Hammond's service 
Macedon during World War 11 and his personal ties to that country, she comments: 
The influence of [Hammond's] personal experiences on his scholarship should 
not be forgotten and can prove both a strength and a weakness. Hammond tends 
to embrace views held by many modem Greeks about matters in which the 
interests of history intersect with those of nationality and modem politics (e. g. 
his views on the Greekness of ancient Macedonians and particularly the royal 
house ) and he is inclined to assume continuity (at times one might almost say, 
lack of change) in Macedonian customs and institutions. If evidence exists for an 
institution at a later period, he tends to believe it must have existed earlier: if he 
knows that it was done at least once, he is likely to believe that it was not a 
unique act but a custom. (p 182) 
Carney's point of view is very relevant in the context of our consideration of 
Hammond's work and its underlying observation of partisanship might be carried 
somewhat further to embrace not only the sections of Volume 11 which were written by 
Hammond, but also those by Griffith. It is certainly true that A History of Macedonia 
suffers from what might be termed scholarly isolation. No other work of comparable 
length existed on the subject at the time of its writing (nor indeed does one today) and 
on reading Hammond and Griffith's work one often gets the sense that this lack of a 
comparable study and the unwillingness of both authors to take the arguments of any 
other modem scholar into very substantial account has left their history a degree of 
freedom which could be seen as its greatest flaw. Both authors have a tendency to 
suggest an interpretation of certain events or sources and then build subsequent theories 
upon it without any defence or consideration of the validity of the underlying theory. 
While, therefore, the great value of their study, partly constituted of its sheer volume, is 
recognised by this thesis, certain of their theories are questioned by it, generally with 
reference to further modem studies which offer alternative interpretations of our ancient 
evidence to that given by Hammond and Griffith. 
The other two continuous modem studies which cover this period, those by Errington 
and Borza, offer dramatically different approaches to that taken by Hammond and 
Griffith. Errington's work is arranged thematically and deals with the years preceding 
the reign of Philip relatively briefly. His work focuses upon the military and political 
events of this period, skimming over some issues which this thesis attempts to take into 
account - the geographical and social realities of Macedon during this period, for 
example, and the character of the kings as they are presented by our sources. Like 
Hammond and Griffith, Errington displays a marked reluctance to refer to other modem 
sources, a reluctance which inevitably deprives his reader of an awareness of a modem 
context for his discussion. Moreover, his thematic division of Philip's reign into 
geographical regions, while it offers some interesting insights into Philip's approach to 
different areas, renders his discussion of it somewhat obscures our view of a coherent 
foreign policy during these years. 
Borza's book offers a different approach yet again. Like Erringon's discussion, Borza's 
treatment is brief by comparison to that offered by Hammond and Griffith - sometimes 
to its detriment, when we find that important historical events (the Sacred War, for 
example) are treated with a fairly broad brush approach. However, Borza's work does 
have the advantage of considerable discussion of other modem sources, and some 
useful consideration of the relevant archaeological evidence, some of which was 
unavailable when Hammond and Griffith were writing. Borza's treatment of the kings 
before Philip is especially brief, and thus some of the more detailed aspects of their 
foreign policy escape his discussion. t) 
Cawkwell and Ellis both provide detailed studies of Philip's reign, although they do not 
cover the full period spanned by this thesis. Cawkwell's book (1978) is especially 
useful. ) maintaining as it does a consistent grasp of the most concrete aspects of Philip's 
reign, containing discussion of the physical resources available to him and displaying a 
marked realism in its attitude towards Athenian resistance to the growth of Philip's 
power. Cawkwell, however, like Hammond and Griffith, does not undertaken any 
substantial discussion of the contributions of other modem sources which were 
available to him and, like Hammond, Griffith and Ellis, Cawkwell was writing in the 
1970s, since which time many modem books and articles have enhanced our 
understanding of Philip's reign. 
Ellis (1976) also provides a lengthy study which focuses on Philip's reign. He, like 
Errington, divides his book into thematic sections which deal with the various 
geographic regions with which Philip came into contact. As pointed out in relation to 
the work of Errington, while this offers a detailed insight into each thematic section, it 
makes it difficult to perceive the relationship between the areas and thus to imagine 
Philip's foreign policy as a coherent whole. Moreover, the very structure of Ellis' work 
clearly illustrates its- underlying concept - that Philip's reign ought to be perceived as a 
process which was designed to establish Macedonian dominance over Greece and to 
bring the city states into alignment under Macedon with a view to launching a Persian 
campaign. This thesis, on the other hand, follows the theory that no such long term plan 
existed, suggesting instead that, especially in the early years of his reign, Philip's main 
goals were survival and the elimination of Athenian influence from his shores, while his 
later gains came about through a combination of opportunism and military 
development. 
Amongst the body of material offered by these large scale modem works on the period, 
then, it seems that there is some room for new contributions to be made. By attempting 
to take as much relevant material, both ancient and modem, into account as possible, 
this thesis is an attempt to make just such a contribution. 
The working method by which this study attempts to fulfil this aim is as follows. Two 
chapters deal with our sources on the period covered by this thesis. Chapter I considers 
the accounts of fifth century Macedon offered by Herodotus, Thucydides and 
Xenophon, and attempts to establish two main points: how Macedon and Macedonians 
were regarded by each of these ancient authors, and how our study will approach the 
material on Macedonian foreign policy and its historical context which they offer, 
taking modem opinions of their writing into account. Chapter 5 attempts a similar 
exercise for our sources on fourth century Macedon, Diodorus, Justin and the orators 
Demosthenes, Aeschines and Isocrates, taking into account the fact that these sources, 
unlike their fifth century counterparts, are rendered problematic by their chronological 
relationship to their material. Here too, modem perspectives on their work are taken 
into account. In both Chapters 1 and 5, the approach taken by this study to our longer 
sources is laid out, while other sources (those of fragmentary authors, references from 
3 
contemporary drama, numismatic and epigraphic evidence, for example) are discussed C 
in the context of our examination of the events to which they refer. 
Chapters 2,3 and 4 cover the foreign policy of Macedon during the fifth century, 
building upon the working method regarding our sources for that period laid out in 
Chapter 1. Chapters 6,7,8 and 9 cover the period of the fourth century, Chapters 8 and 
9 focusing upon the foreign policy of Philip 11 until the making of the Peace of 
Philocrates, a moment which seems to mark the outset of the consolidation of his 
presence and influence in Greece. The aim of this study is to provide a detailed 
discussion of the fluctuations in the power and fortunes of Macedon in the years 
preceding its domination of Greece, with full consideration of both the ancient and 
modem sources on the subject. Especially, we attempt to determine whether Macedon's 
ultimate involvement in Greece ought to be considered to have been a gradual but 
consistent evolution of Macedonian power or whether, instead, Macedon's development 
prior to Philip's reign and during its early years was an uneven process, slow 
development interspersed with violent periods of crisis and decline. The conclusion 
attempts to summarise some of the themes which have been identified during this 
discussion, while Appendix 1 provides a chronology of the period, which is derived 
from our consideration of the order and timing of events during these years. 
Throughout this thesis, the Greek texts which are given are those from Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae, while the translations into English are those from the Loeb series, 
unless otherwise stated. All abbreviations correspond to those of LAnnee Philologique. 
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Chapter I 
Sources for Fifth Century Macedon; 
Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon 
The period examined by this thesis is covered by a wealth of sources, both written and 
archaeological. The fifth century is covered by three continuous written sources, the 
works of Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. The accumulation of centuries of 
interpretation of their work has complicated the relationship between the modem 
historian and the ancient sources, obliging us to take the doubts raised by the more 
sceptical modem critics over the trustworthiness of their reports into account. These 
doubts obviously have some serious implications for the historian who hopes to 
construct an image of fifth century history, and in this case fifth century Macedon, from 
their reports. This chapter, then, will endeavor to critically evaluate each source, and 
draw some conclusions regarding its use in the following thesis. 
Our understanding of this period is also enhanced by references in further sources - 
sporadic references, for example, appear in the Bibliotheke of Diodorus. However, as 
this work covers fourth century Macedonian history more comprehensively than it does 
fifth, a detailed exa ' mination of 
Diodorus' text and working method will be deferred 
until it is more relevant to the discussion in hand. Similarly, the evidence of 
fragmentary historians is less relevant to the fifth century than it is to the fourth, and 
therefore a discussion of how we evaluate it will be given when the fourth century is 
examined. Any instances of fragmentary evidence arising before that will be discussed 
individually within their historical context. 
Specific references to Macedon are scant in the earlier historians, and as a result we find 
ourselves making some attempts to supplement our written sources by making use of 
the main archaeological evidence available, at least that which is pertinent to the public 
domain, such as the numismatic and epigraphic evidence. While these sources are, 
throughout the penod covered by this thesis, very important to supplementing our 
concept of Macedonian foreign policy, it would not be appropriate to the current 
discussion to enter into detailed and technical analysis of either numismatic or 
epigraphic evidence here. Instances where they become particularly important will 
therefore be dealt with as they anse in our discussion. 
We may thus turn our attention to the main task in hand - to establish our position upon 
the three main historians of the fifth century, Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. 
The truth is an infinitely complex concept in the modem mind. The reports of two 
people who have experienced the same event will certainly differ in detail from one 
another, perhaps differ in emphasis and possibly even be unrecognisable as two 
perspectives on the same event. That the same phenomenon was recognized in ancient 
times was pointed out by Thucydides 1.22.1 The enhancement of one aspect of a certain 
event and the simultaneous suppression of another by any particular author may be due 
"Different eye witnesses give different accounts of the same events, speaking out of partiality for one 
side or the other or else fTom imperfect memories. " 
5 
to an almost infinite number of factors - personal interest, political inclination, cultural 
conditioning, the slant of the material available to him and so on adblfl7l 
itI1777. Why and 
how such inclinations influence us are a matter for the psychologist, philosopher and C) 
sociologist - and yet such inclinations are now and have always been innate to an 
individual's concept of an event and hence to his or her report of it. 
On the basis of such a precept, we may argue that a history which develops along a 
linear structure, telling its story from the outset of a penod until what is perceived to be 
its end, is inherently a partially fictional account, because it deliberately suppresses 
certain real events which it perceives to be either irrelevant to its story or detnmental to 
whatever effect it seeks to create, whilst simultaneously enhancing other aspects 
perceived by the author to contribute to the narrative or effect. How then do we 
reconcile ourselves to individual idiosyncrasies of ancient authors - in short, how do we 
know if we can trust them? Where are our guarantees that they will not fall to report 
details which we would have wished to know, either intentionally or inadvertently, or 
that they will not exaggerate facts which contribute to their individual agendas to the 
detriment of their usefulness to us? 
It is precisely questions such as these which have given rise to the sceptical 
interpretation of ancient sources noted in brief above. There are of course, no such 
guarantees, and when it comes to constructing a concept of ancient history, we are 
entirely in the hands of our sources. Below, we will examine how we go about 
establishing some degree of comfort within this objective recognition of our 
helplessness in the hands of our sources. 
Herodotus the 'wondering stranger' 
The identification of Herodotus with the 'wondering stranger' of Plato's Laws (637C )2 
was first made by James Redfield in 1985, and seems to neatly summarise the 
underlying philosophy of Herodotus' working method. Herodotus encapsulated and 
embodied a particular culture - Greek culture - and this he carried around with him as a 
filter through which all the information and evidence which he picked up during his 
extensive travels was passed en route to its narration in The Histories. Hartog, in his 
landmark work translated into English in 1988, argued for a concept of 'otherness' in 
Herodotus - that is, he suggests that the customs and traditions of 'non-Greek' culture in 
The Histories are constructed by means of contrast to the Greek concept of normality - 
and thus the reverse logic is also true: that the concept of 'Greekness' is crystallised and 
confirmed through contrast with 'non-Greekness. ' 3 This theory presupposed that the 
author himself had a firm grasp of 'us' and 'them, ' hence the identification of 
Herodotus as a tourist, explicit to Redfield's article and implicit to Hartog's work. 
Herodotus, when writing on the subject of peoples and cultures, places his own culture 
over that of others, and uses it to measure them. 
2- anyone will say in answer to the wonderina stranaer who looks upon something contrary to his own Z-- 0 L- 
habits: "Do not wonder, stranger. This Is our nomos; perhaps you in such matter have a different one. " ZD 
See Redfield 1985 
' See Hartog 1988, in particular the introduction which explains this concept. 
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This aspect of Herodotus' work is, of course, a very important one for the historian 
whose main interest is Macedon. To examine how Macedon and Macedonians were 
considered by Herodotus, we might consider how they fit into his scheme of Greeks and 
barbarians and the struggle between these two cultures. Herodotus 5.22 relates how 
Alexander I proved that he was a Greek by virtue of his Argive descent, as opposed to 
Macedonian, and was therefore was pen-nitted to enter the Olympic games, competition 
in which was a privilege reserved for Greeks only. The implications of this story are 
clear - if Alexander had stated his nationality as Macedonian, he would not have been 
permitted to compete, proving that Macedonians were not in fact considered to have 
been Greek by those Greeks contemporary to Alexander 1. 
The question of ethnicity, however, is by no means as clear cut as it would appear to be 
here; 1.58, for example, relates how, in very ancient times, Macedonia was settled by 
Donans, peoples of the same descent as those who settled the Peloponnese. From these 
two appearances of Macedonians as a people in Herodotus, we might suggest that 
although Herodotus recognised that in his own times Macedonians were not considered 
to have been Greeks, he also knew that they were derived from the same ethnic roots as 
some portions of the Greek populace. 
This sense of cultural and ethnic ambiguity is compounded by the persona of Alexander 
I in Herodotus, the only Macedonian individual to be documented by him at all and a 
deeply complex figure himself, ethnically separated from his subjects in Herodotus' 
narrative through his claims to Argive descent. 4 His claims to Greek nationality and to 
commitment to the Greek cause during the Persian wars, along with the numismatic 
evidence from his reign, inform us of a genuine inclination towards Philhellenism, 
contrasted though it is with the subjection of Macedon to Persia during much of the 
period covered by Herodotus. 
Additionally, by contrast to the appearance of other 'barbarians' in Herodotus, we 
might note that Macedon and Macedonia are treated rather differently. Non-Greeks in 
Herodotus tend to display markedly non-Greek features. Herodotus had a taste for 5 
relating these. Had there been unusual marriage practices or religious practices in 
Macedon, or other sociological deviations from what, in Herodotus' eyes, was the 
Greek norm, we may be sure it would have found its way into his pages. 
The only conclusion which is available to us on the issue of ethnicity, then, appears to 
be that Herodotus considered Macedon to be ethnically, culturally and geographically a 
marginal state. Its peripheral status with regard to his central narrative, the Persian wars, 
is confirmed by the scant coverage Macedon receives in the course of his narrative. 6 
Yet the appearances of Alexander 1, by necessity the representative of Macedon in our 
text. ) in spite of his claims to 
Greek nationality, tend to come at crucial moments in 
Herodotus' story, and are fairly evenly spaced throughout it. A Macedonian note, then, 
however slight, is a consistent presence in Herodotus' work, mentioned in his opening 
passages about the origins of races and present at the decisive confrontation between 
Greece and Persia, the battle of Platea. Macedon's infrequent but regular appearances in 
4 The appearances of Alexander in the histories are discussed at lenorth below in Chapter 2 which deals 
with his reign. 
' See below. 
6 See Hall 1989 pp170f and pp179f for a brief discussion of Macedon's ethnic status as seen by other 
fifth century writers, with references. 
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Herodotus' narrative thus give it a unique place in it. While by no means central (either 0 
geographically oi- in terms of actual role) to the progress of the Persi l ID Z__ ian wars, we are left with the sense that Macedon a small but essential element in the overall scheme of 
The Histories. It remains to consider how much value we should attribute to the 
information on Macedon which Herodotus offers. 
To approach this problem, we might consider the kind of material which he gathered 
and how he went about collecting and verifying it. The Histories are described by 
Herodotus himself in his opening phrases as the presentation of "what Herodotus the 
Halicarnassian has leamt by enquiry. " (1.1). This theme of enquiry surfaces repeatedly 
throughout Herodotus' text and a basic framework of his working method becomes 
apparent through it - he take the traditional understanding of a certain event, and he 
reports i t. 7 Sometimes he provides us with variant traditions, and occasionally he 
discusses the information which he presents. 8 We are given little indication by 
Herodotus of his personal view of the accounts he receives, and what little he does give 
is not necessarily reassuring to the historian who wishes to use him as a source. 7.152, 
for example, states: 
'E-y('o öe' o'(pF-t'X(o X'£'-, yF-tv ro'c keyoýtF-VCC, nF't'occyooct, 'YF- ýte, v ol) n(XVT(Xlr(X(Ytv 
2 ; ýco (imit ýlot To; üco T' noý y, 'To) % 7t, VT(X T'V koyov- o(PF-1 -0EEE 
F- (X 0 
My business is to record what people say, but I am by no means bound to 
believe it - and that may be taken to apply to this book as a whole. 
Yet we cannot help but doubt Herodotus' word here. Are we to believe that he was 
incredulous towards all the material we find in his work, from the Persian wars 
downwards in scale to the smallest historical details? This does not seem likely. It 
appears, rather, that Herodotus was drawing a sort of personal disclaimer regarding the 
information he offers, or perhaps merely indulging in the expression of a moment's 
frustration with his material. However, the insecurity which his approach fosters 
amongst his modem readership has contributed to a general mistrust of him which has 
arisen over the years. Other factors might also be cited - for example the massive scope 
of material which The Histories includes, and which belies the simple mission statement 
given at the outset of his work: 
Hpo80, to, u Go-opiou ia'Topillý (, xnoöF-ýlý 118e, coý ýtT1, cE T(X 7EvogF-V(x Eý 3 (0 0 F- 1E 11 F- (X - cct (0ýt(X Tcc, (XVOP no)v cco XP' vco ' ý/, cilým 7' Vil'C(X', 0 u- "P'Y(X ýtF-7, ýa 'UE K "Eýýijcit, rý & ßccpßd potcyt c (Xito8F-7,0ýV'C(X, exxxýec -yý oc 9 (X F- EVIITOCI, TCC TE 
9 (X 11 äýAa Km öl, ijv eciTiliv F-nox, wiaav ' U, kotot. 
What Herodotus the Halicarnssian has learnt by enquiry is here set forth: in 
order that so the memory of the past may not be blotted out from among men by 
7 For discussion of the nuts and bolts of Herodotus' workine, methods, see any of the more basic 0 discussions of Herodotus' work included in the bibliography - Buckley 1996 is a good starting point 
although somewhat brief, and Ramm 1998. For a more scholarly approach see Lateiner 1991, which is 
entirely devoted to a detailed discussion of Herodotus' working method, and R. Thomas 2000, a 
comprehensive and very learned attempt to trace the influences of contemporary cultural trends on 
Herodotus' research, material and presentation. For the specific topic of monuments to great events (or 
indeed the view that oreat events themselves might be perceived as monuments) see Immerwahr 1960, zn 
still the definitive study of this question and, brief but thought provoking, Verrall, 1910. See also 
Marincola 2001. who covers both Herodotus and Thucydides. 
8 See for example 4-42. 
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time, and that great and marvellous deeds done by Greeks and foreigners and 
especially the reason why they warred against each other may not lack renown. 
(1-1.1-5) 
The rich and complex tapestry of his narrative, which embraces everything from myth, 
geography and folklore, 9 lengthy elaborations on the origins of nationalities and finally 
collects all manner of interesting features of foreign cultures from the marriage customs 
of the Babylonians (1.196 ff) to the bee keeping practices of the monkey eating peoples 
of the Gyzantes (4.194), far outreaches the boundaries of the original topic area. 
Perhaps this breadth of material, or Herodotus' failure to signpost the divisions between 
what he considered to be myth and what history and his own statement of scepticism 
towards his material, noted above, or his apparent readiness to believe much that is 
unlikelylo but much distrust of Herodotus has arisen over the centuries. Juan Luis 
Vi ves II was the first to coin the name "Father of Lies" as an alternative to Cicero's 
more flattering alternative, "Father of History" 12 and many eminent historians have 
followed in his footsteps. Indeed, complaints of mendacity against Herodotus form a 
respectable tradition from Vives to the present day. Amongst the modem proponents of 
this view, accusations range from claims that Herodotus told outright lies - Hartog being the most prestigious of modem authors to make this statement 13 through to the 
view expressed by Fehling in his landmark work, which was translated into English in 
1989, that Herodotus created a potent blend of fact and fiction which Fehling refers to 
as "pseudo history. ". This view is more generous than the accusation of outright lies - as Fowler 14 neatly summarises, in the work of Fehling " the alternative to Herodotus the 
historian is not Herodotus the fraud, but Herodotus the poet. " (p8l) The conclusion of 
this theory, however, is inevitably as damaging to our concept of Herodotus as a valid 
source as are the accusations of Hartog - it suggests that The Histories are largely a 
fictional work. 
Clearly, the tradition which accepts Vives, along with its current following of eminent 
scholars, has massive implications for any historian hoping to use Herodotus as 
evidence on the fifth century and specifically fifth century Macedon. An acceptance of 
the general point of all the followers of this school - that Herodotus (either through 
naivet6, an overactive bent for entertainment or moralising, or sheer dishonesty) simply 
cannot be trusted - necessitates at least a profound suspicion of his evidence, or, at 
worst, a total rejection of it. 
It is fortunate for the student of the fifth century, then, that this standpoint is not without 
its critics. Of these, the most recent and the most thorough is W. Kendrick Pritchett, in 
9 See for example the abduction of Helen (1.3-5) or Leonidas' divine descent (7.204) and on the 
c general subject of myth and its place in Herodotus' Histories see Vandiver 1991. See especially Book 2 for attention to geographical detail, although the entire work displays a strong awareness of physical Z: ) ZD Z-- CD 
space. The story of An-Ian and the dolphin ( 1.23 ff), the travels of Solon (1.29 ff) the descent of 
Alexander 1 (8-137 ff) all display an inclination to relate tales from folklore. 
10 Several instances spring to mind, all rather charming in their own right - see for instance 3.113 for 
sheep whose tails are so long they have to be supported by little wooden carts, or 4.20 f for some CD 
unlikely references to bald and goat footed Scythians... Z: ý 11 
1636 
12 Cicero Laws 1.1.5 
13 See especially pp 379 ff. 
14 1996 
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The Liar School of Heroclotits. 15 It is, however, Fowler who expresses the clearest 
statement from the school which challenges the theories of what Pritchett refers to as 
the "liar school": "We should not require him [Herodotus] to meet the standards of 
modem historiography. " (p87) 
Fowler's view is a very legitimate one and voices one of the most widely acknowledged 
rules applicable to all examinations of ancient testimony. However, although legitimate, 
it also fails to confront the problem raised but not addressed by the liar school: that is, if 
we reject Herodotus as untrustworthy, how may we go about considering the early part 
of the fifth century BC at all? There is something of a gap in logic here between the 
complaint of the liar school - that Herodotus was not telling the truth - and Fowler's 
refutation of it -that Herodotus' Histories will not conform to modem expectations of 
what history is. It is self evident that we cannot expect Herodotus to answer the 
questions which our culture conditions us to ask, nor to structure his Histories in 
accordance with modem guidelines. What we do need to ask, however, is how far we 
can trust the narrative which Herodotus presents us with. 
To take up the thought lobbed by Harrison into the melee over Herodotus' reputation, 
"Herodotus has been growing increasingly ingenious in recent years". 16 It seems that 
the entire process of interpretation of The Histories is in danger of becoming massively 
over complicated. 
Herodotus' working method appears in fact to have been relatively simple. He made his 
Histories as comprehensive as he could. 17 If not all of the material which we find In 
Herodotus is compatible with the modem palate, rather than looking for ways in which 
to establish that Herodotus was lying (thereby falling into the trap the great detective 
Sherlock Holmes warned against: "one begins to twist facts to suit theories instead of 
theories to suit facts. " (p6)) we must simply accept that Herodotus' work is the product 
of a very different cultural filter to our own. Myth and history, to take one example, are 
evidently not so clearly differentiated in Herodotus' concept of the past as they are in 
ours. Herodotus also tended towards cyclical structures, which are less familiar to his 
modem readers than, perhaps, to his 
18 
contemporary ones - for example, the small 
becoming great and the great, small. These factors are elements of the individual 
thumbprint on the work of any historian, and they are of course prejudices, but not of a 
negative type. As we have attempted to establish above, no histonan is without these 
marks, and, rather than seeing them as flaws, we might be better advised to take the 
opposite approach - to take them as indications of the culture which produced them. 
' 9 
The approach taken by this thesis towards Herodotus' work will not, therefore, be the 
one advocated by the so-called liar school, which has, it seems, in spite of centuries of 
15 1995 
16 Harrison 2000 p I. 
17 See Gould 1989 for some helpful comments on this point. Chapter 2, entitled " "Enquiry" and 
"Social Memory" " (ppl9ff) is especially relevant - in it, Gould argues that Herodotus must be 
approached as a source which is dependent upon what he terms "social memory" and therefore subject 
to the subjectivity of this phenomenon, as opposed to one who deliberately sought to mislead his 
readers. 
18 See van der Veen 1996 for a detailed discussion of this. 
19 An interesting modern parallel is the work of von Fritz, Herodotus and the Growth of 
Historiography, the conclusions of which surely offer us as much of an insight into the growth of 
interest in psychology during the 1930s - suor(yestino, that the development of Herodotus in a maturing Cý CýZ: ) 11) 
process is clearly discernible in The Histories - as it does into Herodotus' work. 
10 
scholarship, failed to conclusively prove that Herodotus was deliberately falsifying his 
account. Rather, we shall attempt to approach his treatment of Macedon on its merits. 
In spite of the modem doubters of Herodotus, then, the method followed by this thesis 
as regards his work will be to use it in its fullest state. Although we might reserve the 4- 
right to question elements of his evidence on Macedon which seem unlikely or ZIII incongruous, we will also consider why each story took the form it did. In this way, we 
shall attempt to utilise Herodotus' work in the broadest way we can. 
Thucydides the Dramatist and the Illusion of Modernity 
In terms of trustworthiness of fact, Thucydides is generally considered to be more 
acceptable than Herodotus. It was Kagan, writing in 1965, who commented that "in 
contrast to Herodotus, ... Thucydides seems to have taken a spectacular leap into 
modernity. " (p. 98). There is no doubt that Thucydides' work fits far more neatly into 
our twenty first century view of what history is and should be and it is not difficult to 
see why the modem reader tends to find the account of Thucydides more palatable than 
that of Herodotus. There are no goat footed people in Thucydides, nor sheep with 
inordinately long tails, and there are no Gods to be found walking the hills around 
Thucydides' battlefields. Indeed, the lack of religion in Thucydides is an element which 
20 many modem authors have noted as indicative of his more rational approach . 
To further contribute to the image of a 'modem' Thucydides, we may note that for 
myth, Gods and the fantastic, he substitutes an emphasis on concrete fact. Thucydides is 
rich in detail on physical realities - topography, numbers of men, numbers of ships, 
equipment, command hierarchies, strategy, etc. 21 The modem historian is comforted by 
such accounts. 22 
Besides the increased comfort of good, firm fact, Thucydides also offers us another 
commodity which we felt the lack of in Herodotus -a continuous chronology. The 
integrity of it is, admittedly, a debated issue in modem historiography and shall be 
briefly considered below - and yet there is no denying that even an awareness of the 
necessity of dating and thus ordering events offers a rational substructure which was for 
the greater part absent from the work of Herodotus. 
20 See for example Cochrane's influential characterisation of Thucydides as the scientist, 1929, and 
Crane 1998, although the latter warns (see below) that this impression is deceptive, 
21 For this type of precision, see especially his account of the Sicilian expedition in Books six and 
seven, although attention to these issues pervades the entire work. C) 
22 Although see Hunter 1973, especially her conclusion (pp. 177ff) for noteworthy dissention from 
modern appreciation of Thucydides. Hunter identifies cyclical structures in Thucydides' concept of 
history, and argues that: tD 
Thucydides' purpose was twofold: first, to select and dispose of his facts in such a way that 
events themselves would conform to and so demonstrate this pattern of history and second to 
show how far and by what means man is capable of intervening in this process. (p. 177) zD 
As a result of this fixed agenda, Hunter concludes, Thucydides was obliged to mould his history to 0 ZD 
shape his preconceptions of what it ought to prove, to the detriment of its veracity and objectivity. In 
our conclusions of Chapter 3, we will suggest that Perdiccas fits precisely into the mould which Hunter 
identifies for Thucydides' history and that, therefore, we need not question the reliability of 
Thucydides' information on Macedon as a result of Hunter's thesis. 
II 
F. Cornford's landmark book, Thucydides Mythistoricits, published in 1907 is, 
remarkably, still the only work to tackle our concept of Thucydides as the central issue 
23 in our reading of hi M. Cornford was the first to state (with the authority of an 
extremely detailed discussion of the text of Thucydides and of other contemporary 
sources behind him) that, just as has been stated here (albeit in a clumsier fashion) the 
historian acts as a window through which the events of history are seen, and, having 
been shaped by certain cultural factors and experiences, they are apt to distort the events 
which they relate accordingly. 
This recognition of the unavoidability of individuality, along with all its prejudices, 
preferences and agendas, is a fundamentally important one in the context of our 
reception of our sources, and in this case, our reception of Thucydides. In Cornford's 
work, no attempt to set up a so called "liar school" on him is made, but instead the 
cultural conditions which led to the creation of Thucydides' work as we have it are 
valued as highly as the cold, ascertainable facts which he claims to discover beneath it. 
To purloin Fowler's summary of Fehling on Herodotus and apply it to Cornford on 
Thucydides, we might say that in Cornford, the alternative to Thucydides the historian 
is not Thucydides the fraud but Thucydides the artifact. Thucydides thus becomes a 
product of his own era and thus a valuable testimony to it. 
Thucydides' era was unique. Like Herodotus, he wrote of a great war, but unlike his 
predecessor, Thucydides had actually witnessed and fought in the war he wrote of, and 
therefore experience at first hand the historical events which constituted his material. 
During the course of this war, hostilities extended into northern Greece, including 
Macedon, and for a brief period Macedon itself became a major theatre of war. 
Thucydides himself served in the north, and indeed seems to have had personal ties with 
Thrace. These two factors combined mean that his perspective on Macedon is markedly 
different to that of Herodotus, who, as argued above, seems to have regarded Macedon 
as being physically, historically and culturally marginal. The details of his account of 
Macedon's role in the Peloponnesian war are discussed at some length in Chapter 3- 
here, however, a brief overview of Macedon's place in Thucydides, and thus our 
attitude towards his evidence on it is necessary. 
The overall philosophical attitude of Thucydides has been the subject of much 
discussion in modern literature. Several authors identify connections between 
Thucydides and the Platonic school of thought. 
24 The general consensus appears to be 
23 In Cornford's work it is possible to trace the origins of the school of thought which produced much 1_ý rn 
of the recent influential work on Herodotus - Hartoo, and Fehlinc, (both discussed above) both owe 1: > zD 
some debt to Cornford, although Cornford's conclusions on Thucydides are radically different from C) 
those of Hartoc, and Fehlino, on Herodotus. Interestingly, the more flamboyant style of Herodotus has, ZID Z: ) C) 
over the centuries of scholarship on him, attracted the attention of more flamboyant critics, taking ever 
more daring positions on his work and frequently being drawn to the more outlandish aspects of it. 
Conversely, the more sober style of Thucydides has invited a more sober line of criticism, and the 
weightiest matter of its content has received much attention - his contribution to the development of 
political theory, for example is a well developed field (see Palmer 1992, Greene 1950, Kagan 1965 and 
to some extent Allison 1997) or his attitude to imperialism (see especially de Romilly, trans 1963). The 
dissimilarity between the modern literature on Thucydides and that on Herodotus renders a comparison 
between them, complex as it already is, even more involved. 
24 See for example Hudson-Williams 1950 and McLeod 1974. 
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that Thucydides, like many of his philosophical contemporaries, was concerned with the 
attempt to impose philosophical rationale over the chaos of fate and the natural world. -5 
Parry 1972 presents a well argued thesis on how this approach affects not only the 
details, but the actual aim and superstructure of Thucydides' work. He identifies two 
coexisting themes in the history, the first being the rise and fall of various earlier 
empires, and the second being a "line of continuous development, ignoring minor ups 
and downs... " culminating in what was, for Thucydides, the ultimate empire - the 
Athenian Empire. 
It is this second curve which makes Athens and the fall of Athens into what I 
have called the final version of the historical process. The rise and fall of earlier 
empires must accordingly be seen as steps upwards, so he stresses their rise 
only... he stresses the creativeness of the early empires, presenting all history as 
a single trajectory, reaching a height in Periclean Athens and coming to an end 
with the close of the twenty seven year war. The ruin of all empires is subsumed 
under that of Athens. (p56) 
If we accept Parry's suggestion here, then we can see that the ultimate downfall of 
Athens is the goal towards which Thucydides is progressing. In this ordered 
development of narrative, Macedon plays a vital role. The appearances of Perdiccas, the 
Macedonian king of this era, are frequent, and his role within the narrative, consistent 
only in its inconsistency, has been described by some modem critics 26 as verging upon 
the comic. This thesis will maintain that Perdiccas, on the contrary, exemplifies the 
struggle of an individual to enforce his will upon his circumstances, sometimes 
successfully and sometimes less so, and as such plays an important role in Thucydides' 
work. In addition, his appearances, as will be discussed at length in Chapter 3, 
constitute a substantial contribution to the progress of the war. 
Thucydides appears to have been well informed about affairs in Macedon, presumably 
because of his own time in the north, but his statements regarding the ethnicity of the 
Macedonian people are ultimately as non committal as those of Herodotus. On one 
memorable occasion 27 he places into the mouth of the Spartan commander Brasidas a 
referenced to the Macedonians as "barbarians" - apparently a clear indication that in the 
"us and them" mentality of Greece at the time, Macedonians were most certainly 
"them". This verdict, however, is undercut by several factors, not least by the fact that 
this reference comes at a moment when Brasidas has just been deserted by Perdiccas 
and is rallying his troops in the face of battle to stand by their Spartan ideals. A racial 
contrast between the troops who are standing their ground and those that have fled was 
evidently too apt a comparison for Thucydides to allow to pass him by. In addition, the 
fact that Macedon is so frequently to be found taking part in that most Greek of 
experiences, the Peloponnesian War, appears to underline that Thucydides, unlike 
Herodotus, did not consider Macedon to have been peripheral to the Greek world as it 
stood in his day, and the fact that hostilities frequently took place in Macedon strongly 
implies that it was not considered to be physically marginal either. Essentially, then, we 
25 See Wiedeman 1983 for a startling perspective of how chaos intruded into Thucydides' world in 
spite of his most valiant efforts to exclude it through reason and order. For a learned discussion of these Cý 
efforts and their place in Thucydides' work, see Cochrane 1929. Cornford 1907 also gives the tension 0 
between yv%iTI and Ti)XTI a prominent position in his work. Edmunds 1975 deals specifically with this 
issue. 26 See Chapter 3 for references and discussion. 
27 4.126. 
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might conclude that in Thucydides, we find the high quality of Information, 
chronological substructure, and increased centrality of the role of Macedon which we 
noted as being lacking from Herodotus. This being so, it is with some confidence that 
we can assert an intention to use the information on Macedon under Perdiccas as we 
find it in Thucydides, well informed on the subject and interested in it as an important 
part of his narrative as he was. 
28 The concept of Thucydides as a dramatist is far from fashionable. Ulri cl writing over a 
century ago, characterlsed The History of the Peloponnesian War as a tragedy in five 
acts, the Sicilian expedition providing the dramatic climax of the 'play. ' Jebb (1907) 
rejects this theory, but retains the sense of the vividness of drama in his concept of 
Thucydides: " He felt the whole moment and pathos of events themselves; ... he saw 
them with the distinctness of intense concentration... " (p437). It was Plutarch, however, 
who first commented upon the vividness of Thucydides' style: 
'Enet 8oKoi)ýtFv o'L')x o'cconcoý rCo NuKtiýc To'v Kp('xacyov iuccpccßcc2, XF-tv icat' T('x 
1-1(XpotK(\x TC(x011ýt(XT(X Toiý EtKF-iIKO-tý, 0)'PCC 7E(XpcclTF-icyo(xt KM IUCCPCCKccxEiv 
IMEP F-ýtoi) -coll)ý F"VT")-yx(x, vovT(Yý Tolý (5")7-YP(XýLýt(XGI TouTolý, 0710)ý em Tatý 
81117iiaecytv Utý ecil)TO\ý (X1)TOÜ ICEP1 VATU Ir(X0I1TIK(OT(XTOý 
gv(XP, YF-CYTGCcoý 7totKtl(OT(XTOý 'YF-VoýLEVOý, E*-Vilvoxe, ýt118EV 11ýtaý 
nF-novOe'-v(xi Ttýt(xt'o) 7u('xOoý öýtotov, 
I think that Nicias is a suitable parallel to Crassus, and the Sicilian expedition to 
the Parthian disaster. I must therefore at once, and in all modesty, entreat my 
readers not to imagine for one instant that, in my narration of what Thucydides 
has inimitably set forth, surpassing even himself in pathos, vividness and 
variety, I am so disposed as was Timaeus. (Plutarch, Life of Nicias 1.1-2) 
The vividness which Plutarch speaks of offers us a privileged insight into Macedonian 
history during the period of which Thucydides was writing, and allows us to construct a 
comparatively comprehensive picture of the foreign policy of Perdiccas. 
Xenophon: Historia, Moralia or Memorabilia? 
The ancient sources contain no record of a debate over Xenophon's reputation. 
Dionysus of Halicarnassus, a first century BC critic, explicitly praises Xenophon for 
choice of subject matter and arrangement, concluding: 
()C, 0, UCOV TCCiý -npFn(OÖF-GT('XT(Xtý 'KE'-XPIIT(Xt -Kalt (X (X i) vX% -CF- -y' p' PX(Xiý 
1. C(XI reT(XXF-v n ra % ýIXE 0E txv"), T(Xt OF-OOF-ßeý Km ötKcctov KM TCEIzotxti Tliv -YPGC(Pllv. TE 'ntÖF-, 
x3c/ 11 EK plýL KM 'K(XPTF-ptKOV MXI F--0nPF-nF-ý, TE Cyl, )Xý, lißb VK 00 £'-VOV 
3 CCPF-T(Xiý- 
Everywhere he has begun at the most appropriate place, and he has concluded 
each episode at the most suitable point. His division Is good and so is the order 
and variety of his writing. The moral qualities which he shows are those of 
piety, justice, persev 
. 
erance 
29 
and affability -a character, in short, which is 
adorned with all the virtues. (Letter to Pompeius 4.2.4) 
28 See Jebb for reference and summary. Sadly this work is not translated into English. 
29 We , to a discussion of further material from this letter below. shall be returning II 
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To what, then, may we attribute Xenophon's decline from a respected peer of 
Herodotus and Thucydides to the shabby figure he cuts in modem criticism, and how 
may we reconcile the latter with our method of accepting, as far as we can, the material 
which our sources offer us? To address these questions, a brief excursus into modem 
criticism is required. 
Xenophon's fall from favour has been gradual. In the 1800s he was already losing 
popularity. 30 At the very beginning of the twentieth century, Underhill was raising 
doubts over Xenophon's reliability by comparing him to Thucydides, who, in the light 
of this comparison, appeared as a very paragon of historical virtue. Xenophon's 
slapdash chronology and explicitly partial style was highlighted and thus condemned. " 
Yet a further blow was delivered in 1909, when the first of the Oxyrhynchus Papyri 
were published, and the rigorous standards of the Oxyrhynchus historian revealed some 
3 glaring flaws in Xenophon's work. 32 The later publication of more fragments served 
only to consolidate this impression yet further. 
Since the days of Underhill, criticism of Xenophon has developed into three main 
strands. Although these schools of thought vary in the degree of accusation which they 
explicitly aim at Xenophon, they are equally damaging to his standing as an historical 
source, as a brief summary of their main themes will illustrate. 
3' Soulis ' heads the most openly condemnatory group - that which supposes that it was 
history, and history in the Thucydidean style, which Xenophon tried and failed to write. 
Soulls picks up on the comparison between Thucydides and Xenophon made by 
Underhill and, as with Underhill, Thucydides emerges from this encounter sleek and 
untouched, Xenophon, tattered and limping. For Soulis, the lack of honesty, the 
stupidity and the hypocrisy of Xenophon's emulation of Thucydides, all of which he 
detects in Xenophon's work, poison his view of Xenophon right through to the core of 
his concept of him as a man: 
Xenophon represents a period of decline. Thucydides has marked the death of 
the Classical period's political and moral standards, and Xenophon, wearing a 
mask of Hypocrisy -a standard feature of decline, reiterates Thucydides' 
controlled and sincere lamentation... 
I try to find extenuating circumstances for Xenophon. When I suppose that he 
was a conventional man without critical ability, I tend to combine this type of 
man with honesty and directness, but I cannot detect such qualities in 
Xenophon. 
(pp. 187-9) 
Soulis' conclusion is damning indeed. Xenophon is dishonest, stupid, conventional, 
hypocritical and morally debased - to name but a few of the flaws identified in him 
30 See below. 
31 Underhill 1900 
32 As Macedon receives no mention I this thesis will not engage in a in the Hellen'ca Oxyrhynchia, L-- 
prolonged discussion of it. However, for further reference, see McKechnie and Kern 1988, Bonamente C) 
1973 and Bruce 1967, full details of which can be found in the bibliography. It may also be noted that 
it is widely asserted that the Oxyrhynchus historian was the main source of the work of Ephorus, and 
that his work in turn forms the basis of much of that of Diodorus, whose Bibliotheke is the subject of a 
later chapter of this thesis. 
33 19 72 
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during the course of Soulis' study. Any inclination towards treating Xenophon as a 
source is thus vigorously attacked by Soulis' approach. 
Far milder but ultimately no less damaging is the theory offered by Cawkwell in his C) 
introduction to the 1979 Penguin edition of the Hellenica- Like Soulis, he asserts that 
emulation of Thucydides was Xenophon's goal in writing the Hellenica and, like Soulis 
again, he maintains that Xenophon failed in the attempt. Rather than this failure being 
the conclusion of his theory, however, as it is in Soulis' work, Cawkwell offers the 
theory that what Xenophon ultimately wrote was a collection of memoirs. To support 
this, he suggests that the Hellenica was a very late work "almost the last thing he wrote, 
the vision of an old man"(p2l). For Cawkwell, this explains (and, it is hinted, to some 
small degree, excuses) the profound flaws which he, no less than Soulls or Underhill, 
detects in the Hellenica. 
Cawkwell is, then, the main proponent of the memorabilia school of thought, as 
opposed to the failed history school exemplified by Soulis. For Cawkwell, Xenophon 
wrote his memoirs, so how could we expect them to be anything other than anecdotal, 
vaguely remembered and partially reported? Seen as an historical source, however, it Is 
clear that Xenophon fares no better with Cawkwell than he did with Soulis. The 
characterisation of the Hellenica as "the vision of an old man" smacks of patronage - it 
hints at possible senility and a heavy seasoning of sentimentality. Such a 
characterisation is akin to the view current in the nineteenth century; Macaulay, for 
example, writing in 1828 concluded on Xenophon: "In truth Xenophon, though his taste 
was elegant, his disposition amiable, and his intercourse with the world extensive, had,, 
we suspect, rather a weak head. " 
Needless to say, the basic assumption of Xenophon's essential inability to write history, 
whether due to the rose tinted spectacles which Cawkwell would have us place on his 
nose, or the intellectual deficiency detected by Macauley, makes an apparently 
irreparable dent in Xenophon's reputation as an historian. 
The third and final school of thought to level a damaging theory at Xenophon is that 
which questions whether Xenophon ever intended to write history as we perceive it at 
all. This theory finds support in Henry (1966) and Wood, (1964), but is most explicitly 
stated by Grayson (1975), who argues that the profound historical flaws in the 
Hellenica may only really be explained if we cease to view it as an historical text at all, 
and add it instead to the body of work designed as moral i sti c/in struct] ve theses which 
form the majority of Xenophon's prolific output. Grayson himself highlights the 
difficulties which this theory raises for the historian: 
The final problem, however, remains: how are we to use Xenophon's Hellenica 
as historical evidence? I suggest that we can rely on it only marginally more 
happily than we resort to his Cyropedia for early Persian history or to the 
Agesilaus for Spartan policy. (p. 40) 
Modem critical attacks on Xenophon tend to be, then, threefold: they suggest that 1) his 
history is unreliable because he was incompetent and morally debased, 2) it is 
unreliable because what started as history ended up as memoirs (resulting in essentially 
the same conclusion as 1) and 3) it is unreliable because Xenophon never intended to 
wnte history at all, but moralia, and thus his facts were subjected to different selection 
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criteiia than they would have been had history been what he was almIng at. The outlook 
for anyone hoping to use Xenophon as a source, then, looks bleak indeed. 
It becomes yet bleaker for the historian hoping to use him as a source on Macedon, as 
he gives almost no evidence at all regarding Macedonian foreign policy during this 
period. However, certain arguments constructed from this very dearth of material can be 
made. Firstly, however, it is worth noting that in spite of his plethora of critics, 
Xenophon is not entirely without defenders. 
Gray's book, The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica, is one of the very few voices of 
dissent from the condemnatory viewpoint of the collective liar school on Xenophon 34 
which Soulis, Cawkwell, Grayson and many others represent.. ) She also uses the 
evaluation of Dionysius of Halicarnassus as a basis for the position taken by much of 
her study, and picks up on one striking assertion that is made by Dionysus - that 
Herodotus, not Thucydides, was Xenophon's role model in writing history. This parallel 
is a very useful one. Xenophon's own explicit references to the work of Thucydides (the 
fact that he beings his work with the words meta de tauta, for example, assuming the 
reader's familiarity with Thucydides) have, argues Gray, misled many modem authors 
into assuming that continuation implies emulation. This, she holds, is a misconception. 
This theory has many positive results upon our concept of Xenophon. Once we dispense 
with the idea that he was somehow obliged to conform to Thucydidean standards and 
style, we also leave behind the notion of failure central to Soulls' tirade against 
Xenophon - his failure to write Thucydidean history. If we also recall the rule which we 
set ourselves when considering both Herodotus and Thucydides - that we must not 
expect an ancient historian to conform to modem standards, we might also call into 
question some of the other criticisms raised by Xenophon's liar school. 
If, for example, we recall that Herodotus did not consider anecdotes to be divorced from 
history, and believed that a celebration of great deeds was a worthy goal of history, then 
Xenophon's digressions into personal anecdotes or, to quote Henry (1966), the 
44 extraneous particular[s] pulled in whole from some strange setting" begin to look more 
familiar. His tendency to celebrate arete sounds less foreign and forced if we remember 
Herodotus' interest in "great and marvellous deeds" and, presumably his manipulation 
of his material so that his narrative might address this interest. 
Rahn in 1971 argued for a theory of development of style throughout Xenophon's 
work. 35 He suggests that although Xenophon started out trying to emulate Thucydides, 
using some fairly superficial stylistic features and, more importantly, applying criteria 
established by Thucydides for the selection of historically significant material. These 
criteria soon collapsed under the pressure of Xenophon's own personal preference for 
certain types of material and his increasing awareness that these criteria did not allow 
him to adequately express his own experience of his historical context. 
34 Anderson 1975 also offers a more positive approach to Xenophon, suggesting that while his 
historical writings do contain mistakes, omissions and prejudices, " his histories contain many incidents Cý 
'llustradna his notions of honourable or dishonourable conduct, and the standards by which he judges II Z-- M 
are by no means dispicable. " (p2) Anderson suggests, it seems, that we ought to be attempting to meet 
Xenophon on his own terms. 
3 This theory was rejected by Cawkwell, 1979 (pp2lf) 
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This theory is helpful to some degree. Whether or not we agree with Rahn that 
Xenophon expressly set out to emulate Thucydides, it is certainly true that his own 
criteria quickly imposed his own style onto his historical model. 36 Rahn's final point is 
perhaps his most useful: 
In summary, then, as the answer to the basic question of what Xenophon was 
trying to do in the Hellenica, I suggest that he began by recording the decline Cý 
and fall of a great city and moved from this to an account of the deterioration 
and disintegration of Hellenic political organisation. In doing so he included 
with increasing frequency material of exemplary value. If we recognise this we 
will not approach the Hellenica with the hope of finding what is not there. 
(p. 508) 
The actual content of Xenophon's Hellenica is an issue which has been much neglected 
in modem times, receiving only the briefest acknowledgment in all the works quoted 
3 above bar that of Gray and that of Tuplin, 7 a scholarly and competent addition to the 
work of dissenters from the liar school. These may be summarised in brief, yet they 
speak quite clearly of the value of the Hellenica and what it holds for the scholar who 
intends to discuss Macedon in the period covered by Xenophon. 
As noted above, the information offered to us by the Hellenica on Macedon is 
negligible, and, as such, clearly indicates a dramatic decline in interest in Macedon, at 
least amongst the Spartan society which interested Xenophon. The scant information 
which we do have on the latter years of the fifth century, we glean from Diodorus 38 and 
epigraphical evidence, and various fragmentary notes from other authors. Perhaps the 
most important implication we can draw from this is that Macedon was no longer 
playing an important role in Greek affairs, as she had during ther period covered by 
Thucydides, or, more specifically, that Archelaus' circumstances allowed him the 
opportunity to consolidate his kingdom rather than, as Perdiccas had had to, be 
constantly concerned with foreign affairs, the lack of notice Macedon receives in 
Xenophon goes some way towards offsetting the theory argued in Chapter 4, regarding 
the importance of the intervention of Archelaus in Thessaly. 
It is equally true that, despite Xenophon's disinclination to inform us of events in 
Macedon, the information he provides on the development of the rest of Greece during 
this period offers us a very valuable description of the state of affairs which left 
Archelaus free of the necessity of maintaining a defensive foreign policy for the major 
part of his reign, and the situation in Thessaly which allowed him to intervene there. As 
such, Xenophon's narrative remains a vital source for this thesis, pertinent as the 
information it offers us is to our discussion of the development of Macedonian foreign 
policy during the latter part of the fifth century. 
The work of these three historians, then, will provide us with a substructure of primary 
idence for the foreign policy of fifth century Macedon. This chapter has attempted to evi C) 
justify the overall approach of this thesis to our ancient material - that is, where 
,6 See MacLaren 1934 for one feature of this - he notes, (p. p. 1352 f) that certain elements of 
Xenophon's narrative express a sense of humour. 
37 1993 
38Discussed at some length in Chapter 5. 
18 
00011, 
%0 
)I 
possible, to accept them as they stand on their own merits, thus making the fullest 
possible use of the information available to us from these, our most valuable sources. 
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Chapter 2 
Patriot Games; The Rule of Alexander I 
An examination of the reign of Alexander I necessitates our turning our attention back 
to the first of the historians covered in the previous chapter, Herodotus. Herodotus' 
portrait of Alexander I of Macedon encapsulates all of the positives and negatives 
which we identified earlier in our relationship with his work: it includes tall tales - in 
this case of heroic rebellion - the partiality which tends to be associated with eyewitness 
accounts and individual political agenda, and yet it simultaneously allows us a 
privileged insight into the motivations of those described and the necessities imposed 
upon them by their situations. 
We find Alexander I torn between two such necessities - firstly, that of preserving his 
kingdom intact during the Persian invasions, and secondly, having collaborated, that of 
salvaging his reputation in the wake of the defeated Persian force. Careful attention to 
Herodotus' narrative illustrates how he achieved both, and uncovers a theme of 
Macedonian expansion (dealt with in the second part of this chapter) which suggests 
that in these pressing and difficult circumstances, he and his country not only survived, 
but prospered. This undercurrent of narrative is supported by the numismatic evidence 
belonging to Alexander's reign. This chapter will first examine the presentation of 
Alexander in Herodotus, dealing with each anecdote individually, and then move on to 
examine the implications of the written and numismatic evidence for our perception of 
Macedonian foreign policy during this period. 
As described in the previous chapter, then, an apprehension of the whole of Herodotus' 
narrative concerning Alexander I will be the definitive characteristic of the use of his 
work in the first section of this chapter. Although we reserve the right to question the 
elements of any anecdote which we might have reason to doubt, we will also consider 
why the anecdote has come to take the form it has. This allows us to remain true to our 
stated aim of accepting Herodotus in the fullest sense we can, while simultaneously 
critically appraising the development of Alexander I's foreign policy ( as portrayed by 
his narrative) and his ability to survive the Persian Wars, subsequently establish himself 
as a philhellenic figure, and simultaneously line the Macedonian nest with territorial 
and financial gains. 
Alexander the Philhellene? 
The first appearance of Alexander in The Histories contains what we might think of as a 
double dose of philhellenism. Firstly, he is portrayed killing off the Persian envoys in a 
fit of anti Persian disgust (a scene to which we shall shortly return) and then, 
immediately afterwards, participating in the Olympic Games: 
"Ekkilvaq 6F'- EIV(Xt TOILYTOI)q TOI')q (XTCO' FIEP81KKEO) 7F-'YOVOTCC;, KCCT(X IUEP 
cc 'To, k, 51 11 131%I- -o t F-, Yol. )Gt, al, )TO; TE O-L)'CCO r-L)7x(xv()) F-7cl(TT(XRF-vo; K(Xl 
61,1 K(Xt EV TOIGI 
I/ ontcTOE, koyotat curo8E; "(x) 6); Eiiat "EXkijvF,;, npo; 6F'- Kai oti TO'V F-V 'Ok-O[tnill 
I 6tF'-7rov, rF-q (xy(i)vcc 'Ekkilvo8it-Kat obr(o F'-7v(t)(Yccv F, 'tvccL. 'AkF-4('xv6pol) 7('Xp 
5 (XEOkElkIV EkORE'VOIL) KOCt' K(XT(Xp('XV'co; ETC' (XlL)TO, TofjTo 01 ccvTtOE10(ToRcvol 
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Vol o-O P(xpp(xp V (x7o)vl(yCFCOV FIvul rov 'Ekkývwv ý46p7ov ýLtv, (p(XýLF 
(X76V(x C'Ckka' 'Ekki'vo)v. 'AkE-'4(xv6po; 6F'- F-TcFi6ij ('xTcF-6E4F- CO; Eiij 
'Ap'YF-ioq, 
3 'OTI I\5 %IF-VO; (Y'U('X6tOV CT1)VF-4'nlTC'rF, T6) np ', F-KP 'CF- F- Val "EXXflv Kcct a7wvtý' E 
Now that these descendents of Perdiccas are Greek, as they themselves say, I 
myself chance to know and will prove it in the later part of my history: and 
further, the Hellenodicae who have the ordering of the contest at Olympia 
determined that it was so. For when Alexander chose to contend and entered the 
lists for that purpose, the Greeks who were to run against him were for barring 
him from the race, saying that the contest should be for Greeks and not for 
foreigners; but Alexander proving himself to be an Argive, he was judged to be 
a Greek; so he contended in the furlong race and ran a dead heat for the first 
place. (5.22)1 
We are thus struck, at the very outset of Alexander's existence in The Histories, with a 
double-barrelled blast of philhellenism. Alexander was so anti Persian (and by 
implication, pro Greek) that he killed the Persian envoys, and not only was he pro 
Greek, he actually was Greek as opposed to Macedonian, as even the Olympic judges 
accepted. 
What are we to make of this? Whether we accept either the claim of Greek nationality 
(and opinions are divided - Hammond, throughout his prolific work, never doubts the 
Greekness of Macedonia as a whole, whilst Borza 1990, to take but one example, 
dismisses the story entirely (pI12) as unsupported propaganda) or the story of the 
murder of the envoys, it is clear that a passionate assertion of pro Greek affiliation is 
being made. 
The scholars who argue for one side or the other of the ethnicity issue are missing the 
main point of it in Herodotus. We do not know whether or not Alexander's family were 
really Argive - Herodotus says they were and, in spite of Borza, we have no reason to 
doubt his word - but the point is long beyond our proving and the most important 
question is not whether or not the story is true, but why it is here. On this point, this 
thesis conforms to the view held by all of the modem authors encountered by this study: 
the aim of this particular episode, and, unwavenngly, all of those which follow, is to 
emphasise the philhellenism (and indeed in this case, the Hellenism) of the Macedonian 
king. The motivations behind this statement of allegiance are perhaps obvious in the 
light of the Greek victory in 479BC, and yet a brief outline of them might set the tone 
for the rest of our examination of the appearances of Alexander I in Herodotus. 
At the time of the writing of the histories, the Persians were long departed and those 
who had assisted the losing side were named as collaborators and reviled by those who 
had won. As will be asserted throughout this chapter, Macedon was one such 
'collaborator' amongst a not insignificant group - Thebes and portions of Thessaly, for 
example 2- and yet it is only on behalf of the Macedonian king that any such specific 
' See P. Roos 1985 for a general discussion of Alexander's activities at Olympia - specifically, he takes 4: ) 
1 
Hammond 1979 (p60) to task over his suggestion that .t unlikely that Alexander I competed as king 
"because the prestige of his kingdom might have been involved. " Roos rightly points out that Archelaosl Cn Cý Cý C, 
and Philip II also competed at Olympia (admittedly as the owners of teams of horses rather than 
personally), presumably without compromising the "prestige" of the kingdom. (Roos p163) 
2 For Thebes, see Herodotus 7.205,222,225,233,9.2,41ffand 9.67. For Thessaly, see Herodotus 
7.6,130,172, and Westlake 1936. 
21 
attempt at denial and at salvaging reputation amongst the victorious Greeks is made. 
Why is this? 
Firstly, the geographical position of Macedon may have played a part. Distant as it was It) 4: ý from southern Greece, its exact relations with foreign powers may have been hazier in 
the southern Greek mentality than that of, say, Thebes. Thus, it may have been easier 
for Macedon to gloss over less complimentary episodes and emphasise pro Greek ones 
without grating too much against public knowledge. On the other hand, this attempt 
shows an awareness of and a concern for southern Greek opinion which displays a 
philhellenism of a much subtler nature than that which might be skimmed from the 
surface of Herodotus' narrative. The philhellenism of Alexander I is not essentially 
constructed of the few crude attempts at espionage which pepper Herodotus' narrative 
but of a deep and consistent concern for Greek good opinion. We might think of 
Alexander's attempts to portray himself as unwaveringly philhellenic, in spite of 
evidence to the contrary, as our earliest historical instance of propaganda. 4 This 
awareness of the need to salvage the reputation of Macedon from the Persian War 
shows a highly sophisticated aspect of Alexander's foreign policy and pervades each of 
his appearances in the histones, as our examination of them will demonstrate. 
The first of these appearances, as noted above, is that which concerns the murder of the 
seven envoys who came to demand earth and water as signs of submission from 
Macedon, at the time of the deportation of the Paeonians in the years following Darius' 
Scythian expedition, - c 513 BC. It tells (5.17ff) how the Persian envoys, once the signs 
of submission to Persia had been given, demanded the company of the Macedonian 
royal women at dinner and, when they arrived, insulted them with improper advances. 
Amyntas, the king, was too afraid to respond, but Alexander, then the hotheaded heir to 
the throne, was unable to restrain his anger and had the envoys killed. Herodotus then 
goes to some pains to emphasise the completeness of the eradication of the embassy, 
and its aftermath: 
Kat OIL)TOt [tEV TOUT(p T(q ýLOP(p 61F-(PO('Xpll(YCCV, K(XI (XlL)TOt K(Xt 71 OEp(x7cllt, 7l 
(X, L), rcov* E'I'T[F-'CO Y(\)Cp 611 Mpt K(Xt OXIIRCCTOC K(X\t OEP('XTCOVTF-q K(Xt Tj TC(X(YCC 710/xxý 
Tc(xp(xa-KE-L)il- n(xvr(x 5ý rccbrcc O'C[tcc Ram Elcavotat 1,1(p(, Xvt(Y'CO. MF"r(\x 6E 
xpovo) 01) IrAM) L, )(TCEPOV ý "M(Tlq 'U&)v ('xv6P6v TOUTO)v ýLF-7&kll E'-K TCOv 
rIEPGF-(OV F-'YIVF-'rO, -KCCI (5(pF-(xq 'AkE'-ýow6poq KOCTEk(XPE (70(PI'ln, xPl4taTa TE 
-W- 601\uq TUOU& K(Xt\ Ti'IV E(I)I)TOb ('X6F, /%(PF-I\IV TI 1 11) E n 01)vO[tcc l1v FI)7(x'-q- 80 \q6 , uocb, r(x Kcvr2-'XccpE o 'AkF'-4ccv6poq Bo-L)P6 pl 6tv8pit rUpai an cc- q, 'C6)V 
&ý11REVWV 
-co'L)q (XT[OX%tE-, Voloq ap Grpccr7j76. '0 ýIE-'v V'UV r(ov rlF-PCYE-, O)v '10,0'r(ov O(xv(xroq 
O, CL, )T(l) K(XT(Xkcc[I(POE\I; F-ut7l'oll. 
3 Other seemingly comparable attempts are made by Thebes and possibly by Thessaly. Theban apologists 
at Thucydides 3.62 allezge that the med'sm of Thebes was instigated not by the main body of the populace 
but by the oligarchic rulers of the time, while the claims at a division in Thessaly between medising and V) C, 
loyalty to the Greek cause made in Herodotus (see below for discussion) may be interpreted as a similar 
attempt at passing the buck. However, the situation in Macedon was somewhat unique, as it was ruled by 
one man and not by rival political groups, thus the medism of Macedon could not be blamed on the 
initiative of anyone other than Alexander I himself, thus requiring a more personal bent in the portrayal of r-I 
the story in Greece. 
Hammond 1979 pp98 ff suggests that Herodotus must have met Alexander, and he may very well be C)t- 
right, given how favorable the accounts of that wily king are. Even if we may not assert with total C) C> LI 
confidence that it was Alexander himself that Herodotus met, we may say without any shadow of a doubt 
that it was a pro-Macedonian source who offered this information, and that it was likely to have originally 
been approved by the king Z-- * 
This was the fate whereby they perished, they and all their retinue, for carriages 
too had come with them, and servants, and all the great train they had; the 
Macedonians made away with all that, as well as with the envoys themselves. 
No long time afterwards the Persians made a great search for these men; but 
Alexander had cunning enough to put an end to it by the gift of a great sum and 
his own sister Gygaea to Bubares, a Persian, the general of those who sought for 
the slain men; by this gift he made an end of the search. (5.21) 
There are elements to this story which may well cause an eyebrow to be raised amongst 
Herodotus' readers. We might wonder what the great king thought when a sheepish, 
newly marned Bubares stood before him, shrugging his shoulders, shaking his head, 
and blaming it all on wolves. The persons of envoys were sacrosanct in the ancient 5 
world and their disappearance is most unlikely to have been dismissed so easil Y. 
Unsurprisingly, then, this story has met with scepticism across the board of modem 
scholarship and almost as many replacement scenarios exist as there are authors. 6 
Hammond's discussion of the event is very bnef (p99) and although he dismisses the 
story of the murder of the envoys as "surely unhistoncal" he retains the embassy itself, 
from now forwards considering Macedon to be subject to Persia. He also (pp57f) 
suggests that it was Amyntas rather than Alexander who negotiated the marriage of 
Gygaea to Bubares. 7 
Errington 8, on the other hand, would have us reject the story entirely, complaining that 
"the partial rejection which has become traditional in scholarship does not seem to me 
to be legitimate in view of the close narrative interdependence of each element of the 
tale" (p142). The only part of the anecdote he retains is that of the marriage of Gygaea 
to Bubares, the existence of their union being proven, he states, by Herodotus 8.136. 
Assuming, as do most modem historians, that Alexander acceded to the throne in c 4989 
he takes Herodotus' word that it was Alexander and not Amyntas who arranged the 
marriage, and dates it to the Thracian expedition under Mardonius in 492. ' 0 
Errington's theory has one aspect which recommends it over that of Hammond - it 
dispenses with the necessity of substituting the name of Amyntas for that of Alexander 
in connection with the marriage of Gygaea, a substitution which seems arbitrary and 
unexplained in the context of Hammond's brief discussion. However, it also obliges us 
to date the first submission of Macedon to 492, which is not consistent with the fact that 
the Paeonians were physically deported to Asia by Megabazos' force in the aftermath of 
the Scythian expedition, usually dated to c 512 or 11. Given that Herodotus 5.16-17 
describes the physical removal of a large portion of the Paeonjan population, and that 
Thucydides 2.99 speaks of this land as being under Macedonian control, it is not an 
unlikely assumption that Amyntas gained from the Persian conquest of Paeonia, the 
most likely scenario in my view being that, on his early and willing submission to 
See for example Herodotus 7.133. 
6 Contrast R. Paribeni 1947 for the very rare view that this story should be accepted. 
7 See pp59f for this theory and for the chronology which he derives from it. 
8 Errington 1981 pp142 ff C, 9 This because of a passage from Justin 7.5.1 which states "post discessurn Bubares Amyntas rex Zý 
decedit. " It is widely assumed that the Ionian revolt prompted Bubares' departure and thus the death of 
Amyntas tends to be dated c 498. This date should be regarded as possible but not certain as no ancient C, 
evidence actually makes any connection between the Ionian revolt and the departure of Bubares from 
Macedon. 
10 Herodotus 6.43 ff. 
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Darius, Amyntas was allowed to subsume a portion of the depopulated Paeonian 
territory into his kingdom, thus placing it under pro Persian control, and to ally his C-) Z: ) 
family to a noble Persian family-" 
Of the versions which exist in modem sources, it seems to me that Badian's is to be 
preferred. After Hammond, he dates the original submission of Macedon to Persia to the 
aftermath of the Scythian campaign, when Megabazos was left in Thrace. Estimating 
that his activities there must have taken two campaigning seasons, Badian dates the 
submission of Macedon to c 511, ingeniously avoiding the problem of Gygaea's brother 
having arranged her marriage rather than her father by suggesting that Alexander may 
have been sent as a delegate to Megabazos to arrange the formal submission. He 
considers the terms of the submission to have been generous (although he does not 
consider the acquisition of parts of Paeonia to have been amongst them), allowing 
Amyntas (represented by Alexander) to marry his daughter to Persian nobility. This 
proves, he argues, that the impetus for submission came voluntarily from Macedon, and 
not from a Persian order, which in turn resolves the mystery of why the envoys had to 
be invented in the first place: 
As there was no record or memory of any demand for earth and water, the 
messengers transmitting that demand had to be invented and then had to 
disappear without trace; and the payment of tribute as well as the distinguished 
marriage connection (by then an embarrassment), became a sacrifice 
necessitated -by the disappearance of the messengers - who, in view of the 
enormity of the sacrifice (a large sum of money and the marriage of a royal lady 
of Temenid descent to a relative of the Barbarian), had to become the most 
distinguished Persians one could imagine for the occasion. Needless to say, 
there was now a chance to depict Alexander as the impetuous hero, whose truly 
heroic deed had to be paid for in a suitably extravagant manner. (p 114) 
Badian's narrative admirably explains several difficult elements of this tale: it resolves 
the problem of why Alexander and not Amyntas arranged the marriage of Gygaea, it 
allows us to date the submission of Macedon to an earlier period than that suggested by 
Errington, and explains why such generous terms were offered, and it also allows us to 
eliminate the entire tale of the murder without eliminating the possibility of submission 
at this time. Errington's perfectly reasonable assertion that the elements of the story are 
"too interdependent to allow us to reject some parts and not others" (p142) is thus 
upheld in Badian's version. 
However, in spite of our acceptance of Badian's theory and of the attention that this 
episode has received, there are still certain elements of it which have been glossed over 
or omitted altogether from modem discussions. We might, for example, briefly consider 
the marriage of Gygaea to Bubares. Modem historians tend not to prick an ear at the 
mention of political marriage in ancient Macedon, and yet we might note that Macedon 
11 Other objections to Errington's theory are raised by Badian 1994, see for example p 110. Borza, 1990, 
calls the marriage of GyOraea and Bubares "an important foreign marriage" and goes on to suggest that L_ Z: ý zD M CI C)C) 
marriage signifies alliance (or at least the recognition of a non-hostile relationship) but not necessarily =1 Z__ t::, 
vassalage" (p 103). Badian quite rightly rejects this, pointing out that "we know perfectly well... that, at 
this time the only form of alliance the king would accept was subjection. " (p 110). See below for further zI_ 
discussion of land acquisition. This theory complements the argument below that Mygdonia should be Cl zn 
considered to have been acquired during Amyntas' reign - this was part of the tract of land originally 
known of as Paeonia. 
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was the only state we know of within the Greek sphere to consistently utilise it in the 
context of foreign relations. This issue is very underdeveloped, the only work related to 
it for this period being that by Carney' 2 and yet it is an essential part of dealing with 
foreign states. Gygaea has the dubious honour of being the first historical Macedonian 
woman to be used as currency in a deal with a foreign power. Given the casual nature of 
the report of the marriage in Herodotus, it might be rash to credit Alexander with being 
the founder of this institution (which survived throughout the years of the Argead 4: ) dynasty) and yet his use of it at this point in the development of Macedonian foreign 
policy is significant. Alexander was not from a large family: Gygaea and one other 
sibling' 3 of unspecified gender are documented by our sources. Gygaea, then, may have Z: ý been Alexander's only sister, and as polyandry was out of the question, she was a token 
which could only be spent once. 14 Amyntas, and his representative Alexander, evidently 
saw the future of Greece at the moment of her wedding as being in Persian hands. 15 
This leads us to take up a further point. Errington closes his remarks upon Alexander's 
behaviour during the Persian wars with the words "the Philhellene Alexander was thus 
the first European Greek ruler of importance to betray the Greek cause. " (p143). 
Scaife 16 goes further yet than Errington by concluding: 
Herodotus portrays in Alexander a leader whose cultural marginality presented a 
stark choice between heroic resistance and compromise. While the king could 
prove his Hellenism in a genealogical sense to the satisfaction of Herodotus and 
the Olympic judges, he did not support that heritage in a consistent, dependable 
manner. (p137) 
We might summarise by saying that there is a sense of negativity from modem scholars 
towards Alexander's medism, born, perhaps, from Herodotus' implied criticisms of the 
medising Greeks and fuelled by centuries' worth of preconceptions over collaboration 
of one sort or another. But ought we really to take Herodotus' prejudice on board so 
unquestioningly? Should we really see only duplicity beneath Alexander's submission 
to Persia and his attempts to conceal his medism. with tales such as that of the murder of 
the envoys? 
The figures which Herodotus gives for the size of the Persian forces which invaded 
Greece have been widely doubted as inaccurate and exaggerated, and yet there is no 
doubt that both that under Darius and that under Xerxes were enormous and could 
easily have overrun Macedon should its kings not have complied. There is little of 
"heroic resistance" in the sacrifice of one's population in the name of a cause which is 
not one's own. It must surely have looked, to the informed observer, as if Persia had the 
upper hand and was by far the most likely to win the coming struggle against the 
Greeks. This point is proved by the marriage of Gygaea - the Macedonian royal family 
12 2000 
13 For discussion of the application of the same institution to this other sibling, see below. 
14 For discussion of Gygaea's marriage, see Badian's article for some interesting suggestions regarding Cý C, t: 'C) -- Z: ) this and the marria(ye of the other siblina. His suooestions are further discussed below. See also our C) CIC) 
appendix on the topic of political marriage in Macedon. C' 
15 Although this last point ought perhaps to be considered in contrast and conjunction with the fact that, L- C) 
althou-h a marriage bond seems likely to have been designed to ensure the longevity of an alliance in real 1-: 1 V Zý 
terms it did not do so, as the reign of Philip was later to prove several times over. 
16 1989. 
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evidently believed that they were allying with what was most likely to be the winning 
si cle. 
On the whole it seems that, for a Macedonian king who was concerned with the 
preservation of his kingdom, submission to Persia really represented the on ly option. 
There would have been little hope of a Greek force being sent to the aid of Macedon in 
resistance, and alone it stood no chance of success. 17 The patriotic Macedonian king, 
then in c 512 or 11, did well to submit, as did Alexander in 492, with Mardonius at his 
borders. The type of moral judgement exemplified by Errington and Scaife derives from 
an assumption (perhaps due to the inherent admiration for Greek culture common to 
most classicists) that the Greek cause was the just cause, and a failure to support it was 
somehow indicative of moral degeneracy. It is unlikely that Alexander of Macedon felt 
himself to be under any such cultural pressure. 
There is something of a chronological gap in Herodotus' narrative at this point. 
Herodotus 5.94 tells us that on Hippias' expulsion from Athens, he was offered 
Anthemus in the Chalcidice by Amyntas (an episode to which we shall return below) 
and this is the last we hear of Amyntas from Herodotus. 18 We may assume that at some 
point during the following period, Alexander acceded to the throne. 
The next appearance of Macedon in Herodotus' text is at 6.44, during the Thracian 
campaign of Mardonius in 492. 
, rob, co 6 F- rco TIF, ý&) M(XICF-80V(X; TCP o\q 'roicyl -0 TE ('X pX0 lu (Y t 501, )Xol)q 
TcPOCTF, lc, rlj(T(XVTu 'rot yocp F-Vroq M(XICF-60VO)V E'-'OVF-(X lt('XVr(X CY(pt lq"6'fl ýV 
ci 'Olroxclpla 7E70VOT(X. 
... next, their land army added the Macedonians to the slaves they had already; for all the nations nearer to them than Macedonia had been made subject to 
Persia ere this. 
This reference is at first confusing, because, as we argued above, it seems likely that 
Macedon first submitted to Persia in c 512 or 11. We have since received no notification 
of its rebellion from Persian rule. Why then did it need to be added once again to the 
Persian subjects? 
Hammond simply rejects this episode as never having happened: 
There is no ground for supposing that Macedon ever rebelled and broke away 
from Persia and was subsequently reduced by Mardonius (as is implied in Hdt 
6.44); for Persia gave short shrift to rebels and Xerxes would not have extended 
the realm of Alexander (Justin 7.4.119) if Alexander had been a rebel. (p99) 
17 Especially as it seems that Thessaly, or at least portions of it, had medised too - see Westlake 1936 on 
this subject, which is further discussed below. 
18 We shall return to a theory regarding the likely development of foreign policy during this t: ) tý L- Cý 
chronological hiatus below. See above, note 8, for the evidence from Justin often used to date the 4-1 
accession of Alexander to c 498. The assumed connection between the Ionian revolt and Bubares' 
departure is unsupported by ancient evidence, and Nlexander could in fact have taken the throne at any 
time after 506. 
19 Discussed below. 
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Hammond's wording is misleading here. Herodotus does not "imply" that Macedon was 
reduced by Mardonjus - he states that it was. This being the case it seems clear that 
relations between Macedon and Persia had undergone some sort of change. 20 It is 
frustrating that Herodotus does not inform us of it, but certain elements allow us to 
build at least a theoretical skeleton of the development of foreign policy during this 
time. 
There is no denying that certain changes had taken place within both states which may 
have affected foreign affairs. The accession of Alexander I to the throne may have 
prompted some need to renew the pledge to Persia, while the Ionian revolt had occupied 
Persian attention and may conceivably have afforded the opportunity for Macedon to 
reject Persian rule. Gerolymatos (1986) in a brief but thought provoking article suggests 
that this period is the most likely date for the proxenia (spoken of by Herodotus at 
8.136. ) awarded to Alexander by Athens. If we accept this theory, we might hesitantly 
conclude that the distraction of the Ionian revolt occupied Persian attention to such a 
degree that Alexander was able to exploit the situation to improve his trade relations 
with southern Greece, specifically Athen S. 2 ' The evidence on this period is, however, 
inconclusive, and both this period as a whole and the resubmission must remain rather 
hazy in our concept of foreign policy at this point. Some necessity for resubmission, 
whether merely the accession of a new king or, more seriously, a tendency towards 
22 Athens, may be assumed, and the resubmission itself seems certain . Taking the 
numismatic evidence into account, we might suggest that Alexander, having acceded at 
some point between 506 and 498, had observed that the war situation, combined with a 
more relaxed attitude from Persia regarding any of its allies who were not openly in 
2' revolt, offered him an opportunity to trade with Athens. ' This proxenia, taken 
alongside the resubmission to Persia, offers us a precious insight into his foreign policy 
at this point. It is one of the few glimpses we have of a desire to foster relations with 
Greece actually during the period of the Persian wars, as opposed to a redrawing of 
events after the fact as represented by several episodes in Herodotus, for instance the 
murder of the envoys. 
We might, then, sketch in a further layer to our portrait of Alexander's philhellenism. 
Rather than simply a postfactum shading of unequivocally medising behaviour, we can 
in fact discern a genuine desire to promote intimacy with Greece during the time of the 
Persian Wars, below a simultaneous compliance with Persia. Whether this desire came 
from an ideological inclination towards the Greek cause, or from a more pragmatic 
desire to keep a finger in each pie and simultaneously exploit the opportunity to 
increase Macedonian revenue, or a combination of both, we can hardly state with any 
certainty, but clearly a range of benefits for Macedon and its king would accrue . 
24 
20 In addition, the evidence of Justin cited here is very doubtful - see below. 21 This theory is supported by the numismatic evidence for this period, discussed in the second half of this 
chapter. 
22 See Errington for the theory that this was Macedon's first and only submission, discussed above, and C, Badian, for an unsupported theory that the son of Gygaea and Bubares was intended as heir to the Z_- 
Macedonian throne but was demoted to a remote Phrygian satrapy because of a Macedonian rebellion 
durinR the Ionian revolt. The main flaw in Badian's araument here is the assertion that Macedon was a 
vital area for Persia - its size and location in fact made it peripheral and it is no surprise to find Gygaea's 
son in a fairly minor role as an adult. 
2' See below for a further discussion of this 
24 Gerolymatos' date for the proxenia is accepted here as Alexander was still an ally of Persia in 479, 
precluding proxenia with Athens after his resubmission and up to this date, and because there are Cý 
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Alexander's resubmission was, no doubt, a prudent move in view of Mardonius' 
presence in Thrace. 
The second appearance of Alexander I in person in Herodotus' narrative is somewhat 
less explosive than his first, the murder of the envoys, but contributes to the same 
political agenda. Herodotus 7.172 finds the Thessalians who had not willingly accepted 
Persian suzerainty 25 sending representatives to the Greek council at the isthmus, asking 
for assistance in defending the pass at Tempe. 26 Herodotus relates how the Greeks 
agreed to the plan to defend the pass and had occupied it with 10,000 hoplites with 
support from some Thessallan cavalry. However, it was not long before they received 
some intelligence which persuaded them to withdraw: 
I/ 'Ake46v6polo rob 'Ag'Ovreco C'Ap O\q Unt-K%tEvOt 7(XP (MEkOt TcC(P(x 
3 M(X-KE60VOq (51)VFPO1AF-10OV CT(pt ('XT1(XkVX(Y(7F-GO(XI ý016F'- ýtF-VOVT(Xq F-V Til 
F-(TpOkfi K(XT(XTCOCTTjOýV(Xt ^OltO\ TOb (YTP(XTOi) TOb ETROV'r0q, C7-%L(XtVOVrE; ro 
TCkfiOO; TE Týq GTP(Vrlý; KOCt\ 'r(\X; VE'-(X; ' (1); 5F\, 0-'O'rOt' mpt T(XOT(X 
(TA)VF, POlAElL)Ov (XP'q(y'u(\x 7(\XP E'-80KEOV Gl)ýLPOIAEUEM K(Xt CRPI F, 1')VOO; 
E(P(X, -'Co 
'OOVTO. AOKE- (X 11 fiV TO tvF E(I)V 0 MCCKF, 8(OV), F, 7CFt 'EtV 8E ýWt, ' pp(06t 
TIFAOOV, (0; F'llrll')OOVTO K(Xt ('X'ik7jV EOb(Y(XV E-'CYPOkT\JV E-'; E)F-(TCT(XkO^\O; K(XT(\X TI)V 
I/ (XV(J) M(XKF, 6OVtIIV 8t(X rIFPP(XIP6)V K(XT(\X IFOVVOV 7EOkIV, Tý ItEp 81' Kcd t 
'P(xkF- ' (5, u p ocr t 2: 7 'p 4ao. K(xr(xpccvrF,; 6 F\, oti "Ekkilve; E'-n\t rc\cq v F'- aq Ea F- 11 11 71 -F- 
ICY(f) F-71OPF-1) E-; 'rov ov. on, ov'ro 6 '100ýt' 
Messengers came from Alexander son of Amyntas, the Macedonian, counselling 
them to depart and not abide there to be trodden under foot of the invading host; 
whereby the message signifed the mulitude of the army, and the ships. Thus 
admonished by the messengers (as they thought that the advice was good and 
that the Macedonian meant well by them) the Greeks followed their counsel. But 
to my thinking what persuaded them was fear, since they were informed that 
there was another pass leading into Thessaly by the hill country of Macedonia 
through the country of the Perrhaebi, near the town of Gonnus; which indeed 
was the way whereby Xerxes' army descended on Thessaly. So the Greeks went 
down to their ships and made their way back to the isthmus. (7.173-4) 
indications that his relationship with Athens deteriorated towards the end of his reign, discussed below. Z: - 
The period immediately following his accession and prior to his resubmission therefore seems the most 
likely. 
25 On this issue, alone, with several others which we shall be considering, see Westlake 1936, 
unchallenged as the definitive study of Thessaly during the Persian wars. In part of it, he argues that z: 1 Zý C) 
while the Alcuadae freely submitted to Persia - as in fact is openly stated by Herodotus and accepted by 
this thesis - their attitude was not representative of the full spectrum of Thessalian public opinion, and it 
was an opposing faction who sent to the isthmus. See Westlake ppl. 6-18. C) 
26 1 am unconvinced by Robertson's argument (Robertson 1976 pp. 101f) that Damastes of Sigeum's 
version (FGrH 5 F4) should be preferred to that of Herodotus. Using Darnastes, Robertson suggests that 
we ought to replace 'Tempe' in Herodotus' text with Heracleium, just across the border in Macedon. 
Robertson later suggests that "it is very doubtful whether Heraclelum and the stretch of coast immediately 
north of the Peneus mouth belong to Macedon in 480, a time when Thessaly was strong and Macedon t: D 4D 
was weak", but this is clearly an unsupported assumption, the logic of which could suggest that most of zD C) 
Macedon could have been in Thessalian hands. Had a Greek abandonment of a Macedonian post been a 
possible reason for Alexander to submit to Persia, we may rest assured that he would have exploited this 
excuse to the full for its propaganda value. In addition, whether we accept the chronology suggested by Z: ) C. Cl Z-- 
Badian which has Macedon submitting to Persia in c 512 or II or that suggested by Errington, which Cý Z-- 2n 
would date it to 492, there is no escaping the fact that by the time of the standoff at Tempe in 480, 
Macedon was, and in all probability had been for the last 30 years, a Persian ally. No general in his right Z-- L- 
mind would plan such a strategically delicate manoeuvre in what was effectively enemy territory. 
28 
Westlake's aricle of 1936 is the best study of this episode. He asserts that portions of 
Thessaly had medised and suggests, on the basis of the evidence of a letter of 
Speusippus to Phili P27 that the contents of Alexander's message was not, in fact, the 
enormous size of the force (which as he points out "would supply a more cogent reason 
for holding the defile than evacuating it.,, (p 18))28 but notification of the medism of the 
Aleuadae- This is a most convincing theory. Given that the Aleuadae were the ruling 
family of Larissa -a town located to the south of Tempe - this intelligence would have 
alerted the Greeks to the possibility of the pass actually being closed behind them. 
Certainly this was a danger too grave to be risked, even if the abandonment of Tempe 
meant the surrender of Thessal Y. 29 
However, whether or not we accept Westlake on the contents of the message to the 
Greeks, the implications of Alexander's actions here had major repercussions for the 
wellbeing of Macedon in the context of this, the latest Persian invasion. Firstly, the 
success of his message had saved Xerxes the fight for Thessaly, effectively clearing 
away any resistance all the way down to Then-nopylae. From a Persian point of view, 
their ally the Macedonian king (who, evidently, was actually marching with them) had 
served them well. Secondly, whatever the contents of Alexander's message, but 
especially if we follow Westlake, there is no denying that from a Greek point of view, 
there was every reason to regard Alexander as a benefactor. If he had indeed pointed out 
the treachery of Larissa, then he had saved the Greek force from what could only have 
been a massacre. He had thus killed two birds with one stone, facilitating the Persian 
war effort and giving the Greeks reason to feel indebted to him. Robertson, in 1976, 
was the first to point out that there was a Macedonian aspect too. 
We can easily imagine Alexander's dismay when the Greek allies resolved on 
the defence of Lower Olympus. A Persian army bottled up in the Pierian plain 
would soon exhaust the resources of his little kingdom. (pl IS) 
This argument immediately brings the final and perhaps most important aspect of this 
episode into sharp focus. Alexander, posing as pro Persian and simultaneously pro 
Greek, was actually taking a step which was fundamental to the survival of his own 
country, whilst at the same time augmenting his image with both sides of the struggle. 
We cannot but admire his sleight of hand. FEs intervention was a truly mastery stroke, 
an act of self interest with a veneer of co-operation with the Persians and friendship for 
the Greeks. 
Perhaps the most baffling of Alexander's actions in Herodotus is that which is related at 
8.34: 
27 Epist. Socrat 30.3 
28 It is also likely that the Greeks would already have been made aware of the size of the Persian force by 
s 'es, see Herodotus 7.146-7. For the use of espionage in the ancient world see Starr 1974. 2PI Z: I See Westlake pp18-21 and Gomme's excellent discussion of 1933 (especially pp 16-20) which argues, tl 
on the basis of our knowledue of the desian of triremes from various ancient sources, that every fighting C, Z-- 0 
naval force required a friendly shore nearby so that it could rest and feed its men, as there was no room 
for quarters nor food stores on board. This consideration, he states (ppl9f), went yet further towards 
rendering Tempe an unsuitable position for the Greek force to occupy, as Thessaly was not secure and 
thus no such support would be available. 
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(X To' 4F-v nkF-iauov Kcc't Öi)vccT(ý, u(x'Uov TA CYTP(DCT0b " Wx cc"-)'c6) 
0ý' 'AO'vaý ýCYýßeckE ýý Botü), co bý, ýý 7ýv T'V 'OPX04F-vi nopF-, o 4F-VOV En 11 9 F- F- 11) 9 11 l(OV. 
BOIÜ)-C(ý)V U- 7ZCXV TO' n2, ýOOý TOCý 59 nOklý (X1, )'7(i)V (XVÖPF-ý 
m(X-KF-80VF-ý 
81(X'CF-'uoc"[gF'-vot E"cyo)ýov, Wro, 'AXF-ý()CvÖpol) ('Xn0nF-ýt(pOE'-VTF-ý* F'-'(Ycoýov ÖE zýÖF-, 
Öýkov ßo-OX0, ýtF-Vot'notF, -F-tv E-EF-Pýin Öu-u -Cc'c 
m1j80)v BOIO)'uoi gpoveotF-v. 
The greater and stronger part of the host marched with Xerxes himself towards 
Athens and broke into the territory of Orchomenus in Boeotla. Now the whole 
people of Boeotia took the Persian part, and men of Macedonia sent by 
Alexander safeguarded their towns, each in his appointed place; the reason of 
the safeguarding being, that Xerxes might understand the Boeotians to be on the 
Persian side. 
One gets a frustrating feeling here that the information which might have enabled us to 
understand what was going on has been omitted somehow from the narrative. Ought we 
to infer that Macedonian troops, acting on Persian orders, actually invested certain 
Boeotian towns? Are we witnessing another philhellenic sanitization of events? Or 
might we conclude that some form of agreement had been made between Alexander 
and these towns which somehow entailed his promoting their cause and safeguarding 
them when the invasions came? Sadly, our information here is too scant to allow us to 
draw any firm conclusions on this episode - it must remain amongst the more shadowy 
of Alexander's appearances in the text. 30 
8.136 ff tells us the story of Alexander's mission to Athens on behalf of Mardonlus, and 
it follows a similar theme of claims of dual affiliation to both the Persian and the Greek 
causes as the events at Tempe. 31 While there is no doubt that Alexander's presence in 
Athens is very much under Persian auspices, there is an implicit claim to a secret 
allegiance to the Greek cause in the personal message which he has been asked by 
Mardonius to convey: 
1, ) EE 1-) 'E, yc'o ÖF- nFp't ýtF-v ei)votii-lý T% npo'ý eý eýtýeo ýe01b)allý oi &v kýýco ýo b 
, y(Xp (Xv Vi)V 7upcüTov e_Kýt(XootCF-l, ITPOGXP-qt, ý0) öE 'L)ýtE-0)v nF-10F-G0(XI 
Mccpäovi(o. 'EvopF'-co y(xp logiv o-oK o-uotcyt TF- eaoýtütvotat TO'V n(, xv, [(x XPOVOV 
nokF-ýLF-F-IV (xp F-V(OP(»v TO-L)TO F-V 1, )g1v, 0-0-K (XV KOTF- cý 1)ýtEaý '-SpýIn y ýkoov F, -, XO)v koyouý Tol)a5p-)- Kat' -y('Xp 81-Wapý l)nF'-p (, xv0p(oluov 11 ß(xGtx£-, oý 
E(: yTt KM XF-tp Hv wv pl (xi, ), ztx(x oýtoko7-qcy-qTe, ýtey('xk(x 
@F' Xouat, 8F-týt(Xt ev npoTF-IV0V, Tcov Fit Ot(Yt oýIOXO-YF-F-IV E Ve) onep 1)ýte«)V 
Tplß(P TE g(/xxtcyT(X Ot"Kllýt£-'V(OV Vi)v (Y1)ýL4(, XX(üv IU()CV'T(OV ettF-t TF- (POF-tPoýtF'-V(OV 
1) ýý(xipezö ?-D 'Ak; £ä nFiOF-cOe- ýto vcov, F- t OV Tt ýLETCCIxýLI0V VIV 'tI1V F-'KTTJýtFVCOV. (X 1 
nokxo£) -YC\cp upv (, gla 'C(Xi)'Z(X, Ft' ß(XcytxF-1)ý -YF- 0 ýtE, --yaý ýl01)volat 14tiv 
'EX; ýAvcov c('Xý CCýt(xpr('Xäccý 67actiý £', OF'-XF-t (piXoý yp-vF'-CYO(xi 
30 How and Wells opt for the latter option, stating that "the presence of the Macedonian agents was V) Z: ) 
intended to prove the Medism of the Boeotians, and thus to save them from molestation" (p245) 
However, they offer no explanation as to how this conclusion was reached. Badian pp117 f notes this 
episode but fails to reach a conclusion on it. Hammond and Borza both simply omit it. Inconclusiveness 
therefore pervades modern writing on this episode. 
31 Gerolymatos points out (pp75 and 6) that Herodotus specifically mentions Alexander's proxenia as a 
reason for his being chosen as envoy, thus leading us to suppose that the proxenia ought to pre-date this 
embassy. 
1 
For my own part I will say nothing of the goodwill that I have towards you, for 
it would not be the first that you have heard of that; but I entreat You to follow 
Mardonius' counsel. Well I see that you will not have the power to wage war 
against Xerxes for ever; did I see such power in you, I had never come to you 
with such language as this; for the king's might is greater than human and his 
arm is long. If therefore you will not straightway agree with them, when the 
conditions which they offer you, whereon they are ready to agree, are so great, I 
fear what may befall you; for of all of the allies you dwell most in the very path 
of the war, and you alone will never escape destruction, your country being 
marked out for a battlefield. (8.140) 
We must recall, of course, that the text we have here is not an actual record of the 
speech given by Alexander, but that which Herodotus has given him. Its contents, 
however, perfectly support the duality of the persona of Alexander presented throughout 
The Histories. The tone of this more personal message is conspiratorial - it suggests that 
Alexander, out of "goodwill', is offering extra information and advice. However, his 
own advice to the Athenians is in essence a summary of that from Mardonius. Nor is 
this similarity clear only to modem eyes - the Athenians, in their formal rejection of 
Mardonius' proposal, add a threat to Alexander himself: 
111) ce Toý) x0t7[Oi) Xo'YO', )ý E, )C(J)v Totoi)c8F- ýu9' £'-Tct(paivro 'AGqvcciotot, plÖF'- 
ÖOKE-, (»v xpllaT(X 1. )IUO")P7F-F-iv (, xoe-lRt(5'C(X EpöF-tv n(XP(X, tVF-F-- 0,1) ap EYF- 
ßol)koýLF-0(X 0^0,8F\-v c"cXccpt npo'ý 'AOilv(xt'o)v n(XOFiv, F-OVT(X itpO4F-IVOV TE KM 
(Pt'9ýov. 
To you we say, come no more to Athenians with such a plea, nor under the 
semblance of rendering us a service counsel us to do wickedly; for we would not 
that you who are our friend and protector should suffer any harm at Athenian 
hands. (8.143) 
The Athenians, then, are unconvinced by Alexander's attempts at friendly persuasion, 
as perhaps we ought to be too, because although the protrayal of friendly advice may 
give an impression of philhellenism, the main purpose being served here was Persian. 
The impact, then, of this particular episode as a piece of pro Macedonian propaganda is 
weakened by Alexander's obviously pro- Persian position. The veneer of philhellenism 
here is thus uneffective as a disguise for a pro Persian agenda. It is also interesting to 
note that Alexander was now quite evidently a trusted ally of Persia, for the mission was 
an important one and not something that would have been entrusted to a messenger of 
uncertain loyalty. As with all of Herodotus' narratives on Alexander, both the facts 
related and the narrative slant placed upon them are of value here. They enable us in 
this case to discern a firm skeleton of facts regarding the profundity of Macedon's 
connection to Persia below the fleshing out of this story with philhellenic padding. Both 
tendencies conform to our conclusions up to this point regarding both Alexander's 
actual activites and the concern for good opinion in Greece which the nature of their 
reporting convey. 
The last of Alexander's appearances in Herodotus bears some similarity to the Tempe 
episode, in that it occurs before a battle, this time the battle of Plataea. Again, similar 
threads of actual Persian affiliation - for Alexander is after all undeniably a part of the 
Persian camp - coinciding with the strong Greek sympathies which are professed, 
emercye. Having crossed to the Greek lines in the dead of night, Alexander relates It) - 
31 
intelligence regarding Mardonius' lack of provisions and his plans for a dawn attack, 
asserts his commitment to the Greek cause, and ends his speech with the words: 
"Hv öe' ugiv o 7cokF-ýtoý böe K(xcc\c voov ýtvT1(YOýval Ttvcc Xpll 'KCCI 
4t9,0 FUF-lAep(botoý nF'-p-t, öý 'E; ý; ýlivcov F-ivF-Kcc F'-'p70v lz(xp('Xßoi^ý, ov 
EP7(X(Jýtccl lolzo TIPOOI)ýttilý, 9'0F'-Xcov i. )ýtiv 511. XCOG(XI TI)v 81(XVOI()CV 
'cýV M(Xpöovtol, ), 't'V(X p\I c7utnzcywcyt 114tiv ot' ß(, xpß(Xpot 
npc)EYÖF-KoýtF-voiGt Ko). Eip Öe 'AX£'-ý(xv8poý 0 MocKF-Ö(ov. 
If this war end as you would wish then must you take thought how to save me 
too from slavery, who of my zeal have done so desperate a deed as this for the 
cause of Hellas, in my desire to declare to you Mardonius' intent, that so the 
foreigners may not fall upon you suddenly ere you expect them. I that speak am 
Alexander the Macedonian. (9.45) 
The desire to display commitment to the signature Greek concept - freedom - is evident 
in Alexander's speech. As a piece of propaganda to be aimed at Greece, this episode is 
priceless. Alexander is represented as risking life and limb in this heroic midnight 
escapade, with only the Greek cause at heart. It has, however, like the story of the 
murder of the envoys, met with incredulity in modem scholarship. Borza summarises 
the objections: 
The story is suspect on several grounds, including the commonsensical 
unlikelihood of the king of Macedon himself making his way across uncertain 
ground at night, the speech's Greek sentiments about patriotism and freedom, 
and the fact that there is no response from the the Athenian side ( the speech is a 
monologue), moreover, the story does not square with the description of the 
opening of the battle (9.47-8): at dawn - at the very moment that Mardonius was 
supposed to attack - the Greeks began shifting battalions to different positions 
on the field, hardly a sound manoeuvre in the face of an imminent offensive ... 
the whole story is just short of absurd. (pI 10) 
Whilst each of these point may be debatable, Borza's argument here fails to apprehend 
the full significance of Herodotus' narrative. He rightly notes the "Greek sentiments" of 
Alexander's speech, but does not consider why such sentiments surface at just this 
moment in the mouth of the Macedonian king. Whether or not the details of the episode 
are true, its purpose is clear - here, at a great moment of victory for the Greek cause in 
The Histories, a Macedonian voice is added to the story, claiming affiliation to what 
the Greeks themselves were fighting for. In propaganda terms, this is a statement as 
strong as that in which Alexander claimed Greek nationality, or asserted that, so 
affronted was he by Persian customs, he had the seven envoys killed. This is a claim 
indeed to philhellenism, made as it is at the moment of victory for the Greek cause. 
Such, then, are Alexander's appearances in Herodotus. Lastly, before we move on to 
examine the further evidence on Alexander's reign, we nught pause to consider how 
much weight Alexander's presentation as a philhellenic figue in Herodotus would have 
carried in the Greek world. Because his slim presence within the bulk of Herodotus' 
narrative is the closest thing we have to a narrative history of his reign, it is tempting to 
see Herodotus' presentation of him as definitive, equal to the image of Alexander of 
Macedon which might have been held by the average contemporary Athenian. This was 
unlikely to have been so, however. How widely known Herodotus' histories were is an 
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unanswerable question to the modem historian. Alexander's portrait there was, 
however, aimed at the Greek populace and represents the ultimate testimony to his 
claims of phihellenism in spite of his evident medism, An examination of other 
evidence continues these themes of dual allegiance, and reveals a bedrock of 
Macedonian self interest below the reality of Macedon's submission to Persia and the 
philhellenic tendencies such as they are discernable in Herodotus. 
Alexander the Macedonian 
While Alexander's policy towards each of the opposing sides of the Persian wars was 
conciliatory, his attitude towards neighbouring states can only be thought of as 
aggressive. Thucydides 2.99 informs us of the boundaries of Macedon during the reign 
of Perdiccas, son of Alexander: 
Tcov 7(xp M(xKeöov(ov etial Kai AL)7xrlcyT(xi Km 'E9ýtýtt(i)T(xt Kaj o"cý, X(X F- v "0 
F-n(XV(OOF, v, (, x\ ýl, )gýt(XX(X 4EV F-CYTI '101), cotý KM WEIJKOCC, ßoccytxF-i(xý 5' F, -, XF-t 
K(XO' (X'L)TC'C. TI1V 8p\- IECCPC\( 0('xkcccyaccv vi)v M(x-KF-Öoviccv 'AXE'-ýccvÖpoý o 
1-IF-p8'tKKoý) n(xTilp K(xu ot izpo7ovoi oci, ), roÜ, TqýtF-vt'Öoct co\ ('xpy, (xiov ovcsý Eý 
"Ap, yol, )ý, npCorot £-'-KTi'Icy(xvTo Km e'-ß(xcyiXF--oa(xv ('xv(xcyTllcy(xvTF-ý ýtccXll Z-K ýLFv 
rItzpiaý HiF-Paý, 01 -0(5-CF-Pov -ono TO rl(, x7-Y()ctov nF-P(xv 1, upi)1.10voý o')'KTICY(XV 
(1)(, X7PIIT(X KM ('X'ý. XCC X(t)PI/(x K(Xt\ F'-TI K(Xt\ VüV FIIF-ptKo\g Ko; ýnoý K(Xý, eic(xt 11 
c Ulro, 'TCO rl(Xy7(Xt'(1) npo, ý 0(, XX(XG(: Y(xv 71j, F'-K 8F- 'cýý Burrt, (xý K(XXOI)ýtF, -vTlý 
BO'[Ttccto")ý, ot VI)V %tOpol X(XXKI8E(ov oiKoi), atv. 'cýý be rlectoviaý n(XP(, x TU 
Aýto\v noT(xýtov aTF-vT1v Ttvcc K(x0ijKol. )(Y(xv (xvü)OF-v ýtEXpt FleUilý iccci 
0aUxaailý F'-KTila(xvTo, Km nF-pccv 'Aýtoi)' ýtF-'Xpt Dupi-)ýtovoý Týv M-o78ovt'(xv 
K(xkouýte', vilv 'HÖCov(xý vF-ýtov-c(xt. CCVFcyTllcy(xv öE KM EK TTlý 
vi)v lopötiaý Kccko-oýt£-'v-qý 'Eop8o1, )ý, ('t)v ot' ýLEV noý. XO\t F, -(po(, XPqa(xv, ßp(Xxl) ÖE'- Tt CCIOTCOV nEpt' 'K(XT(PKIIT(Xt, -K(X'l F'-ý 'Aý, ýtconmý "AXýtcon(xý. 
F--KP(X'UIICY(XV ÖF\- K(X\t TCDV C"CXXO)V F-OVG)V Oti MCC'KF-ÖOVF-ý 0'OTOI, (X K(X\t VV Ei-' 1 
F-7,01)Gt, 'Tov 'UF- 'AvOF-ýtoüvu(x Kat\ Fpll(: YTCOVt'(XV -KCCt' BtG(XXC't(XV 'K(Xt\ 
M(X-KF-ÖOVWV (XI)'TCOV 7co; ý; ýýV. To' 89 ýl4tIZUV MCCKF-ÖOVt'(X K(XXFiTcct, Kat 
I-IF-pÖtKK(xý 'Aý, F-ý(xv8po-o ß(xcYtXF-, oý (xI), rCov fiv O'TF- liT(UKliý 
The Macedonian race includes also the Lyncestians, the Elimlotes, and other 
tribes of the upper country, which, though in alliance with the nearer 
Macedonians and subject to them, have kings of their own: but the country by 
the sea which is now called Macedonia, was first acquired and made their 
kingdom by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his forefathers, who were 
originally the Temenidae from Argos. They defeated and expelled from Pieria 
the Pierans, who afterwards took up their abode in Phagres and other places at 
the foot of Mount Pangaeus beyond the Strymon ( and even to this day the 
district at the foot of Mount Pangaeus towards the sea is called the Pieran 
Valley), and also, from the country called Bottiaea the Bottiaeans, who now 
dwell on the borders of the Chalcideans; they acquired, further, a narrow strip of 
Paeonia extending along the river Axius from the interior to Pella and the sea 
and beyond the Axius they posses the district as far as the Strymon which is 
called Mygdonia, having driven out the Edonians. Moreover they expelled from Z: ) 
the district now called Eordia the Eordians, most of whom were destroyed, but a 
small portion is still settled in the neighbourhood of Physia; and also from 
Almopla the Almopians. These Macedonians al. so made themselves masters of 
certain places, which they still hold, belonging to other tribes, namely of 
Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, as well as a large part of Macedonia proper. But I 
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the whole is now called Macedonia, and Perdiccas son of Alexander was king 
when Sitalces made his invasion. 
The information given here is very valuable to our concept of Macedon during the early 
part of the period covered by this thesis, and allows us to clearly identify a trend of 
expansion in early foreign policy. We are faced with one large obstacle, however, and 
that is that Thucydides does not specify which king made which conquest, nor 
(uncharacten sti call y) does he give us an indication of a timeframe for these even tS. 32 
Certain suggestions, however, may be made on the basis of other evidence which is 
available to us. Certain areas are referred to by Herodotus - for example, at 5.94, describing the exile of Hippias, he informs us that Amyntas offered him Anthemus. We 
might reasonably assume, then, that Anthemus was Amyntas' to offer by 506BC when 
Hippias was expelled. Anthemus being on the eastern side of the Thermaic gulf, that is, 
on the opposite side to the tract of land which contains Aegae, then the Macedonian 
capital, it is also likely that Bottiaea and either part of Mygdonia or all of it were also in 
Macedonian hands, these territoiies being the ones which constitute the headland of the 
gulf, lying between Aegae and Anthemus. 33 The conquest of the central area of 
Macedon, then, ought to predate the reign of Alexander. However, certain of the 
following conquests might be attributed to him on the basis of further evidence. 
On the subject of the western states, a scholiast on Thucydides offers us some 
interesting information. At 1.57.3, he states that Derdas, whom we know from 
Xenophon 34 to have been king of Elimea, was a cousin of Alexander's sons. This 
information requires-some mamage tie between the Macedonian royal house and that of 
Elimea to be included in our picture of relations between the two states at around this 
time . 
35 Contrary to the conclusions drawn by many modem authorS36 it is not possible to 
firmly attribute this development to the reign of either Amyntas or Alexander, but it 
must have taken place under one of them, as by the time of the reign of Perdiccas, this 
connection was but one generation distant. Marriage ties such as these usually signify 
alliance - thus, we should consider Elimea to have been added to Macedon either 
towards the end of the reign of Amyntas or at the beginning of that of Alexander. 
As Eordaea lies between Elimea and the heartland of Macedon containing Aegae, we 
might reasonably suggest that its absorption into Macedon might have predated that of 
Elimea, as Elimea would otherwise have been isolated from Aegae by unsubdued 
temtory. By the same logic, we might suppose that the inclusion of Lyncus would also 
postdate that of Eordaea. 
32 As a result of this and the impossibility of establishing the exact year of each addition to Macedonian 
territory, these conquests are not included in the chronology, given in our appendix. t: ) Z! 5 
33 8.127 supports this assumption for the Bottiaeans to some deorree - telling how that luckless people, =1 C) 
having been expelled from their homeland by the Macedonians, had resettled in Olynthus and were there 
besie0red and slaughtered by Artabazus. The elimination of this tribe dates to the early 470s, and so by t: ' tý 
this point they had already been expelled and had time to resettle. The date of the expulsion remains 
somewhat approximate, in spite of this indication, however. For Mygdonia, see discussion above. 
34 5.2.38. ff. Admittedly Xenophon refers to events of the fourth century but the name and the reference 
to the marriage connection here allow us to state with some confidence that our fifth century Derdas was Z: ) 
very probably also king of Elimea. C, 
35 On this point, see the appendix to Badian's article of 1994, which contains a clear and concise 
summary of the arguments upon this point to date, besides a well argued conclusion of his own. This Z1- C) 
conclusion is not accepted here, however, as the only thing which supports it is his previous conclusion C, 
on the marriage connection of Gyo-aea and Bubares, which was rejected as improbable above. L- Z-- 36 Hammond pp99 ff, Badian pp117 ff and Borza ppI24 f. 
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We might then suppose that, at the time of Alexander's accession, Macedonian territory 
consisted of the headland of the Thermaic gulf, including Aegae and the surrounding 
area, Bottiaea, part or all of Mygdonia, and Anthemus, that is, the Macedonian plain. At 
some point either not long before his accession or not long after it, Eordaea, Elimea, and 
Lyncus were added. Almopia, to the north east of Lyncus, was probably also included 
during this westerly and north westerly expansion. 
The conquests which we can firmly attribute to Alexander's reign, however, are those to 
the east of the land which he inherited from AmYntas, Crestonia and Bisaltia, the area 
up to the boundary noted by Thucydides, the Strymon, and along with it the Bisaltic 
silver mines. Herodotus 5.17 infon-ns us of Alexander's possession of these silver 
mines, control of which was to have a dramatic effect on his coinage. The conquest of 
Bisaltia may be firmly dated to some extent - it should probably postdate 480, as Herodotus 7.115 speaks of it in the following terms: 
, Qq 8F, 
- (, XTCo, rob 
Dupuýtovoq E-, TcopF-l, )F-, To 0/ cyTp(xroq, EvootbTa Tcpo, q 71xtol) 
6-uaýLuov E-'(Yri (xt'yi(xXo'q F'-v r6 ot'-Kil[Lr-vllv "Ap7tkov noXtv 'EU68a 
TUXPEýIltE* 6F'- 'K(Xl -q 'K(XT', )TcF-pbF- Kcc/XF-F-, rcct Btacckrtiij. 
Journeying from the Strymon, the army passed by Argilus, a Greek town 
standing on the stretch of sea coast further westwards; the temtory of which 
town and that which lies inland of it are called Bisaltia. 
Alexander, then, was probably responsible for the addition of this area to Macedon, 
although this ought not be taken as definite as other areas of Macedon (for example 
Pieria) retained their original names after the defeat or absorbption of their native 
population. 37 
We are not informed how far north into the interior Alexander's kingdom penetrated by 
the above section of Thucydides. However, when writing about the Thracian invasion, 
he writes: 
c 0 58 CTrpcvco'q TCov OpqicCov E'--K Týq Aopllpo-O E-, CTE, -PcckF- TEPCOrov ýLF,, v E'; 'UT)v 
Otkinnoij itpoTF-pov oL)(Yocv ccpXilv, Kcci F-'tkEv EL6%tEvi\jv ýtF\, v KOurcc KpOcroý, 
I-op-cl, )vt'ccv 8 F\, Kcct\ 'Ac(xX(Xvrilv lccc\t O'c?, /kcc &Vra XO)Pt'cc %tOkO7itV 8t(\x 'cl\lv 'A[tljv, ro-o (ptk'tccv 7cpoaX(opol, )vT(x rob (Dikinicol. ) uIF, -o; Tc(xpovcoq. 
The Thracian army, advancing from Doberus, invaded first the province which 
before had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm; but Gortynis, 
Atalanta and some other places capitulated voluntarily... (2.100) 
Although this passage is non specific on the subject of where Macedonian territory 
began, it is clear that the province referred to for Philip38 included the area below 
Doberus. Idomene is the northernmost Macedonian town referred to here in Sitalces' 
southward advance into the Macedonian plain, so we might reasonably assume that the 
region of the Doberus pass is likely to have been the border between Thracian and 
Macedonian territory, a narrow defile offering maximum security as a border to both 
37 For the possibility that some of Alexander's coins celebrate the conquests in this area, see Raymond 
1953 pp88 f. For Alexander's coinage in the wake of the capture of the silver mines, see Hammond 
pp84ff and below. 
38 This reference will be further discussed below, in the chapter on Perdiccas. 
35 
sides. When exactly this area came under Macedonian control, we have no way of 
knowing, but we might suggest that It is likely to have been fairly late, certainly 
postdating the conquest of Bottiaea and probably postdating also that of Crestonia, as 
there would have been no way of securing the plain containing Idomene, Eidomene, 
Taunana and Gortynia from the Crestonians to the cast. It is very likely, then, that the 
expansion to the east and to the north may be attributed to Alexander's reign. 39 
To recapitulate, then, it is possible that Alexander was responsible for the alliances 
which Thucydides describes with the tribes to the west of the Macedonian heartland, 
almost certain that we may attribute the conquest of Crestonia and Bisaltial up to the 
Strymon, to him, and very likely that we may add some northern conquests embracing 
territory up to the Doberus pass to his military achievements as well. All in all, it seems 
that the aggressive attitude to neighbouring states which had been taken by Amyntas 
was continued by Alexander. The result was that during the reigns of these two kings, 
Macedon effectively increased its territory by an enormous percentage. Besides the 
basic recognition of this policy of expansion, we might reasonably question how this 
massive acquisition of land came about. 
It seems likely that some elements of this expansion took place in the wake of the 
Persian invasions. Certainly the deportation of the Paeonians by Dan US40 must have 
made some contribution to weakening the tribes surrounding the central area of 
Macedon and thus allowed the Macedonians to simply flow into the vacuum left by the 
Paeonians. There is also some evidence that Alexander (possibly on the event of his 
resubmission to Persian suzerainty) was actually given land as a gift. Justin 7.4.1 -2 
relates: 
After Bubares left Macedonia King Amyntas died. The family ties which his son 
and successor Alexander enjoyed with Bubares not only ensured him peace in 
the time of Darius but also put him on such good terms with Xerxes that when 
the latter swept through Greece like a whirlwind he granted Alexander all the 
territoty between Mount Olympus and Mount Haemus. But Alexander extended 
his kingdom as much through his own valour as through Persian generosity. 
It is unfortunate that Justin is not a little more specific. A glance at a map shows that his 
reference to Alexander's territory embracing all between Mount Haemus and Mount 
Olympus may only be described as a sweeping generalisation. It is perfectly plain that 
Xerxes did not grant Alexander all of this territory, as much of it belonged to him 
already and other parts never in fact belonged to him at all, either before or after the 
Persian invasions. A more conservative approach might be to reject this evidence 
altogether, and yet one cannot help but wonder how it came to be included in Justin's 
narrative at all. 
If we wish to consider the possibility of land donations from Xerxes to Alexander, we 
might question what Xerxes had to give. The passage quoted above from Herodotus 
7.115, about Xerxes' army encountering the Bisaltae might be cited as evidence. This is 
the only territory that the Persian force had to cross which may not have currently 
39 Hammond's maps have been used for all the above suggestions. Hammond pp61 ff discusses 2: )ý 
Cý III is not accep Macedonian expansion, on p 65 providing a summary of 
his conclusions. His time scale ted 
here, mainly because the dates which he includes are not adequately explained. 
40 Herodotus 5.12, discussed above. 
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belonged to Macedon but which at some unspecified point later, did. The imaginative 
historian might be tempted to fill in the gaps of this narrative by having Xerxes conquer 
the Bisaltae and handing Bisaltia over to Alexander as a gift. 
This is an unsupported theory, however, and while Justin's evidence ouo7ht not to be 
rejected entirely, it is unwise to construct much in the way of theory upon it. Perhaps 
the best attitude to take here is to suggest that while Justin may conceivably have meant 
that Xerxes actually handed over land to Alexander, we have no firm evidence which 
would really allow us to assert which areas those might have been, and it is equally 
possible that Justin was writing in a broader sense, meaning that Persian generosity 
allowed Alexander to retain his kingdom, ruling as an ally of Persia, rather than 
attempting to invade. 
To return, however, to the more certain ground of the issue of expansion, the fact 
remains that Macedon increased in size during the reign of Alexander, an increase 
which must have represented an enormous military achievement for the Macedonian 
kings. To conquer these areas at all would have required an army of some strength - to hold it once conquered and to have the confidence to lengthen one's borders to such a 
huge degree must have required not ony a basic army, but a large and well organised 
one. 
This brings us to a discussion of a piece of fragmentary evidence by the ancient author 
Anaximenes, which-refers to the reorganisation of the Macedonian an-ny by a king 
called Alexander: 
F-Vilý P-V cc v. (Diý£tnntxü)v nF-pi 'AXF-ýc'cväpo-o Äi F-, YO)v ýpilat F- n F- ur a 
,1 ob ýt Ev Fvöoýoz(Xzo-üý tnnF--OF-tv GI)VF-Oiaccý Urcup01)ý 
npoEyll, YOPF-1)GF-, TO, 1)ý öF, - nxp-t, cyTol)ý Kait Toll)ý ne(obý F-iý 
0X01, ) K ec, t F- K (X 8a1. C cc t' c o'c 6' X 9ý a ('X PX C'C F- X ('0 v 
]TeýF-Talpoloý (. OVOýL(XGEV, on(üg F-K(XTF-Pot geTF-XOVTF-ý Tilý 
ß(X(51xtlcýý E, T(Xtpiotg npooloýIO'tourot 81(X'CF-X(i)CYIV o, vTeý. 
Anaximenes in his Philippica says this regarding Alexander: "Then, having 
taught the aristocracy to serve in the cavalry [ or "to nde' 41 ] he called them 
Companions. He organised the masses and the foot soldiers into lochoi and 
decads and other commands and named them "foot companions". Thus he 
intended that all, having a share in royal companionship, would be very loyal. 
(FGrH no 72 F 4)42 
This statement has given rise to some controversy in modem authors. Firstly, it is 
generally agreed that, because these divisions were already in place by the reign of 
Philip 11, the Alexander whom we might naturally think of as a military innovator, 
Alexander 111, is not a possible candidate for Anaximenes' Alexander. 43 Two 
41 See Brunt footnote 4 p151 for this interpretation, which seems the most likely. 
42 The translation here is my own. 
43 Demosthenes 2.17 is the reference generally cited to support the theory that Philip's army already Z-- 
contained these divisions. - See 
below, chapter on Philip, for a discussion of his army. Griffith is the only 
modern author I am aware of who dates these changes to Alexander III's reign, using Theopompus (FGrH 
no 115, F 348) to support this: 
0, -ý7rqI47Týý ýýo-iv on eX 7TaV70)2/ 76)11 Maxe3ý1)(ol) ei7rLkex-rol ot gero-7ot xai 
10-veo-ra7ol eýoeL)ýoogotn) -rýv ýaG-iAe'a xa; Maýoýv-ro 7reýiTaieoi. This Griffith translates as: "Theopompus says 
that picked men out of all the Macedonians, the tallest and strongest, served as the kings guards, and they Cý Z-- Z1- 
were called foot companions. " (p406). Griffith derives from this the implication that onýy these men were 
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Alexanders are therefore possible candidates for the author of these reforms - Alexander 
I or Alexander 11, great grandson of Alexander I and the elder brother of Philip H. Cý 
P. A. Brunt44 rejected either of these men as the sole author of these changes, on the 1 C) basis of one main argument: "it is virtually impossible to believe that any one of these 
kings actually promoted all the reforms mentioned" (pl5l). He goes on to build on this 
initial objection, arguing first that, because Perdiccas' army was weak and unable to 
confront Sitalces in 429 (Thucydides 2.100), these reforms ought not to be dated to the 
reign of Alexander 1, while because of the recentness of Alexander 11's reign to 
Anaximenes' writing and moreover its brevity, it cannot have been Alexander II either. 
He thus concludes: 
All that it permits us to infer is that the institutions he mentions are earlier than 
the time of Philip 11, of whose innovations he could not have been ignorant, and 
perhaps somewhat remote. (p153) 
We ought not to be so hasty in dismissing Alexander I as the author of these reforms. 
On the contrary, a reexamination of the evidence pertaining to his reign in fact reveals 
that he is by far the most likely candidate for the role of Anaximenes' military 
innovator. 
First and foremost, in support of this argument, we might cite the expansions in territory 
described above. We noted that these expansions must have represented a very 
significant military investment both in terms of initial conquests and in a longer term 
perspective of holding these territories once taken. While these expansions do not 
explicitly prove anything beyond the fact that Alexander had an army whose size, 
organisation and communications he could rely upon to maintain the immense kingdom 
he possessed by the end of his reign, a theme of military innovation would compliment 
in very practical terms the theme of expansion characteristic of his reign. 
The invasions under Sitalces, cited by Brunt pp151f, do not, in fact, imply that these 
innovations had not yet taken place. It is clear from Thucydides' account (2.98 ff) that 
Perdiccas' army was not a match for the immense force under Sitalces (Thucydides 
2.98 mentions a figure of 150,000 for the Thracian an-ny as a conservative estimate) but 
this may have been, indeed, is likely to have been primarily because of inferior numbers 
(2.100) than because of a lack of organisation. It should also be pointed out that a 
successful army requires not merely an original organisational drive but constant 
maintainance to uphold a high standard. The invasion of Sitalces ought not to be 
considered proof that no strong Macedonain army had existed in the previous reign. 
For it to have been able to face him, it would have needed constant maintenance from 
Perdiccas, which the various crises of his reign may not have allowed him to give. 
known as foot companions. What is here stated is in fact that a certain number of body guards were C) 
selected to serve directly under the king - there is no direct statement that they were singled out by name L- Zý 
from the rest of the soldiers. Demosthenes 2.17 is translated by J. H. Vince in the Loeb version as reading 
44 as for his household troops and footguards, they have indeed the name of admirable soldiers, " but the Z-- 
Greek in fact reads ", `, iý, oi xa; 
7r,. 
;j 
nzigot" which could equally be translated "his foreign soldiers and his 7re; e7agot, 
" the latter denoting 
Macedonian infantry en inasse as opposed to mercenaries. This interpretation is also accepted by A. B 
Bosworth 1973. Griffith's argument is therefore not accepted here. 
44 1976. 
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Having removed this as the main obstacle to our believing that Alexander I was the king 
referred to by Anaximenes, we might also dispense with the other candidate, Alexander 
11. His rule, being generally agreed to have been at the most three years long and 
perhaps less than one, and troubled by serious instability within the royal house which 
culminated in his assassination, seems rather less likely to have included military 
innovation than that of Alexander 1, for whom questions of territorial security and 
conquest were evidently a primary concern. One of Brunt's arguments is very relevant 
here - as quoted above, he denies that any one king could have made all of the 
innovations listed by Anaximenes. In the case of Alexander 11, with his brief and 
unstable reign, this is certainly true. 
It is much more difficult to see why such an objection might be raised in the case of 
Alexander 1. At the most conservative estimate, Alexander acceded in c 498, and 
assuming that he died immediately after his last appearance in Herodotus in 479, his 
rule spanned two decades at the very least. Surely this would have been ample time to 
institute these reforms. 
There are further pieces of evidence which guide us towards accepting the possibility 
of Alexander I being the reformer in Anaximenes. The coinage of what is often referred 
to as the Thraco-Macedonian area had always had a theme of horse types from the years 
during which it was a collection of small independent kingdoms - this theme was 
continued during the reign of Alexander 1. Under his rule, however, the horses 
represented upon them underwent a dramatic change. 45 Thucydides 2.100 tells us that 
despite the lack of any significant infantry, Perdiccas' cavalry alone were able to put up 
some resistance to Sitalces' force -a remarkable endeavour for the cavalry alone in the 
face of so large an invasion. The ability of Perdiccas' cavalry to undertake such actions 
is testimony indeed to their bravery, number and skill, and may be used to support yet 
further the theory that improvements to them had been made by Alexander (and 
supported by Perdiccas). It is tempting to infer that the change to the horses on 
Macedonian coinage first noted by Raymond, was made to celebrate improvements to 
the actual Macedonian cavalry. 46 
To recapitulate, then, the evidence which Brunt cites as disproving the theory that 
Alexander I was responsible for the innovations to the Macedonian army related by 
Anaximenes is not in fact an obstacle at all. On the contrary, because of the theme of 
conquest and expansion which is widely asserted by sources both ancient and modem to 
belong in Alexander's reign, it seems almost inescapable that some attention was paid 
by him to his army, and it would thus seem perverse to reject the evidence which we are 
given on this point by Anaximenes. This theory is supported by a possible 
interpretation of some of the numismatic evidence for Alexander I's reign. 
If we then conclude, as it seems right to do, that Alexander's reign saw an almost total 
overhaul of the army, we begin to appreciate how profound the changes of this period 
45 See Raymond 1953 pp. 108 ff for the original observation of this change and an excellent discussion of 
it. 
46 The conclusions arrived at by Raymond pp 115 ff, that the changes may have been due to a southern 
artistic influence, either in the abstract sense or in the more concrete form of a southern artist being 
employed by the royal Macedonian mint, is not accepted here, because there is no evidence of a 
contemporary refinement of horses on the coins of southern Greek states. See Ravel 1928 and Kraay 1976 
in general. 
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were. Alexander's new, vastly improved cavalry and infantry allowed him to uphold a 
consistently aggressive policy towards his neighbouring states, conquering Crestonia, 
Bisaltia, probably the northern territories up to the pass at Doberus, and maintaining the 
subjective alliance of the western states. Thanks to his dramatically successful foreign 
policy, the end of Alexander's rule saw Macedon established as the leading power of 
the north. 
It may have been Alexander's success in establishing Macedon so securely which led to 
the first cracks appearing in relations between Athens and Macedon, cracks which over 
the penod covered by this thesis were to gradually widen into the ideological divide 
which was ultimately settled on the battlefield of Chaeronaea. 
The early part of Alexander's reign had seen a growing intimacy between the two sides. 
The proxenia offered to Alexander by Athens during the early years of his reign 47 
appears to have represented a change in attitude from both sides - Alexander was 
evidently taking some steps to revise the policy instituted by his father, whose support 
48 for the tyrants is documented by his offer of Anthemus to Hippias , and find some form 
of working relationship with democratic Athens. Athens was evidently receptive to this 
change to some degree. It appears that the basis of the friendship between Athens and 
Macedon may have been trade. Raymond, ppl8ff, argues that two clearly 
distinguishable standards characterise the issues of Alexander's reign. 49 Of these, she 
notes, one conformed to the Attic weight system, that is, four of the tetradrachms issued 
by Alexander were equivalent to three of those of Athens, while the other, she states, 
was interchangeable with the Persian standard . 
50 
It is thus evident, thanks to Raymond's study, that the numismatic evidence of 
Alexander's reign reflects the trend of dual alliance which we saw throughout his 
appearances in Herodotus. We might suggest that his use of the Athenian standard 
should be associated with the years before his renewal of submission to Persia, years 
during which, it has been suggested above, he received the ng4eiyoý -re eiq <Zyeti> xal, 
51 
eueeT,, TVý from Athens which we learn of from Herodotus 8.136. Of these two 
standards the Persian one need not, perhaps, surprise us, given that Persia was where 
Alexander's formal allegiance lay. This, additionally, was the standard to which 
Thessaly was currently confon-ning. 52 The use of the standard, then, would allow trade 
with both his Persian allies and his Greek neighbours to the south. 
His use of the Athenian standard was a far less obvious choice. We might theorise that 
during the hiatus between the two Persian expeditions, after the Athenian defeat of the 
47 See above and Gerolymatos 1986. 
48 Herodotus 5.94 and above. 
49This use of two standards is also noted by Kraay p142, who, rather than attempting to discern any 
historical significance behind it, contents himself with the observation that the use of a dual standard was 
44 1ng 5FUZZI For her discussion of this, see Raymond pp 20 ff, and the evidence cited by her in support of this 
argument. 
51 Some modem authors (See for example Borza p 113 and Errington p 13) hold that the 
reason for this honorary title was his supplying timber to Athens during the 
Thernistoclean ship building programme at Athens. This is by no means an unlikely 
suggestion, but it is entirely unsupported by ancient evidence. 
52 Kraay pp 115 ff and Westlake 1936 pp 11 ff. 
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Persian force at Marathon, Alexander may have sensed a chan(: Ye in the political climate, Z- 
and hedged his bets by establishing a relationship with Athens. 
In the wake of the defeat of Persia, however, and taking the massive Increase in 
Macedonian presence, both in sheer size and in military force into account, it seems that 
some threat was perceived by Athens from Alexander. It was Hammond who first 
identified the capture of the site of Amphipolis by Alexander ([D]12.20-21) and that of 
Eion by Athens (Plutarch Cinion 7.1-3) as "rival attempts to control the exit of the 
Strymon basin" (p102). Although Hammond does not include this point, we might add 
to this theory the evidence from Plutarch that Athens might have had in mind a more 
sinister motive for her interest in this region. Later in his Life of Cimon, Plutarch relates 
how that commander subdued Thasos, and on how this capture was viewed in Athens, 
he has this to say: 
E-KdOCV 8F- pq8t(, Oq E-'7rjpýV(Xj M(xICF-8oVt'(Xg 'K(XI nOXXT\JV CC7COTFqLcGOCCt 
b X(5-LkF-O) n(XP(X(77, OV Wq E601CEI, ýtlj OF-XTI(Y(X; (XtTI(XV E7-'(5XF, &OPOIS I)n \0 TO P( 'q 
'AXF, ý&v6polo mqumndaffixt, Kcct\ 8t'Kilv F", (pi)7F- r6v EXOp6v (71, )Grc'cv'To)v E-7n' 
From this base [i. e. Thasos] he had a good opportunity, it was thought, to invade 
Macedonia and cut off a great part of it, and because he would not consent to do 
it, he was accused of having been bribed to this position by King Alexander, and 
was actually prosecuted, his enemies forming a coalition against him. (14.3-4)53 
We hear nothing of this rift from Thucydides, and yet we have no reason to doubt the 
information of Plutarch on Cimon (who was, it appears, acquitted from this charge, 
15.1). It seems likely that the perceived threat was to Athens' Achilles heel, the com 
route from the Bosphorus, the security of which was dependent upon Athenian 
superiority over the sea and secure footholds in the coastal region along it. Macedon's 
struggle to resist the establishment of such footholds and Athenian domination in the 
area were to characterise the relationship between Athens and Macedon for the 
following decades. 
It appears, then, that Alexander's highly successful military innovations and aggressions 
towards his northern neighbours had been something of a double edged sword for 
Macedon. While it had fostered the development of a strong army and allowed 
territorial expansion, it had also attracted the aggression of Athens, consistently a thorn 
in the side of every Macedonian king from Perdiccas onwards. 
To conclude, then, we might say that our study has identified the three different 
personae of Alexander I in the narrative of Herodotus and amongst the other evidence 
of his reign. He at once managed to maintain good relations with both Persia and 
Athens, and simultaneously protect his kingdom during the war, expand its size, and 
improve its military and general prosperity. As such, we might say that the foreign 
policy of Alexander I was a marked success, and yet its success sowed the troubles 
which were to dog the reign of Perdiccas. 
53 Gomme, in his commentary on Thucydides (Vol 1, p202) on Thucydides 1.57-2. uses this passage to C) 
suggest that Alexander "had perhaps encouraged Thasos in 
her revolt from the League in 465. " There is, 
however, no explicit connection to be drawn from this passage between 
Alexander and the revolt of Z.; - t 
Thasos, and no other ancient evidence makes one. 
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Chapter 3 
The Reign of Perdiccas 
lcali Tuap6x rlF-p6tKKO'O W61")811 V(Xl, )(TIV TUXVID Tcoý, Xod; 
The above quote from Hermippos, the fourth century comic poet, clearly illustrates that 
the negative opinion held by most of the modem scholars who comment upon 
Perdiccas' reign has its roots in contemporary Athens. From an Athenian point of view, 
Perdiccas' frequent changes of alliance rendered him an inconsistent and untrustworthy 
ally. However, a close analysis of the evidence pertaining to his reign illustrates, as this 
chapter will argue, that contrary to the view held by most modem commentaries on his 
reign, far from being arbitrary, all of Perdiccas' changes of alliance (bar his defection 
from Brasidas, which was made for personal reasons) were made either as a direct result 
of hostile behaviour from Athens or with a clear intention of ensuring the security of 
Macedon. As such, this chapter will argue that, rather than being the somewhat 1= embarrassing episode of Macedon's history that Perdiccas' reign is often thought by 
modem scholars to be, it in fact spanned a period of extreme peril for Macedon, 
reflected by Perdiccas' apparently erratic approach to foreign policy, and that through 
this policy he was ultimately successful in safeguarding his kingdom and throne. 
The accession of Perdiccas II, the son of Alexander 1, is notoriously difficult to date, 
due to variant traditions on the length of his reign. ' Modem responses to the ancient 
evidence are accordingly various, ranging from the firm assertion by Raymond, made 
on the basis of the numismatic evidence from the period 2 that Perdiecas should be 
considered as having acceded to the throne immediately on the death of Alexander, with 
no very serious challenge to his throne, to that of Hammond, who concludes that "the 
hypothesis which best explains the discrepant traditions about the length of Perdiccas' 
reign is that his throne was insecure and disputed from c452 to c 435 but fully 
3 recognised thereafter until his death c 413. " (pI15) . As the internal instability of Macedon and the presence of challengers to Perdiccas' kingship had a direct bearing 
upon his foreign policy during the early years of his reign, this chapter will begin with 
an account and discussion of the circumstances surrounding his accession. 
The last appearance of Alexander I in our primary sources is found in Plutarch's Life of 
Cimon 14.3.2, in which he describes the allegations that Cimon had been bribed by 4 Alexander in the late 460s . Our sources are silent about the death of the king, but there 
I Athenaios 5 217 D-E records no less than six traditions, see below for a brief discussion. 
2Raymond 1953 ppl. 50 ff. 
3 Hammond 1979. His position should be treated with caution, because the seventeen year period during 
which he considers Macedon to have been without a confirmed king seems too long to be credible. Cn C) 
Raymond's argument on the other hand seems too dismissive of the challenges to the throne, especially C C) 
that from Philip who, as is discussed below, had a large power base in the north to support his claim. Z-- 
Gomme's explanation seems the best - he concludes that the varying lengths of reign recorded by 4-- C z: 1 
Athenaios should be attributed to "genuine historical controversy"(p201). It is possible that partisan 
reports inserted another king or other kings between Alexander and Perdiccas thus shortening Perdiccas' Z-- MM 
reign, although it seems unlikely, as pointed out by Raymond, that Perdiccas ever actually lost control of C Z-- 
the throne itself. 
4 See previous chapter for a discussion of the occasion of these allegations. Z-- 
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is no reason to believe that it was due to any but natural causes .5 It Is evident from our ancient sources that a new system of rule had, either before the death of Alexander or 
soon after it, been put in place. Alexander was unusually well supplied with sons, 
having no less than five who are documented by our sources. It appears that, on his death, or perhaps before it, some or all of his sons were given certain areas over which C) to preside as princelings, presumably in a subordinate position to the son who inherited 
the throne. 6 
We hear of one brother in control of such a territory from Plato's Gorgias, in a passage in which one of the characters, Polus, is describing the state of affairs in Macedon. 
Oq 76 I[P(OTOV ýLEV -COIJTOV CCILYC O\v 'rov 6F-(FTcoTilv Kat OF-iov RET(xTcFqLW%LFvoq 
co cc (0 t L) 0 (X t q 7EO6 
, (TOW TTIV (, Xpxl\lv Il\v rlF-p8l -KK(xq (X' T\V, (PEI XETOI... 
First of all he [Archelaus] summoned this very master and uncle of his to his 
court, as if he were going to restore to him the kingdom of which Perdiccas had 
deprived him. (471B) 
The man who is here referred to as "master and uncle" is Alcetas, Archelaus' uncle and 
the brother of Perdiccas. No sooner have we heard of his arche during Perdiceas' reign, 
than we hear of his being relieved of it. It appears that Perdiccas was not unduly 
troubled by Alcetas, of whom we hear nothing in the context of later historical 
development. 
A greater thom in the side of the newly acceded Perdiccas, however, was another 
brother, Philip, who appears to have been given a strategically important arche in the 
north. Thucydides, when informing us of the route taken by the invading force under 
Sitalces, 7 has this to say: 
c 0 6E axparo'q rCov OpýxKCov Elc -Cfiq Aopllpol, ) E'CEP(XXE irp&rov [tE'v E'; rT'lv 
(DtXitiucolo IrpoTF-pov oi)(; ccv (xpXqv, -Kat FJXF-v Et8oRF-vi\lv ýtF-v K(X'C(X Kp(X'Uo;, ]Fop, rl, )Viccv 6F\- icca 'AT(xkccvrilv -Keu ('X'kkcc civroc X(OPI'(X ORAOttv 8tcc CT\lv 
'AýLlbvro-u (pi. Xt'ccv 7rpo(TX(opobvT(x rof) (Dtkt'TcTco-L) 1, )t'Fo; Tcccpovroq- E^o'p(ono\ v 6F\- 
-E7rOXIOPKTj(Y(XV [tEV, EX6V 6E OUK E61)V(XV'rO. E'7rF-IT(X 6F\- K(XI Eq TIJV ('X'XXIIV 
M(xicF-6ovt'ccv icpol, )X(opet r7lv F-v ccpt(; TF-pc-c rIE'-Xk-q; imit Kl, )ppou. 
But the Thracian army, advancing from Doberus, invaded first the province which 
before had belonged to Philip, and took Idomene by storm; but Gortynia, Atalanta, 
and some other places capitulated voluntarily out of friendship for Amyntas, son 
of Philip, who accompanied Sitalces; moreover they laid siege to Europus but 
were unable to take it. Next they advanced into the other part of Macedonia, 
which is to the west of Pella and Cyrrhus. (2.100.3-4) 8 
5 Hammond pi 15 mistakenly interprets Q. Curtius Rufus 6.11.26 as evidence that Alexander met a 
violent end. This passage refers not to Alexander 1, but to Alexander 11, who met his death at the hands of C, 
Ptolemy of Alorus. 
6 Cole 1974 p56 probably correctly attributes this decision to a belief on Alexander's behalf that the 
decision would "conduce to sounder administration. " No ancient evidence on the motivations behind this 
innovation exists, however, and Hammond's suguestion "that it came about throuah dissension between 1=14D Cý 
the brothers and a decision by the Macedonian assembly" (p 115) ought not to be entirely ruled out either. 
7 See below for discussion. 
8 See Chapter 2 for a brief discussion of the implications of this passage for our understanding of the 
extent of Macedonian territory at this time. 
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If all of the cities mentioned in this context were part of "the province which before had 
belonged to Philip", then we may only conclude that his cirche had been both large and 
influential, embracing all the territory from the Doberus pass right down into the 
heartland of the plain, with unknown eastern and western borders. However, by the time 
of Perdiccas' first appearance in Thucydides (1.57,432BC) Philip too had been relieved 
of his kingdom, as Alcetas had been, and was now plotting against Perdiccas in 
conjunction with Athens. Although no very firm conclusions regarding the date of the 
expulsion of the brothers may be drawn, what seems apparent is that the early years of 
Perdiccas' reign were troubled and insecure, and to consolidate his position he was 
obliged to defend himself against rival claims to the throne and to reverse the decision 
to divide Macedon between the brothers, centralising control of the whole territory 
under one king again. Thus, although the comparative complexity of Perdiccas' 
accession makes it impossible to reach any certain conclusion as to the date of it, it 
seems likely that Perdiccas took the throne on Alexander's death, c452, and in spite of 
challenges to his reign retained his place upon it until his death. The only princelings 
left following the purge of his early years were the subordinate ones of Upper Macedon 
whom his father had permitted to retain their positions. 
The lack of security in Macedon in the years immediately following Alexander's death 
was exploited by Athens, in spite of the nominal peace and alliance between the two 
states, 9 requiring Perdiccas' early foreign policy to be a defensive one. From the outset, 
then, it appears that Perdiccas had inherited the aggression of Athens attracted by his 
father's foreign policy in the latter years of his reign. 10 In formal terms, however, the 
relationship between the two states was characterised by friendship and alliance. We 
shall therefore proceed to examine this relationship and how Athenian aggression won 
out over the alliance during the early years of Perdiccas' reign. 
Perdiccas and Athens in the Early Years 
Alexander is named by Herodotus 8.136 as proxenos kai euergetes of Athens. 
Thucydides 1.57 puts the current dispute between Athens and Perdiccas into context by 
designating Perdiccas as ýbR[t(xXoq TcpocF-pov -K(x-'L (pt'koq 65'v Given that we know of no 
occasion early in Perdiccas' reign which might explain a new alliance between the two 
states - indeed, from the first attempt by Athens to settle Amphipolis 
II during the latter 
years of Alexander's reign, the relationship had begun to deteriorate - it seems possible 
that the original treaty with Alexander, that in connection with which he was named as 
proxenos kai euergetes, included a clause on behalf of his heirs, as was often the case in 
a treaty contracted with a reigning Macedonian king. 12 If, as is often suggested by 
modern scholars, 13 the treaty with Alexander was contracted to secure rights over 
Macedonian timber, then a clause including Alexander's sons becomes yet more likely, 
because long term access to the timber supply was what the Athenians were presumably 
hoping to achieve through such an agreement. 
9 Thucydides 1.57. 
10 Discussed above in the previous chapter. 
Thucydides 1.100 and previous chapter. 
IG 1.2.71 (which, contrary to Meritt et al 1950, is not identified with the original alliance and which Z-1 
will be discussed below) provides an example in which a kinzc--,, and all his possible heirs were named. 
13 See previous chapter for discussion and bibliography. z: ' 
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Relations during the very early years of Perdiccas' reign are ambiguous both in terms of 
how they are reported by our ancient sources and how they are interpreted by our 
modem ones. Theopompus F 387 provides one example of early interactions: 
E)F-OTCO[l7LOq 62-' (PIJ(YI FIF-PIKXE'-O-Oq XFtpol, )[tFvol, ) El'j'pot(xv 'Col', )q 'I(T'rl(Xtdq K(XO' 
t lo (1) %tOX071ccq F-t'q M(XKF-8OVt(XV ýLF-U(XCT'UlJV(Xt, 8t(yXtXtO q 6' Eý 'A"vat v 
F-XOOV'UCtq TOV 'f2pF-O'V Ot'Kfi(YCCt... 
Theopompus says that when Pericles was subduing Euboea, he resettled the 
Histiaeans in Macedonia under an agreement and two thousand Athenians went 
and occupied Oreus. 14 
The exact nature of the agreement is obscure. Cole comments: 
It looks like something fairly informal: Perdiccas perhaps asked for Athenian 
permission to receive and settle the refugees, anxious at this time not to give 
offence nor to precipitate a recrudescence of ill feeling by rash action. (p58) 
This may well have been the case; on the other hand,, it is easier to see the advantages to 
Athens of the agreement - the removal of the troublesome population of a neighbouring 
territory - than it is to see those to Perdiccas. It is possible also to interpret this 
agreement as characterising Athens' attitude to Macedon at this juncture - an inclination to appropriate portions of Macedonian territory to fulfil her own ends. 
Indeed, it seems unwise to read an overly friendly attitude from either side into this 
agreement. After all, these refugees would have been very hostile to Athens, and their 
presence would not have enhanced the popularity of Athens wherever they settled. 
Whatever the exact circumstances of the relocation of the hapless Histiaeans, it is 
undeniably true that before long relations between Athens and Perdiccas were in sharp 
decline. Thucydides 1.57 briefly documents the causes of the breakdown of the nominal 
alliance: 
Flepät-KKaý u- 0 'Aý, F-ý('xväpoi) M(xicF-Öovo)v ßccc7iXF-1)ý ýi-)KM o 
npoTF-Pov xcu (Pt (i) F- wE0t9 (X Xoý ' V. '7102,9ýL ' 0,18 \ "'Z't 4bIý. "n71e) Tü) ' (Xl)'UOý) ' ÖF-k(P(i) KM 
, A£-'pö(x KO. Lvfi np \O ko, £, 'ýNOTIvcciot ýuýLýtaxtav (X 11 v -vavulo-oýUF-Volý 01 
gnollja(XVTO. 
Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, who had before been an 
ally and friend [of the Athenians] had now become hostile. And he had become 
hostile because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philip and 
with Derdas, who were making common cause against himself. 15 
14 
Translated in Shrimpton 1991. 
15 It was generally believed that IG 1.2 53 contained the text of the alliance between Athens and Philip, C 
until Meritt (1947) convincingly argued that ýDtkos was a more likely reconstruction of the word than C-1 I 
(Diki, nnos. Papantoniou (1971) does not adequately refute Meritt's arguments. Meritt's restoration of the 
decree means that IG 1.2 53 must be interpreted as an alliance between Athens and an unknown state, 
rather than between Athens and Philip. 
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It is important to note that, from the evidence available to us, we have little reason to 
lay the blame for this rift at Perdiccas' door. ' 6 On the contrary, it is Athens whom we 
see taking the offensive. Already. the two main characteristics of Athens' attitude to 
Macedon during the reign of Perdiccas are emerging. We have already noted that 
Athens had a tendency to try to appropriate Macedonian land (or, in the case of 
Amphipolis, land bordering on Macedon) for their own purposes. This interest in the 
internal instability in Macedon and its exploitation through the support of a rival claim 
to the throne, shows a further and more worrying facet of Athenian aggression during 
this period. Presumably the thinking behind it from an Athenian point of view was that 
a king who owed his throne to Athenian support would be likely to promote the 
Athenian cause in the north. From Perdiceas' point of view this early development 
necessitated that his early foreign policy was one of defence, in this case not of his 
country but of his throne. He might be forgiven for displaying a lack of trust towards 
the Athenians later in his reign, as one of his earliest acts upon the throne was to defend 
it from a rival supported by Athens. 17 
The Athenian support of Philip should be considered in the context of the establishment 
of Amphipolis. The original attempt to establish a colony on the River Strymon at Nine 
Ways had evidently planted the idea of the usefulness of such a colony in the Athenian 
mind (an idea which was to become something of an obsession in later years and which 
came to symbolise the Athenian empire itself) and in 437 a second attempt at 
establishing such a colony was successful. The possession of this site gave the 
Athenians access to Macedonian timber and pitch, both essential for the maintenance of 
the fleet, and gave her a foothold in the Thermaic gulf. 
We may only guess how the establishment of a large Athenian colony on the edge of his 
territory was regarded by Perdiccas. The scant ancient evidence we have on this issue 
comes from the Athenian tribute list from the previous year, 438.18 In this list, certain 
Thracian towns were listed as "unassessed" - this is interpreted by Meiggs as "a gesture 
by Athens towards Perdiccas, king of Macedon, possibly part of a formal agreement" 
(p250). Meiggs presumably sees the reduction of financial demands on the area as 
symbolic of a reduction of influence, implying that Perdiccas was being somehow 
favoured by a lessening of widespread Athenian control of the Thracian coast. 
Although Thucydides 4.102 specifically names the Edones as the people from whom 
the site of Amphipolis was taken, rather than the Macedonians, it seems clear that the 
founding of Amphipolis could be seen by Macedon as an aggressive move, designed to 
increase Athenian influence in the area, albeit not one which specifically targeted 
Macedon. The Athenians' championing of Philip's cause should be seen in a similar 
light as the establishment of this colony. Athens, we assume for material reasons, 
wished to increase her influence in Macedon and eastern Thrace. ' 
9 As already noted, 
having a Macedonian king who owed his throne to Athenian support could only 
contribute to this agenda. 
16 There is no evidence, for example, to support the supposition made by Cole that "the implication of this 
[i. e. the inclination towards Philip rather than Perdiccas] is that Perdiccas showed himself to be unreliable 
as an ally. " (p57) 
17 See chapter on the accession of Philip 11 for a comparable situation. Perdiccas' response to this 
repudiation of the treaty between them is discussed below. 
's Meritt et al 1950 
19 See below for a discussion of the treaty with Sitalces. 
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Perdiccas' response was ambitious and international. Thucydides 1.57 continues: 
eý Te Týv A(xi<F-Öcciýiova 7rE'-47co)v binoý noXEýtoý y£-'vilT(xi 
(xl)TO% Tcpo'ý I-Icko7covvllcytol, )ý, Km rouý KoptvOtoi)ý TipoGF-irotEtTo Tilý 
FIOTEIÖ(Xi(Xý npooF(PF-PF, 59 Xo'YO', )ý -K(Xt' 'Toiý Em op(XXI-lý 
X(XX'Kt89b(51 Kai BOTT1(Xiolý ýl)V(X7U0(YTýV(Xl, VOýLiý(J)V, el, 41')ýt4(X)(0( TOCUM 
Exol, %L0p(X OVT(X TU X(t)PI(X, pýCOV C(V To\V 7co; ýF-ýtov ýtET, (Xl, )TCOV ICOtgicyo(xt. WV 
oti 'AO-qv(xiot (xicjüoýtF-voi ßol-). ko4Fvoi itpox(xT(Dcjkuýtß('XVF-IV VýV IUUEM 
Wý (XIZOGTOCGEtý £E', 'Tl, )XOV '«\XP Tpt(X'KOVT(X VM)ý (X7Z0(YTF-/^ý; ýOVTF-ý K(Xi )ctxlOl, )ý 
c F'-ii\t Ti\lv 7ýv 'APY, 9(: 7'CP('XTOI) TOi) 
ÖEK(X _IL (YTP(XT1170i)VTOýý TO% ('X'PXOI)Gt TWV VEÖ)V rIOTEIÖF-(XT(i)V 
TF- Oýtlip01)ý Ä, (XßF-iV 'K(Xt\ Tä TEi)CC)ý 'K(XOEXFiV, TÜN TE 7[Xll(YIOV nOXF-(J)V 
ýD'()ý, (XKI\IV 9", YgtV Ö7W)ý gl) ('XIUOGTIICYOV-1(Xl. 
Alarmed at this [alliance between Athens, Philip and Derdas] he kept sending 
envoys to Lacedaemon, trying to bring about a war between Athens and the 
Peloponnesians. He sought also to win over the Corinthians, with a view to the 
revolt of Potidaea; and, furthermore, he made overtures to the Chalcideans of 
Thrace and the Bottiaeans to join in the revolt, thinking that if he had allies in 
these countries, which bordered on his own, it would be easier, in conjunction 
with them, to carry on the war. But the Athenians became aware of these 
designs, and wishing to forestall the revolt of the cities, ordered the commanders 
of their fleet (since they happened to be sending against the country of Perdiccas 
thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the command of Archestratus son of 
Lycomedes and four others 20) to take hostages of the Potidaeans and pull down 
their wall, and also to keep a watch upon the neighbouring towns and prevent 
them from revolting. 
Perdiccas' actions here display two almost opposing tendencies. On the one hand, his 
insecurity regarding Macedonian military capacity is evident. He did not believe that 
Macedon alone could face the threat, evidently both real and imminent, from Athens. 
On the other hand, his actions display a profound grasp of curTent affairs beyond the 
boundaries of his own country, and both the inclination and the ability to manipulate 
them to serve his own ends. These tendencies characterise much of his foreign policy 
throughout his reign, and this, the first display of them, had dramatic effects upon 
Macedon itself and the situation in Greece. Modem scholars do not, in general, put 
Perdiccas' actions here into the context of the Peloponnesian war on the whole. 21 J. T. 
Chambers 22 challenges this dismissive attitude: 
Thucydides saw a direct, linear progression of events from Perdiccas' intrigues 
to the meeting at Sparta and the eventual declaration of war by the 
Peloponnesians. Perdiccas must therefore been seen as the catalyst which 
precipitated the proximate cause of the war. (p42) 
20 Presumably this force represented the honouring by Athens of her alliance with Philip and Derdas. C, 
Neither Gomme nor Hornblower attribute any significance to this passage their commentari Z-ý C, ies. 21 Hammond (ppl22f) limits his discussion to an account of the details of the campaign against Perdiccas, C) C, 
whilst Kagan's discussion of the outbreak of the war contains only four pages in which Perdiccas' actions L- Zý 
make any appearance at all. Salmon (1984) goes so far as to state in a footnote that "it could hardly be C, 
argued that the possibility of bringing Perdiccas of Macedon into the war was the decisive factor in C -- C) 
rsuadina Corinth to fight in 433. " (p282) 
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Chambers' point is a very valid one. Rather than seeing Perdiccas' actions here as 
localised mischief making, the impression one derives from a survey of most modern 
literature, it is important to place his strategy in both a local and a larger context. In 
local terms, he was manipulating the surrounding political context to ensure the security 
of his kingdom and throne, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the strategies of his 
father. He was also making one very important point which was to charactense 
Macedonian relations with Athens regardless of the reigning king until 336: that 
Athenian attempts to impose any forrn of control over Macedon itself would not be 
tolerated, no matter what lengths had to be gone to in order to oppose them. In terms of 
a broader historical context, it is undeniably true that, as Chambers points out, 
Perdiccas' actions had a direct bearing upon the declaration of war. As such, Perdiccas' 
early defensive foreign policy had large scale implications in Greece, effectively 
opening a northern frontier in the Peloponnesian war. 
By this stage in Perdiccas' reign, the menacing tone of the interaction between Athens 
and Perdiccas may be noted. In answer to Athens' tendencies towards a territorial 
interest in Macedon and intervention in the internal situation there, Perdiccas was 
presenting a clear response, in which he firmly rejected the possibility of tolerating 
Athenian encroachment upon his kingdom or throne, and made it clear that he was 
prepared to oppose her endeavours to do so by any means he had to hand, including 
involving himself in the wider Greek political situation. Just as the broad tendencies 
which have been identified as characterising Athens' behaviour during Perdiccas' reign 
continued throughout it, so too did these broad tendencies continue to characterise 
Perdiccas' response, regardless of the many treaties drawn up between Athens and 
Macedon during his reign. 
The immediate result of Perdiccas' actions, as we see from Thucydides, was to prevent 
an attack upon Macedon and to deflect the Athenians' attention to her allies. 
Thucydides 1.58 documents how the Potideans revolted as a direct consequence of the 
success of Perdiccas' diplomacy in Sparta. Perdiccas' efforts to foment this situation did 
not cease, however, as Thucydides goes on to tell us: 
\ rIE (X 0E OVT(xq -K(Xl K(Xt -p8t"KK(Xq TCEIOEI 
X(XXK'Lft-(X; r(x; F-Tit 00. , (TCTIR it' XEIq , ickl7c, 
KCC, T(XP(AOVT(X; C'CVOtKI'CY(X(YOOCI E'; "Okl-)VOOV ýU'CCV TE TCOXtV 'UocOTIIV t'(YXI)P(\XV 
C Irotli(TOCCOM. Toi; T, E, KkUEOýXyt 'rou'rot; 'Cil; F-coorob 7ý; rý; M-0760vta; TCF-Pt 
, rilv Bokpilv k'LRV1jV E'8(t)KF- VE'-ýtF-00(lt, FEW; 
&V 0 np o\; 'AOllv(x'to-0; TCokEýtoq 
KOcti Oit ýtFý-v &XVO)KitýOVTO TF- K(XO(XtpObVtF-; *T(\X; IUOkEt; K(Xt\ E-'; TcAF-ýtov 
7r(XPF-(TKF-I)('4... 
Perdiccas at the same time persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down 
their cities on the sea coast and settle instead at Olynthus, making there a single 
strong city; and he gave them, when they abandoned their cities, a part of his 
own territory of Mygdonia around Lake Bolbe to cultivate as long as they 
should be at war with the Athenians. And so they proceeded to dismantle their 
cities, move inland, and prepare for war. (1.58) 
'13 
23 See Raymond 195-3) ppl. 57 ff for a discussion of the impact of the decline in relations with Athens and 
the establishment of Olynthos upon Perdiccas' coinage. The increase in mint activity during this period 
sug_, gests that the Athenian presence at Amphipolis had not restricted Perdiccas' access to the Pangaeum rD 
silver mines to any significant degree. See Hornblower 1991 ppI02f for references on this "synoikism" of Z-- zn 
Olynthus. 
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The establishment of a large and populous city on his borders was one of Perdiccas' tn more short sighted moves. 24 However, in the context of the Athenian interest in the 
area, it served its purpose. It drew the vulnerable population of Chalcidice away from 
the coast, out of reach of Athenian naval power. This being the case, the Athenians 
focused their attention upon Macedon, where, as Thucydides 1.59 informs us, Philip 
and Derdas had already invaded. 
This was perhaps the moment of greatest vulnerability in Perdiccas' reign. His 
diplomatic efforts and his energetic support of the allies in revolt had been successful to 
some degree, in that it had momentarily distracted the attention of Athens from 
Macedon itself, but general war on a large enough scale to distract Athens for the 
foreseeable future had not broken out - indeed, Perdiccas' actions now seemed to be 
backfiring upon him calamitously. Athens had not abandoned the cause of Philip to deal 
with more pressing concerns, as presumably Perdiccas had hoped that she would - 
instead, she was now fulfilling her alliance with him by fighting in conjunction with 
him, and worse, Athens' wrath had been so invoked by Perdiccas' actions that she was 
sending a larger force to supplement the rather half hearted thirty ships and thousand 
hoplites which had made up the original force. Thucydides 1.61 informs us of the state 
of affairs which this new force found awaiting them in Macedon: 
C% )% 
Ot 0C(PtK%tEVOt E; M(XKF-6OVt(XV TIPWTOV KCCT(X; UX[tp('XV010(7t TO'o; 71POTEPOliq 
xtxt, ol); 8EPpIv (XpTt inpil-KO"Tocq Kcct rll, )8v(xv IUOXtOPKObV'U(X;. 
TIPOGMXOEý6[tEVOt 6E KCCi CWTOt' TI)V Ill')6VCCV E'IrOXtOPKTJ(YCCV [LEV, ETCEtT(x 6E, 
ýUgPCXGtV IrOtIjCFC'CýLEVOt KCCt ýUýt[MXWCV CCV0C7KCCt(XV ltpOq TOV I-lF-p8t'KK(XV, (t)q 
()Cl)'rO')q KccTlITEEt7F-V 11 rlO'rE't8CCt(X K(X't 0 'Apt(TTF-lo; 7rocpEXijXi)0o)q, 
(XTC(Xvt(TT(XVT(Xt EIC Týq MOC'KF-80vt/(xq... 
These [troops] first came to Macedonia and found that the former thousand had 
just taken Therme and were besieging Pydna; so they also took part in the siege 
of Pydna. But afterwards they concluded an alliance with Perdiccas, being 
forced thereto by the situation of Potidaea and the arrival of Aristeus, which 
compelled them to hasten, and they withdrew from Macedonia. 
The benefits to both sides from such an agreement are evident. From Athens' point of 
view, little more could be achieved in Macedon to influence the more serious hostilities, 
those with Potidaea. Therme had already fallen to them, so they were already 
established on the coast. The laborious reduction of individual Macedonian cities 
would be costly and would contribute little to the progress of the war against the allies 
in revolt. 
Perdiccas, on the other hand, must have feared for his throne. Seeing enemy troops in 
Macedonian territory for the first time in living memory, losing Therme to Athens, and 25 
being hard pressed from the north or west or both as well as the coast , his only hope 
was to divide and conquer. Treating with Athens served two purposes - it relieved the 
24 See below, especially chapters 6 and 9 on Amyntas III and Philip 11 for discussion. 
25 It seems likely that the invasion by Derdas and Philip came from Philip's arche in the north, or from 
Elimea in the west, or conceivably from both directions at once. Derdas is generally assumed to have z: 1 
ruled Elimea on the basis of Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.38, which names a Derdas as the contemporary kintg 
of Elimea, presumably a descendent of the Derdas of Thucydides. Thucydides 1.61 mentions six hundred 
rý is was representative of Philip's military and cavalry from Philip's force, a very large number. If thi III 
financial capacity, he posed a serious threat indeed. 
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pressure on his own coastal towns and simultaneously it deprived Philip and Derdas of 
support. 
This alliance was, however, remarkably short lived. By the time of Perdiccas' next 
appearance in Thucydides, he had already betrayed the alliance with Athens and was 
once again supporting the cause of the allies in revolt. Cole provides an intelligent 
theory as to why this may have been: 
The alliance did not ... end Athenian intrigue with Philip. Perdiccas may have 
assumed that it would, and his subsequent defection is possibly explicable in 
terms of Athens' duplicity rather than his own. Six hundred cavalry from the 
force of Philip and Pausanias joined the Athenian army as it was moving from 
Macedonia into Chalcidice (1.61.4). Perdiccas' reaction to what he may have 
justifiably regarded as an act of "bad faith" is not unexpected. (p63) 
This seems sensible. If Perdiccas had indeed hoped to divorce Philip and Athens 
through the treaty, the fact that he was now expected to fight alongside Philip must have 
dashed this hope. Again, it seems unfair to attribute this change of heart to mere 
capriciousness on Perdiccas' behalf. In return for supporting Athens, Perdiccas may 
very well have hoped that Athens would sever her ties with the most dangerous rival for 
the Macedonian throne. As Cole points out, it comes as no surprise to find Perdiccas 
supporting the Potidaeans once again in the light of a worrying reaffirmation of 
continued Athenian involvement with Phi lip. 26 
No very serious consequences arose following Perdiccas' defection. The following 
encounters between Athenians and rebel forces were indecisive and the stand off in the 
north ended with the siege of Potidaea. The first bout of armed hostilities between 
Athens and Perdiccas, then ended with a state of unresolved tension between the two 
sides. As commented above, Perdiccas' actions had made a significant contribution to 
the outbreak of the war, because the Peloponnesians, partly as a consequence of the 
27 Athenian siege of Potidaea, subsequently declared war upon Athens . 
Treating With the Barbarian; Athens, Perdiccas and Sitalces 
Thucydides 2.29 informs us of how this state of hostility came to a brief halt. Having 
described a situation in which we find Athens striving to improve her relations with 28 Thrace , he goes on to inform us that this northern olive branch was extended to 
26 On the issue of Perdiccas' military support for Potidaea, there seems to be some controversy over the 
Greek in 1.62 2, which is translated in the Loeb as "having appointed lolaus as his administrator at 
home, " while the Penguin translates less literally "Instead of being there [at Potidaea] in person, he sent 
Iolaus as deputy commander. " See also Hornblower 1991 on this passage, where he suggests that it is 
more likely that Iolaus commanded the troops, Macedonian domestic arrangements being, he argues, 
inconsequential to Thucydides' narrative at this point. Hornblower's argument is valid only if we 
presume that Thucydides was uninterested in Macedonian foreign policy, to which the defence of the 
throne was a fundamental part, as we have seen above. In fact, both translations are possible, and either 
interpretation highlights an awareness for the need for security. Either a trusted deputy must maintain the 
king's position in his absence, or else the king himself must be present in person to safeguard his throne 7-D ZD 
and a deputy sent as a commander. Perdiccas was jealously guarding his throne. C) Cý 27 Thucydides 1.88. 
28 Presumably with an eye upon northern timber. So far, as discussed, relations with Perdiccas had not 
been fruitful, a failure which had no doubt had some bearing upon Athens' access to Macedonian timber. C) 
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Perdiccas too, through the offices of one Nymphodorus of Abdera, the brother in law of 
Sitalces. 
Tlipilý 89 0U59 co cci)TO öv0px F'-'XO)v ß(Xcytý, F-1)ý ITE1 nPCý)TOý F'-v KPC'CTF-1 'OÖP'JEYG)V F-7F, -VF-, uo. 0i) Öij o'V'EC, ( uO'v 2: iT('XX-Kllv ot 'AOllv(xiot uýtýLuxov 
E7U0tOi)VTO, ßol, )koýteVol G(PICYI TCC Utl OP6KIlý XWPVX XCU rlgp8I'KK(YV 
ýlOW-ýF-keiv (xi)Tov. e'-kOcov Ts F-g u'cý 'AO-q'vccg o Ni)ýt(p08a)poý uliv u- coýü 
EIT('X; ýK01, ) ý1)ýtýLUX1(XV g'7Z0111(YF- Ken l('xÖo-Kov To'v loto'v cci, )Toi) 'AOilv(xiov Tov 
u 11 TE Elut E)PC'cKlIý nOXF-ýLOV 1)7UF-ÖF'-XETO KCCT(XX GF-tv- nFICYF-tv 7CCP Y-ITC'Cý, K v 
7ZEýtnp-tv 0, TP(XTI(xv E)pýxKi(xv 'AOllv(xtotý tiznF-o)v ce icail 
ýl)VF-ßißcc(YF- 8F'- icccit cO'v rlF-p8t'K-Kccv To%. 'AOllv(xiotý -Kai (2)£-'pýtlIV Ul)TCO 
F-TIF-ICYEV (XITOÖOi)V(Xt* ý'1)VF-CYTP('XTF-1. )0F- TE EIA1)ý rlF-PÖt'KK(Xý 9'-IZt\ X(XXKtÖE'-(Xý 
4ET6X 'AOilv(xt'o)v Kat (I)opýLt(ovoý. ol'), rco ýtýev EtTüüKilý TF- ob TTýlpF-o) OPýxKCov 
1%c ßcColkei)ý ý1)KLUxoý E-yrZ, -VF-TO 'Affilvmotý KM 
FIF-Pö'IK'K(Xý 0 
'Aý, F-ý('x'väpou M(xKF-öovo)v ßcccit2, ei)ý. 
Teres... was the first king to attain great power among the Odrysians. And it 
was his son, Sitalces, whom the Athenians wanted to make their ally, wshing 
him to help in subduing the places on the Thracian coast and Perdiccas. So 
Nymphodorus came to Athens, brought about the alliance with Sitalces, and got 
Sadocus son of Sitalces made an Athenian citizen; and he promised also to bring 
the war in Thrace 29 to an end, saying that he would persuade Sitalces to send the 
Athenians a Thracian force of cavalry and targeteers. Moreover, he brought 
about a reconciliation between Perdiccas and the Athenians, whom he persuaded 
to restore Therme to him. Perdiccas immediately joined forces with the 
Athenians under Phormio and took the field against the Chalcideans. It was in 
this way that Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, became an ally of the 
Athenians, and also Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians. 
(2.29)0 '0 
The benefits to both Perdiccas and the Athenians, as in the case of the last treaty 
between the two, are evident. 31 For Athens (had her mindset been one of co-operation 
instead of control) the alliance could offer precisely the degree of influence in the north 
which she desired. For Perdiccas, who as we learn from 2.95 was struggling to cope 
with the war situation, the restoration of Therme 32 and the reconciliation with Athens 
An improved relationship with Thrace may have gone some way towards increasing Athenian access to Zý Cý 
the timber she needed, and facilitating its transport, not to mention offering increased security for C) 
Amphipolis. Aristophanes Arcarnians 134 - 74 ridicules the Athenian/Thracian relationship, commenting 
especially upon the grant of citizenship to Sitalces' son. 29 It I is noteworthy that, although the Loeb translation reads "the war in Thrace", the Greek ol, ZIE't 0PCCKjS 
is generally taken to refer to the Greek settlements near Thrace. On this point, see Gomme 1945 pp203ff 
for discussion and bibliography. If this is assumed to be the case here also, then Nymphodorus must have C. 
been referring to the troubles in Poitidaea. 30 On this passage, Rusten comments that this agreement represented the first in "a series of unreliable 
aareements in the early years of the war, as Athens breaks its promise to Sitalces and Perdiccas breaks his 
promises to everyone. " (p133) Rusten's viewpoint on this passage is representative of the negative view Z7> 
of Perdiccas held by many modern scholars and which, it is argued here, an examination of the ancient 
idence challenges. evi 1-ý 31 S. Casson (1926) rightly points out that "the possibilities of this [triple alliance] were almost Z: 1 
incalculable" (p 183). 32 Therme, unlike Methone (whose case is discussed below) had been taken from Perdiccas as an act of 
aggression by the Athenians, rather than allying to Athens of its own free will, as Methone seems to have Z1_ : _1 
C 
done. The alliance of Methone was no doubt lamentable to Perdiccas, but not a direct insult to him, as the 
capture of his territory was. 
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offered a vast improvement to the security of his country and contained the added 
3' advantage of a friendship with the now very powerful Odrysians. ' The rapidity of ZI Perdiccas' co-operation with Phormio against the Chalcideans underlines his eagerness 
to make the new alliance a practical reality. 
However, the Athenian attitude towards Macedon and Perdiccas, highlighted by 
Thucydides in the above passage, meant that the alliance was never destined to fulfil its 
potential. In spite of the apparently benevolent efforts of Nymphodorus to bring 
Perdiecas into the alliance as an equal partner, the Athenians had never abandoned their 
original plan to use the alliance to subdue "the places on the coast of Thrace and 
Perdiccas". 34 At 2.80, we receive a brief notice from Thucydides that Perdiccas, without 
35 having formally renounced the alliance with Athens, was secretly aiding Sparta. 
Thucydides offers no explanation for the king's change of heart, but we might 
reasonably assume that it had somehow come to his notice that Athenian intentions 
towards him were not entirely benevolent, as he had no doubt been led to believe was 
the case by Nymphodorus. A brief consideration of the position of Methone may shed 
some light on how this came about. 
Four decrees regarding Methone were recorded on a single stele in Athens in 423 B C, 36 
and although only the first two are well preserved (the third being only partially 
preserved and the fourth entirely lost) they are enlightening. The text of the first decree 
informs us that Methone, which had probably been an Athenian ally since 430,37 notes 
that Methone was in debt to Athens. It also dictates that envoys were to be sent to 
Perdiccas to ask him not to restrict Methone's freedom of movement nor to march 
troops through Methone's territory without permission. The circumstances under which 
this decree was passed are somewhat unclear. If Perdiccas was indeed marching troops 
through Methone's territory and restricting her freedom of movement, we might wonder 
why he was doing so, given that both he and Methone were allied to Athens. On the 
other hand, we might consider that Perdiccas may have had reason to be suspicious of 
Athens' supposed generosity in the return of Therme in the alliance between himself, 
Athens and Sitalces. The one issue which is clear in this decree, however, is that 
Methone was requesting financial consideration from Athens because of harassment 
from Perdiccas. 
A lingering hostility between Athens and Perdiccas is evident from this decree. If, when 
the treaty was made between these two parties, Methone was still an Athenian ally, as 
seems likely to have been the case, the concession of Therme was a small favour - 
Athens was not renouncing her claim to all Macedonian territory, but giving up a base 
which was smaller and more difficult to defend than Methone, which is likely to have 
been used as a base for the siege of Potidaea. Perhaps Perdiccas was aggrieved that, ZD 
33 See Thucydides 2-95ff for an indication of the potential military might of the Odrysians, and Casson 
1926 for an excellent discussion of the area. 
34 See above for quote. 
35 See below for discussion. 
36 Meiggs and Lewis 65 (1969). 01-, ý 37 In either 443 or 430, but 430 is more likely as Methone does not appear on the tribute list for 434 or 
433. 
38 So Hammond (1979) pl. 1-5, where he suggests that the likeliest date for the addition of Methone to the t:, C) 
Athenian alliance was between June 432 and c August 43 1. 
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after the fall of Potidaea in 430/29, when an ally should have little use for a base on his 
coast, Methone remained as a tribute paying Athenian ally, and his goal was its return. 39 
Whatever the exact circumstances of the rift between Perdiccas and Athens around the 
time of the passing of this decree, we soon hear that Perdiccas was once again dabbling 
in the shallows of the Peloponnesian War. We are informed of this by Thucydides 2.80: 
TA 8' ainA OE-'po-oý, o'u' no; ýk(i) u"cyrp-pov rou-cwv, 'Aýtlrpcc-KtCOT(xt Km 
XÜ. oveý ßou9£oýtevoi 'Axccpv(xviccv Tilv lz(Xcj(xv (XT(XCYTp£-'ýf(XCYO(xl Kal 
'AOiivcci(ov (xnocyuýCY(Xt nF-L001)al AUKF-ÖCCIýtovtol, )ý V(XI)'TIICOV T F, 
71(XP(XGKF-1)(XEYCCCJO(XI EX T% K(X\t onxiT(Xý xtxiol. )ý 7UF-ýtY(Xt F- n' 
AK(xpv(xvt'(xv, ý, F'--yovTeý oTt, (XV V(Xl. )cyt Km nF-ýCO ('X'ýtoc ýle'm CY(PO)V F-'XO(t)(ytv, 
(xö, UV(, x, Tcov Ov-ccov ýuýLß01J0F- , iv TO)v (, xno\ 0aUcaailý 'Aicapv(x'vo)v p(x8tüt)ý 'AK(XPV(XVt'(xv (jyovuF-ý -K(xt Tfiý Z(XK1")vool, ) i«x\t KF-(p(xkXilvt'(xý KpccTil(jo-L)at, 
'K(Xt 0 TCF-Plnk0, L)ý 01, )KF-'Tt "(501'CO \c F- 'AOqv(xioig oýtoto)ý nept 1-1F-ý, onovvilaov- Uniba 8' eitvat Kai N(xi, )Tc(xxTov kccßF-iv... t 1-1 t (X e18 F\- X (x\ FPÖ'-K-K ý xpl)(P(x 
TCov 'AOilv(xiwv Xtkiouý M(xxF-Öovo)v, oi (')(YTF-pov 1X0ov. 
During the same summer, not long after these events, the Ambraciots and the 
Chaonians, wishing to subdue the whole of Acamania and detach it from 
Athens, persuaded the Lacedaemonians to fit out a fleet from the countries of the 
Doric alliance and to send a thousand hoplites against Acarnania since the 
Acamanians on the sea coast would be unable to aid those inland, and then to 
make themselves masters of Zacynthus and Cephallenia also; after that the 
Athenians would no longer be able to sail round the Peloponnesus in the same 
way as before; and there was a chance of taking Naupactus also... Perdiccas, 
without revealing his intentions to the Athenians, sent 1,000 Macedonians, who 
40 arrived too late to take part in this expedition . 
Perdiccas' actions here are initially difficult to explain. Unlike his fomenting of the 
situation at Potidaea, in which he apparently hoped to deflect Athens' attention from the 
contest between himself and Philip for the Macedonian throne, his involvement in 
Acarnania had no direct bearing upon the wellbeing of Macedon nor his own position 
on the throne. Rather, it shows a genuine inclination to influence the war in Sparta's 
favour. Perhaps the continued Athenian presence at Methone had convinced him that 
only a Spartan victory would actually rid him of an Athenian presence on his coast. 
Whatever the thinking behind this decision was, however, its implications are clear - 
39 See Meiggs and Lewis (1969), H. B. Mattingly (1961) and N. G. L. Hammond (1979) for discussions of CýC> Z-) 
the dating of this decree. Of the dates suggested, that upheld by Hammond and Meiggs and Lewis of Zý C) 4= Z: I 
429/8 is preferable, because of the appropriateness of the historical context. 
40 See Beaumont 1952 for the curious suggestion that Perdiccas was attempting to establish a route by => C, 
which the Spartans could reach the North without the necessity of passing through Thessaly. While such a in C) 
route would have the advantage of allowing such a journey at least greater, though not total, secrecy from =1 ID C) 
Athens, Perdiccas remained, as far as we know, on good terms with the Thessalians ( Thucydides 4.132), 
thus rendering an alternative route unnecessary. There is no need to seek such an explanation for 
Perdiccas' actions here - he had before shown himself to be capable of involving himself in actions 
outside Macedon which he believed would undermine the Athenian position (see, for example, 
Thucydides 1.57 and the discussion of it above) and there is no reason to suppose that he was not engaged 
in a similar exercise now, abortive though it was. Hoffman (1975 p374) doubts Perdiccas' involvement in 
this episode at all, arguing that the supposition that Perdiccas was assisting Sparta here, although Z-- Z-- t: 1 1: ý 
conveniently late (thus not included in reports of military action) arose "as an explanation for what had 
happened at Chalcidice" (p374). There is, however, little reason to doubt either Thucydides' word or 
Perdiccas' presence on this occasion. 
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0000, 
something had changed dramatically since Perdiccas I eager assistance of Phormio 
against the Chalcideans, and for one reason or another he no longer held the treaty with I.:, Athens in high regard. 
Thucydides does not inform us whether or not the attack upon Perdiccas by Sitalces 
later in the same year came about as a direct result of Perdiccas' underhand repudiation 
of the treaty with Athens, but it seems likely that it did. An Athenian connection seems 
evident from the terms in which Thucydides describes the original alliance between 
Athens and Sitalces, and from the description of Sitalces' force. Having explained that 
Sitalces wished to "extract one promise, " an agreement of some nature between 
Perdiccas and Sitalces, which Perdiccas had failed to deliver upon, and also "make good 
another" promise -a somewhat vague assurance to Athens that he would end the war in 
the Chalcidice, Thucydides notes that: 
(X4(POTF-P(ov olov F-Vgl«X TIIV F-(poöov F-7101E1T0 KM TOV ce (I)ixilEno, 0 Utov 
'Aýti)vT(xv wý F', nt' ß(xGtý. F-t'ýx ubv M(xlcF-Öov(ov Aye Km u6)v 'AO-qvcct'o)v 
j e/ \c ci npe(YßF-Iý, 0,1, F'-"Ul, )XOV 7U(XPOVTF-ý TOI)Te)v F-vF-, K(x, x(Dct llyF-ýiov(x A7vü)voc- c'ÖF-t 
, yäxcp ]Mit To'bý 'AOqvcct'o-L)ý v(x-oat ce Kai (YTp(xrtöx (oý nkF-tcTi TO' Eizt uý X(xxKtÖF-(xý n(Xpccycvccyo(xt. 
For both these reasons, then, he now began the invasion, and he took with him 
Philip's son, Amyntas, with a view to making him the king of the Macedonians, 
as well as some Athenian envoys who had come to see him on this business, and 
Hagnon as a -commander; for the Athenians were to furnish a fleet and as large 
an army as possible for the war against the Chalcideans. (2.95) 
It is generally agreed by modem sourceS41 that the original plan had been for the 
Thracians and Athenians to launch a joint attack upon Perdiccas, Sitalces invading from 
the north and the Athenian force joining him from Methone, and this, the generally 
accepted version, seems very plausible. Equally unanimous is the opinion that, this 
being the case, Perdiccas was extremely fortunate that the Athenians failed to turn up - had they done do, his reign would almost certainly have come to an end at the hands of 
this formidable attack. 
The campaign itself requires little discussion. The Thracian force swept south through 
Macedon into the heartland of the plains, meeting resistance only from Perdiccas' 
cavalry 
42 
in a series of brief and inconclusive skirmishes. Unable to offer adequate 43 
armed resistance , Perdiccas resorted to a course of action which served many a hard 
pressed Macedonian king well over the centuries - bribery. 
44 
41 See for example Hammond p. 127 and Cole p65. 42 Thucydides 2.100. 
43 This occasion is a further example of Perdiccas' lack of a major infantry force and was used by P. A. 
Brunt (1965) to dismiss the possibility that Alexander I had implemented any large scale military 
reforms. The case for Alexander I is discussed at some length in the previous chapter. The size of 
Sitalces' force (one hundred and fifty thousand beinor the number given by Thucydides 2.98) meant that 
no matter how well organised the Macedonians were, they simply did not have the manpower to stand up 
to such to such an invasion. Indeed, the very fact that Perdiccas' cavalry were able to offer any resistance 
at all suggests that it was a major force by this point and may well have been the "exceedingly loyal" 
cavalry men of the fragment. Brunt's rejection of Alexander I on these grounds is not, therefore, accepted 
here. 
44 See chapters 8 and 9 on the reign of Philip 11 for plentiful examples of the continuation of this tradition. 
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1/ 
c 0 6F- TIJV TF, XCCkKI&KýV Kai BomKýV Kail M(XKF, 
6OVt(YV &ýL(X E, IrEX(J)v 
I/ E(POEIPE, K(XI C7UEl6i'j al'), r6 0-66F-V FTCpocCYCYETO COV F'-'VF-'KOC E', (: 5E', P(XkF, -KOU Tj 
(5, Tp(xTt(X (TiTov TE OUK F--IXEV (XIOVý 1, C(X'l 107r6 XF-I[t6)VOq E', TOCk(Xl7C(J)PFI, 
3 (XV(XTCF-IOE,, T(Xi A')TCO' Y-F-100010 TOb Y-7r(XP(X6O'KO1, ), ('X6F-X(PI60b O'VcOq Myl ýLC, 71(YTOV 
ýLF-O' E'(X^L)TO'V 8l0V%LE', VO1), (O'CTT' F'-V TaXEI O'CTCF-/kOdV. TO'V U IF-10071V Kpl, )(PCC 
rTF-p8t'K'K(Xq 167MGXOýLEVO; (3X6F-X(PIJV Fc-(Xl)TOb 8('O(5F-lV 'K(Xt' XPII[ICCT(X F-Ir (Xl)'r7l 
7rpO(37EOtF, iT(XI. KOd 0 ýLE\V 7UEt(YOF-\tq KOCI ýtEtV(Xq TPI(X'KOVT(X TU.; TCOCCF(xq 
71ýLEP(Xq, TOILMOV 8E 0'-KT(\O EV X(XkKt6F-i)CTIV, C'CVF-X(I)PIJ(YF- T6 (Y'Tp(xrcp K(XTC\c 
ToCxoq EIT OIKOILY rlEp8tKl<ccq 5E, 1")(TTF-POV Y., TpaTovI, Kqv Tl\lv EýW)Tol) (X 8F-X(Pllv 
ýq, 
(007CEP I-ME(TXETO. Ta [IF-V 0A)v KOCTOC T11V ItT(, XxKol, ) GTP(XTF-IU. V 
O^L), T(J)q F-7EVETO. 
But meanwhile Sitalces kept on ravaging at one and the same time Chalcidice, 
Bottiaea and Macedonia; and then, since none of the original objects of his 
invasion was being accomplished, and his army was without food and suffering 
from the winter, he was persuaded by Seuthes son of Sadocus, a nephew and 
next to him in power, to go back home at once. Now Seuthes had been secretly 
won over by Perdiccas, who had promised to give him his sister in marriage and 
a dowry with her. So Sitalces yielded, and after a stay of only thirty days in all, 
eight of which had been spent amongst the Chalcideans, returned home with his 
army with all speed. And Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to 
Seuthes as he had promised. Such, then, is the history of the expedition of 
Sitalces. (2.101) 
The three way alliance between Perdiccas, Sitalces and Athens, then, had come to a 
conclusive end. The presence of an Athenian commander with the Thracian force 
cannot have failed to alert Perdiccas to the Athenian involvement in the attack. It 
appears that, although Perdiccas was not openly at war with Athens, as Thucydides 4.79 
points out, their implicit commendation of the Odrysian attack on Macedon convinced 
Perdiccas of Athenian treachery towards him. He vented his feeling on Methone. The 
second Methone decree, dated to 426, records promises to hear the case against 
Perdiccas and grants Methone Pontic corn, presumably to relieve the city from a state of 
blockade. In spite of Perdiccas' efforts (or perhaps as a result of this support from 
Athens) the city did not fall, or if it did it re-allied to Athens, because ten years later we 
45 find it being used as a base for cavalry raids against Perdiccas . It comes as no surprise, 
then, to find Perdiccas in alliance with Sparta at his next appearance in Thucydides. 
Macedon in the Archidarnian War 
In the gap between the withdrawal of Sitalces and Perdiccas' next appearance in our 
sources, relations between Macedon and Sparta had evidently blossomed. Thucydides 
4.78f finds the Spartan commander Brasidas en route to Thrace on the invitation of 
Perdiccas in 424BC. 
, roiju) ro) cponcp Bpacyt8ccg Ocaacckticcv (POc'caccq 
8IF-6paýtE Itpiv Tivec 
K(OXIOEIV MXPCCCF-KF-U(XCTCC(TOCC-L, KCC\l Wpi-KETO (0ý rlF-p8l-KKCCV KCCI F-; VIV 
c XCCkKt6tKllV. EK 70CP Tý; HEXOTCOW11001. ), wq rec r(ov 'AO-qv(xt'(ov ill), r')XF-t, 
45 Thucydides 6.7, see also Cole p66 and Casson p193 ff for discussion of the situation in Methone - the 
loss of the third and fourth Methone decrees, and the absence of any further evidence from Thucydides, 
however, make it impossible to reach a firm conclusion upon what the outcome of Perdiccas' hostilities 
there were, or to assess the effect on the city of subsequent fluctuations in relations between Perdiccas 
and Athens. 
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ÖF-IEY(XVTF-9 oi TF- F-Tit E)p(x-Kilý (x(pF-GTCoTF-ý 'AOllv(xi(i)v Kcci flF-pÖtKK(xý 
F- 11-Y(X-Yov -cov ciTpo(Tov, 01 ýlEv XGCXKIbýý vopýOvTeý E'-n't cy(püý np&rov 
OP4,1c7F-Iv 'coloý 'AO-qv(xioi)ý ('-Kcct 6ýta (xi 7uXilatoyü)pot noU-iý (xi), rCov (xi ol, )'K 
ýI. )VETCý7OV 'Kpl)(P(X), IIEPÖI'KK(Xý ÖE nOXE'-ýLIOý ýtF'-V 01'ÜK (-'1)V EX 
-5 Toi) (P(XVF-PO-ýö, (poßol, )ýtF-VOý 8F'- 'K(xi c(i)Täý Tix n(x; ý(xi('x bi('X(popcc To)v A0ilvoci(ov 
KM px F- (X 1 UIG'm ßo")kOýLF-VOý 'Appccß(xiov T o\V Al)'y-KilGTG)v ßc(Cytxý 
n(XP(XCYTIIG(XCYO(xl. 
It was in this manner that Brasidas succeeded in rushing through Thessaly 
before anyone could get ready to hinder him and reached Perdiccas and the 
Chalcidic peninsula. The reason why the people in Thrace 46 had revolted from 
Athens and had, in conjunction with Perdiccas, brought the army all the way 
from the Peloponnese was that they were filled with alarrn at the success of the 
Athenians. The Chalcideans thought that the Athenains would take the field 
against them first, and the cities in this neighbourbood which had not yet 
revolted nevertheless took part secretly in inviting the Peloponnesians to 
intervene. As for Perdiccas, although he was not yet openly hostile to Athens, he 
also was afraid of the long-standing differences between himself and the 
Athenians, and above all he was anxious to reduce Arrhabaeus, the king of the 
Lyncestians. (4.79)47 
This passage is illuminating. Firstly, it allows us to fill in a further reason, in addition to 
the decline in relations with Athens following the Odrysian invasion, for Perdiccas to 
involve himself once again in affairs between Athens and Sparta. Arrhabaeus, the king 
of the Lyncestians, had rebelled from Perdiccas' rule in some way. Again, Perdiccas 
evidently lacked the confidence in his own army to deal with the problem alone. He had 
every reason to fear a revolt by any influential figure in Macedon - Athens had in the 
past showed herself to be very willing to champion any cause which would undermine 
him. With a mind to resolving both the issue of deteriorating relations with Athens and 
46 A, c,,, ain, this indicates the Greek living in the Thracian area as opposed to the Thracians themselves. See 
note 29. 
47 The manner in which Brasidas was able to achieve this invasion is of some interest to our discussion of 
Macedonian foreign policy. Thucydides 4.78 explains how Brasidas' passage through Thessaly was 
negotiated: C> 
III Bpaai8aq 6F'- lcac& rO'v oc-brO'v Xp6vov TOb OCPOI)ý IEOPE1L)%IEVOq ET[U(X'KO(FlOtq ICCCi X 
I 
tkiotq 
onki, roctq E-'q 'rec Elci apaKTiq EnE18ý F'-yE'vF-, co ýv 'Hpaickeicc -cl- TpccXivt imi, EV 
71po7IE[tW(XvToq CCloTOI) (x77F-kov i; (D('xpcy(xkov 7rccp& Toi)q E'-7rtTTjýF-io-o;, 6c4Lobv-coq &6c, [F-tv 
c ECCIOTOV -K(Xi Ti V (Y'rPCC-Ct('XV 
... fiyov 
8F- -K(xi C"CXAot Orcacycck6v cc-6, co'v mxý F'--K A(xpi(TTI; Nucovikcq TI 
I-lF, p8i'K'KqC bUITT'18EIOq 6V. 
About the same time in the course of this summer, Brasidas, who was on his way to Thrace with 
one thousand seven hundred hoplites, reached Heracleia in Trachis and sent forward a messenger 
to his friends at Pharsalus requesting them to conduct him and his army through... He was 
conducted by several Thessalians also, among whom were Niconidas of Larisa, a friend of 
Perdiccas. 
This mention of Perdiccas' influence in Thessaly is supported by 4.132, where Thucydides notes that 
Perdiccas was able to work in conjunction with "his friends in Thessaly, with whom he was always on 
good terms" to prevent the passage of Spartan reinforcements through Thessaly. Relations between the 
Macedonian royal house and Thessaly, specifically the noble Aleuadae of Larisa ( of who it seems likely 
that Niconidas was a member) offer much scope for further study. We might compare these two instances 
of coordination of foreign policy with those during the Persian Wars, discussed in the previous chapter. Cý L- 
Archelaus' betrayal of some Thessalians, most probably the Aleuadae, is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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i 
the problem with Arrhabaeus, Perdiccas 
designed to woo Sparta into the north. 
had launched into a round of diplomacy 
Through this diplomacy, Perdiccas was able, as we are informed b the passage quoted 117) y 
above, and by 4.78, to work in conjunction with the Thessalians and the Chalcideans to 
persuade the Spartans to undertake the lengthy march to Macedon, and to ensure their 
safe passage through Thessaly. A direct result of his actions, as we are informed by 
4.82, was the declaration of war on Perdiccas by Athens. The potentially valuable 
relationship between Perdiccas and Athens, which had, in name if not in spirit, survived 
the attack by Sitalces, officially came to an end in 424. 
Brasidas' immediate concern in Macedon, to Perdiccas' mind, was to resolve the 
problem presented by Arrhabaeus. However, 4.83 reveals that, from the outset of the 
relationship, Brasidas' ideas regarding the object of their joint campaigns did not 
necessarily tally with Perdiccas'. 
I PÖ'K'K(Xý 8' BP(X0t8(XV KM TljV (YTP(XTIC(V e'O'ý k(Xß'V ýigT' T% 'CCI)Toi) -lE I F- 10 10 (1) U F- 
CYTP(X'TF-1, )r-l ent 'App(xß(xiov TO' v Bp%tzpoi) AI)'YKTI(YTCOV 
M(X-KF-ÖOVCOV ß(X(5tk£'-(X öýLOP0V O'VT(X, ÖICC(POP&ý TE C(i)TCO OUCTlý 'KM 
ßO-OkOýtEVOý KCtT(XCYTPENI(XCYO(Xt. E'IZEI ÖF'- V(E'VET0 Vi) OTPOCTý) ýLEM TOI, ) 
3/ Bp(x(Ytöol) E7C1 Tfi e'aßokfi Týý At), y-Kou, Bpecct'ö(xý ko70iý E(Pil ßoi)XECYO(xt 
7CPCOTOV F'-XOC\ÜV llp0\ noUýLou 'Appecß(xiov ýloýtýMY, 0v A(XKF-ÖcctýLOVIO)v, c-'cv 
81Ü'VIIT(Xt, 7[OtllGCCt. KM 7(XP Tt K(Xt\ 'Appaßaioý ETOIýtOý WV 
Bp(xcyiÖcc ýtF-Go) Öt-Koc(: iTin eTctcpF-icF-tv- 1<cct 01 X(xlKtöe'_COV rp2'-cßp-tý 
ý1)ýimpov, rEý F-Öt'b(XG'KOV OC'()TO'V ýtil lc, )7CF-ýF-Xeiv TCO rlgpÖiKxa T('X ÖF-IV('X, etV(x 
np001, )ýLO'CE-'p(p £'-'XOIF-V MXI Eý Tä F'-(X1)T(i)V XpýCOUt. be' TI 'K(X\t F-tpll-Keaecv 
TOXATOV Oli IUCCP(\X TOi) rlF-PÖI'K'KOI) E'V Tfi ACC-KFÖCCt'ýtOVt, (0ý ICOUÄ\X CC1-)TOiý TCOV 
'\ 
Co D-- 
l[Ept ccil), Tov xcüptcov 410, ýtýM)cU IEOIIICYOI, WCYTE EK TOI) Tot01. )TO'L) Kotv11 ýLCXXXOV 
o Bpccatöccg T(\x Tob 'Appccß(xiol, ) liýtolo np(xaaF-tv. I-IF-PÖt'-K-Kocý Öc\ O`UTE 
öt-KCCCY, zl\lv F, -, (pll 
BPCCCYt'Öccv T(i)V (Y9F-Tep(ov Ötcc(Popcov (, x7(X'YF-iV, 4&Xý. OV Öe\ 
j\ 1\j, ö-L-K, , (X 'To£ n noxeýLI(ov oc ilaetv TE EI KOCO(XtpgTllv cov (XV (xioToý (XIE0(Pcctvl 9 -k) TPF-(POVTOý TO 11ýt101) TOlL) cyTpccToü 41, )vF-cyTcct 'App(xßoct'co. 0 ÖF\- ('X'KOVTOý Km EK 
rcelGoelý Toiý ko^fotý TIIV (JTP(Y. Ttccv 
7[Pt\V E'(Yß(XXF-iV E'ý Tl\IV XCOP(XV. rlgpÖtK-K(Xý Ög\ ýtET6 TO£)TO Tpt/TOV ýtF-'poý ('Xvo' 
11ýttCYF-Oý Tfiý TPO(pfiý F'-8't50'0, VOýt'Iý(1)V ('XÖIKF--t000Ct. 
Perdiccas immediately took Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, 
and made an expedition against Arrhabaeus, son of Bromerus, king of the 
Lyncestian Macedonians, for he had a quarrel with him and wished to subdue 
him. But when he and Brasidas arrived with their combined armies at the pass 
leading to Lyncus, Brasidas said that he wished, before appealing to arms, to 
have a conference with Arrhabaeus and make him an ally of the 
Lacedaemonians, if he could. For it seemed that Arrhabaeus had made some 
overtures and was ready to submit the question at issue to Brasidas' arbitration; 
the Chalcidean envoys who were present also kept urging him not to remove the 
difficulties from the path of Perdiccas, since they wished to have in him a more 
zealous helper in their own affairs. Furthermore, the envoys of Perdiccas, when 
they were at Lacedaemon, had given a hint to the effect that he would bring 
many of the places in his neighbourhood into alliance with the Lacedaemonians; 
consequently Brasidas was inclined to insist upon having a freer hand in dealing 
with Arrhabaeus. But Perdiceas said that he had not brought Brasidas to be a 
judge of their quarrels, but rather to be a destroyer of any enemies whom he 
himself might designate, and that Brasidas would do wrong if, when he himself 4- 
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maintained half the army, he should parley with Arrhabaeus. But Brasidas, in 
spite of Perdiccas and after a quarrel with him, held the conference and finding IIZ: ) 
11 ading his the king's arguments convincing, withdrew his army without inv i 
country. After this Perdiccas contributed only a third instead of half of the 
maintenance, considering himself to be aggrieved. (Thucydides 4.83) 
The initial attempt at collaboration, then, came to something of an anticlimax. Rather 
than having a Spartan army which he could simply point towards his adversaries and 
consider responsible for their elimination, as he had apparently hoped and expected, 
Perdiccas had been firmly reminded that solving his own internal concerns were not the 
objective of the Spartan force in Macedon. 
This outcome, however, was not entirely without benefits for Perdiccas. As Gomme 
notes, on Thucydides' statement that Perdiccas, following this "campaign, " continued to 
pay a third of the army's expenses: 
Why did he continue to supply any? Brasidas was persuaded by Arrhabaeus' 
promises; which will then have included an agreement that Arrhabaeus would 
not do anything that would injure the joint plans of Perdiccas and himself, and in 
particular not take any steps against Perdiccas - terms in fact rather favourable 
to the latter as perhaps he had grudgingly to admit. (p551) 
Gomme is certainly -correct in reading some recognition of acceptance into Perdiccas' 
continued contribution to the army's maintenance. The precise terms which were 
arrived at between Brasidas, Perdiccas and Arrhabaeus, however, are unknown - what 
does seem clear is that the problem posed by Arrhabaeus was, at least temporarily, 
shelved as a direct result of Brasidas' arbitration. Perhaps Perdiccas and Brasidas 
reached some kind of private agreement by which Brasidas agreed to put a more 
permanent end to the problem in Lyncestis before leaving Macedon. Certainly the 
subsequent attack upon Lyncestis in 423 seems to have been undertaken without any 
48 further provocation from Arrhabaeus . 
Whatever the exact terms of the withdrawal from Lyncestis, the subsequent co- 
operation of Perdiccas with the Spartan war effort in the north, coupled with Brasidas' 
brilliance as a general, bore fruit, During the summer of 424, Brasidas persuaded 
Acanthus and Stageirus to revolt, and during the following winter delivered a body 
blow to Athens with the capture of Amphipolis. 
There is no mention of any military participation from Perdiccas during these 
campaigns, save for a brief notice at 4.107 that "Perdiccas also arrived directly after the 
capture [of Amphipolis] and worked in co-operation with Brasidas. " On the betrayal of 
Amphipolis, however, Thucydides informs us that: 
ý(Yav y('Xp 'Apy-LXto)v rF- cv avrfi ot'-Ki', ropF-q (Fiat 
5F- ot' 'Apyt'Xtot 'Av8p't(I)v 
(Xlrot, Kot) I-C(Xl' ('X'xxot O'L' ýlL)VE'-TCP(X(TGOV T(A)T(X, 01 ýLF'-v rlF-p8, t-KKq TIEW%tEvot, 
Oct 6F'- X(Xi%'Kl6F-i)(TIV. 
48 Thucydides 4.124 ff and below for discussion. 
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Those who were plotting with him [Brasidas] were some settlers from Argilus, a 
colony of Andros, who lived in Amphipolis and who were supported by others 
too who had been won over by Perdiccas or the Chalcideans. (4.103) 
We might theorise that, besides making a substantial financial contribution to the 4: -: ) 
Spartan presence in Macedon, Perdiccas had also been engaging in diplomacy on 
Brasidas' behalf. The modem viewpoint, which is most dismissive about Perdiccas' 
contribution to Brasidas' success in the north 49 therefore ought not to be accepted 
unquestioningly. The potential of an alliance between a co-operative Macedonian king 
and a vigorous and brilliant Spartan commander, both aiming at eliminating Athenian 
influence in the north, was potentially fatal to Athens' presence there. Brasidas' 
successes there, especially the loss of Amphipolis, are noted by Thucydides as a main 
factor in the armistice between Athens and Sparta in the spring of 423. 
The brief armistice did little to slow the progress of Brasidas in the north, but a serious 
rift between Brasidas and Perdiccas put a permanent end to their potentially powerful 
alliance. During the period of the armistice, Perdiccas and Brasidas launched a second 
attack upon Lyncestis ( perhaps, as suggested above, as the fulfilment of an agreement 
contracted on the occasion of the previous expedition) which culminated in the 
severance of the alliance between them. Thucydides 4.124 informs us that a large force 
(in excess of 4,000 men) led by Perdiccas and Brasidas, assembled in Lyncestis, where 
they found the Lyncestians gathered and ready to confront them. After an initial victory 
to the Spartan and Macedonian force, they agreed to put off a further encounter until 
they were joined by Illyrian mercenaries recruited by Perdiccas. These, however, 
defected, and joined Arrhabaeus, causing a panic amongst the Macedonians. They fled, 
followed by Perdiccas. The Spartans won the following encounter, and took revenge 
upon the Macedonians, whom they considered to have deserted, by killing their cattle 
and appropriating any equipment they came upon during their return march. Thucydides 
4.128 tells us of the impact these actions had upon the relationship between Perdiccas 
and Brasidas: 
WCO TOUTOIL) TE 7TP(, ), rov rlF-p6Ucwccq Bp(x(YI6(xv TF- TcoXF'-[LLOV Ev%tt(YE K(Xl Eq To 
xol7rO\v rIEXOTEOvvll(ylwv Ti I 
,q 
8t' 'AOqv(x'o-L); o' 4'v-qOE; [tiao; ,Q ýLtv Yv(%ti 1 1) 11 C/ F-tXF-, TCOV 6E\ CCV(XY-KCCt(OV 41, )ýUPOPWV 6t(XVCC(YrC\C; E'7tp(X(T(TF-V OT(j) TPOTC(O 
'rOCXI(Y'TCC TOiq ýIF\-V 4l0RpljGF-TCCt, TCOV 8F\- C'CTCCCXXC'C4F-'CCCt. 
It was because of this that Perdiccas came to regard Brasidas as an enemy and to 
feel towards the Peloponnesians a hatred that scarcely fitted in with his anti- 
Athenian policy. He now departed from the necessary implications of this and 
set to work to get rid of the Peloponnesians as soon as possible by coming to an 
arrangement with Athens. 50 
It seems likely that the agreement made at this juncture is that preserved by IG 1.2 71. 
The dating of this decree has been the cause of much scholarly debate, due to the 
various possible restorations of the text of the decree. Meritt et al restore the names 
49 See for example Cole pp67 ff and P. A. Brunt 1965 p275. 
50 In the context of this renewed alliance with Athens, we find Perdiccas at 4.132 once again exerting hi z: 1 is 
influence in Thessaly to prevent Spartan reinforcements from reaching Brasidas. See note 47 for some 
comments on this episode and its implications for our concept of Perdiccas' foreign policly. 
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Philip and Amyntas to line 52 and on the basis of this date the treaty to "some time 51 52 before 433, while Hammond, at the other end of the spectrum, dates it to c 415 . 
Two main considerations make 423 the most likely date for this inscription. The first is 
the inclusion of the name of Arrhabaeus in an undamaged segment of the stele. While 
the fragmentary nature of our evidence regarding Macedon under the reign of Perdiccas 
means that we cannot rule out the possibility of an earlier or later date at which 
Arrhabaeus was a cause for concern for Perdiccas, thus necessitating his inclusion a 
treaty with Athens, the recent confrontation with him makes it likely that some 
settlement with him needed to be reached. The sudden parting of the ways between 
Perdiccas and Brasidas had left the situation in Lyncestis unresolved. The inclusion of 
Arrhabaeus in IG 1.2 71 alone suggests a date at which he had given some cause for 
concern an in 423 such an event was very recent. 
Further, IG 1.2 71 contains a clause 53 in which the Macedonians swear to sell timber 
only to the Athenians. Hoffman 54 sees this as an indication that Macedon was in a 
position of weakness when she made the treaty, and uses this as an argument on which 
to reject 423 as a possible date. Contrary to his argument, this clause in fact supplies a 
further clue which points us towards a date of 423, rather than away from it, as a detail 
of Thucydides' narrative at 4.108 indicates. Immediately after the fall of Amphipolis, 
we find Brasidas engaged in an activity which we might consider to be somewhat 
unusual for a Spartan: "Brasidas sent messengers to Sparta asking for another army to 
be sent out to him, and meanwhile began to arrange for the building of triremes on the 
Strymon. " 
This innovation on Brasidas' behalf came at a moment when the relationship between 
Brasidas and Perdiccas was still intact - indeed Perdiccas had just participated in the 
capture of Amphipolis. If Brasidas was building triremes, it would seem perverse to 
assume that the timber was coming from anywhere other than Macedon. The 
whereabouts of this timber would have been doubly interesting to Athens - first, the 
Athenians would wish to prevent its being supplied to Brasidas, and second, they would 
wish to secure its provision to themselves. Indeed, 423 is the only time at which we 
have any reason to suppose that Perdiccas was supplying timber to anyone but the 
Athenians. In this historical context, then, this clause makes excellent sense. 55 
Considering the track record of such alliances between Perdiccas and Athens, it comes 
as little surprise that, on his next appearance, he has betrayed the alliance and allied 
instead with Argos and Sparta. What exactly caused him to take such a course of action 
is unclear. However, it is likely that by this point in his reign he had grasped that 
Macedon's security was best served by distance from Athens as opposed to proximity to 
her. Perhaps his perception of the course of the war led him to believe that he might 
now safely abandon Athens. If so, he was mistaken - his betrayal brought swift 
51 ATL p 313. 
52 Hammond 1979 ppl. 34-6. See also P. H. Davis 1926 for a further theory as to how the decree ought to C 
be considered, and R. J. Hoffman for the suacestion that it ought to be placed in the context of the alliance L-C) I-- 
between Perdiccas, Sitalces and Athens of 43 1. 
53 Line 23. 
54 p368 
55 Hammond's convincing reconstruction of IG 1.2.71 p136 is as valid for 4223 as it is for the date he 
proposes, c415, and ought therefore to be considered correct if the 
date of 4213 is accepted. Z: ) 
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retribution from Athens, who in winter 418/17 blockaded Macedon, and the following 56 
year used Methone as a base for cavalry raids upon his territory. 
Neither side, however, could withstand the pressure of this situation for long. The 
summer of 414 found Perdiceas assisting Athens in an attempt upon Amphipolis. Again, 
Thucydides fails to inform us of the reasons behind this, Perdiccas' last change of heart. 
It seems, however, that the course of the war had progressed beyond a stage at which 
Sparta considered it worth her while to send assistance to Perdiccas, and perhaps 
pressure from the blockade and the use of Methone as a base against him obliged 
Perdiccas to reconsider his view of Athens. His final alliance and subsequent action in 
conjunction with Athens is his last historical act - he makes no further appearance in 
Thucydides and by the time Xenophon took up the pen, Archelaus was king of 
Macedon. 
As stated at the outset of this chapter, the aim of our discussion of the foreign policy of 
Perdiccas has been to question the dismissive attitude towards its conduct and its impact 
upon Macedon and the other states it involved common to most modem discussions of 
it. This chapter has attempted to illustrate that, far from having "chopped and changed 
all his life ... to no very good purpose"57 he in fact chopped and changed all his life to an 
excellent purpose - to ensure the security of his kingdom and throne. Indeed, it was this 
purpose which constituted the consistent aim of his foreign policy throughout his 
frequent changes of alliance. If viewed in this light, a new theory regarding these 
changes emerges - that they were, in fact, valid and successful responses to the 
challenges presented to his reign as a result of Athenian aggression towards the north, 
and the fluctuations in fortune of both sides in the Peloponnesian war. He retained his 
throne and kingdom against, at times, great odds against him, his one serious sacrifice 
to this cause being, it appears, his credibility in ancient and modem sources upon his 
reign. 
In Chapter 1, under our subsection on Thucydides, we identified a tendency, widely 
recognised in modem sources 58 for Thucydides to express a contemporary fascination: 
that is, man's struggle to impose himself and his rationality over the complex and 
unpredictable set of circumstances in which he finds himself. Far from seeing 
Perdiccas' foreign policy as the undignified scramble from one alliance to another 
which it appears to be in most modem sources, this chapter has sought to illustrate the 
rationality of its pursuit, a point of view which leads us, in conclusion, to draw some 
parallels between Perdiccas' predicament and his response to it during the 
Peloponnesian War and Thucydides' model of the struggle between rationality and 
chaos. In some respects, it could be argued that Perdiccas in fact embodies precisely this 
struggle, and his ability to survive the Peloponnesian War with his kingdom more or 
less intact to be passed on to his son a miniature representation (according to the scale 
of the whole work) of an individual's victory over his circumstances. 
56 Respectively Thucydides 5.83 and 6.7, 
57 See Gornme p201. 
58 See Chapter I for discussion and references. 
61 
01000' 
Chapter 4 
Archelaus the Philhellene, and His Successors 
Given the precedent of the reign of Perdiccas, it might be thought that Macedon under C) 
Archelaus had little hope of prosperity. By the time of the death of Perdiccas, however, 
the greatest threat to Macedon's security, Athens' interest in and ability to interfere in 
her affairs, was greatly diminished, leaving Macedon's new king free to undertake some 
far reaching internal changes which were to have a great impact upon Macedon and her 
relations with foreign states during his reign. This chapter will discuss these changes, 
and consider the extent of Archelaus' philhellenism and its impact upon his reign and 
those of his immediate successors. 
Perdiccas' last appearance in Thueydides' occurred in 414, while his son Archelaus' 
debut in our ancient sources may be dated to 41 1.2 Given that we can firmly date 
IOS4 Archelaus' death to 399, ` the opinion of Syncel that Archelaus' reign lasted fourteen 
years is preferable to either that offered by Eusebius 1.227 which states that it lasted 
seventeen years, or that of Diodorus 14.37.5-7 which gives seven. The date usually 
accepted by modem scholars for Archelaus' accession is therefore 413 B C. 5 
Both the manner in which Archelaus' accession is reported, and the broader political 
circumstances in which it took place are of some consequence to our concept of foreign 
policy during his reign. At the time of his death, Perdiccas had recently made his last 
about face in allegiance, and had joined the Athenian force which was engaged in 
blockading Amphipolis. 6 Archelaus, although never actually assisting Athens in any 
active sense beyond the provision of timber, maintained an alliance with her throughout 
his reign, thereby breaking the general mould created by Perdiccas, who by the time of 
his death had made no less than eight changes of alliance. The consistent nature of his 
friendship with Athens will be discussed at greater length below, but it is worth noting, 
considering that he remained on friendly terms with Athens throughout his reign, that 
the only Athenian source on his accession is markedly hostile. Plato Gorgias 471A-D 
takes Archelaus' case as an example in an ironically phrased argument on the subject of 
happiness and virtue: 
FU2A. 'AikX('x ýte'v Öil 7[Coý 01)-K 6511<0ý; (9 7c 7[PO(YllK9 49v TIlý (XP Tlý OM v 
fiv vüv F'-'XF-t, o'vTt ex 7i)v(xtxoý TI ýv Öol, )kil 'AXKF-To, () TA 1-IF-p5'txKol, ) 
(')c5eX(poi), Kai K(xT('x gEv To' öiK(xtov öof)ý, oý Av 'AÄKF-'Toi), K(xt% ei F, -ßol, )kF-TO 
, c(X 8I'K(Xtcc ItotF-iv, F'-öoll)XF--oF-v ('x\v 'AXK'Ti t\ 10 týt(ov K(XT(X TOV CYOV F- n «x Av e'ö(x' 
Xo'YOV. Vi)V Öe\ coý ('X'OXIOý 79,70vEv, E7UF-l% T(\x g9'71cYT(X 118iKIIKF-V* o% 
79 IZPCOTOV 4EV Toi)TOV (Xl)'CO'V To\V 89cY7I0T1IV K(X\t OF-iov 
3 CCIEOÖCOCYCOV Týv 6pxýV fiv I-IEP8iK'K(Xý (X1)To\v (, X(Pgt; ýETO, 
ýF-Vicaý Km 
K(XTGCýIF-01. )0(Xý (X'L')TOV TE K(xi TO'V i: ýbv 'Aý, F'-ýav8pov, ('xvF-yto'v (xi), roi), 
CYXF-Öo\v llxtxtwzylv, e, -gß(Xk(OV Etiý (C), cýMýav, VI)K'Cwp F'-ýCC7CC70)v ('X7[£-'G(P(XýE'-V ICE 
1 Thucydides 7.9.1-6. 
2 Andocides 2.11, discussed below. 
3 Diodorus 14-37.5-7. 
4 Pp482 and 500, Dindorf edition. 
5 Borza (1990) p162, Errington (1990) p24 and Hammond (1979) p137 
6 See previous chapter for discussion. 
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KM TI(P(XVIGEV Uýt(POTF-Pol-)ý. KM T(Xl, )T(X CCÖIKllcocý F, -, 
ý, (X 0 F- v F-(xljTo, v 
(X0klo)T(xTog 79voýtEvoý KM 01, ) ýLEu-ýLE- XX9C 01 ov 1) POV TOV kil(JEV (xi)Tý), (' 'X y' CTE 
(XÖEX(POV, TO\V 'YVI/CIOV TOf) IIF-PÖI'KKO1) UOV, '9(Xi8(X 0)ý 97tTETII, 01-) Tel ('XpXlj 
F-71, YVETO 'K(XT('Y To, 5'IK(XIOV, 01)K r, z-ß01)x11011 F--O8(Xi40)v 7F-VF-(: iocct ölK(X'10)ý 
2 F-, KopgNf(xg KM 67u0801)ý Ti\IV (, xpxl\IV e'KgiVO), ('X; ý; ý' Eiý (PPF-'(XP 2-'4ß(Xý. (i)V KOU 
1-J, (X7ronvilýuý npäý T'v 4ilTe'-p(x (xi)Tof) KýF-on(x'Tpccv Xilvcc F-(pil Öto')KovT(x ,n 
EýL7UF-CYF-iv KM (, X7C00(XVF-iv. TOtY(X, PTOI Vl, )V, (XTE ýtF-7-L(: YT(X TIÖIICIIKO)ý TO)v EV 
M(xl<Eöoviýx, ('Akto)TaToý F'-(YTIV n(XVTO)v M(X'KEÖOVCOV, (kU, 0 lb K 
el)Ö(Xlgove'CYT(xToý, Km icy(oý F'-'cYTiv öcyTtg 'AOllvccicov 0'Cn0\ (Yo£) c'cp4('xýtEvoý 
C'CV ('Uxoý OCTIGAV M(XKF-Öovcov 'YF-VF-CYO(Xt ýtCxý, 2, ov ök 'ApX£-'X(xoý. 
Polus: Well, but how can he [Archelaus] be other than unjust? He has no claim 
to the throne he now occupies, being the son of a woman who was a slave of 7 Perdiccas' brother Alcetas, and in mere justice he was Alcetas' slave ; and if he 
wanted to do what is just, he would be serving Alcetas and would be happy, by 
your account, but as it is, he has become a prodigy of wretchedness, since he has 
done the most enormous wrong. First of all he invited this very master and uncle 
of his to his court, as if he were going to restore to him the kingdom of which 
Perdiccas had deprived him; and after entertaining him and his son Alexander - his own cousin, about the same age as himself - and making them drunk, he 
packed them into a carriage and drove them away by night, and murdered and 
made away with them both. And after all these iniquities he failed to observe 
that he had become a most wretched person, and had no repentance, but a while 
later he refused to make himself happy by bringing up, as he was justly bound, 
his brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy about seven years old who had 
a just title to the throne, and restoring the kingdom to him; but he cast him into a 
well and drowned him, and then told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in 
and lost his life while chasing a goose. So now, you see, as the greatest 
wrongdoer in Macedonia, he is the most wretched of all the Macedonians, not 
the happiest, and I daresay some Athenians could be found who would join you 
in preferring to change places with any other Macedonian of them all rather than 
Archelaus! 
The use of a philosophical text as an historical source is perhaps problematic, as it 
might be argued that Plato's agenda when presenting us with this information may well 
have differed greatly from that of a writer concerned with presenting an accurate 
historical account. Indeed, the veracity of Plato's account is debatable, as is discussed 
below. The fact remains, however, that in spite of the plethora of examples of tyrants 
7 Plato deliberately underplays the fact that Perdiccas was in fact Archelaus' father, although he refers to 
his brother as Perdiccas' legitimate son. The name of Archelaus' mother, Simache, is provided by Aelian t: ) 
Varia Historia 12.42, which also states that she was a slave. Aelian is gathering a list of noteworthy Cl 
characters reputed to have been of lowly birth and states no reason for his conclusion that Archelaus' 
mother was of servile status. He may have been using Plato as a source, although the fact that he records Z: ' her name, which is not included in the passage from Plato, indicates that on this point at least, Aelian had Z: ) 
a further reference to her which is now lost. Simache's servile status is questioned by Carney (2000) p17, 
who suggests that she may have been mistakenly thought of as a slave through a Greek misunderstanding zNn t= z: 1 
of Macedonian royal poly-amy. This aroument is not acceptable, because several royal wives throughout Z-- C) r) 
the period covered by this thesis were in polygamous marriages, but none other than Simache is L- Z: ) 
considered to have been a slave by Greek sources. In spite of Aelian's support of Plato, it seems likely 
that the allegation of the illegitimacy of Archeiaus' birth and the servile status of his mother are the 
invention of a hostile source, either Plato himself or some other, and contribute to the generally hostile 
picture of him being created in this account. The unlikelihood of Archelaus having been either 
illegitimate or the son of a slave is further discussed below. 
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and rulers who had gained their thrones in a morally questionable manner, Plato settled 
upon Archelaus to exemplify his ideally bad ruler. 
As pointed out above, this version of the story of the accession of Archelaus is 
questionable to say the least. First and foremost, we know that Archelaus was 
designated as a potential heir to the throne as early as 423, assuming that our dating of 
IG L 2.71 is accepted as correct, 8 as his name appears in the context of the alliance 
between Perdiccas and Athens which it records. It seems that this slight upon 
Archelaus' legitimacy has more to do with a desire to cast him in a generally negative 
role that any actual fact surrounding his birth or legitimacy as heir. To what extent any 
such status as heir to the throne existed in ancient Macedon is, of course, debatable. 9 
What does seem evident, however, is that Archelaus is unlikely to have been the 
illegitimate son of a slave whom Plato describes. 
Neither does the account of the murder of Alcetas and Alexander ring true. If Plato is to 
be believed, then Alcetas and Alexander were lured to Archelaus on the pretext that he 
was going to restore to them the arche of Alcetas -a promise which surely could have been made only if Archelaus was on the throne when he made it - otherwise how could he restore an arche over which he had no control? Polus' account is in fact very 
inaccurate. Owing to the impossibility of Archelaus' "restoring" Alcetas' arche unless it 
was his to offer, it is evident that Archelaus' rule was not dependent upon Alcetas' 
death and thus that Archelaus did not murder his way to the throne. Yet that Archelaus' 
throne was gained through Alcetas' murder is the clear implication of Polus' words. 10 
Likewise, the murder of the seven year old son of Perdiccas and Cleopatra is 
unconvincing. If the murder was originally kept secret from the child's mother, are we 
to believe that it has now somehow become public knowledge? The existence of the 
child and his death must have been fact, but the connection to Archelaus must have 
been at best speculative. " Nor is this Plato's only jibe at Archelaus - in fact, he 
emerges from the Gorgias having essentially been held up as the Platonic ideal of a bad 
man. 12 Borza remarks upon this and other hostile traditions, and identifies both 
Archelaus' philhellene tendencies' 3 and his incursion into Thessal y 14 as Archelaus' 
response to general hostility from southern Greece: 
8 Indeed, if our date is not accepted, the alternative date of 431 suggested by some scholars (see previous tý 
chapter for references and discussion) would put Archelaus' recognition as a legitimate member of the 
royal family even earlier. 
9 See for example Greenwalt (1989) for an excellent discussion of this issue. 
10 It is worth noting that Socrates, who invariably emerges as the wisest of Plato's characters, never 
actually agrees with Polus on the subject of Archelaus. 
11 It does not seem right to absolve Archelaus entirely from guilt over these deaths, but the fact that he felt 
the need to consolidate his position by marrying the dowager queen and instituting a purore on potential t; l Cý : Z> CD 
rivals for the throne does not suggest that there was some question over his position on it. Amyntas 111, Clý 
Perdiccas III and Philip 11, all blood relatives of the last reigning kin-, all instituted similar purges, 4: 5 ZD ZD ID 
without provoking comment from the Greeks. It seems that that such behaviour was considered part of 
the course of Macedonian royal politics. But whether or not Archelaus was responsible for these murders 
- and it certainly seems unlikely that he committed them in person - the fact remains that Plato records 
what is quite obviously either in part or in full a fabricated account of the accession of this illegitimate 
son of a slave who murdered his way to the throne. 
12 See E. R. Dodds (1979) p241 for further comment on this point and Aelian Varla HistoriaI4.17 for 
further derogatory remarks about Al-chelaus. C, 13 See Borza (1990) ppl. 71-177 and below for discussion. 
14 Also discussed below. 
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Many Greeks were not persuaded of Archelaus' Greek origins and did not 
welcome his attempts to introduce Hellenism into his court through the 
patronage of Greek artists, thinkers and writers. What the Greek refusal meant to C) 
Archelaus is uncertain. One is tempted to speculate that Archelaus' intervention 
in Thessaly was a demonstration that, in the end, the Greek recognition of 
Macedonian Hellenism was irrelevant before the power of Macedonian arms ... It was not recognition as a Hellene that Archelaus wanted, but respect. Greek 
culture was perceived in the west as a standard by which civilised people 
measured their accomplishments. The adoption of that culture was one means of 
achieving respect. The other was force. (pp176-7) 
While Borza's argument is convincing in some respects, it fails to take others into 
account. The most fundamental of these is the fact that this hostile tradition regarding 
Archelaus appears to have arisen only in the later years of his life, if not actually after 
his death, 15 and is at sharp variance with another far more positive one from earlier in 
his reign. Andocides 2.1 116 writes of a family friendship with Archelaus and, as 
Errington points out, "he clearly would not have wished to boast of this relationship if 
Archelaus had not been persona grata in Athens" (p24). Archelaus received high praise 
indeed from ThucYdides at 2.100: 
Koci oi ýt9v M(x-KF-80vp-ý oiL), rot 0xX0i) cyTpccToo cc81, )vccTot ovuý F, 71tovToý 71 
TE TO'C KCCPTF-PCC XCU TCC TEtXII, O(YCC AV E'V Tý j)p9t, X, 
F-GF-ICOýLtaoll(: yccv. ýv öp\- Ob noUcc, ccxx(\x -, oaTF-Pov ApXE'-X(xoý o fIgpÖtKKol) 
7F-VoýLEVOý Tix vßv OV'U(X EV Tfi Pýx 0')'KOÖO' ýt11GE -K(Xt\ 0,80ioý x«) 
E"TEýtF- K(X't T('XX; ýCC ÖIF-KÖ(Yý111(YF- VX TE 'K(XT(X TOV 710'XF-ýtov 11,7rIcolý 'KM 
C/ 
olzkotý K(X\t Tfi ('X'kkl 'KF-I)fi KPF-i(: ycyovt (X ýuýLnavuý Ot' ('X'XX0t ß(Xcytxfiý 
OKT(i) Ot Izpo (Xil)TO£) 7EvoýUF-VOI. 
The Macedonians of this region, unable to defend themselves against so great an 
invading army, betook themselves to the strong places and fortresses that were 
in the country. These were not many, but subsequently Archelaus son of 
Perdiccas, when he became king, built those that are now in the country, and cut 
straight roads, and in general organised his country for war by providing cavalry, 
arms, and other equipment beyond anything achieved by all the eight kings who 
preceded him. 
The vote of thanks to Archelaus recorded in Meiggs and Lewis 91 also bears witness to 
the fact that official relation with Archelaus, at least early in his reign, were good. 17 
We may therefore note a sharp distinction between the sources which date to Archelaus' 
lifetime, and those which follow it. ' 8 This chapter will suggest that the reasons for this 
change may in some part lie with Archelaus' foreign policy. As outlined in the abstract, 
the increased stability which characterised the situation of Macedon during Archelaus' 
15 Plato was writing in the years following Archelaus' death, and Aelian not until the first century AD. zl_ C) 16 Discussed below. 
17 Although see below ( note 20) for some reservations regarding, the use of this decree as evidence. t, Cý 18 Although Rusten 1989 points out that "the finality of Thucydides' Judgement suggests that it was C) i Cý ZND 
written after Archelaus' death in 399" (p244). While Rusten's observation is worth taking into account, 
this is by no means certainly the case: Thucydides is, after all, referring to a certain group of reforms, 
those embracing the construction of roads and the improvement of equipment, which had evidently been r_- 
completed at the time of Thucydides' writing. Indeed, Hornblower (1991) points out that there is no other C, I 
evidence that Thucydides was writing during the fourth century (p376). C) C) 
65 
0000, 
reign allowed him to consolidate Macedon's defensive capacity, improve its financial 
situation, and ultimately develop its military force to the extent that it was able to 
intervene, for the first time in the period covered by this thesis, in Greek affairs. The 
sharp change in the tradition regarding Archelaus may to some extent be considered as C) reflecting this actual change in Macedon's capacity, mirroring the Greek negativity 
towards the idea of a stable and potentially powerful Macedon. ' 9 
Having considered the events surrounding the accession of Archelaus, we might then 
return to a discussion of his foreign policy during the early years of his reign. A passage 
from Andocides informs us that Archelaus supplied timber to Athens around the 
beginning of his reign. Addressing the Athenians, he says: 
ockk' ainimx ýtýv u6, uF- F-i(Tijycc7ov F-i; ri'lv cyrp(xTt&v j)ýtcov oý6(7(xv ýv 1&[t(p 
K(J)Tcý(X;, T6)v TETP(XKOcyi(Ov ý811 T& TCP&W(XTOC ýA&&- K(xTF-tk7l(p6'r(Ov, 6vro; 
[tot 'ApXF-, k&o-u ýývou 7c(xcptKof) imi 8t86vTo; AýLVECTO(Xi 'CE Kai ý467F-(YO(Xt 
67c6cyou; ýPou/M[vqv. Toý), rou; rF- F-iCY117(x70v TOU; KO)IEF-(X;, K(xt TUXPOV Rot IUýVTF- 6paXýVbV TýV TtýIýV (Xi)UCOV &4CCOOM ObK ýOýkq(T(X RP&4(X(70(Xt nkgOV 
(6)c 6cyo-L) ý[toi imrkTr-qcT(xv... 
I at once proceeded to supply your forces in Samos with oar spars - this was 
after the four hundred had seized power at Athens - since Archelaus had hereditary connections with my family and offered me the right of cutting and 
exporting as many as I wanted. And not only did I supply the spars; I refused to 
charge more -for them than they had cost me, although I might have obtained a 
price of five drachmae apiece. 20 
It is difficult to know how this move ought to be interpreted. At a superficial level, it 
appears that Archelaus is acting as a genuine ally to Athens, supplying her with timber 
and, if we accept Meiggs and Lewis' restoration of their decree 91, allowing her to 
construct ships on his territory, perhaps on the Strymon, as the Spartans had planned to 
do in 424.2 1 However, at least two factors in Andocides' statement indicate that 
Archelaus' interest in exporting timber to Athens was influenced by more than a purely 
selfless desire to help them. The first of these factors is a small point. Andocides' 
statement implies that Archelaus granted him permission to cut timber more because of 
the guest friendship between their families than out of any political inclination towards 
22 the democratic fleet at Samos . Perhaps Andocides emphasised this point because of 
19 This idea will be further discussed below in the context of Archlaus' innovations in Macedon and 
intervention in Thessaly. 
20 Andocides 2.11. Meiggs and Lewis 91 records a decree in which the Athenian people thank and honour Z-1 C) 
an individual for the provision of timber to their fleet. The name "Archelaus"as the name of the man to 
whom a proxenos kai eurgetes is awarded as restored by them, and they date the decree to 407/6 
accordingly. If their restoration is accepted, this decree could be associated with the same transactions 
involvinc, timber described by Andocides. On the other hand, the decree is extremely fragmentary and 
even the restoration of the name "Archelaus" is uncertain. As a result it is unwise to regard this decree as 
a firm basis upon which much discussion may be built. 
21 s ee previous chapter for discussion of this episode. 
22 Errinorton (1990) p '224 rightly notes the distinction between the democratic fleet, to whom Archelaus L- C) 
supplied the timber. and the oligarchic party which held Athens at the time. If we chose to accept the C) 
restoration of Meiggs and Lewis 91 as evidence on Archelaus, discussed above in footnote 1-0, we might C)C71 ZD 
note that the inscription constitutes a full democratic decree, which might support the idea that it was the Zý 
democrats as opposed to the oligarchs who could claim Archelaus' political affiliation, if indeed any such Z-- II 
detailed interest in the situation in Athens might be attributed to him. C) 
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his own agenda in this speech, but all the same it implies that Archelaus felt more 
bound by this personal tie that by the terms of allegiance with Athens. 
Additionally, Andocides makes it clear that Archelaus charged a price for his timber 
which was lower than that which could potentially have been obtained - but that some kind of financial transaction took place is evident. We might consider, then that this 
apparent early act of good will towards the democratic fleet at Samos was tempered by 
at least two factors other than simply fulfilment of the terms of an alliance -a personal 
motivation, in the friendship with Andocides, and a financial one too . 
23 To some extent, 
then, Archelaus was capitalising upon Athens' situation in the war. To what degree this 
financial opportunity influenced his decision to assist Athens and to what degree it 
sprang from a genuine desire to help her is unclear. However, the example of his 
father's reign must have taught Archelaus that a powerful Athens with a healthy fleet 
was not a positive thing for Macedon. It would be unwise to consider any move on 
Archelaus' behalf to foster the growth of Athens' fleet as being born of purely altruistic 
motives. This being the case it would be unwise (in spite of the effusive terms of 
Meiggs and Lewis 91, if their restoration of Archelaus' name is accepted and he is thus 
considered to be the honorand) to interpret Archelaus' willingness to assist the fleet as 
an uncomplicated display of pro-Athenian fervour. A hard-headed recognition of the 
financial benefits to Macedon in this opportunity to market her natural resources might 
be detected beneath it. 
Equally ambiguous are his first military dealings with Athens. Diodorus has this to say Z7-) 
about Archelaus' activities during the year 41OBC: 
'ApXcX(xoq 6' o cCov Mcc-KF-6ov(, )v rCov ri 6v(xt( 'cTcF lo 'U(O 1) t)v c -loo v v, 
Tuoxxfi 81-)V('XýtEl TI)v Iroxtv TEF-PtF-(TTPCCCOTEE'-8F-1)(TF-V- IC(XPF-PO'011(YF, 6' (X^U''UCO KCdt 71 
OIJP%tE'Vlj; F'-'X(I)V U'UOXOV' O"q XPOVtý01')(Tlj; Tfi; JTOXWPKICCý (')ClrF'-7rxF-, L)(YF-V Elq 
E)poC-Kllv Tcpo,; Opaal)poukov To, v (, X(Plj-joljýtEvov Tob (TToko-L) n(xvToq. 0 ýtF-v 
o-ov ApXE-'?, (xoq (PtXO'Ut[tOTFPOV IrAtOPKý(FCCq 'TýV rll, )8VCCV 'K(Xl' -KP(XTII(T(Xq 
C, ,,, " occk, TuTlq c, 6tcc. ýLET PKt(YEV (Xl, )T-QV CCTCO (X coq FtKO(Tt (Tr(x 
Archelaus, the king of the Macedonians, since the people of Pydna would not 
obey his orders, laid siege to the city with a great army. He received 
reinforcements also from Theramenes, who brought a fleet; but he, as the siege 
dragged on, sailed to Thrace, where he joined Thrasybulus, who was in charge 
of the entire fleet. Archelaus now pressed the siege of Pydna more vigorously, 
and after reducing it he removed the city some twenty stades distant from the 
sea. (13.49.1-2) 
Two separate elements seem to be present here - the cooperation between Archelaus 
and Theramenes, the Athenian general, seems to have been the result of a genuine 
23 This last might go some way towards explaining a puzzling development in the standards used in C Z:, Z:, CD 
Macedonian coinage during Archelaus' reign (further discussed below). Head (1887) notes (p194) that C) Cý Z-- 
Archelaus' staters were chanaed to conform to the current Persian standard, while the laraer Macedonian C, z: I 
coins which conformed to the Attic standard (used by both Alexander I and Perdiccas) were discontinued. 
Given that the timber trade was based on a very simple economic structure - that is, Archelaus was 
selling and Athens buying, we might suggest that the revenue that this brouaht into Macedon from C) C) tý InC) Cý 
Athens rendered it unnecessary for Archelaus to produce coins to the Attic standard himself. See below 
for further discussion. 
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commitment to the alliance, 24 and yet Diodorus' account leaves us in some doubt as to 
the precise nature of the operation. We note that it was only after the departure of the 
25 Athenian general that Archelaus "pressed the siege of Pydna more vigorousl Y I'D 
reduced the town, and moved it inland -a gesture which recalls both Perdiccas' 
relocation of the Chalcidic cites away from the coast in 432 to remove them from the 
threat of Athenian naval attacks, and hints at a recollection of Athens' interest in Pydna 
later in the same year. 26 Whether or not Archelaus' actions here were indeed born from 
a suspicion of Athens, perhaps even a suspicion of the motivations behind Theramenes' 
assistance, we may only speculate, but, as discussed in the previous chapter, his father's 
reign had given Archelaus ample examples of Athenian duplicity and it is certainly 
conceivable that the legacy of the stormy relationship between Perdiccas and Athens 
was felt to some degree during the early years of his son's reign. 
The fact remains, however, that all of Archelaus' actions so far in his reign were at least 
nominally pro-Athenian, and if indeed this note of suspicion may be detected in his 
early foreign policy, it was not destined to taint the remainder of his relationship with 
her. Meiggs and Lewis 91, which might be accepted at least at a general level in terms 
of the evidence it provides, speaks of ship building in Macedon and votes proxenia kai 
euergetes to a Macedonian and his sons, possibly but not definitely Archelaus himself. 
At any rate, the connection with Macedon is beyond doubt. As noted above, this decree 
is dated by Meiggs and Lewis to 407/6, a full four years after our initial notice from 
Andocides that some trade in timber had begun. Whether or not this trade was 
continuous throughout this period, it seems at any rate to have established some basis 
for friendly relations. Archelaus consistently refrained from engaging in any hostile act 
against Athens throughout his reign, in spite of the revolt from Athens by various of her 
allies in the north, her eventual defeat in the Peloponnesian war three years after this 
decree was passed, and the intervention of Persia on behalf of Sparta. 27 Archelaus' 
fidelity to this strategy marks a complete departure from the foreign policy of Perdiccas, 
who exploited every opportunity to deflect Athens' attention away from his own 
territory and whose alliances with her were almost invariably short-lived. The most 
obvious reason behind this change in policy is the fact that, following the defeat of the 
Sicilian expedition in 413,28Athens' capacity for interference in affairs in the north was 
limited. This being the case, she focused her attention instead upon the Hellespont, and 
area more crucial to her corn supply and thus her war effort. The deaths of Cleon and 
Brasidas and the loss of Amphipolis had seen the end of any large scale military activity 
in the area of Macedon and meant that the progress of the Peloponnesian war need not 
entail a defensive foreign policy for the reigning Macedonian king. 
To a large degree, then, the practicalities of Archelaus' situation released the pressure 
on his relationship with Athens. Whether his provision of timber, his refraining from 
participating in any hostile activity towards her, and his interest in Athenian culture 
ought to be read as a genuine benevolence towards Athens, or whether it should be 
considered to be a more self-interested inclination towards capitalising upon her need 
24 Although Hammond suggests (p137) that it may have come about through leverage applied by L, Z->I=l C) Z: ) 
Archelaus through the Macedonian timber supply. Zý 25 Although Borza reaches the conclusion that "the Athenian reinforcements turned the tide" (p162), 
Diodorus quite explicitly states that this was not so. 
26 See previous chapter for discussion. 
27 See the accounts of Thucydides book eight and Xenophon Hellenica books one and two. 
28 Thucydides book seven. 
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for timber and patronising the arts and artists available to him will be discussed at 
greater length below. 
Macedon Under Archelaus 
In spite of the fact that the Peloponnesian War itself no longer occupied the Macedonian 
army, troubles on the home front required their attention. We learn of one such occasion 
from Aristotle's Politics when he informs us of the reasons for Archelaus' 
assassination: 
noý. X(xi 8' 
/ 
OF'-CYE tý 7F-'YF-VllvT(Xt Kat' öt('X 'co, F-tiý To, CYCOýt(X octaxf)V(Xt -c Co v 
gov(, xpx(J)v TUCCý. OIOV Kal' Ij Kp(xu(xio-o etiý 'ApyF'-X(xov- cct'Ft' 7C'cp ß(xpF-'(oý etxü 
71poý TIIV oýttxt, (XV, o)'GTE iK(Xvij KM E9 2-VETO Itpo XCCTTO)V ('X'V 7' (P(Xatý-(X 51oTt 
T(i)V 01, )7(XTF, -pcov 01)89ýtt'(XV F'-'8(üxcv oýto; 
ý0'YAG(Xý (Xil)Tý), (, XA, »k, (, x TIIV ýtF-v 
npoTF-P(xv, KUTEX0gEvoý Uno noXE-ýIO1L) ItpOý Et'pp(XV KM \ 'AppC'Cßcctov, 9'8o)-KF- 
, rCo ßcccyt; ýF-i T(i) Tfiý 'Eý, týtFt'ccý, Ti\lv U- vFo), rF-pccv [CO Ut'F-i 'Agi)vT(x, otoýtF-voý 
01)'TCOý CCV FKF-tvOv ilKtcyTcc Ötcc(pF-pF-cYO(xt Kcct\ To\v e'-, K Tijý KXF-onccTpccý- 
Many risings have also occurred because of shameful personal indignities 
committed by certain monarchs. One instance is the attack of Crateuas on 
Archelaus 
'29 for he was always resentful of the association so that the smallest 
excuse became sufficient, or perhaps it was because he did not give him the 
hand of one of his daughters after agreeing to do so, but gave the elder to the 
king of Elimea when hard pressed in a war against Arrhabaeus, and the younger 
to his son Amyntas, thinking that thus Amyntas would be less likely to quarrel 
with his son by Cleopatra... (1311 B) 
Aristotle's brief notice here is the only evidence we have at all on the subject of this 
war. However, from the information he provides, we can ascertain that Archelaus, like 
Perdiccas, was troubled by uprisings of some sort from Upper Macedon, namely 
Lyncestis, as the Arrabaeus mentioned here is almost certainly the king of that name 
against whom Perdiccas and Brasidas joined forces. It is possible that this war also saw 
the beginnings of trouble from Elyria for Macedon, troubles which would continue into 
the reign of Amyntas 111.30 
It is impossible to date this war, beyond saying that that it is likely to have occurred 
before Archelaus' incursion into Thessaly, which probably took place right at the end of 
his life '3 
1 because it seems evident that Archelaus would not have intervened in 
Thessaly had his own country not been secure. Equally, the period around 410 seems 
unlikely, as this was the time at which Archelaus was concerning himself with 
suppressing and re-establishing Pydna. Some point between 409 and c400 thus seems 
the most reasonable date. Perhaps a later date is to be preferred, given that the motive 
behind Crateuas' assassination of Archelaus is connected to these marriages. 
29 The assassination of Archelaus by Crateuas and his associates will be discussed below. 
30 See the followinc, chapter for a discussion of the war with Illyria of 393BC, and the possibility that 
Sirras, the king mentioned here, was in fact an Illyrian king. This identification is by no means certain, Cý 
however, and discussion of it will be postphoned until it may be considered in the ll(),,, ht of Amyntas' 
marriage to Eurydice, who is often named as an Illyrian princess by ancient sources. 
31 See below for discussion. 
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To resolve the situation with Lycestis which he now faced, Archelaus resorted to a time 
honoured practice for the Macedonian court -b ibery through marriage alliance. It i 171 4--: ) 1 is not clear whether the king of Elimea was bribed into abandoning an alliance with 
Lyncestis, out of making an alliance with it, or into forming an alliance with Archelaus 
against it. Indeed, the events of this war are very unclear indeed and no firm conclusion 
may be reached on it. It appears, however, that whatever the solution to this problem 
that Archelaus found, it was sufficient to extinguish the rebellion in Upper Macedon, 
because we hear no more about it during the rest of his reign. 
In Spite of this probably fairly small interruption in the peace of Macedon under 3 Archelaus, J2 his reign was considerably more stable and less troubled by conflict, 
whether external or internal, than those of either of the two kings so far studied by this 
thesis. This stability offered Archelaus the opportunity to capitalise upon Macedon's 
natural resources to increase her prosperity and to make some internal changes which 
were designed to consolidate her defence systems and communications and generally to 
shape her into a safer, wealthier, and potentially more powerful state. As this chapter 
suggests that these developments in Macedon's status were to some degree responsible 
for the change in the way in which Macedon and her king were regarded in Greece, 
some consideration of these innovations is necessary. 
Of all the new developments made in Macedon under Archelaus, perhaps the best 
known is his transference of the capita133 from Aegae (modem Vergina) to Pella, 
located further down in the Macedonian plain. No direct statement which names 
Archelaus as the king who was responsible for this move exists in ancient evidence. 
However, the statement of Xenophon 34 that Pella "is the largest of the cities in 
Macedonia" during the reign of Amyntas is generally accepted as evidence for 
connecting Archelaus with the establishment of a capital at Pella, while Aelian Varia 
Historia connects him to the construction of a palace which may be that at Pella: 
' 9ýF 
3x-2 
Y, 0)KP(XTI'Iý 9 -7F-v 
'ApXF-'k(xov eý Tljv otKt'(xv TFZpccKocyl()cý ýtv(xý (XV(XÄA(Y(Xl, 
' ýLEV0V T' V '1-IP(X'Ký, F- ' VIV, "V(X (X 'T' zEbýIV ýLICOMM 0w1 1) ilv -K(XC(XYP(X(Pot, gý F, (XI, )TOV 
5F'-o'L) 8 F- v. 
Socrates said Archelaus had spent four hundred minae on his house, hiring 
Zeuxis of Heraclea to paint it, and nothing on himself. (14.17) 
Whilst neither of these statements proves beyond doubt that Archelaus founded Pella, 
various other factors contribute to the theory that he did. Firstly and perhaps most 
importantly is the fact that he seems to have been the only king who had the stability, 
financial security and comparatively long reign necessary to undertake this task. 
Certainly the kings who came before Archelaus may be ruled out. No source, either 
written or archaeological, suggests that Pella was a major site as early as the reign of 
32 No actual invasion is recorded in any of our ancient sources. 
33 The capital is considered here to be the king's place of residence, and thus the main seat of Macedonian 
government. As is evident from the royal burials situated there, in spite of the relocation of the king's g C) 
idence to Pella, Aegae retained great cultural and religious significance. Hatzopoulos (1987) argues resi Z-- C) C, C- 
that it was Amyntas III and not Archelaus who relocated the capital. However, his argument fails to take C, 
into account the various testimonia (discussed below) to Archelaus' authorship of the move, and, as 
Greenwalt (1999, p163) points out, given the turbulent nature of Amyntas' rule, it seems unlikely that he Z: ) 
could have devoted the attention and money necessary to such a relocation. 
34 Hellenica 5.2-13 
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Alexander 1, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, Perdiccas' reign was 
characterised by fundamental Instabilities both in the security of Macedon itself and in 
that, at times, of Perdiccas' very position on the throne. Archelaus' immediate 
successors, discussed briefly in the latter part of this chapter, were not on the throne 
long enough to make such a fundamental change, and Amnytas III's reign was, as 
pointed out above in note 33, too turbulent for him to be considered a serious candidate. 
35 We know from Strabo that Philip 11 grew up in Pella,. ' and so the move must predate 
his childhood. Through sheer likelihood, then, it seems that Archelaus must be credited 
with the foundation of Pella as the Macedonian capital. 
This supposition need not rest solely upon likelihood, however. A play written by 
Euripides during his stay in Macedon puts the issue beyond reasonable doubt. Various 
fragments of this historical play survive. 
36 From these, it can be gleaned that the play 37 tells a revamped version of the foundation myth of Aegae, in which the founder, 
through no coincidence renamed Archelaus, triumphs over the evil king Kisseus and 
founds a city at the command of Apollo. It is unlikely that this play was written, 
touching as it does upon a theme so important to Archelaus' rule as the relocation of the 
capital, for any purpose other than to celebrate the founding of Pella. 38 
The question which remains to be asked regarding the relocation the capital has been 
raised and discussed in detail by Greenwalt in "Why PellaT . 
39As the topographical 
advantages of this move have been fully set forth there, no in depth discussion of them 
is necessary here. A brief summary, however, reveals that the two main factors in his 
argument deserve some discussion here. He points out that the location of the new 
capital had some bearing upon Archelaus' foreign policy. 
We are informed of the first of these influential factors by Strabo 7 fragments 23 and 
20, which notes the existence of a curious geographical feature: 
1 -05 - rjekkoc e(yrl' [tF-v rýq icc'cr(o Moc-KF-6ovt'(xq ýv BoTrt(xiot K(xCE-IXOV- F-Vrcclj i1v 
lrcck(Xt To 'Uýq MCCKF-60vl(xq xp-q[t(xrt(Trljptov- -qlj4TJ(TF- 'Uilv noktv EK gtKpccq 
(D'ktlrnOq 'EPCC(PF-'; 'V CC ' Tý. E', 'XF--L 6' C"CXP(XV E'V Xt[tVl K(XXO-L) 'VI tt F- 1) 
, 
F- q Aou8', [t ICU 
35 See the following quotation. z: 1 
36 These are published in E. Harder 1985, along with Hygenius test. 7 which summarises its plot. See also 
W. Ridgeway (1926) for some discussion of this play. 
37 The original version may be found in Herodotus 8.137-9 rn 38 On Euripides' presence and work in Macedon, see E. R. Dodds 1944 pp xxxvff. Webster 1967 pp252 ff 
contain some notes upon the context and story of the Archelaos. On Euripides' death there, see Diodorus 
13.103.5. 
39 1999. For consideration of a serious disadvantage to this move, see Borza 1979, which argues that the 4-: ý C) 
Macedonian plain was malarial throughout antiquity. To support his argument, he cites evidence from the 1ý zn 
early twentieth century which shows that malaria was endemic in Greece at that time, and, in the fifth part 
of his article, suggests that the modern climate, which is so conducive to malaria, (or rather, to the 
mosquitos which carry it) were also present in Classical Greece. He cites Jones 1907 and 1909 for an 
impressive collection of ancient testimonia on the disease, commentine, that "it seems ... prudent to 
accept the testimonia of the ancient writers about the prevalence of malaria. It is unlikely that so much 
precise Information could be transmitted about a disease that did not exist. " (pp II If). If this was indeed 
the case, Archelaus evidently felt that the advantages of the site outweighed this factor. z! ) C) 
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Pella belongs to lower Macedonia, which the Bottlaei used to occupy; In early 
times the treasury of Macedonia was here. Philip enlarged it from a small city, 40 because he was reared in it. It has a headland in what is called Lake Ludias.... 
Archelaus, then, deliberately chose a residence which had access to a fortifiable harbour 
and the sea. This fact, taken in conjunction with his modemisation of the coinage 
41 -e system , strongly suggests that Archelaus intended his new capital to 
be moi 
accessible, both physically and economically, to trade and contact with foreign states 
His decision in favour of the specific site of Pella ought to be read in conjunction with 
the method in which it was portrayed during Archelaus' own lifetime, so far as we can 
ascertain what this was from the Euripides play. Issues of ideology are hazy and 
difficult to discuss in terms of the historical facts of foreign policy, but nonetheless 
certain ideological strata may be clearly discerned under Archelaus' decision to relocate 
his palace and court. Evidently, Aegae no longer fitted the requirements of Archelaus' 
design for Macedon. Its lesser degree of accessibility 42 no doubt played some role in 
this move, but perhaps some further threads of association needed to be severed, or 
loosened before Macedon could be shaped into the fresh blueprint which Archelaus 
seems to have designed. Aegae had been the capital of Macedon since ancient times 
and it would be unwise to underestimate the significance of the relocation of the 
residence of the king. The new capital would have more contact with foreign states, and 
was founded, according to Euripides' reworked version of the story, at the command of 
Apollo, a considerably more refined god than those most often associated with 
Macedon, such as Ares and Dion YSUS. 43 The establishment of a new festival to the 
Muses and Olympian Zeus 44 also testify to a desire on Archelaus' behalf to utilise a 
firmly Greek religious system, as does his emphasis on the connection between his 
family and Heracles '45 visible 
in his coin typeS46 and emphasised in Euripides' 
Archelaus. The widely recognised fact that Archelaus did his best to people his court 
with leading figures from Athenian culture completes the image of Archelaus' desire to 
integrate Macedon, led by Pella, into Greece. 47 
If we accept, then, that the refounding of the Macedonian capital was designed to foster 
greater integration with Greece, both literally and ideologically, it is worth considering 
whether the other innovations made by Archelaus could be considered as such too. 
Various modem studies of Archelaus' coinage exi St. 480f these, Greenwalt 1994 is by 
far the most comprehensive, and puts the overall theory that Archelaus' substantial 
4, I 0 Greenwalt (p 16 1) concurs with Hammond (p 147) in identifying the '(x-Kpcc mentioned by Strabo and the 
(p(xpos commented upon by Hecateus Fr 144. Livy 44.46.6-8 also describes the installation at the head of 
the lake. 
41 For discussion of this, see Greenwalt 1994, and, briefly, below. 
42 For the situation of Aegae, see Hammond volume I map 12 and pp156ff. 
43 See Raymond 195 3 pp 113 for a discussion of references to the gods on early Macedonian comage. 
44 Arrian 1.11.1, Diodorus 17.16.3-4. See also A. B. Bosworth 1976 ppI 19-121 for discussion. 
45 Although this was also noted in connection to both Alexander I and Perdiccas. See above, Chapters I 
and 2 for discussion. 
46 See Greenwalt 1994 and Head 1887 for discussion. 
47 For the presence of Agathon at Archelaus' court, see Aristophanes Frogs 85 and Aellan Varia Historia 
2.11. and 13-4. Euripides is also mentioned by the latter, and see W. Ridgeway 1926 
for a discussion of 
Euripides' visit and a bibliography of the ancient sources on his activities and his death in Macedon. t-I 
Aristotle Rhetoric 1398 A attests Archelaus' invitation to Socrates, and its refusal. 
48 See for example U. Westermark 1993 and especially Greenwalt 1994. Hammond 1979 p138 also 
contains a brief survey. 
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chancres to his kingdom, including the relocation of capital and the restructuring of 4n- C) In its defences and military capacity 49 were supported by what essentially constituted a 
revolution in Macedon's minting procedures and oUtpUt. 50 Archelaus' coins were 
minted in good silver 51 by contrast to those of Perdiccas, which had been heavily 
debased. 52 Westermark (ppl8ff) notes a dramatic Increase in the number of dies 
exemplified in hoards of Archelaus' coinage and concludes from her findings that his 
mints must have been considerably more productive than those of Perdiccas. In 
addition, Archelaus seems to have introduced the first token coinage to be found in 
5' Macedon. ' These wide ranging reforms can only be assumed to have had an extremely 
stimulating effect upon the economy of Macedon under Archelaus. Encouraging trade 
with foreign states must have been only one factor in this development. The increased 
revenue which accrued to Archelaus through this and through the increase in coin 
production allowed him to initiate reforms in his defences and his army which made a 
substantial contribution to the development of foreign policy during his reign. We learn 
of further innovations from Thucydides 2.100.1-2 when he describes the invasion of 
Sitalces: 54 
It is evident from this passage that Archelaus' innovations in Macedon were designed 
not only to augment Macedon's trade relations with Greece - he was taking steps 
towards making her militarily viable too. 55 The construction of forts must have made a 
significant contribution to the security of Macedon on two counts. Firstly, they could 
provide shelter for the population in a time of invasion, such as that offered by the city 
56 walls of a Greek city state. Secondly, if manned, they could provide a significant 
defensive system, potentially supplying locations for stores or for fixed barracks. The 
cutting of "straight roads" should be associated with the establishment of these forts, 
would have to have been maintained and been able to be manned quickly - it was 
therefore imperative that Archelaus' forts were connected by roads which could be 
easily travelled by both infantry and cavalry. It seems likely therefore, that the new 
49 Discussed in brief below. 
50 The discontinuation of the heavy standard based upon Athenian weights has been touched upon above. 
Greenwalt 1994 pp113-4 tentatively suggests that the ration of alloy in Archelaus' silver coinage meant C)1-1) tD 
that the actual silver content of his coins was, in fact, approximately interchangeable with the Athenian Z: ý 
weights system. While Greenwalt's theory is ingenious, there is no precedent for this, nor later example Cý ZI) 
to prove that interchangeability which relied upon percentage of alloy was ever used, and this chapter Zý r) 
maintains the theory stated above - that is, that trade with Athens under Archelaus was essentially one 
sided, with Archelaus selling and Athens buying. This would ensure an influx of Athenian coinage into tn 1: ) tl 
the Macedonian economy without the necessity of coins to these standards actually being produced there. 
51 Greenwalt 1994 p 113. 
52 Raymond pp23f and 154. 
53 Greenwalt 1994 pIO8. 
54 Quoted above. Sitalces' invasion is discussed in the previous chapter. 
55 Greenwalt, in "Why Pella? ", p168, plausibly suggests that Archelaus ma have established a permanent y 
engineering unit to cope with the various construction tasks which his new plans for Macedon entailed. Z-- Z: ) 
This is an area which would benefit from some further research, but there may even be a case for 
speculating that Archelaus may have established Macedon's first professional army. The introduction of 
a token currency suggests that there was a market for small denomination coins, presumably generated by 
individual monetary trade. The introduction of a professional army would have meant that there was a 
certain portion of the population which would have been reliant upon purchased goods for their upkeep 
and the two may be thought of as being connected. However, there is no firm evidence on this and in this 
absence these suggestions must remain at a speculative level. C)O 56 See previous chapter for an example of the removal of the populace to fortified positions in the face of 
an invasion. 
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system of forts was complemented by the new system of roads, and likely too that the 57 
new capital, Pella, was included in the network . 
Implicit in Thucydides' description is the assumption that besides constructing these 
forts, Archelaus had the manpower to maintain them as a defensive network. Perhaps an 
increase in the actual size of the Macedonian army ought to be assumed as a further 
branch of these developments. Coupled with the improvements to the army and cavalry 
which Thucydides mentions, we can imagine that that the improvement to the military 
situation of Macedon as a whole must have been dramatic. It is to these improvements, 
no doubt, that we may attribute the calamitous incursion into aggressive foreign policy 
made by Archelaus in the last years of his reign - his incursion into Thessaly. 
The benefits to Macedon from these innovations are not difficult to discern. With the 
example of Perdiccas' reign still fresh in the national memory, containing as it did 
various incursions from Athens, the large scale invasion of Sitalces and internal 
instability in Upper Macedon, the necessity for a better defensive system could hardly 
have been clearer. Contrary to expectation, however, the ramifications of these 
developments were far from positive. 
Thessaly and the Undoing of Archelaus 
Archelaus' intervention in Thessaly is usually dated to the last years of his reign, and 
indeed its connection with his death 58 supports this supposition. Most modem sources 
are dismissive of the importance of this episode, perhaps because the documentation in 
ancient evidence which directly relates to it is limited to a speech of disputed 
authorship 59 and indistinct references to otherwise undocumented events. This chapter, 
however, maintains that Archelaus' intervention in Thessaly constituted a crux point in 
Macedon's relationship with Greece, representing as it did the culmination of the 
military and economic development fostered by Archelaus himself and, to varying 
degrees, the two previous kings discussed by this thesis, and the first instance of the 
shift from defensive to aggressive foreign policy towards Greece. 
Peri Politeias is the transcript of an impassioned speech delivered to the Thessalian 
government by a pro Spartan speaker in an attempt to persuade them, in their present 
state of stasis 60 to turn to the Spartans for assistance and not to Archelaus. Although the 
references are at first oblique, it soon becomes apparent that the force which Pseudo 
Herodes describes as "that which is naturally hostile to this land" is in fact Archelaus 
himself. He describes the cause of the ill feeling between Archelaus and Thessaly thus: 
, rov ccv6p(x Tobrov ol)&, noo, 11[tiv TIOov CGO[tEvov, 0168C 8t(xkxccYT, lv 
i Co 'Xkk' c ticd F-CYO[tEVIJV EICEIV(p 7UPOq 1JR&;. Ol') 'Y('Xp ('X&ICOUREVO; 1)(p' %L V, ( 0' 8V 
po-oko[tevo; E, -Xopo, q IlRiv F-GC-Lv. E, -, Xet RE, -v 'YF- X(op(xv, I'l'v liRiv ot, TI(X-CEPE; 
57 See also Hammond 1979 pl. 40, which suggests, on the basis of Thucydides' terminology here and its CýC> Cý 
similarity to that used at 2.98 to describe Sitalces' construction of a road by cutting through a forest, that 
Archelaus too opened up roads through previously impassable forest land. 
58 Discussed below. 
59 See for example H. T Wade-Gery 1945, which argues that Kritias was the actual author of this text and 
that the version that has survived to us was edited, not written, by Herodes. For the text and a 
commentary on it see U. Albini 1968. 
60 For a discussion of Thessaly during this period of history, see Westlake 1935. z: ' 
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KTTJG&ýLEVOt 7r(Xpý8(j)j4C(XV, ýV 6t& RýV 'T )V J [tErýP(XV &CTOýVEJ(XV 94EI, 516C TI Ti Ti 
6ýmxpv &K(j)v 6cno8kya. 
This man [has never been] a friend to us [and] will never be our friend, nor will 
there be a reconciliation between us. For he... wished to do us wrong through 
hatred. He will hold this territory, which our fathers held as their heritage- 
through the power which he will have on account of our weakness and restore 
[only] on account of our strength. 
The speaker goes on to counsel against trusting in Archelaus, advocating instead an 
appeal to Sparta. Some modem authors read into this speech the implication that 
Archelaos was invited to intervene in Thessaly by the Aleuadae (and indeed, in the light 
Stotle6l of the identification by Ari , of one of Archelaus' assassins being from Larissa, 
the home of the Aleuadae, this seems likely, given that the intervention in Thessaly, 
including the refusal to return Thessalian land which he had been holding is directly 
cited by Aristotle as a motive for Archelaus' assassination) and attribute his withdrawal 
62 from Thessaly either to the threat of Spartan intervention or to Archelaus' death . 
The exact events of this intervention are unclear. From the passage quoted above, and 
from that in Anstotle on Archelaus' death, it seems that Archelaus had come into 
possession of some portion of Thessalian land, although whether this had been handed 
over to him by allies, whose cause he then betrayed by retaining the land for himself, or 
whether he took this land by force from the outset, promising, but not delivering, its 
return to his allies, is unclear. 63 At any rate, it seems evident that, because of the 
increased security in Macedon itself and the improved capacity of his army, he was able 
to take advantage of the unrest in Thessaly to impose himself there. From the option of 
handing the situation over to Sparta, which Pseudo-Herodes supports, it is evident that 
Archelaus' presence there had attracted some attention and concern beyond Thessaly. A 
lack of evidence on the subject prevents us from reaching any firm conclusions about 
precisely what Sparta's interest in Thessaly was at this point, but it certainly calls to 
mind the fact that Archelaus retained his friendship with Athens throughout his reign. 
This intervention represents an important milestone in Macedonian military history. It is 
the first instance we have of an aggressive incursion by a Macedonian force onto 
mainland Greek territory. It could potentially have brought benefits to Macedon in the 
shape of captured territory and the less concrete, but no less real, gain in kudos which 
would have arisen from a successful intervention. In spite of the initial success of 
Archelaus' incursion, however, it proved disastrous for Archelaus himself and had 
serious implications for the relationship between Macedon and Greece, seriously 
damaging the embryonic intimacy which, as argued above, Archelaus' policies to date 
had sought to nurture. 
61 Politics 131 1B. 
62 For example Borza p165 and Hammond pl. 41. 
63 Because Hellanocrates of Larisa is named as one of Archelaus' assassins, it is tempting to speculate 
that Archelaus' involvement in Thessaly came about through the traditional i 
Z=' 
Zý II ties 
between the Macedonian 
royal house and the Aleuadae of Larisa, and suggest that Archelaus might have been invited to intervene C. N: ) Z=ý 
there by that family. For the existance of a long standing connection between the Aleuadae and Arcreadae, Z: ý C 
see the discussion on the ' 
subject, with references, in Chapter 2, and Thucydides 4.78 and 132 and notes 
48 and 51 in Chapter 3. Alexander I was to repeat Archelaus' actions on this occasion some thirty years 
later, with almost identical results; see Chapter 7 for discussion. 
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On a personal level, the intervention in Thessaly proved fatal for Archelaus; it seems all 
64 but certain that his actions here constituted a motive for his assassination . We are informed of this connection by Aristotle Politics 1311 b. Following his account of the 
motivation behind the attack by Crateuas, a favourite of the king'65 Aristotle adds: 
(JUVElt F'-OFTO 8F'- i-ccci 'Eý, ý. ccvoKp('xTilý 0' AuptC7(Xioý Ötex Tljv (X-o'Tljv ociTi(xv » ob ý 
1) 11 lý lo 11) 
0 70cp XPO4LEvoý (X TA Tfi ' XIK, (X 0, K(YTý7F-V c 7[OGXgF-VOýl Öt' e'ßP1V K(X 0, 81, E' PÜ), ulKijv 2'-7U10, Ugi(xv ('t)'F-TO EIV(XI Tijv YF-7FVllýievilv oýtt2,1(xv. 
And Hellanocrates of Larissa also joined in the attack for the same reason; for because while enjoying his favours Archelaus would not restore him to his home 
although he had promised to do so, he thought that the motive of the familiarity 
which had taken place had been insolence and not passionate desire. 
The connection between Hellanocrates' participation in the attack upon Archelaus and his failure to restore him to his home is eXpliCit. 66 This factor ought to be associated 
with the complaint in Pseudo Herodes that Archelaus had taken Thessallan land which he now refused to return. On a personal level, then, Archelaus' aggressive intervention 
in Thessaly was disastrous indeed - it was partly responsible for his death. 
To consider the negative implications of Archelaus' actions in a broader perspective, 
however, we might refer back to the beginning of this chapter, where it was suggested 
that the events of Archelaus' reign so influenced the opinion of him in Greece that the 
attitude towards him in later sources was soured. During the course of his discussion of 
Archelaus, Borza remarks: 
Whatever the nature of his [military] reforms, Archelaus was probably the first 
Macedonian king to think strategically about Macedon's military potential. One 
wonders if, had he lived on, Archelaus might have anticipated Philip's attempt to 
make a permanent settlement with the Greeks. (p. 166) 
It seems possible that the Greeks themselves were also wondering about Archelaus' 
inclination towards what Borza somewhat euphemistically terms "a permanent 
settlement". As this chapter has attempted to illustrate, the reason for this negative 
change in attitude might be found in an examination of Archelaus' foreign policy. It 
could be that, having witnessed the startlingly rapid growth in the Macedonian economy 
and military capacity during Archelaus' reign, culminating in the aggressive 
intervention in Thessaly, Macedon was, for the first time in history, perceived as an 
aggressor towards Greece. 
If this was indeed so, then Archelaus' attempts to render the Macedonian court 
physically, economically and culturally more open to Greece had been undermined by 
64 Carney points out that we should "note that Aristotle insists that this attack was personally motivated, 
though his narrative contains factors more political than personal. " (pp262-3). Z-- 65 Quoted above. 
66 It is only in Aristotle's account of Archelaus' death that Hellenocrates' participation is recorded. In 
Aelian Varia Historia 89 and Plato Alcibiades H 141 d-e, only the wronged lover Crateuas is indicated, in 
while in Diodorus 14.37.6 Archelaus' death is alleged to have been accidental. Aristotle. however, not 
only informs us of Hellanocrates' participation, but also informs us of a further motive behind Crateuas' 
attack, beyond the desire to rule, the grievance over the marriages of Archelaus' dau hters. It is worth C) Z: ý 9 
noting that, perhaps coincidentally, this motive is also connected to Archelaus' foreign policy. Cý 
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his simultaneous attempt to make her militarily more competitive as well. Rather than 
culminating in a greater integration between Macedon and Greece, Macedon's 
development had been perceived as a threat and a negative tradition regarding its king 
had developed. 
Archelaus' Successors 
However, if it was a strong Macedon with a vigorous king which Greece feared, the 
years following Archelaus' death must have greatly reassured any interested party. Two 
rulers, Crateuas and Orestes 67 occupied the throne only for very brief periods before 
falling prey to political intrigue and being assassinated themselves. There is a hiatus at 
this point in the conduct of an active foreign policy during this period, due to the brevity 
of the reigns of each of these two kings. A short account of their reigns, however, will 
serve to clarify the circumstances of Archelaus' assassination and the line of succession 
which ultimately led to Amyntas III taking the throne. 
Four accounts of Archelaus' death survive. 68 All four name Crateuas as the killer, and 
although they vary on the precise details of his motivation, all but Diodorus attribute to 
him some political ambition connected to the murder. Aristotle, as noted above, 
connects Hellanocrates of Larissa to the assassination as well, thus forging a direct link 
between Archelaus' conduct of foreign policy and the motivations of both of his killers. 
Both Plato and Aelian 69 assert that, having killed Archelaus, Crateuas took the throne, 
but remained upon it only for three to four days before being murdered himself. 
Crateuas was succeeded on the throne by Orestes, as we are informed by Diodorus 
14.37. 
KoCT('X 8F', rl'lv McncF-6ovl'av 'ApXF'lkccoq 0' P(xcytXF-1, )q Ev Tlvt K-L)vq7t(P TcX'q7F-tq 
alcoloatio); 'L')nO\ Kp(xrF-poi) uob E'-po)[tt'-vou uo\v Pt'ov ýtF-, rl'/XX(x4F-, P(x(TtXF--L)accq 
ETTJ ETCrU' 'MV 6' ('XpXl\JV &Eft'-ýCCTO 'OPF-(T'Ull; nCCiq o')v, o'\v c'cvF-kc\ov 'AEpoTcoq 
F, Irt, TPOTCO; (OV -KCC-CF-GXF, 'MV PCC(YtXCt(XV F'-"rll F'-'4. 
In Macedonia King Archelaus was unintentionally struck while hunting by 
Craterus, 70 whom he loved, and met his end after a reign of seven years. He was 
succeeded on the throne by Orestes, who was still a boy and was slain by 
Aeropus, his guardian, who held the throne for six years. 
We might assume that, as Orestes was clearly still a child at the time of his 
assassination, he was the son of Archelaus and as such was considered to have some 
67 The rule of Crateuas, which lasted only a few days if at all, is doubted by some scholars, including 
Hammond (pl. 68), who fails to take into account that blood relationship to the king was not a necessary 
qualification for the throne (see the case of Ptolemy of Alorus, discussed in Chapter 7, for an example). 
Diodorus 14.37 omits the rule of Crateuas, but all the other sources on Archelaus' death include it. On 
these arounds it seems reasonable to accept it as a possibility although whether or not we include it has Zý ZD little impact on our discussion of foreign policy, since even if it is included all of the sources on it say that 
it lasted only a few days. Orestes must have been Archelaus' son, as he took the throne in spite of the fact 
that he was only a child (Diodorus 14.37). 
68 These are: Diodorus 14.37 f, Plato Alcibiades H 141 D-E, Aelian Varia Historia 8.9 and Aristotle 
Politics 13 11 B 
69As noted above in connection with the question of the legitimacy of Archelaus' birth, it is possible that 
Aelian was using Plato as a source. C, 
70 The slight difference in spelling here between Crateuas and Craterus is not significant enough to zn Z-- LI- 
indicate that Diodorus was actually referring to another person. C, 
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legitimate claim to the throne .71 Despite his apparent legitimacy, however, Orestes fell Z: ) victim to an assassination plot, and his guardian Aeropus took the throne. 
Exactly who Aeropus was in relation to Archelaus is unclear. 72 His rule, however, is the 
longest of those of the kings in the interim between Archelaus and Amyntas III, and a 
brief insight into his foreign policy is provided by Polyaenos 2.1.17 and 4.4.3. These 
passages contain the only references to any active foreign policy during this period, 
relating an abortive attempt by Aeropus to prevent the Spartan king Agesilaos from 
marching through his territory with a large an-ny. This passage perhaps refers to the 
incident also documented by Xenophon 73 under the year 394, when Agesilaos is 
hurrying back from Asia to support of his country following the battle of Nemea. If this 
was indeed the case, we might infer from Aeropus' attempted resistance that he was following a policy of goodwill ( as we know of no formal alliance) towards Athens, 
similar to that of Archelaus and possibly connected to Sparta's hostile intervention over 
Thessaly. A lack of evidence firmly connecting his resistance to this specific instance, 
however, prohibits any firm conclusion upon his motivations, and it might equally be 
that his attempt to prevent the march was born instead from a simple reluctance to allow 
a large and potentially hostile force to pass through his land. From these references, 
however, it seems clear that the animosity between Macedon and Sparta, which had its 
origins in Perdiccas' final defection from Sparta 74 and resurfaced over Archelaus' 
intervention in Thessaly, could still be discerned in the earliest years of the fourth 
century. 
The six years of Aeropus' reign, and the single year for which his son Pausanias ruled 
after his death 75 were not distinguished by either military success or financial 
prosperity. We note that Aeropus was unable to prevent Agesilaos from marching 
through his territory, thus perhaps suffering rather than benefiting from the 
improvements to the Macedonian roads made by Archelaus - evidently the existence of 
straight roads through Macedon made the country more accessible to enemy troops as 
well as the king's force, if he was unable to defend them sufficiently. 
Diodorus 14.84 informs us of Aeropus' death and the accession of his son Pausanias, 
who, after reigning for a year was assassinated by Amyntas IH, who then took the 76 
throne. Certain scattered references exist to yet another ruler in this period, called by 
7' The instance of a legal heir to the throne ruling with a guardian is also exemplified following the death C, Z: ) Zn V> 
of Amyntas III. On that occasion also, the guardian abused his position to kill his ward and to take the 
throne himself. 
72 Although see Hammond for the suggestion that Aeropus was a son of Perdiccas. However, this Cý Z: ) 
suggestion raises a serious question - if he were a son of Perdiceas, how did he manaae to survive C)CI t: ' Archelaus' purae on rivals to the throne? If a little boy of seven was a great enough threat to require his Z-) ZD 
elimination, surely an elder brother would have been even more dangerous? We have no way of t) 
ascertaining , of course, what the real relationship was between Archelaus and Aeropus, nor whether 
Aeropus had, by the early three nineties, grown more ambitious than he had been in 413. It seems 
unlikely, though, that a man who was ruthless enough to dispose of his young ward would have quietly C) Z-) C, 
withdrawn into the background when in 413 Archelaus was bidding for the throne, especially if his own 
claim could be based upon legitimacy. 
73 Hellenica 4.3.3. 
74 See previous chapter for discussion. 
75 Diodorus 14.84 
76 The reign of Amyntas III is the subject of Chapter 6. The fragmentary nature of the evidence on the 
period of the successors to Archelaus does not allow us to reach any firm conclusions as to the identity of 
these men and their relationship to either Archelaus or Amyntas III, except in the case of Orestes (see 
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77 some modem scholars Amyntas II, but known in ancient sources as Amyntas the 
Little. His reign is not referred to by Diodorus and although he is named by Aristotle 
Politics 1311B, it is not as a king - indeed the only reference to his rule is In the 
chronographic sources Eusebios and Syncellos. 78 A reign of a few months may be 
tentatively attributed to him following the reign of Aeropus, but no foreign policy is 
connected to him by any of our sources and we might think of his brief reign and 0 
assassination as symptomatic of the turbulent state of the royal house during these 79 
years. 
There is little or no evidence pertaining to the active practice of any foreign policy 
during this period. The coins issued by these kings 80 speak of poverty and political 
instability during this time - Aeropus minted only in copper, while Pausanias, during 
his brief reign, added a line of heavily debased silver. The efforts of Archelaus to raise 
Macedon's standing in Greece had been all but undone by the time that Amyntas III 
took the throne. 
Archelaus' rule, then, and those of his immediate successors, saw dramatic changes in 
fortune for Macedon. Archelaus' innovations initially brought a period of prosperity, 
which enabled him to initiate some important internal changes and had a substantial 
impact upon the conduct of foreign policy during his reign. These changes, however, 
and his approach to foreign policy, had a disastrous backlash upon Archelaus himself 
and his assassination initiated a descent into instability. 
note 67), although Hammond pp176f attempts to devise a family tree which includes them all. 
Certain 
Cý 
authors include Amyntas the Little as Amyntas 11 before Aeropus' rule. 
77 Hammond (1979) pp167ff Errington (1986) pp24 ff and p251, and Borza (1990) ppl77ff and pp296f. Z-ý 
78 1.229.17 and 495.1,500.12-14 respectively, 
79For an excellent discussion of these years, see D. March Historia 1995. 
So See Head 1887 for a catalogue of these, and Greenwalt 1994 pp 119-20 for discussion. C) 
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Chapter 5 
Sources for Fourth Century Macedon; Diodorus, Justin and the Orators 
The sources on the fourth century offer us a complex range of viewpoints and of 
problems, which render a discussion of them an essential preliminary to our 
consideration of that period. The essential of these sources and their inherent problems 
may be very briefly summarised, providing us with an outline of the issues which will 
be addressed by this chapter. Diodorus offers us our only surviving continuous 
annalistic history of this period and is therefore a valuable source. However, he was not 
contemporary with the events he recorded but writing several centuries later, drawing 
his material from a series of contemporary sources of varying standards of reliability 
and with varying degrees of success in terms of maintaining the integrity of his 
chronological system and the degree of detail which he gives on certain events. Thus 
our only continuous narrative of the period is severely flawed, a factor which has led to 
the Bibliotheke being widely cnticised by modem authors. Justin's Epitome of the work 
of Pompeius Trogus is similarly hampered by its late authorship and yet further by the 
inclination of its author towards the sensational over and above the factual; and yet 
Justin's work too has something to offer us because he occasionally fills in details 
which were absent from the work of Diodorus. I The speeches of the orators, including 
the vitriolic court case over the second embassy to Philip and comments upon various 
other important aspects of Philip's foreign policy, mark the explosion of information 
suddenly available to the historian of fourth century Macedon, but are simultaneously 
marred by the most extreme of problems to be found in the use of contemporary 
sources: the overwhelming presence in every detail of the speeches of a strong personal 
agenda and thus a marked inclination to bias the information contained in them. A 
further problem is that, as the speeches all come from Athens, they naturally give an 
Athenocentric viewpoint on events, thus further biasing their contents. 
This brief summary, then, serves to illustrate the problems inherent to our fourth 
century sources and the necessity of establishing some degree of comfort within our use 
of them. Through an examination of the sources available to Diodorus and Justin and 
the use of them by each of these two historians, and a consideration of how we might 
approach the material contained in the speeches of the orators, this chapter will attempt 
to achieve just such a position.. 
Diodorus and Justin; Their Sources and Aims 
Both Diodorus and Justin had an overview of the fourth century available to them from 
their sources, a factor which allowed them to see that the importance of Macedon was 
increasing during this period until, by the end of it, she had gained a position of 
dominance in Greece. Although the chronological boundaries of this thesis do not 
extend to this point, we crain certain benefits from this factor, in that 
both historians pay C) 
some attention to the early stages of the development of Macedon, especially 
during the 
early years of the reign of Philip. To examine how this point was achieved, we need to C) 
1 One important example which is of some importance to our 
later discussion being the use of laurel 
wreaths by Philip II's troops at the Battle of the 
Crocus Field, for discussion of which see Chapter 9. 
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consider the nature of the information which was available to both Diodorus and to 
Trogus, the author of the odginal work which Justin epitomised. 
The work of all the original sources that we know to have been used by either Diodorus 
or Trogus exist now only in fragmentary form. Of these, the largest body of work on the 
period seems to have been that by Theopompus, the monumental fifty eight book 
Philippica. The sheer size of this work 2 is the main factor which suggests that 
substantial use of it by both historians must be assumed. 3 
In Chapter 1, we sought to emphasise that recognition of the personal experiences and 
interests of any given historian is fundamental to our acceptance of the validity of his 
work. Nowhere is this recognition more vital than in our study of the work of 
Theopompus. Cicer04 comments thus on the nature of ancient historians: 
What can you find more pleasant than Herodotus, more serious than Thucydides, 
more clipped than Philistus, more bitter than Theopornpus, more gentle than 
Ephorus? 
Theopompus' histories do indeed, according to Shrimpton's translations of the extant 
fragmen tS, 5 contain much that is detrimental to Philip, and must have had some degree 
of influence upon any later historian who was to use him. A consideration of the dates 
of his life and his relationship with the subject matter of the Philippica might shed some 
light on the possible -origins of his criticisms. 
Shrimpton suggests 
6 379 or 378/7 as a likely date for the birth of Theopompus, although 
he also mentions the tenth century tradition from the Suda that it was as early as 408 or 7 404/3. Although these dates display a wide discrepancy, we can immediately conclude 
that Theopompus was at least alive and of an age at which he could understand political 
events during Philip's reign, being between seventeen and forty eight when Philip came 
to power in 360BC. The date of c 378, however, seems preferable, as, due to the bitter 
criticism of Philip contained in Theopompus' work, it seem unlikely that it was 
published during Philip's lifetime, or even that of Alexander 111,8 and besides, T2 of 
Shrimpton from Photius' Life of Theopompus describes how, reviled by the Greeks, 
Theopompus fled to Egypt, where Ptolemy was king. As Ptolemy took Egypt only after 
Alexander's death in 323, a date of 408 for Theopompus' birth would make him eighty 
five plus at the time of this incident - not impossible, but surely rather unlikely. The 
date of 379 or 378/7 is arrived at via the same source, Photius' Life of Theopompus, 
2 Although how much of it may be assumed to have had a direct bearing upon the work of either 
Diodorus or Trogus, as the work was extremely digressive, will be discussed below. 
3 Althouoh see Hammond's series of articles on the subject of the sources of Diodorus and Justin (1937, 
1938 and 1991, the first two being dedicated to the work of Diodorus and the third to that of Justin) in 
which he argues that Theopompus was the main source of Justin only. This treatment of the subject is 
discussed below. 
4 Testimonia 40 from Shrimpton 1991 p215, Cicero Orationes 15 1. 
5 1991. Here, Shrimpton's page number will be given alone, with the number of the fragment according to ZD C) C> Z-1) Z: ) 
Jacoby. All the following translations of fragments or testimonia on Theopompus or Ephorus are 
Shrimpton's. 
6 
p3- 
7 Although see Flower (1994 ppl2ff) for some discussion of the evidence regarding Theopompus' birth Z-1 
V C) 
date. 
8 Contrary to Hammond 1991 p507, who suggests that Theopompus was writing for contemporaries of C, t; 41) 
Philip and Alexander. 
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who tells us that at the time of Alexander's letter to the Chians (generally dated to 334) 
Theopornpus was forty five. Discrepancies in dating this letter9 have led to a leeway of 
three years between 379 and 377 for his birth, thus allowing us to imagine that he was 
between seventeen and nineteen at the accession of Philip (and fifty six plus, rather than 
eighty five plus, at the time of his adventures in Egypt, a rather more credible scenario). 
Theopompus was, then, a younger contemporary of Philip and as such a candidate for 
all the positive associations made between contemporary historians and their subject 
matter. 10 
However, it is the negative characteristics which occasionally muddy the waters of 
contemporary accounts which we encounter as soon as we begin to examine 
Theopompus' narrative of the age of Philip. The few mentions of Philip himself which 
have survived contain no mention of Philip's military dedication or diplomatic genius II 
- instead, we are presented with scenes of drunken loutishness and sexual debauchery. 
Perhaps the most striking of these images is the portrait which Theopompus paints of 
the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronaea, a moment which is not covered by this thesis 
as it occurred later than the Peace of Philocrates, but one which serves to illustrate the 
image which Theopompus sought to present of Philip: 
F-V Ö9, Tfil TPt'T111 KM TEF-VTIIKO(TTIII lugpl TO)v F-v Xcctpcovet(xt yEvoýtevo)v 
g1«7z(J)v xcc't Joý E'nt' öe-iltvov 'co-, oý n(XP(X-YFVoýUF-VO-Oý -CCOV 'AO-qv(Xt, (J)V 
npeaßF-tý (Pilaiv- (äo 8F'- (Diktnnoý (XTCOXO)Plla(XVT(OV EXEtVCOV 
F- TE Ir 9 ýt 11 ET0T1V (X T (0 V F- T (X 1p (0 V, X (X ý, F, iV 
EKýý, EUE - Tccý (X 1, ) X'9'r Pt' 8 cc ýK (X it 'AptaTovtKov T0v 
Ktf)CCP(üt8 O'V -K(Xt' Awp"Lcova 'C O'v wokil'uýV w(Xi 'Toi)ý 6klouý 
TO ý F- t (X 11) ýb t c71)gnlvF-tv , nF-PtllYF-TO 7 (X p 1) ' olcýtevo-oý ,Z( 
n (X vT cc 7,0 i) Co oý T0 10 1, ) T0 lo 0 (1)t' 2, t ir n0K (xit 
K (X T (X CY XE1, ) (X CY (X ýt F, v0ýAv 0' py (X v (X Z 0. X, X (, x CY 1, ) ýt 710 CYt' 0 1) K (xit 
(X O't 11 K (X t TOV Tp0 710 v CY -0 v0 -0 (Y 1 (X ý. (0 vyp (pixon , 
awokao'coý Kal ßcoýto; ýox0-t)ý F-IXF- nF-P1 (X-OTOV a-Oxv0-0ý 
Kect TCOV nept TIIV ýt01, )cyt"KlIv OVTO)v XCU TWV TU 7F-ý, 0t(X 
k F- 't 0VT 0) V. 11 t (1) v5 F\- Týv v ILYK T (X IU(XG(XV 'K(XI ýt F- 0 1) CY 0Eiý 
Gt t CC lu aVT CC ýT0 1) ý&kk0 1) ý n0X ii IC (X t\ 7c (X T6ý (Y, ý, (P e\ ý 
2 
(X 71 CC ý, x6TTEG0 (X t 11811 7cp äý 11 ýu E, P OC V F'-'K (i) ýI (X 
ýEV (0 ýT0 1) ý 
npFý-GßF-tý Tol\L)ý T(i)V 'A 0 il v (x il co v- iýI 
In the fifty third [book] he[Theopompus] speaks about events at Chaeronaea, 
how he [Philip] invited the ambassadors who had come to him to a dinner: "As 
soon as they had withdrawn, Philip sent for some of his Companions, and gave 
the order to call the flute girls, Aristonicus the Lyre player, Dorion the aulos 
player, and the men who were accustomed to drink with him. Philip used to lead 
around with him such sorts everywhere and was prepared with a lot of 
equipment for drinking bouts and parties. He was a tippler and undisciplined in 
character and he used to keep himself surrounded by a host of buffoons, 
musicians and jesters. He drank the whole night through and became intoxicated 
having quaffed a great deal; he permitted the others to depart; when it was 
9 Tod (192) dates it to 332, while Rhodes and Osborne place it in 334. 
10 For discussion of Theopompus' life and the themes of his work, see Robert Connor (1968), Shrimpton 
(1991) and Flower (1994). Momigliano (1935) offers some further 
discussion on the datino, of Z. ) I-- 
Theopompus' work. 
11 See Chapters 8 and 9 on Philip's reign for ample examples. 
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already near daybreak, he went revelling to the ambassadors of the 
Athenians... (p249 - 50, Shrimpton, Frg 236) 
12 
Philip is thus shown as immoderate, disrespectful, and neglectful of the very necessary 
business of diplomacy in the wake of the battle. "' The reasons for this bitterness 
towards Philip, expressed in a desire to tarnish his reputation, cannot be known to us in full. Shrimpton advances two credible hypotheses by way of explanation, however: that 
Theopompus was naturally repelled by Philip's immoderate celebrations after the battle 
of Chaeronaea or that Theopompus may have been a candidate for the post of tutor to 
the young Alexander, but was rejected in favour of Aristotle, thus souring his feelings 
towards the Macedonian court. Either suggestion is possible, as are a multitude of 
others unknown to us - whatever the solution to this mystery, however, the fact is that 
his personal feelings manifested themselves in a profound bias in his histones. The facts 
available to both Diodorus and Trogus from Theopompus, then, had been through a 
very specific filtering process. 
Besides the attempts to sully Philip's reputation through accounts of his degenerate 
behaviour, Shrimpton's collection of fragments reveals other tendencies which are 
relevant to our evaluation of Theopompus as a source for Diodorus. What immediately 
strikes the reader is how little material there actually is on Philip himself, given that the 
title of Theopompus' work might reasonably lead us to conclude that the life and deeds 
of the king were to be its main subject. The history was extremely digressive. If the 
12 This episode will be further discussed in the context of our study of Diodorus. Contrast between this 
account and that of Diodorus provides a useful insight into Diodorus' relationship with Thepompus' I=> 
work. Gardiner - Garden (1989) attributed several pieces of information on a Scythian king, Atheas, 
found in various ancient sources, to Theopompus, and makes the following suggestion regarding the t) Zý C) z: 1 Z: ) 
persona of Atheas in Theopompus: 
To Theopornpus, the Scythians may have been the antithesis of the Macedonians, just as Hartog 
has recently argued that to Herodotus and others they were the antithesis of the Greeks. If V> 
Philip's Macedonians were greedy and morally degenerate, Ateas' Scythians were simple in iD :DI 
their possessions, and rewarded for their virtue by possessing a large unified empire. (p39) 
Gardiner - Garden's sue-yestion is an interesting one, and might even lead us to draw some comparisons ZIND C, between the portrayal of Philip in Theopompus and Plato's use of Archelaus to exemplify the ideally bad 
man, discussed in Chapter 4. However, the attribution of these fragments to Theopompus is far from 4-: 1 
certain and we cannot afford to build much in the way of theory upon it. Von Fritz (1941) and Robert 
Connor (1967) both take a psychological approach to Theopompus' work, von Fritz suggesting that tl tlzn C) Theopompus' work was inherently contradictory and seeking the reasons for this tendency, ultimately C) 
concluding that Theopompus exemplifies the political psyche of his time. Robert Connor comes up with 
some similar suggestions, attributing the venom in Theopompus' work to an attempt to find examples of Z: lr> tI5 
purity and virtue in his material, frustrated by historical reality and over exacting moral standards. Both 
interesting insights on Theopompus' writing. provi I Z: ) In 13 This is by no means the only report we have of the licentiousness of Philip's court; the companions of 
Philip receive rough handling in many other sources too, leading Polyaenus to comment (thus delicately C, Cý 
avoiding the sexual extremes dwelt upon by another commentator, Athenalos): Zý 
To put it simply, in order that I should cease speakina at great lenath, especially since so large a C, 0 C) IIZ: ) deluge of affairs await my attention, I believe that those who are called the friends and Z: ) 
companions of Philip were such wild beasts and of such character as neither the Centaurs who 
occupied Mount Pelium nor the Laestragonians who inhabited the plain of Leontini, nor any 
other monsters. (p219, Flower) 
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fragments are at all representative of the nature of the work as a whole, 14 then most of 
the bulk of the fifty eight books appears to have been made up of geographIcal notes 
and comments, from descriptions of the whereabouts of various cities through to an 
examination of regional wildlife. 15 The title Philippica may well lead the reader to 
expect more in the way of historical substance related to Philip and there is some 
evidence that the ancients too were disappointed in their search for information 
regarding Philip from Theopompus' work. Eusebius strikes a plaintive note in his 
comments about Theopompus: 
7r(xp(YtT71TF-OV 6F- K(Xt' To' 7rapeic P(, XGF-tq [tETOC410 6tll771(YF-(Oq 
ýIaxpxq. oil) 7ap (x7rxcoq Xpi nacmv Tcccp(xtrd(yOcct, K(XO(Y'. Tcep 0 (Dt/xtcToq Ti 
-IX, LK(Y' T71V To, (xv()cn(xl, )F-I 7(XP 'Cllv 8'ccv0t(xv TO)v ('X-KPO(X'r(I)v, (XX (x 'rqv VIX 1) C, ýLfiKoq, C, Ttq ('XTC(XkkoTploi T'v 8to, CvotOcv TO)v (, XKPO(O"V(ov, (1)(TTE 66GOCCI 11 11 
C(x T ktv '07u%LVII(YF-(j)q T&)V TCPOEtp7j[LE, -V(Ov, (oq 
E)COTc%tlroq EV T(xi; (I)tktTcTctK(X- q. 
6,60 'Y('XP Irol) K(Xt TpEt; K(Xt\ T[kEt/O-L)q t(YTOPt'(Xq Ock(X; 'K(X-C(\X R(XPE'-KPCC(TtV 
I-5 C-L)pt(TKORF-V, F-V at; oux 071(0; (I)tkUrno-L), ('Xkk' ol-)66\ M(X-KF-60voq 'Ttvo; Ov%L& 
F-(TTtv. 
It is imperative to avoid the insertion of long digressions in the middle of one's 
discourse. No, it is not necessary to avoid digressions altogether as Philistus 
does, for they rest the reader's concentration. Only avoid the digression that is of 
such length that it causes the reader to lose the chain of thought with the result 
that he is unable to recall the thread of the story. Theopompus is like that in the 
Philippica. For there we find about two, even three and more histories in the 
form of digression; and in them is no mention of Philip nor even the name of a 
Macedonian. (T30, p212 Shrimpton, Eusebius The Study of Philology 10.3.12) 
In the light of Eusebius' comments, the words with which Diodorus begins his Book 16, 
recommending that actions be connected and not stray too far from their theme, take on 
an added significance. Perhaps the same plaintive tone which may be detected in 
Eusebius' words can also be read into Diodorus' comment that "incomplete actions, the 
conclusion of which is unconnected with the beginning, interrupt the interest of the 
curios reader". ' 6 The sense that even in ancient times the Philippica was thought to be 
ramblingly lengthy is supported by the fact that Philip V thought it necessary to trim out 
all the various digressions, presumably in an attempt to achieve a more streamlined (and 
thus more readable) format for the fifty eight book text: 
Wherefore Philip - who made war against the Romans - extracted the 
digressions and put together the activities of Philip into a mere sixteen books. He 
fitted it all together adding nothing of his own, nor, as the story goes, did he 
14 Indeed, some evidence might lead us to suppose that the fragments which have been passed down to us Cý Z: ) 
of Theopompus' history should not be considered as being representative of his work. Fracment 336, for z: 1 Z__ 
example, cites Theopompus as being, "second to no-one in attention to the [Pythian] oracle, " and yet any C) 
religious interest is certainly not an obvious theme in the surviving fragments. Cý C) C) 
'5 Shrimpton p 252, for example, records the following note: z: 1 
E F- cjt oýt i uý Týv 5' ýv Aoýxiotý Kpilvilv, ic(xo(ý7rFp icccpäc -coiý A(xýiWcclcTlvoig, F'-'xFtv 'v' (Y1) 00 
, roiý K(XUotlctöiotg. tEYTOPF-iv öe'- mika 9F-6nognov. 
Accordina to a story in circulation at Lampsacus, the spring at Lusa has in it [field] mice similar Z: ) C, 
to house mice. Theopompus records this. (Jacoby Frg 269) 
16 Quoted in full below. 
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subtract anything but the digressions. (Photius' Life of Theopompits 206 T? 
Shrimpton p198) 
The very fact that the contents of fifty eight books, minus digressions, fitted into just 
sixteen books gives us some idea of . ust how very digressive the Philippica was. J C) However, we must not allow the forty two books of digressions to distract us from the fact that, even at only sixteen books in length, Theopompus' record of Philip's activities 
was still twice the length of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, 17 and of 
that volume, the fragments which remain to us contain some tantalising snippets of information regarding Philip. 
Nc/ C\ 'Aým6oi<oq- 0 Urot, ltccrilp -Kcct 'o-Loq, Oq Kcd 430" .... 6'00 7F-7'vcccytv 0- t LlUccol (TIJ[4LCCXII(Tcov ýXOF-v F-t; c O\v Tcp 0\; KF-pcyopXE-'iruqv noXFqtov. aR(porE-'p(Ov 
ýtFý4tvflvxt OF-Ono[moq Ev uýt icc rCov (DtXtmrucCov. 
Amadocus... there were two of them, father and son, the son went to Philip in 
order to become his ally in the war against Cersobleptes. Theopompus mentions 
both in Philippica eleven. (Fragment 101 p231, Shiimpton) 
This information is detailed and precise. Theopompus is able to supply us with the 
chronological context of the events he describes (Amadocus' alliance with Philip) in 
relation to other contemporary events (the war with Cersobleptes) and to not only 
differentiate between two men of the same name but also to supply their relationship to 
one another. In spite, then, of the fact that the ancient writers though Theopompus 
digressive, and that our fragments of his work bear this out to a great extent, there is 
some evidence that Theopompus' work contained an element of historical fibre which 
has for the greater part been I OSt to US. 18 
The fact that Diodorus' account of Philip's reign is full enough to be continuous gives a 
further hint as to this possibility. If Ephorus' histories, as Hammond suggests, 19 covered 
only the period immediately following Philip's accession, 20 then Diodorus must have 
had access to some other source for the remainder of Philip's reign. How much of this 
information came from Theopompus, and how much from other sources, either those 
we have now only in very fragmentary form 21 or indeed other influences which are now 
entirely lost, we are not in a position to say; however, the sheer size of Theopompus' 
work might well lead us to suppose that it must have been a significant influence upon 
both Diodorus and Trogus. 
In the context of the work of Diodorus in particular, another significant influence must 
be taken into account, one that softened the harshness of Theopompus' picture and 
helped mould the impression of Philip's character which has survived in Diodorus' 
17 Which is discussed at length in Chapter 1. Zý 18 Lane Fox (1984) is the most condemnatory amongst modern sources of the historical value of 
Theopompus' work. On the Philippica and its use by later sources, he notes: - Its attitude to Philip and 
his vices helps us to se why Plutarch never included the king in his many biographies: Theopompus' 
book contained nothing which would assist a balanced appraisal. " (p. 120) While Lane Fox's criticisms are 
largely justified, he is perhaps over judgemental in failing, to discern any historical worth whatsoever in 
Theopompus' work. 
19 See below. 
20 Fragments of Ephorus' work support this suggestion, and as a result it is accepted by this chapter. 
21 Besides Theopompus and Ephorus, Diodorus himself mentions Diyllus, Demophilus and Callisthenes, 
16-14.33-5. 
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work. The comments of Cicero which allude to Theopompus' bitterness also provide us 
with a contrast to his approach. If nothing more bitter than Theopompus may be found 
by way of historical work, Cicero comments, then Ephorus provides the converse case 
by being unrivalled in gentleness. Z: ) 
The testimonia which Shrimpton provides on Theopompus also give us useful 
information on Ephorus - for example, it is agreed by the ancient sources that Ephorus 
and Theopompus were contemporaries and studied together under Isocrates, thereby 
answering for us the inevitable question of Ephorus' dates. 22 It is Cicero again who 
provides us with an insight into the difference in character between these two students: 
"Isocrates, that eminent teacher, used to say that he normally used the spur on Ephorus 
but the rein on Theopompus. " (T5 P199 Shrimpton, Cicero De Oratione 3.9 (36)). This 
summarises what does indeed appear to be something of a consensus throughout the 
testimonia - that by comparison to Theopompus, Ephorus' style was, put more bluntly, 
"dull and sluggish and lacked all intensity" (T8 from the Suda, p204 Shrimpton), on the 
whole appearing to have been less verbose and more deliberate than the garrulous and 
malicious Theopompus. 23 
Besides the difference in style of these two ancient historians, they have a very different 
significance in terms of our discussion of the sources available to both Diodorus and 
Trogus, as they covered different periods. While Theopompus covered Philip's reign in 
particular, Ephorus' work appears to have been concerned on the whole with earlier 
24 history, laid out according to theme . This factor naturally has an impact upon the 
relevance of the works of both historians to our consideration of Macedon, because 
while the doings of Philip may be said to have been a central theme (digressions 
notwithstanding) to the work of Theopompus, they were peripheral to that of Ephorus, 
the reign of Philip having been the subject of a single chapter, which appears to have 
been unfinished at the time of Ephorus' death. 25 However, Diodorus' relationship with 
Ephorus especially appears to have been an intimate one ; 26 twelve of Jacoby's 
fragments of Ephorus and five of his testimonia are from Diodorus, illustrating how 
frequently the name of that historian appeared in the Bibliotheke and suggesting that 
Ephorus was a consistent influence upon it. The merits of Ephorus' histories, then, are 
of some importance in a consideration of the general worth of Diodorus' Bibliotheke. 
The value of the work of Ephorus as an unbiased and skilled historian has, however, 
come under fire in modem sources, the most vehement of his critics being Barber, who 
in chapter six of his book advances a theory that Ephorus was profoundly unreliable, 
and given to biasing his work towards Athens and towards an unjustified degree of 
attention to his own home town of Cyrne. 27 He argues that Ephorus' rhetorical training 
22 See Reed (1976) for an extensive discussion of the influence of rhetoric upon Theopompus' work. 
Barber (1935, briefly discussed below) makes a similar study with regard to the works of Ephorus. On 
Isocrates' school and teaching methods, see Johnson (1959), and more generally Mathieu (1966), Usher ZD Z: ) 
(1999) 
23 Perhaps we might attribute an apparent lack of modern interest in Ephorus to this difference in style. 
Schepens (1977) laments the lack of modern material on Ephorus, pointing out (p98) that his importance ZD 
to our extant sources would justify far greater attention being paid to his work. 
24 On the subject of Ephorus in general, Barber's book of 1935 remains the definitive work. On the issue ZD 
of the content and organisation of Ephorus' work, see especially his chapter 2, ppl7ff. 
25 See Barber p20f. 
26 See below for further discussion. 
27 pp84ff. 
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under Isocrates marred his value as a historian, as it lent him the tools to distort his 
narrative according to a personal and political agenda to a greater degree than most 
historians could be said to do . 
28 Indeed, even in the ancient world, Ephorus' reputation 
was far from unsullied. Seneca 29 comments: 
Ephorus is not particularly reliable. Sometimes he gets fooled himself, 
sometimes he fools you. Such is the case of the comet, which is attested by 
many eyewitness reports because it ushered in a great event, the inundation of 
Helis and Buris; Ephorus says it separated into two stars as it departed, and he is 
the only one who gives such a report. (F212 of Ephorus). 
In looking at what we know to have been two major works on the period covered by 
Diodorus and Trogus, then, some disturbing issues surface even before we begin to take 
into account any concerns over the agenda or working methods of either of those two 
historians - it is clear that the information which was available to them, writing, as they 
were, several centuries after the event, was already skewed by bias. In the light of this 
recognition, we might move on to discuss how the two historians handled their material. 
We will first consider the work of Diodorus, as his history forms the backbone of our 
discussion in the following chapters on the fourth century, and some defence of our use 
of and trust in him is rendered necessary by the widespread doubt over his reliability in 
modem sources in general. 
Diodorus opens book sixteen, that which is to deal with the reign of Philip 11 and other 
contemporary eventS30 with the following words: 
'Ev 7c('x(ycctq ýL F'-v Tcctq t(TTOPtlc(xt; RPCCWcc'rF-I(xt 011KF-I 'rO'-)q (TL)77PC((PF-tq 
TCF, Ptku. Rp(, XVF-. Lv F'-v CCCL; P, Lpkot; 6X TcokF-(OV (X P(X(5-LkF-(Ov np4E-tq (Xll, )TorF-kp-iq 
II 
(X Ir cc 6E cc cc CCVO[tF-V TqV Pxfiq IL, xpt 'Tof) 'r'XO'L); ' 01)'U(O; 7' P R' XI(Y'rcc 8t(XXC4* 
ci kyx 1)(Tt (Xi ýLE t(5TOP'Lccv F-A)Rv'qROVz^OTOV -K(xl O(I(Pfi 7FVF-'(TOcct Tbit; (xv(x7tv( 0 V. 'v 
c rcci; O, Cpxcci; ro' TCEP(X; 7CCP TUTF-Xdý 1UP641; 0-O'-K E"XO-L)(Ycct (5-L)VEX'; 
'rl'lv E'nt0l)Rt'(xv T6)v (PtX(Xvcc7v(O(T'rO-L)V-C(J)v, (Xt' 8c TO' Tfiq 
8t'9711(TF-(Oq (71, )VF-XE'; nF-PtXCCRP('XVO-OGcct REXPt T71; CC7EIjP'rl(3ýtF-VIjV 
(X-Orll T(OV VIV T6)v TcPcc4F-(Ov E"XOI)(Ytv C'CR(x77F-Xt'ccv. O"r(xv 
lrp(xy, OF-V, r(ov a-OVF-P71, n rot; (T1)7YPa(PF-A)(Tt, ror 11,811 navrexco; oA, )-K 
WCOGIrccluEov E(xl), rll; 'ril; lrpocctpF-(YF, (I);. 
In all systematic historical treatises it behoves the historian to include in his 
books actions of states or of kings which are complete in themselves from 
beginning to end; for in this manner I conceive history to be most easy to 
remember and most intelligible to the reader. Now incomplete actions, the 
conclusion of which is unconnected with the beginning, interrupt the interest of 
the curious reader, whereas if the actions embrace a continuity of development 
culminating naturally, the narrative of events will achieve a well rounded 
perfection. Whenever the natural pattern of events itself harmonises with the 
28 Schepens' study of 1977 further developed Barber's criticisms of Ephorus, detecting a moraliSing 0 
theme in his work which, he argued, undermined "the standards of Scientific detachment" (p 118) which 
modern historian hopes to find at the root of his sources. 
See Chapter I for a comparable complaint 
against Xenophon. =1 29 Quaest. 7.16.2 
30 For which see Chapters 8 and 9. 
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task of the historian, from that point on he must not deviate at all from that 
principle. 
In laying out his manifesto so explicitly, Diodorus appears to be giving us his pledge 
that it is just this reassuringly systematic approach which he himself intends to utilise, 
and our expectations that a thorough and well organised treatment will follow are 
aroused. The strange, patchwork narrative with which we are then faced initially 
appears to wholly discredit the working method which Diodorus originally set out, and 
has given rise to much modem disappointment, the factor which has given criticism of 
Diodorus' work its venom over the years. Writing in the 1930S, 31 the young Hammond 
reached a degree of vehemence so far unmatched, commenting upon Diodorus' 
"habitual laziness" (p3), terming the historical summaries provided in Book Sixteen 
ýCmonotonous and ridiculous" (pl) and urging his reader to remember that "Diodorus is 
a careless and unintelligent compiler" (pl) as a guard against taking his work too 
seriously. 32 More recently, Terry Buckley 3 ') takes a similar approach, noting that 
Diodorus is "capable of being inefficient, careless and confusing" (p7) and considering 34 his dating system to be "arbitrary and erroneous ... and... extremely unreliable" (p8) . 
In spite, however, of the vehemence of these criticisms, we need not despair entirely of 
using Diodorus as a source. The working method by which these conclusions were 
reached themselves admit of some flaws, which might lead us to suppose that they need 
not be accepted in entirety. 
Hammond's two papers of 1937 and 1938 examine Diodorus' working method and 
sources for the Macedonian narrative and the Sicilian narrative respectively. The 
opening section of his work on the subject deals with existing modem sources on 
Diodorus and the problems innate to their methods. He dismisses the method which he 
calls "argument from detail", that is, the assumption that if a detail of Diodorus' 
narrative corresponds to the information in a fragment, then the author of the fragment 
was necessarily Diodorus' source for the period, as invalid, on the grounds that it 
permits of too wide a margin of error. His own approach, then, he defines thus: 
By regarding the narrative from the general angles of fullness, accuracy, military 
and political detail and conception of the general theme, I hope to find separable 
groups of narrative. For each group an author of the same general qualities will 
be identified as a hypothetical source; fragments of the author and discrepancies 
in Diodorus will then be applied to test the identification. (p3) 
Using the analytical framework which he sets forth here, Hammond then goes on to 
identify three separate narrative threads which, he argues, make us Book 16. He 
identifies source one, 64 a first class source, writing at full length with the power of 
Philip as a central theme" (p4) with Ephorus, who shares, he argues, " the eulogistic 
tone, the nature of the proem, the Pan Hellenic colouring, the attention to geography, 
the colour in military narrative and especially the firm grasp of a central theme" (p7) of 
the passages which he has identified as having been drawn from source one. This 
source, he argues, covers only the period from Book 11 until that immediately 
31 1937 and 1938. 
32 For a similar verdict on Diodorus on the fifth century, see Gomme (1944) pp51ff. 
33 1996. 
34 See Sacks (1990), discussed below, for an alternative approach. 
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following Philip's accession, Ephorus' work having been broken off pre-maturely by the 
author's death, as later sources inform us. 
Source two, he argues, covered the Sacred War and was remarkable for "a blend of 
piety and impartiality" (p5). This source, he suggests, may only really be identified as 
Demophilus, son of Ephorus, as fragments of no other authors on the period exist. 
Source three is identified as having a markedly different tone from that of the other two: 
Source three is clearly pro Athenian, nurtured on the Attic orators, interested in 
anecdotes, court scenes and gossip, a champion of the autonomous tradition, 
attentive to personalities. One would imagine a third rate Hellenistic historian, 
bred in Athens; his method is to mingle a thin factual account with a deal of 
scandal. (p6) 
Diyllus of Athens is, according to Hammond, the "obvious candidate" (pt I). 
There is no doubt that Hammond's writing on the subject advances some legitimate 
complaints against the work of his predecessors, and that his own working method is, in 
theory at least, practicable. His suggestions regarding why the source which he 
identifies as Ephorus disappears after Philip's accession and then reappears to discuss 
the siege of Perinthus are ingenious and ought to be taken into consideration. 
However, there are some glaring flaws in Hammond's arguments and in his 
identification of all three sources. His identification of Ephorus does not take into 
account the complaints raised against that historian by Barber, whose work was 
published two years before the appearance of these articles, that Ephorus' histories were 
not the "first rate source" which Hammond reads into the passages attributed to source 
one on account of the extreme bias which both Barber and Schepens detect in them, and 
while Ephorus does seem to have had a Pan Hellenic bent, he does not appear to have 
had "the power of Philip as a central theme" nor to have been especially "eulogistic" 
towards him. Demophilus was, contrary to Hammond's implication, by no means the 
only ancient author to have been writing on the period of the Sacred War - Diodorus 35 
himself cites two others, Callisthenes and Diyllus, as having covered the period, 
implying if not directly stating his use of their work. Hammond's thesis is even more 
vulnerable over the question of Diyllus, of whose work we have too few fragments to 
legitimately ascribe a certain style to him; as Markle, in his chapter in Ventures into 
36 
Y Greek Histor points out: 
Diyllus is a convenient receptacle for the ragbag of remnants consigned to him 
by Hammond since only three authentic fragments of his history have survived 37 
and very little is known about him. (p46)' 
Perhaps the most serious flaw in Hammond's argument, however, is that he fails to give 
Theopompus any place in his consideration In spite of the fact that at 16.14.3-5 
Diodorus specifically mentions his work. Many years after his original examination of 
3ý 16-14.3-5. 
36 1994. 
37 Reed (1976) quite rightly comments "It Is easy - and probably appropriate - to be faint hearted about 
the possibility of describing any fragmentary historian with conviction. " (pl. 23) Cý Cý III- 
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3 the work of Diodorus, he published an article on the sources of Justin)8 in which he 
identified Theopompus as a main source for Trogus, unaccountably concluding that 
although Trogus and Diodorus were contemporaries or near contemporaries, the sources 
used by one were not used at all by the other. 
Such a rigid approach to analysis of Diodorus' relationship with his sources clearly will 
not do to examine such an organic and personal process as the assimilation of source 
material, its rearrangement and editing. Sacks, in two open minded and original 
studi es, 39 provides an alternative approach by raising some very valid complaints 
against the genre of criticism of Diodorus as a whole: 
Over the past century and a half it has been virtually axiomatic that, aside from 
errors he inadvertently introduces, Diodorus is faithful to his sources. Thus he is 
called a "mere copyist" and considered to be "slavishly following his sources. 17 
This should, ironically, be a compliment to an antiquarian historian; whose 
purpose is to preserve the factual record. But the judgement is also applied to 
how Diodorus produced the sinews of the Bibliotheke - the philosophical, moral 
and political judgements which establish for any work its intellectual unity. The 
assumption that Diodorus was incapable of imposing his own interpretations 
reflects a lingering nineteenth century approach to source criticism and is 
methodologically weak: for the most part the corresponding narratives of the 
original source are no longer extant, so that there are few controls, direct or 
indirect, over how much thematic material Diodorus has borrowed from his 
sources. (p213 )40 
Sacks' broad brush approach forms a refreshing contrast to earlier attempts at close 
analysis of Diodorus' work, and his subsequent consideration of themes which recur 
throughout the entirety of Diodorus' histories, thereby providing it with an autonomous 
philosophical framework which can only have been derived from the author himself 
makes a convincing case for Diodorus' original ity. 41 Indeed, a brief retrospective glance 
at the subject of an earlier part of our discussion will serve to illustrate that Diodorus' 
authorial presence might even be occasionally identified and thus ought to be taken into 
account in a consideration of the value of his work. 
Above, we quoted Theopompus' account of the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronaea, 
in which Philip was portrayal as disrespectful, loutish and lacking in statesmanship. The 
account given us by Diodorus makes an interesting comparison: 
AE'7oliat 8F- ctvF-q on icat Tcccpcc Tov Tcorov TcoXl, )v F-R(popljaccRevo; cc-Kpccrov 
KCCI ýLFMX TCOV (Plix(Ov TOV URVIKIOV (X'YO)v Kc%tov 6t(\x [LE(ROV TCOV 
i, P(x X; (XWtOcx(OT(0V 6,81ýF-v bppiý(A)v 8t(\x X070)v T(\ T6V ('XKXIIPO^L)VIT(I)V 
All[t(x, 5llv 6F- To v [)Aropa iccur, ExEivov T O\v K(Xtpov EV Tot; 
aWmxffrot; ovu(x xpýmxaoat TE(XPP-qatq Imi X070V wco(POE74ccaoat 
Gi cc EtTcd 51)v(' XREVOV ('XV(X(T'TEiXut Týv TOf) PCC(YIXF-'(O; ('X(TE-'X7F-t(xv- (P(x t7\Pv 
avrov, B(xat/XF-b, Týq T-oXii; (Tot TcEptft-tiaij; npo(y(onov 'Ay(xRe[tvovo; (x-OToq 
0K Ocluxi. )VI (X ,Q Tljq 
ETct Tj n Tip TT(j)v EPW E)F-pat'Tov; T 6\v 8 F\- (DiXtir7cov Tj TCXý4E(O; 
38 1991, discussed below. 
39 1990 and 1994. 
40 1994. 
41 One theme which is identified as a recurrent one is that of the rise and fall of empires. See Chapter 
under the subsection on Thucydides for a comparable theme in that author's work. 
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F-I, )(Y'roXtq KIV710F-vr(X ro(50ý), ro ýLF, 'rOCPCCk6V TT'IV o'kllV 5tCCOF-(YtV 0)'CY'UF- 'rOi)q g6v 
C7'rF, (PC(VOlOý O, CTCOppiW(Xt, T& 8F', (510V(YKOkOl000i)VT(X K(XT('X TO'V K(OýLOV Gl, )[tpO/%(X 
Týq ^, OPPE(I)q (, XT[OTptAg(x(To(xt, rO'v 8, (, x, v6p(x rO'v XPIJ(5(4tF-VOV rý lt(XPPIJGt, (X 
Ic Kat Týq aWtaka)(Tta; ('x7rokiboarra 7cpoq E(xl), rov ocv(A(Xp6v 
EVTtg(l);. 'TE-'i%Oq 6' 101 \0 TOb AIJýL(X6olo K(xOopkijOE'-v-ccc rcc-tq 'Arrt-K(x-tq Xaptat 
7rccv, r(xq Mrokbcml ro^\O; OCWL(X, %C'OT01, )q (XVF-10 kl-)TPO)V, K(Xookol, ) 8' ('XlrooF-gF-Vov 
T11V EK Týq VtKllq 1)TCEP7j(PCXVt(XV 7EPECYPF-tq WrOCYTEUM 7rpo; Tov 8ýgov T6v 
A071v(x't(t)v K(x\t cyl, )vOF-(70(xt irp o\; ccl, )TO'L)q (Ptkt(XV TE K(Xt CTIL)gýLocXtOW... 
The story is told is that in the drinking after dinner Philip downed a large 
amount of unmixed wine and forming with his friends a comus in celebration of 
the victory he paraded through the midst of his captives, jeering all the time at 
the misfortunes of the luckless men. Now Demades, the orator, who was then 
one of the captives, spoke out boldly and made a remark able to curb the king's 
disgusting exhibition. He is said to have remarked: "0 King, when Fortune has 
cast you in the role of Agamemnon, are you not ashamed to play the part of 
Thersites? " Stung by this well - aimed shaft of rebuke, Philip altered his whole 
demeanour completely. He cast off his garland, brushed aside the symbols of 
pride that marked the comus, expressed admiration for the man who dared to 
speak so plainly, freed him from captivity and gave him a place in his own 
company with every mark of honour. Addressed by Demades with Attic charm, 
he ended by releasing all of the Athenian prisoners without ransom and, 
altogether abandoning the arrogance of victory, sent envoys to the people of 
Athens and concluded with them a treaty of friendship and alliance. (16.87.1-3) 
While Diodorus notes the scenes of drunkenness and arrogance which make up all of 
what remains to us of Theopompus' account, Philip's character is, in the eyes of 
Diodorus' reader, wholly redeemed by the open heartedness with which he receives 
Demades' criticism and his subsequent clemency towards the Athenians. Although it is 
impossible to say whether Theopompus' Philip redeemed himself in a similar fashion, 
as our fragment of Theopompus breaks off by the morning of the party he describes 
(thereby in theory at least still giving time for Demades to make his comments and 
Philip to respond to them outwith the remaining fragment) the tone of moral outrage 
which characterises Theopompus' narrative of the party is entirely lacking from 
Diodorus' version. As Diodorus specifically mentions Theopompus as one of the 
sources he used, we can hardly assume that he was unaware of Theopompus' version, 
but must conclude that he was exerting authorial presence over his material here and in 
doing so has rendered a more balanced and objective point of view. 
Certain assumptions are inherent to modem criticisms of Diodorus which doubt his 
reliability on the grounds of arguments based on the attribution of elements of his 
narrative to one source or another. The first, as we have seen, is that his narrative may 
be divided up and its contents attributed to one or another existing but fragmentary 
contemporary source. This is not an especially useful approach, partly, as argued above, 
because the identification of the original source is usually at best speculative, and partly 
because we are obliged to recognise, on the basis of probability, that other influences 
and sources were at work on Diodorus which are now lost to US. 42 Above and beyond 
42 Markle (1994), for example, identifies a voice in Book 16 which constantly strikes a pious note and 
cal viewpoint. Hi Cý attempts to identify a source for this philosophi II is arguments, however, are inconclusive 
and we are obliged to recognise that Diodorus appears to have been under the influence here of a source I- Zý 
which is now unknown to us. 
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the issue of specific sources, however, a failure to recognise and acknowledge Diodorus 
himself as author and editor of the Bibliotheke has further hampered modern studies. 4' Modem authors ' tend to assume that all the influences, including personal Inclinations, 
which were at work upon Diodorus are transparent to us, an assumption which is 
disproved by any consideration of his work, such as, for example, the comparison 
between Theopompus' account of Philip's conduct following the battle of Chaeronaea 44 
and that of Diodorus . Here, Diodorus evidently had more than one account of a certain 
event to choose between, and in making his choice attempted to present us with a 
balanced view of Philip. Assumptions that Diodorus was a "mere copyist", then, are 
questionable, as is an assumption that in exercising his editorship, Diodorus was 
marring the trustworthiness of the histories as opposed to augmenting them. C) 
While this study will, then, take into account the value of Diodorus' Bibliotheke as a 
highly useful source on the fourth century, it is also obliged to recognise that there are 
undoubtedly some flaws in it, most notably those to be found in its chronological 45 
system . Rather than dismissing Diodorus as entirely incompetent on the basis of these 
errors, however, we shall attempt to consider each chronological problem as it arises in 
the course of our discussion, and analyse it within its historical context. 
Diodorus is not the only ancient historian to come under fierce criticism from modern 
authors; Justin too receives a bad press. Mei ggS46 is distrustful of his work, teri-ning it "a 
wildly erratic summary" (p475) and Devlin, the commentator on the Atlanta edition, 
notes that "the text -of Justin encompasses material of varying degrees of credibility" (PI). 
In 1991, Hammond, using the same techniques of analysis which he had applied to 
Diodorus' narrati Ve47 in his two articles of 1937 and 8, attempted to identify the sources 
used by Justin and claimed that Theopompus' work formed the basis of Justin's 
information on Philip, suggesting that some merit may be found in Justin's work 
through this association due to the fact that Theopompus was a contemporary source 
and was thus "careful to record his facts correctly". The methods used by Hammond in 
his two studies of the sources of Diodorus and Justin have been sufficiently discussed 
above and need not be reworked here - however, we have already argued that attempts 
to reach a firm conclusion upon the origins of the information to be found in either 
Diodorus or in Justin cannot hope to achieve any great deal of success, owing to the 
impossibility of definitive analysis of the material and the difficulty of attributing it to 
any fragmentary author. Perhaps marginally more successful is the work of Momigliano 
(1933), of which Hammond was apparently unaware. He suggests a more organic blend 
of sources for Trogus, including both Ephorus and Theopompus. 
43 Hammond, Markle and Buckley, for instance. 
44 1 instance, A similar, though less dramatic, comparison may be made with the work of Ephorus. For i 
Barber 1935, p86, records that Ephorus was in the habit, whenever he had nothing of interest to say C> 
regarding Cyme, his home town for a certain year, of remarking "at the same time the people of Cyme 
were at peace. " Diodorus does not record this detail, evidently having judged it irrelevant to his narrative. bjz:, I 
Similarly, the comet which divided itself into two halves in Ephorus the account of which is lamented as 
unreliable by Seneca (see above for discussion) is absent from Diodorus. See also Reid, 1969 for a 
detailed discussion comparison of the work of Diodorus with that of Ephorus. 
45 This issue is especially relevant in the following chapter on the reign of Amyntas. 
46 1.972 
47 See above for discussion. 
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Quite aside from the ultimate origins of the material to be found in Justin's Epitome, 
however, is the issue of the very nature of his work. Any reading of it mmediately 
highlights a serious problem with its use: that is, that (whether Trogus or Justin i C) II is to 
blame) it displays a marked inclination towards what might be thought of as "tabloid 
history, " history which is invariably willing to sacrifice historical fact for sensational 
reporting, heavily seasoned, one suspects, with invention. An important example of this 
in the period covered by this thesis is the part played by Eurydice during the 360s BC - Justin would have her conniving at the murder of her first bom son as part of a plot to 
put her lover, Ptolemy on the throne, and then proving likewise fatal to her two younger 
sons Alexander 11 and Perdiccas 111.48 As we know from Diodorus (16.2.4-5) that 
Perdiccas fell in battle, and sheer likelihood makes us balk at accepting Justin's account 
of the rest of Eurydice's murderous actions, Justin is exposed as an unashamed 
embroiderer of fact with fiction, surely revealing considerably more of the bloodthirsty 
reading tastes of the Roman world in which he was living that any facts of actual historical worth regarding Macedonian history. Some chronological confusion also 
complicates his narrative: for example at 8.3 he dates both the capture of Olynthus and 
making of the Peace of Philocrates after the conclusion of the Sacred War. 49 The 
evidence of both Diodorus and the orators illustrate that both the fall of Olynthus and 
the Peace of Philocrates in fact predated the end of the war. 
While on the whole this thesis has sought, as far as is possible, to pursue a philosophy 
of accepting what we can, within the bounds of reason (and always reserving the right 
to question events which do not seem to make sense) from our sources, we are obliged 
to allow that the work of Justin does seem to admit of some serious flaws, most 
especially that imposed by the agenda of its author, to make it as sensational a read as 
possible. On the other hand, there are a few occasions on which Justin is able to provide 
us with some additional information to that which is found in Diodorus. The general 
approach used by this thesis towards his work, then, will be one of extreme caution, 
raising elements of his narrative only when they provide an interesting contrast with the 
more reliable version of Diodorus. 
Having considered the various aspects of our historical sources on the fourth century, 
then, we shall now progress to a discussion of the material which is found in the 
writings of the orators, and its value and use in this thesis. 
The Orators as a Source 
While the matenal contained in Diodorus and Justin provides us with invaluable 
information on the period of the reign of Amyntas III and the 360s BC, which is 
unavailable elsewhere, as well as information on the reign of Philip, the material of the 
speeches is almost entirely limited in relevance to Philip's reign. They present problems 
which are markedly different to those found in Justin and Diodorus and yet their use as 
a historical source is by no means less controversial. 
When considering the material contained in the writings of the orators, we come across 
a situation which is both uniquely privileged and uniquely complicated. Demosthenes, 
Aeschines and Isocrates were adult men, fully politically engaged and aware during the Z-: ) 
'8 See Chapter 7 for discssion, and Mortensen, (1992) for an excellent modern discussion of Eurydice's 
actual role during this decade. 
49 These events are discussed in full in Chapter 9. 
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exact time of the reign of Philip, and as such were able to bequeath to us the kind of 
insight unavailable from other ancient authors: they are able, for example, to describe 
such details as the mood in Athens at certain momentS50 or deliver a contemporary view 
on Philip and his practice of foreign policy. It is, however, precisely the elements which Z7ý 
render the speeches so evocative and so highly contemporary which also render them 
infinitely complex as a historical source. Of the sources considered so far both in 
Chapter I and here, none are as profoundly subject to the influence of personal bias as 
those of the orators. The extremely intimate relationship between these men and their 
material is rendered yet further complicated by the fact that their writing, unlike that of 
any other source which we have so far used, makes no claim at having been intended as 
objective, chronological or sequential historical wnting, 5 I but represents a body of 
political speeches intended either to galvanise one party or another into action or to 
blacken the name of a political rival. The chronological order of the speeches is itself 
occasionally unclear, while the material contained within them ranges from brief 
outlines of a general political situation through to highly specific details, attempts to 
identify sources of discontent for Athens specifically or for Greece, and general or 
specific suggestions as to how these situations could or ought to be remedied, and, 
tendencies which are especially prevalent in the speeches regarding the embassy to 
Philip and the award of a crown to Aeschines, personal accusations against each other 
or defence of individual actions. This range of material is contained, in all of the 
speeches, under the umbrella of a highly personal agenda for each speaker. 52 
Various issues regarding the use of the speeches by this thesis need, evidently, to be 
addressed, most importantly, how we go about distilling some grain of historical truth 
from this matenal and reconciling the individual bias contained within it with their use 
as a historical source. 
The speeches contain much which is useful in establishing the political affiliation of 
each of the orators. The association of each orator with one political movement or 
another represents a branch of the history of this period which is of very limited 
relevance to our discussion here, and while some modem bibliography on it will be 
given, we will on the whole refrain from any lengthy discussion of it here. The basic 
political inclinations of Demosthenes, Aeschines and Isocrates, however, do of course 
have some bearing upon the specific bias of their speeches, and hence a brief outline of 
the agenda of each orator and an overview of the material contained in his speeches on 
the relevant period will be given here. 
Demosthenes offers us the largest body of relevant material on the period covered by 
this thesis. 53 His exact political affiliations have been subject to some debate amongst 
modem authors '54 but his attitude towards Philip is plainly stated - 
he was, from when 
50 See, for example, the highly evocative speech On the Peace, which highlights with perfect clarity the C> II Cý ZID 
alarm felt in Athens over the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates and the Sacred War, discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
51 Although see Chapter I under our subsection on Xenophon for some suggestions that his work did not 
make a claim to such writing either, but was instead intended as moralia or personal memoirs. zn 52 For a useful summary of the life and works of all three of these men, see Dobson, (1918), Kennedy 
(1963), Edwards (1994) and Usher (1999). 
53 For modern discussions of the life of Demosthenes see especially Sealey (1993), Pickard Cambridge 
(1914) and Werner Jaeger (1938). 
54 See for example the question of his attitude towards Thebes. Trevett, 1999, argued that Demosthenes 
was a Boeotian sympathiser, against the view advanced by Cawkwell in 1963 and followed by Harris i C, i in 
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we first find him discussing Philip at any length, highly sensitive to the increase in 
Macedonian power and influence and wary of Philip's Intentions. Because of this 
attitude he has been blamed by authors both ancient and modem for war mongering, 
and it has been suggested that his political orientation was ultimately responsible for the 
battle of Chaeronaea and the defeat of Athens by Philip, the mistrust that he had 
fostered having made it impossible for Philip to pursue a more pacific path . 
55 While any 
such conclusions may only ever be speculative, a brief consideration of the content of 
his speeches illustrates the reasoning behind this school of thought. 
In the Philippics and Olynthiacs, Demosthenes attempted to alert the Athenians to the 
growing threat of Philip's increasing power and, as Demosthenes saw it, aggression 
towards Athens and Athenian interests. The series show an increasing tendency towards 
invective with the progression of time, and while the Philippics represent a general 
body of advice and the Olynthiacs focus on the specific case of Olynthus, an Athenian 
56 ally which fell to Philip in 348, both advocate a policy of active resistance towards 
Philip including the proposition of a series of expeditions against Philip and a vehement 
condemnation of Athenian indifference to what Demosthenes characterises as a growing 
threat. 
Precisely the tendencies identified above as both useful and complicated to our use of 
these speeches may be found in both series. Demosthenes allows us a unique insight 
into the thinking and policy of a particular political faction in contemporary Athens - 
that which was strongly opposed to Philip. He lays out in some detail the financial 
situation in Athens and its potential military capacity for a war with Phi lip'57 and is our 
most vital source on the lethargic attitude towards Philip which seems to have prevailed 
over any the acceptance of any such suggestions. In terms of historical fact, however, 
these speeches are deeply flawed by the political agenda of their author, who tends to 
summarise events rather than detailing them fUlly58 and, we suspect, to exaggerate facts 
or situations which recommend his proposals. 59 
1995, that the ultimate alliance between Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea was a last minute measure born 
of desperation rather than the product of any longer term individual political affiliations. Although this is Z-) tn 
an interesting and ongoing debate, it has no real bearing on our discussion of Philip's foreign policy, and ZýI 1-ý 1-n 
therefore will be passed over here. 
55 See for example Aeschines On the Crown, although Adams (1963) attributes noble intentions of C) 
defending liberty against imperialism to Demosthenes as opposed to the uglier allegations found in ZD tn ZD 
Aeschines. Cawkwell, in his series of articles on this period and his book on Philip (see bibliography for C) full references) consistently argues that Demosthenes was out of touch with the reality of the time and 
thus his efforts were futile from the outset. 
56 See Chapter 9 for discussion. 
57 See for example the First Philippic 16 ff in which an expedition against Philip, including some Cý 
financial calculations as regards its upkeep, is proposed t: ) 58 For example, the First Olynthiac 12 contains a passage which has been much used by modern authors 
(see Chapters 8 and 9 for discussion of these events) in which Demosthenes rattles off a list of 
Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea, Methone, Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, Thrace, Illyria, Paeonia and King 
Arrybas as the series of Philip's conquests. As this list gives us no indications of its intended 
chronological sequence nor is it even accurate, Thessaly now being tied to Philip by alliance rather than 
out and out conquest (see Chapter 8 for discussion) it is of limited historical value. Here, the impact of 
Demosthenes' proposals on the Athenian assembly is in general passed over as being of limited relevance Cý Z: I 
to our discussion - for a thorough treatment of this, however, see Montgomery 1983. 1: 1 M 59 See for example the Second Olynthiac IIf for some apparently unsubstantiated claims that Thessaly 
was on the brink of demanding the restoration of some of its land from Philip, and, even more spurious, 
15 ff contains some suggestions that Philip's subjects were exhausted by Philip's constant campaigns and 
showing signs of unrest, a claim which Demosthenes is entirely unable to cite any examples of. 
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De Fcdsa Legatione represents the prosecution which Demosthenes brought against 
Aeschines for his alleged part in the makin_ of the Peace of Philocrates, who had 
himself been found guilty ( in abse77tia - he had prudently removed himself from Athens) of having, been bribed by Philip dunng the making of the peace. Aeschines, 
claimed Demosthenes, had shared in Philocrates' corruption and was thus guilty of 
treason. 60 
The very nature of a speech of this kind makes it highly problematic. Demosthenes 
documents the exchange of embassies and the mechanics of the making of the peace in 
microscopic detail, a process which allows us to document every step along the way of 
the making of the treaty; 61 however, the information which he offers in this way is heavily tinted with bias, as the whole was written not to be used as historical evidence 
but to incriminate Aeschines. Aeschines' defence, on the other hand, contained in the 
speech On the False Embassy is equally detailed but if anything yet more biased -a 
man who is on trial for his life is unlikely to be capable or even willing to give an 
objective viewpoint. This vitriolic court case is loaded with personal and political 
agenda and yet forms the basis for what we know of the peace, as Diodorus failed to 
include it in his history - perhaps because, in spite of this wealth of information, it was 
short lived and of little actual historical importance. 
Aeschines' position on Philip was less clear cut - it appears that he initially opposed Philip and, like Demosthenes, advocated a policy of active resistance against him, but, 
recognising Greek lethargy in this field and ultimately being persuaded that Philip was 
in fact no barbarian but "the most Greek of men" was, along with Philocrates, one of the 
proponents of peace. Aeschines, yet more than Demosthenes, had a highly personal 
agenda in his speeches. His political integrity (and popularity) rested entirely upon his 
ability to convince the Athenian people of Philip's good intentions towards them and 
indeed his very life was dependent upon his ability to secure an acquittal from the 
charges of bribery which Demosthenes had brought against him. An overwhelming 
personal bias thus colours Aeschines' version of events 62 and nowhere more than in his 
speeches is the element of personal bias so evident. 
Isocrates, also writing during Philip's reign, is an equally difficult source. While he did 
not enter into the court case between Aeschines and Demosthenes, he seems to have 
been something of an eccentric; as Ellis and MilnS633 put it: 
Isocrates, a political philosopher and teacher of the arts of oratory and history, 
sheds more light, when he writes to Philip, on himself than on the Macedonian 
king. He preserves for us far less of what Philip thought and did than of what he 
considered Philip ought to think and do. (pplf) 
6() For a fascinating discussion of the use of character denigration as an element of political speech during ZD 
this period, see Burke's study of 1972. 
61 The importance of the Peace of Philocrates has been inflated in modern sources by the wealth of 
information that is available to us on it. This point is further discussed in Chapter 9. 
62 See for example the discussion of Aeschines' description of the intervention of lphicrates on behalf, 
allegedly, of Philip and Perdiccas during the reign of Ptolemy of Alorus in the following chapter. 
63 1 970 
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Their evaluation is thoroughly borne out by a reading of Isocrates' Letter to Philip and 
On the Peace. The information that he gives is therefore limited not only by bias but 
also in terms of sheer volume. Little of relevance to us may be distilled from his 
expressions of personal theories of political practice which have only a tenuous 
connection to historical real ity. 64 
Several factors might, then, influence our position on the use of the orators as a 
historical source. We are obliged to recognise their usefulness on account of the high 
degree of involvement between their authors and the subject matter they describe, and 
as a result their information will be cautiously taken into account during our discussion 
of the reign of Philip to provide comparison with the more chronologically ordered and less biased Diodorus. However, in recognition of the flaws which they admit of, again, 
due to the intimate relationship between these authors and the situations they describe, 
an awareness will be constantly maintained with regard to the information they 
provide. 65 
The method followed by this thesis in approaching sources on the mid and later fourth 
century will be to use Diodorus, our most consistent and least biased chronological 
source to construct a framework for our concept of this period. Justin and the orators, in 
view of the tendency in each author to omit from or embroider upon his version of 
events, will be used only to augment the version given by Diodorus on occasions where 
they provide credible supplements to his narrative. 
The sources on the fourth century are, if anything, even more complicated than those on 
the fifth. In critically evaluating them, however, and using them in a way which 
recognises both their merits and their flaws, some basis of information may ultimately 
be constructed for a discussion of Macedonian foreign policy during the fourth century. 
64 For modern discussions of Isocrates' work, see Gunther, 1967 and especially Too, 1995, for an 
extensive discussion of Isocrates' relationship with contemporary politics. 
65 Pearson, in his exhaustive study of Demosthenes' style (1976) says of that author "we should not 
complain if he sometimes misrepresents fact or law in order to achieve his particular purpose. " (pv, 
preface)While this approach may well be admissible for a stylistic study, it must be rejected by one 
which hopes to achieve an accurate grasp of the historical context in which the speeches were written. 
Harris (1995) establishes a set of criteria by which, he suggests, we might be able to evaluate the 
reliability of any given piece of information in the speeches (pp8ff). Whilst these are helpful to a certain 
extent, they are hardly a guarantee of veracity. He suggests, for example, (plO) that a piece of information C> CýC 
which refers to an event which would have been public knowledge ought to be considered to be reliable. VD Cý 
This is by no means the case. Public knowledge of the event may well have been derived from the orator C 
himself, as we have no way of knowing if the author relates the whole event or merely a part which 
contributes to his agenda. 
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Chapter 6 
The Reign of Amyntas III 
"Cum Illyris deinde cum Olynthiis gravia bella gessit"' 
As discussed in the latter part of Chapter 4, the high promise of Archelaus' kingship, 
with its increased mint activity and the transformation of Macedon's defensive 
structures, had collapsed in the final Years of his reign, and following his death the 
throne had been contested to the detriment of the stability and strength of the country. In 
addition to (or perhaps as a result of) the intrinsic weakness of Macedon at this time, 
Amyntas' reign faced various crises including two major invasions. In spite of this inauspicious outlook, however, 2 Amyntas did in fact succeed in retaining the throne for 
a twenty four year period 3 and despite various fluctuations in his fortunes he was 
ultimately successful in negotiating all the challenges which he faced during his reign. 
This chapter will discuss how this was achieved. 
The ancient sources on the reign of Amyntas III are, as with those on the kings of the 
fifth century, scant, and yet the information which they offer is complex and the events 
interwoven. Amyntas' foreign policy was dominated by his dealings with Athens, 
Sparta, and with the. three ascending northern states, Olynthus, Elyria and Thessaly. The 
high degree of interdependency between the various strands of Amyntas' foreign policy 
as it is recorded by our ancient sources necessitates some consideration of the 
chronology of his reign, certainty upon which eludes us in the inconsistent and often 
confusing accounts of it. In conjunction with its discussion of Amyntas' foreign policy, 
this chapter will attempt to disentangle some elements of the chronological confusion 
which accompanies it. 
Some chronological security may be reached upon the date of Amyntas' accession, 
although it is almost immediately thrown into doubt by contradictory information. 
Diodorus 14.89.2 records his assassination of Pausanias and accession to the throne in 
the year 394/3 and gives the length of his reign as twenty four years, recording his death 
in 370/694 . These dates would appear to complement each other, were it not for the inclusion at 14.92.3-4, following his notice of the Illynan invasion 5 of the insertion "by 
some [sources]" of a two year reign by another king, Argaeus, at this point. Ought we 
therefore to include these two years, and date Amyntas' accession to an earlier time, or 
his death to a later? 6 A retrospective look at the preceding years allows us to date 
1 Justin 7.4.6 
2 The fact that Amyntas' claim to the throne may not have been especially strong ( see Greenwalt 1988 
p35 and Hammond 1979 p170, who both suGgest that the fact that Amyntas was obliged to murder ZD Cý C) 
Pausanias to take the throne (Diodorus 14.89-2) implies that that he was not in fact a true heir) must 
sure] have added to the precariousness of his reign. y Z: ) 
3 See below for a discussion of chronology and the possibility of an interruption to the reign of Amyntas t-1 Z: ) 
by a rival claimant to the throne, Araaeus, a name which resurfaces during our discussion of the reign of 
Philip II. 
4 At 15.60.3. 
Or, according to Hammond 1979 pp174f, the first Illyrian invasion - he argues that there were in fact C 
two. This is discussed below. 
6 The possible period of Argaeus' kingship is discussed below. 
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Amyntas' accession to 394/3 with some confidence. Placing Archelaus' death in 
400/399, the death of Aeropus c 395/4 and that of Pausanias jn 394/3 7 allows us to 
attribute a six year reign and a one year reign to Aeropus and Pausanas (and possibly 
also one of a few months to Amyntas 118 ) according to Diodorus 14.37.6 and 14.84.6 by 
reckoning the reignal years inclusively. We may accept, then, a date of 394/3 for 
Amyntas' accession. 9 The remaining chronology of his reign is discussed below. 
A brief consideration of Macedon's situation at this point might indicate what dire 
straits she was in at this moment of her history. It has already been noted that the years 
of contest over Macedon's throne had had a detrimental effect upon the stability and 
prosperity of the country. 10 A brief review of the development of her neighbouring 
states reveals that Macedon's weakness made her a tantalising possibility for invaders. 
To the north and west the threat of Illyria was looming large. " The unity of a large 
portion of Illyria under the ambitious king Bardylls, and possibly the covetous eyes of 
another Illyrian ruler, identified by Mortensen as Sirra, from an impoverished area of 
the country, 12 resulted in at least one invasion and certainly two separate occasions upon 
which Amyntas was defeated in battle by Illyrian forces. To the east a federal centre, 
Olynthus was increasing in both power and aggression 13 and was disinclined to regard 
14 Macedon, weakened as she was, with much respect. To the south, Thessal y was 
undergoing some immense changes which culminated in its union under Jason of 
Pherae. It appears that, towards the end of the reign of Amyntas, Jason's plans may also 
have included using an alliance with Amyntas to gain some control over Macedonian 
foreign policy, thus taking advantage of Macedon's dependence upon other states for 15 security. 
On Amyntas' accession in 394/3, then, Macedon, with her unstable throne and rich 
supply of timber and minerals, might be best likened to a plum npe for the plucking by 
any hand that cared to reach for it. It appears that the extreme precariousness of his 
position was clear to Amyntas, and it seems likely that one of his first actions on the 
throne was to attempt to increase Macedon's security by contracting an alliance with 
Olynthus. 
Tod 11,16 records a fifty year defensive alliance between Amyntas and the Chalcidians. 
The stele also records the grant of right to the Chalcidians to export pitch and timber of 
7 Diodorus 14.37.6,14.84.6 and 14.89.2 respectively. 
8 See previous chapter for discussion. 
9 The ingenious system of reckoning regnal years inclusively was suggested by Hammond in 1979 (pl. 82) C L- CIZD 
and followed by March 1995 (pp258ff). It allows us to conceive of the year 393/2, for example (the 
probable period of Argaeus' reign) as a two year period. March also suggests that kings must be allowed Zn I=> Z: ) ZD 
in our chronologies to share a regnal year. The implications of this point are discussed below. 
10 See Chapter 4 for discussion of this, and below for a note upon the decline in Macedonian coinage at 
this point. 
11 For the development of Illyria during this period see S. Casson (1926) and, more recently, Aleksander 
Stipcevic (1977). Mortensen's article "The Career of Bardylis" (1991) will be discussed at some length 
below. 
12 See Mortensen 1991 pp50 f. 
13 See A Gude (1933), D. Robinson (1933), M. Rose (1984) and, most recently, S. Psoma (2001) for 
some discussions of the size and wealth of Olynthus. 
14 Upon which Westlake still appears to be the authoritative work. 
15 See below for discussion. 
16 Volume II pp 30 ff. 
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all kinds from Macedon. 17 It is possible to discern certain subtexts in this decree. The 
rights to export timber probably signified a concession on Amyntas' behalf, probably 
indicating that his own was the weaker position in the negotiations for the treaty. The 
implications of these generous terms to Olynthus is that Amyntas felt indebted to them for their willingness to ally with him - through this alliance he was receiving 
reassurance that the Olynthians at least would not attack him, and that he would receive help from them should he be attacked by another power. It seems likely, then, that Amyntas' first act of foreign policy was a defensive one, designed to increase the 
security of Macedon in the face of troubles brewing for her from the north and west, the threat of which was probably already apparent to him. 
The Illyrian Invasion of 393 and the Possibility of a Doublet 
Diodorus 14.92.3-4 informs us of the first invasion of Amyntas' reign, placing it under 
the year 393/2: 
KccTcc 5F- Týv M(xxFÖovi(xv 'Aýii)vwý o (I)iXinnoi) n(xTilp 'IXXi)pi(i)v jq F-ýtßcc-ýOVT(OV Eiý MOC'KEÖOVI(DCV EX T% X(OP(xg* ('XIEO7V0, L)ý Öe' Tijv 0; ýl, )VO' otg ýlev TIIV (Y1)ve771, )g XO)P(XV £'-80)PllcyccTo, (Xl. ) 5 (xpx v TO E TOTE ýLEV 2 (X7[F'-ß(Xkg T\IV ß(X(Ytý. Et'(XV, ýLET, 0' Xt'70v 5 e\ xpovov IM \O e)ETT(XÄ, (i)V 'K(XT(XXOEt'ý 
(XVEXT 1(Y(XTO TIIV (xpxllv, K(XI E1E F- (pcccrt 
ßcccixp-)GF-v 9"Tll E', 'Ko(yl T' TT(XP(X. Ivt01 8' 
gF-T(\x TI\lv F'-"K7[TO)GIV Tljv 'Aýti")v-coi) 6tF-TIj XPOVOV 'Apy(xiov T6)v 
j M(X, KF-Öov(ov, Kcct ToTF- T o\v 'Aýti)vT(xv (xvocKTil(Ycc(YO(xi Týv ß(X(YtXF-i(xv. 
In Macedonia Amyntas, the father of Philip, was driven from his country by 
Illynans who invaded Macedonia, and giving up hope for his crown, he made a 
present to the Olynthians of his territory which bordered on theirs. For the time 
being he lost his kingdom, but shortly he was restored by the Thessalians, 
recovered his crown, and ruled for twenty four years. Some say, however, that 
after the expulsion of Amyntas the Macedonians were ruled by Argaeus for a 
period of two years and that it was after that time that Amyntas recovered that 
kingship. (14.92.3-4) 
The contents of this passage have caused great debate amongst modem scholars, 
because they are partially repeated at 15.19.2-3 under the year 383: 
K(XTOC 5E T7\v M(xKF-8ovt'ocv 'Ap)wou cob P(xcTtXF'-(Oq I'TTilOElvToq 'L)Tco\ 
'N, 1%I)PtCOV K(X\l 'r(\x 'KoCTO\c 'Tl\lv O'CPX1\lv ('XTC07vOv'uOq, TcPO\ q5 F\- Tol")Totq TCO 5711UP 
c , rcov 'Okuvolicov 6(opiloaýtE'vol) Tcoxý, Ijv r7lq 0[topol') X(Opccq 61cc T71V 
(XTcO, yv(o(TIV -[ý; E(X-L), Tob 6-L)V(xarEl(x;, 'ro ýLev TEP(l)-cov 0 8fiýLoq 0 u6v c 
'WA)VOti(ov T(, Xq 7rpo(YO501-)q Ex('4tP(XVE T(\X; E"K Tfiq 80OF-ICYlIq XCI)PCCq, ýtF-T& 6E' 
17 This chapter concurs with Tod in dating this decree to 393, although some authors (notably Hammond C) rn 
p173, whose opinion is discussed below) prefer to date it later in his reign. The early date Is preferred 
here, partly because it ties in well with a natural desire on Amyntas' behalf to consolidate his position at 
the time of his accession with the surrounding states and because of his grant of land to Olynthus on the C) 
occasion of the Illyrian invasion later in 393. It does not seem likely that Amyntas would donate land to 
Olynthus if no official friendship was in existence between them, especially if Greenwalt (1988) is 
correct in suggesting that the similarity between the coinage from the mint at Damastion and that of the : _- Z-1 Z: ) tý Chalcidic league (see J. M. F. May 1939 pp 17 f) signifies that a cooperation between these two powers Z-- C) 
was in existence. Harding 1985 suggests (p35) that the stele records two, not one, alliances between Cý ZD L- 
Amyntas. This view is not accepted here because no occasion on which a second alliance might have 7-ý 
been made readily presents itself in Amyntas' history, and furthermore because, contrary to Harding, no tD 
difference in tone may be noted between the two parts of the decree. 
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T(xl-)T (XVF-X7CICYTO)ý Toi) V(XX(Xß ' vroý ' auT, v -K(X' c'v' XTIV ' PX (X 0 F- 01 11 0 (X 11 v 
(XV(XKTIICT(XýtF, VO'o 01 ýLF-v 0; ýi)votot Tljv xcüp(xv (, xn(XI-UllogvCF-ý 01)x Oiot 
ýCY(xv ('XluoÖt80v(xi. 8tOnF-p 'Aýt1, wmý iÖt(xv Te 8ý)v(x4iv al)vF-EYTIIG(XTO KM 
TO1L)ý A(X-KF-ÖCC140viol)ý JUOITICYCCýLEVOý 01-)ýLýt(XXOI)ý EIEEICEV 94(XnOCYTF-iXCCI 
(JTP(XT11^(O'V XM ÖlbVC(ýLIV (Xý10iý070V 2'-lE1 TO1L)ý '0; ý1, )VO101. )ý. 
In Macedonia Amyntas the king had been defeated by the Illyrians and had 
relinquished his authority; he had furthermore made a grant to the people of the 
Olynthians of a large part of the borderland because of his abandonment of 
political power. At first the people of the Olynthians enjoyed the revenues from 
the land given them, and when later the king unexpectedly recovered strength 
and got back his entire kingdom, the Olynthians were not inclined to return the 
land when he asked for it. Consequently Amyntas gathered an army from his 
own people, and forming an alliance with the Lacedaemonians persuaded them 
to send out a general and a strong force against the Olynthians. (15.19.2-3) 
The similarities between these two passages have caused a great deal of confusion 
amongst modem scholars. To tackle this problem, we might begin by examining the 
events of the first invasion, as we have them from Diodorus. 
The grant of land to the Olynthians tallies well with the terms of Tod I 11, in which (as 
noted above) a defensive alliance was drawn up between Amyntas and Chalcidice. 
Amyntas (fearing, perhaps for his life after only one year on the throne and with several 
examples of kings who had been removed by assassination before him) fled, but 
Olynthus was true to her oath in the treaty and took on the defence of part of Macedon, 
the part nearest to her, in trust. 18 
The two year reign of Argaeus has been doubted by some scholars'9 - however, there 
seems to be little reason to reject it and, if Amyntas did indeed despair of his crown, as 
Diodorus twice informs us that he did, the installation of a puppet king seems likel Y. 20 
How the restoration of Amyntas was achieved in the face of this invasion is detailed by 
Isocrates' Archidamus 46 .21 This passage tells of a remark made to the tyrant Dionysius 
who, besieged by a Carthaginian force was preparing to flee when an advisor remarked 
18 Taking Olynthus' guardianship of this land into account, we might call Greenwalt's suggestion that in C, r) ZD 
some kind of agreement existed between Illyria and Olynthus, into question. If this had been the case, 
Olynthus would surely not have allied with Amyntas at all, or, if he had, she would then have seized this 
land and perhaps even contributed in a pincer movement to the Illyrian invasion. March (1995 p 275) 
(Yoes so far as to sucaest that the land was in fact "extorted" (though from Argaeus, not from Amyntas). ZI) C) C> 
t: - 1-1) 
Given that there is no mention of either the extortion of land nor of Argaeus being on the throne at this 
point in any of our sources, it seems somewhat fanciful to assume either, especially given the existence of C) 
Tod I 11, which gives us every reason to believe in a defensive alliance as the explanation for Olynthus' 
involvement. 
19 For example Borza (1990) p. 182, who disregards it on the grounds that evidence attesting it is too slim C) Z: > L-1 
- Ellis (1969) p7 follows the German scholar Geyer in equating, the rule of Argaeus with the Olynthian Z: ) Cý 
invasion rather than that of the Illyrians, although this theory appears arbitrary and lacks supporting 
evidence. 
20 See the Athenian support of Philip during Perdiccas' reign, or that of Argaeus at the beginning of the Cý Z-- ZD C) t: ý 
reign of Philip 11 for other examples of an aggressive power supporting a rival claim to the throne, 
presumably in the hope that in the case of their invasion being successful, their candidate would rule in a C) 
way which reflected his debt to his supporters in gaining his throne. Z: ý 
2 16.46 
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to him that "royalty is a glorious shroud. " Dionysius took courage from this and stayed 
to fi ght. As a post scription to this anecdote, Isocrates relates that: t: ) 
IFI(xPanklimoc 8F'- rol'), rot; 'Aýo0vU(Xq 0 MCCI<F-60V(I)V PCC(5tkF-'U'q F'-'7rp(X4F-V. 
'HTTIIOEI; 7('XP '6-90' T6v P(xpp(6xp(ov T6)v Tcpo(TotKoi)vc(ov ýt6 XI 16 cc, n Kat Tcccmiq MCCKE60VI(Xq ('XTCO(YTF-PIIOElq, T6 [LEV 7tp(i)'rOV EKkITCF-! V T7)V X(OP(XV 6tF-VOIIOII 
I'Mt TO CTCOg(X 8MCTCOýEtV, ('XKOI)(5(X; 56 'rtVOq E'-It(XtVObVTOq TO T[POq AlOV10(YtOV 
IIOEV KCCI ýLETWYVOI'); 60CMEP E'-KF-iVO;, X(OPIOV ýUKPOV 'K(XTCtk(XP(I)V KCCt 
P071OF-I(XV E'-VOF'-V6F- [tC'r(XTC6ýtW('4lCVOq, E-'VTO\q ýLEV 'CptCOV ý01V&)V K(XTFCYXEV 
(x7r(ycy(xv M(XKE60vt(xv, TO'v 6' E-'TctXOITC()v XPOvOv PCC(YIXE1)()V PIN TO\ v PtOv 
F-TF-xr-l, )-CIJ(TF-V. 
Similar to this was the career of Amyntas, king of the Macedonians. Worsted in 
battle by neighbouring barbarians, and robbed of all Macedonia he at first 
proposed to quit Macedonia and save his life, but hearing someone praise the 
remark made to Dionysius and, like Dionysius repenting of his decision, 
Amyntas seized a small fortified post, set out thence for reinforcements, 
recovered the whole of Macedonia in three months and spent the remainder of 
his days on the throne and finally died of old age. 22 
Adding together the evidence of our sources, then, we might recapitulate events in the 
following way. Amyntas, having come to the throne in 394/3, immediately contracted a 
defensive alliance with Olynthus and, in accordance with this formal friendship, handed 
over some of his territory into the care of his new ally for protection in the face of the 
Illyrian invasion. He then fled, perhaps to Thessaly, as we hear of his restoration by 
23 Thessalians, and Argaeus ruled Macedon for two years . Amyntas then changed his 
mind about abandoning his kingdom and seized "a small fortified place" - perhaps one 
of the forts constructed during the reign of Archelaus - and from there was assisted by 
the Thessalians, and regained his crown. 24 
Three questions remain to be answered on this episode: who were the Thessallans who 
helped Amyntas, can we identify the Illyrians who invaded, and if so, how did they fit 
into Amyntas' foreign policy in the years following the invasion? 
22 Hammond p174 apparently misinterprets this passage as referring to the Olynthian invasion, although 
the mention of "barbarians" clearly indicates the Illyrians instead. Ellis (1969) pp 3f uses the mention of 
three months as the time for Amyntas to recover his kingdom here as an argument against our acce ting 0 Zý p 
the rule of Arcyaeus, suaaestino, that if the invasion was over in three months, then a two year reign for C> C)4-) Z: ) Argaeus must be rejected, but in fact Isocrates' statement quite clearly refers not to the period of the C 
entire invasion but to that which elapsed following Amyntas' capture of a "small fortified post" before he r) 
had regained his entire kingdom. As March (1995 p271) points out, by met oligon chronon Diodorus C) Z-: ) 
usually means a very short period, but occasionally (e. g. 15.76.4 and 17.1.3) he uses it to refer to a period 
of years. 
23 March suggests that by reckoning inclusively, this two year period need not disturb the chronology of Cý zD tý 
Amyntas' twent four year reign; that is, by considering that Argaeus came to the throne in 393 and was y Z: ý Z! ) L- 
removed from it in 392, his reio-n would have spanned two incomplete calendar years and both of these Cý 
years were shared with Amyntas - in 393 when Amyntas was removed from the throne and in 392 when 
he regained it. We need not, therefore, consider Argaeus' two year reian as an obstacle to Amyntas' 
accession in 394/3, his death in 370/69, nor his reign having spanned a period of twenty four years. CI ICD 24 This Thessalian involvement apparently confused a scholiast on Aeschines 2.26, who has the 
Thessalians expelling Amyntas rather than restoring him! This reference has clearly arisen from a 
misunderstanding of the original source. Z-1 Z: ) 
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Most modem scholars assume that the Thessalians who came to the assistance of 
Amyntas were the Aleuadae of Larissa. This, however, is doubtful. It seems likely that 
it was the Aleuadae whom Archelaus had betrayed at the end of his reign by refusing to 
return land which had been given to him, probably by them, in trust, and likely too that 
25 one of Archelaus' assassins was of the Aleuadae . There 
has been no evidence since of 
any rapprochement between the Argeadae and the Aleuadae, and by the end of his reign 
Amyntas had allied with Jason of Pherae, the political archenemy of the Aleuadae and 
the new power in Thessaly. To assume that the Aleuadae were Amyntas' champions 
here, we are obliged to insert into our concept of this period a realignment between the Z: ) 
Argeadae and the Aleuadae before the Illyrian invasion and then a deterioration of this 
relationship once more before Amyntas' alliance with Jason, neither of which is 
documented in our ancient sources. 
There is very little evidence on the ascendance of Jason in our sources; by the time we 
hear of him he is fully fledged and can claim the whole power of Thessaly behind 26 him . This being so we are in no position to speculate upon whether or not 
he had a 
hand in the restoration of Amyntas following the Illyrian invasion - it is, however, 
perhaps worth questioning the long held assumption that the A-rgead/Aleuad connection 
had endured to a point at which Amyntas could call upon Aleuad support in this crisis. 
No definite conclusion can be reached on this issue, but it is possible that Jason was 
already cultivating the friendship of neighbouring states, and if so that he had a hand in 
Amyntas' restoration. 
Whatever the identity of Amyntas' champions, it appears that by 392/1 at the latest, he 
was back on the throne. The identity of the invaders, and how Amyntas was able to, deal 
with them, remains to be considered. 
Most modem scholars assume that the leader of the massive Illyrian invasion of 393 
was Bardylis, largely, it seems, because Bardylis is named in our sources as an Illyrian 
leader, because he is known to have been alive and an adult at the time of this invasion 
27 
and above all because in later years he was to invade Macedon at the head of a powerful 
army. Mortensen 28 challenges this assumption. She suggests, in a detailed and 
convincing argument, that the leader of the 393 invasion was not Bardylis, but Sirras, 
who has usually been associated with Lyncestis. In support of this argument, she first 
identifies Eurydice, the wife of Amyntas and the mother of Philip 11, as the daughter of 
SirraS29 and then cites various sources which refer to Eurydice having been Illyrian. 
'O 
As Eurydice's mother is known to have been the daughter of Arrabaeus, the Lyncestian 
king, then it follows that her father, Sirras, must have been Illyrian for his daughter to 
have been considered Illyrian as well. 31 Mortensen then suggests that Sirras' kingdom 
bordered upon that of Arrabaeus: 
25 See Chapter 4 for discussion. 
26 See Xenophon Hellenica 6.1.4 ff. 
27 Lucian Macrob. 10 informs us that at the time of Bardylis' battle with Philip in 358, he was ninety 
years old, making him thirty five at the time of the invasion 
in 393. See the following; chapter for 
discussion. 
28 199 1, see especially pp5l ff. 
29 According to an inscription from Vergina, which reads E-opi. 6Kcc Y-Lppcc EuKkF-tcu. (See M. G. 
Demitsas, 1980). 
30 Plutarch Moralia 14b; Suda Karanos, Libanios Vita Demosthenis 9. 
31 For the identity of Eurydice's mother, Strabo 326. This ties in with the 
fact that Arrabaeus and Sirras 
were united against Archelaus at some point 
in his reign (see previous chapter). It thus seems possible, 
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In view of the fact that Arrabaeus and Sirras fought together and, it is ar 4 gued, cemented their alliance with a marriage bond between the two houses, it seems I highly probable that Sirras' kingdom bordered Lyncestis; yet, surprisingly, only Z: ) C) 9 Papazoglou 32 as far as I am aware, has registered this. Sirras' kingdom, then, 
was very likely that fertile area around the Lakes Ochrid and Prespa which is the 
part of Illyna that borders on Lyncestis. This region is not only fertile but also 
has a significant strategic importance, controlling as it did the best route from 
Macedonia to the Adriatic and the northwest via the Dnn valley. (p53) 
Mortensen's suggestion here is based upon speculation and perhaps so specific an 
identification of Sirras' realm is questionable. However, her conclusions regarding 
Sirras' Illyrian nationality and credentials are thought provoking at the very least: 
Sirras... has the appropriate background of past military experience against 
Macedonia; the necessary link with the royal house of Lyncestis, whose territory 
lay between his land and Macedonia; and the daughter who married Amyntas - 
all of which make him, in my opinion, the most likely candidate for the leader of 
the 393/2 invasion. (p54) 
Certainty on the issue of the identity of the leader of the Illyrian invasion is impossible 
as none is named by our ancient sources. Mortensen's argument, however, is 
convincing and calls the fact that Bardylis was not the only Illyrian leader who ought to 
be taken into account in a consideration of this invasion to our attention. An acceptance 
of her suggestion would also allow us to answer our third and final question regarding 
the 393 invasion - how did Amyntas' foreign policy accommodate the aftermath of the 
invasion? If the invader was Bardylis, then we must simply assume that he was driven 
out by Amyntas and his Thessalian allies and no accommodation between the two sides 
was reached. If, on the other hand, we accept that the invader was Sirras rather than 
Bardylis, then we might suggest with some confidence that the marriage between 
Amyntas and Sirras' daughter Eurydice was contracted to sea] a peace made between 
the two warring factions. 33 
In spite of some lack of clarity regarding a few points on the narrative of these years, 
then, some conclusions may be reached. Amyntas, under attack from some part of the 
Illyrian population, whether that led by Bardylis or that led by Sirras, handed over some 
land to Olynthus and fled. After some time he was restored by a group of Thessalians, 
perhaps, but not definitely, either the Aleuadae or the political group which was 
eventually led by Jason of Pherae. The defensive foreign policy of the very early years 
of Amyntas' reign had required a monumental effort of coordination of alliances and 
determination, but Amyntas had survived and had managed to regain his throne against 
all odds. There followed some years of peace, during which Amyntas was able to 
indeed likely, that their alliance was sealed by a marriage tie between Sirras and a daughter of Arrabaeus, 
and that the product of their union was Eurydice. 
32 F. Papazoglou, 1965. 
33 Indeed, whether or not we accept that Sirras was the leader of this invasion, Mortensen's identification 
of Sirras as an Illyrian leader and as the father of Eurydice seems almost certain. This point might also 
contribute to our understanding of why, on Amyntas' death, the sons of Eurydice were preferred to those 
of Gygaea, in spite of the fact that the latter were almost certainly older. Quite simply, Eurydice's family 
were more influential than that of Gygaea. A Lyncestian grandmother would also go some way towards 
explaining why Philip seems to have been able to exert a greater degree of influence in Upper Macedon 
than the preceding kings. See Chapters 7 and 8 for discussion. 
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consolidate his throne, thereby putting an end to the years of unrest which had preceded 
his reign. 
As noted above, the manner in which Diodorus reports the Illyrian and Olynthian 
invasions has given rise to some scholarly debate over the years. In 1883, Beloch and Swoboda made the suggestion that 14.92.3-4 and 15.19.2-3 constitute a "doublet that 
is, they simply repeat the same event twice. This landmark suggestion was to influence 
scholars for several generations; however, it is abundantly clear to any reader of these 
passages that 15.19.2-3 is not a perfect repetition of 14.92.3-4, giving as it does 
additional information '34 and in 1930 another German scholar, Geyer, suggested that 15.19.2 is not a doublet but a conscious repetition of the information given at 14.92.3- 4, designed to remind the reader of the circumstances of the land donation to Olynthus 
before then explaining their refusal to return the land and the subsequent Spartan 
invasion. This point of view appears to tally well with Diodorus' account and is 
accepted by this thesis. Borza 35 and Ellis 36 both concur with Geyer on this point, Ellis 
commenting that: 
The "to men proton... meta tauta" construction makes [it] clear grammatically 
[that Diodorus intends us to realise that some time has elapsed between 
Amyntas' grant of land to the Olynthians and his request for its return]; common 
sense suggests that the revenues of the land would require some time for 
determination and collection, quite apart from the time needed to draw produce 
from it. It is pointless, admittedly, to speculate on the form taken by these 
revenues; what matters is that Diodorus is explaining that the Olynthian 
exploitation of them is a result of the events of 2a and 2b, [sections imposed by 
Ellis upon the passage of 15.19.2 in which Amyntas is driven from his kingdom 
and hands land over to Olynthus, which Olynthus then uses], an exploitation 
challenged by the unexpected revival of Amyntas' power and his request for the 
return of the land. The consequence of this request and the Olynthian refusal was 
the Spartan alliance. That is, Diodorus has repeated the earlier information to 
explai the Spartan intervention that followed, but as explanatory matter, not as 
a doublet. (p2)37 
34 That is, the refusal of Olynthus to return the land which Amyntas had given to her and the events C)l following this refusal. 35 1990 p 184. 36 
1969 pp 2 ff 37 Hammond's point of view, 1979, is the most recent addition to the scholarly debate on the issue to 
propose a new reading, rejecting previous interpretations of a doublet or a conscious repetition of the z: 1 Z7 
same event and suggesting instead (pp174f) that passages 14.92.3-4 and 15.19.2-3 report two separate t: 1t: 1 t: 1 Illyrian invasions, ten years apart. He argues: 
The points of difference between D. S. 14.92.3-4 and 15.19.2 are obvious: in one case the Illyrian 
occupation was complete and lasted up to two years, and it was the Thessalians who put 
Amyntas back on his feet; in the second a disastrous defeat in battle was followed fairly soon 
afterwards by Amyntas recovering himself in an unexpected way (Isocrates adding the point that 
within three months he regained all Macedonia). The theory, then that Diodorus repeated himself 
inadvertently or that he described the same incident twice from different sources, does not stand, 
On the other hand, the superficial similarities - Illyrians, giving land to Olynthus, and Amyntas 
despairing - arise from the geographical setting which was the same on both occasions. " (pl74) C, C) L- 
Hammond's summary here should be treated with extreme caution, and the Idea that Diodorus is 
describing, two separate invasions is not followed by this thesis. One of the major flaws in his ar"IuMent is 
his view of the involvement of Olynthus in this affair, because by acceptInIg, two Invasions, Hammond Is 
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If we concur with Ellis and Borza, we accept that Amyntas suffered just one Illyrian 
invasion. In spite, then, of the dispute in modem sources over this episode, we might Z-) 
conclude that the passages 14.92.2-3 and 15.19.3-4 are not, in fact, problematic. We 
might therefore settle upon the following sequence: z:: ) 
1) (14.89.2) Amyntas succeeds to the throne and immediately concludes an alliance 
with Olynthus, that recorded in Tod 111. 
2) (14.92.2-3) The Illydans, perhaps under the leadership of Sirras, invade, and 
Amyntas despairs, hands over some land to Olynthus for protection and flees. 
Isocrates' mention of a [t(xX-q (6.46) should be associated with this occasion, as 
it seems likely that Amyntas fled after defeat in battle. 
3) (14.92.3) In the absence of Amyntas, Argaeus took the throne, probably frorn 
393-392. 
4) (Isocrates 6.46) Amyntas changes his mind about his kingship, seizes a fortified 
position, sends out for reinforcements, and with these, regains all the land taken 
over by Illyrians. Accepting Mortensen's identification of Sirras as the Illyrian 
leader, we might add that Amyntas then allies with Sirras and marries his 
daughter, Eurydice. 
No information exists in our sources about the events following this recovery of his 
kingship and territory - we might assume, however, that Amyntas was free to 
consolidate his rule throughout the following decade. We might now turn our attention 
to the second great invasion during Amyntas' reign - that by Olynthus in 383. 
Frankenstein's Monster; Perdiccas' Olynthus 
We learn of the establishment of a large city on the site of Olynthus in 432BC38 from 
Thucydides 1.58: 
KM PÖ'1, CK(Xý IZF-'OFt X(XxxtÖ, G(YI 'X \ FIE 1t mý Tocý ent (X 0E OVT(Xý KM 
ýn 
7c ýEtý ' 
K(XT(Xß(XXOVT(Xý (, xvotKt'G(X(Yocct E'ý "Oý. 1, )VOOV ýtiav TE IroXIV Tccl)T-QV t(ixi)P(xv 
710til(Y(Xao(xt. 
Perdiccas, at this point, persuaded the Chalcidians to pull down and abandon 
their, cities on the coast, and to settle inland at Olynthus, making it into one big 
city. -)9 
obliged to accept two land donations, and on p173 asserts that the agr or eement between Amyntas and C) 
Olynthus recorded by Tod 111 "probably regulated relations between the two states c39 1, when Amyntas ID 
had regained his throne and received back his territory around Lake Bolbe c391. " In making this C) - ZD 
assertion, Hammond is not only disregarding the evident concessions made in the treaty, which strongly tD Zý 4ý 
suororest that it was made at a time when Amyntas was sorely in need of help and was prepared to come to 1=>Z: ) 
generous terms, but is also obliged to invent a return of the orio-inal donation of land which is unrecorded Zý 4-- Z: ) 
by any source. His assumptions that the "unexpected" recovery of Amyntas and the intervention of the 
Thessalians refer to two separate events, that the defeat in battle at 15.19.2 and the removal of Amyntas 
from Macedon of 14-92.3 should be divorced, and that the period of two years mentioned by Diodorus 
and that of three months mentioned by Isocrates cancel one another out are misunderstandings by 
Hammond of Diodorus' evidence and need no further refutation here. 
38 Although according to archaeological findings it had been inhabited, though on a much smaller scale, C, C Zýl Zý =1 
for some time. See especially D. Robinson (1933) 
39 See Chapter 3 for discussion of the circumstances of this action. 
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Since this time, Olynthus had been growing in population, wealth and power, and by the 
time of the accession of Amyntas was at the head of a Chalcidic league, that with which 
Amyntas formed an alliance in 393. 
A well intentioned advisor to the king in 432 might have pointed out to him that the 
establishment of a large and populous city upon the borders of his territory was a 
somewhat short sighted move. A mere half century later, Olynthus invaded Macedon 
and Amyntas was removed from his throne for a second time . 
40 The fact that the 
donation of land had occurred in 393 while the Olynthian invasion did not take place 
until 383, ten years later, causes yet further chronological upheaval in the concept of 
Amyntas' reign which is held by modern scholars. March 41 considers this issue of a ten 
year gap to be so problematic that we must redate the Illyrian invasion on account of it: 
If we accept Diodorus... and Ellis' account of the "doublet" question 42 then we 
must assume that the Olynthians held on to the disputed land for ten years! It 
seems that we must either reject D. S. 14.92.3 as evidence for dating the Illyrian 
invasion to 393/2, or we must give up on dating the reign of Argaeus [who is 
said by the chronographic sources cited by March 43 to have reigned for two 
years after six years, not one year, as in Diodorus, of Amyntas' reign. ] Given the 
nature of Diodorus' main source, Ephorus, and his own dating unrellability, I 
believe it to be foolish to reject consistent chronographic information in his 
favour. I propose to redate the Illyrian invasion to 388/7 and believe that this 
date better explains subsequent events... 
An Illyrian invasion in the spring of 387 is more consistent with a surge in 
Illyrian activity at this time. Diodorus records an Illyrian invasion of Epirus in 
385/4 (15.13). The Illynans were supporting the restoration of Alketas as king of 
the Molossians and routed a Molossian force. Similarly, the elevation of 
Argaeus in Macedon may have been an Illyrian aim from the start and part of an 
ambitious plan by Bardylis the Dardanian for domination. All this would better 
explain a Kallisthenes fragment (FGrH124, F27) indicating that Bardylis had 
control over Epirus and Macedon at one time. (pp27 If) 
March's argument here may be called into question on several counts. For example, if 
Mortensen's argument is taken into account, then we must accept that the identification 
of Bardylis as the leader of Illyrian invasion is by no means certain; indeed it seems 
possible if not likely instead that the leader was Sirras, the father of Eurydice, rather 
than Bardylis, while the identity of the leader of the invasion of Molossis is accepted by 
all modem scholars covered by this thesis (including Mortensen) as Bardylis, thus a 
connection between the invasion of Macedon and that of Molossis cannot be made. 
Even if we do not accept Mortensen's argument and suppose that it was in fact Bardylis 
who invaded Macedon in 393, the assumption that the installation of Argaeus along 
with that of a new Molossian king was part of a programme for Illyrian domination of 
the area is somewhat fanciful. Equally, March's acceptance of Jacoby's emendation 44 of 
fragment 27 of Kallisthenes so that it reads Bardyliden7 illyricum Molossis usque ad 
40 The passage of Diodorus which informs us of this dispute and how it came about is quoted above 
41 1995. 
42 Which, as noted above, favoured the idea that 15.19.2 serves as a reminder of the events preceding the 
Olynthian invasion. 
Zý 
43 These are : Eusebios, Panodorus, Diodorus, Porphyrios and Syncellos - see March p261 for references. 
44 Also accepted by Hammond 1979 pl-72. 
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donihiatlt, 1145 and the redating by Hammond (pl-72) of the events to 
which the fragment refers to the period following the Illyrian invasion of Epirus in 
385/4 is unsupported by ancient evidence. Jacoby's date for this fragment, 360/59, on 
the other hand, corresponds to a time when, as we are informed by Diodorus, Bardylis 
did indeed dominate both Molossis and Macedonia. 
Lastly, March's incredulity over the ten year gap between the donation of the land by 
Amyntas (or, as he suggests 46 Argaeus) and the Olynthlan Invasion is unwarranted. 
Certain adjustments to our understanding of this ten year period must be made to 
include the invasion itself, and perhaps the two year reign of Argaeus. A certain period 
of time ought also to be reckoned for Amyntas to consolidate his position once more 
before his request for the return of the land was made. Diodorus' account omits to 
inform us of how the negotiations for the return of the land developed to a point at 
which Olynthus invaded - however, it seems unlikely that the request for the return of 
the land was followed by an immediate invasion - some time for an escalation of hostilities should also be taken into account. A ten year gap between the donation of the 
land and the Olynthian invasion poses no obstacle to our acceptance of the suggestion 
first made by Geyer in 1930 and more recently followed by both Ellis and Borza - that 15.19.3 serves as a reminder to the reader of the circumstances surrounding the 
donation of land to Olynthus before going on to describe the dispute which then broke 
out between Macedon and Olynthus over it. 
The first part of the relevant section of Diodorus was quoted above. The passage 
continues: 
oi 
89 
ACCI<Eöcctýtoviot xptv(xVTEý (xvre-, XF-Gocct T(i)V Z' ni OP9C-Kilý Toito)v, 
' ýx E? % -K(X, up- ýav cyTpancoTaý "ic TF- 'TCOV noxtT(i)V -KOCt\ Impec 'C(J)V GuýLýt(xx(ov Touý 
c(ImvTaý onF-p 41, )ptol)ý- n(XP(XöovTF-ý öF\- cl\lv 81")vccýtiv gbotßiöcc TCO Y. 7C(XPCICCTT1 
7up(: )GET(xýccv (iiiýtýt(xXF-iv u6) 'Aýti)vr(x -K(xi ýtvr' 
The Lacedaemonians, having decided to extend their control to the region about 
Thrace, enrolled soldiers both from their citizens and from their allies, more than 
ten thousand in all: the army they turned over to Phoebidas the Spartan with 
orders to join forces with Amyntas and to make war together with him upon the 
Olynthians. 
It is Xenophon, however, who informs us of the true profundity of the crisis in Macedon 
at this point. He tells US47 of an embassy sent to Sparta from Acanthus and Apollonia, 
placing it in the year 383, to request Spartan aid against Olynthus. Cleigenes of 
Acanthus addresses the Spartan and allied assembly in the following words: 
'f2 (, hÖpeý A(X-KEÖ(Xtýtoviot' 'CE Km cyl)4ýt(Xxot, Ot'oýLF-OCC XCCVOCCVF-tv 14läý 
9'Y(X (P1. )oýLF-VOV F-V Tý "TI 4'V 'Y'P T(i)V 'IZ' Op, , npa740c W, 'EXX('xÖt. oE (X F, 1 (XXIlý 
ýtF-, yila, Ull n60xIý "Okl)VOOý CYXF-Öo, v lt('XVTF-ý olýL), rot T(i)V 710ýF-COV 
npoG117cC7OVTO E(P ü)TE voýtOtý To% (X1OTOiý XpýCOM KM 
F, ICF-tT(X ÖF'- K(X't TCÜV gEtýOV(OV 7UPOCYE-'k(xßOV TtVCCý. F'-'K 8F'- TOUTOU F-7t£7, EIPIIGCCV 
KM Mý T% MCCKF-ÖOVI'Uý lE0kEtý £'-XE1, )OF-POýÜV (X7[0% 'Aýti)vToi) TOi) M(XKF-Öov(I)v 
45 The first word originally having been Balalirem as opposed to Bardylidem. Jacoby's emendation seems 
most sensi - Hammond's redating, on the other hand, does not. 
46 
P274. 
47 Xenophon Hellenica 5.2.1 lff. 
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t 8C Fj OCt F-771)TOCT(X (XIOTOM X K( tt To(; Tx '0 xE 7r 
TCOPPO) K(Xt ýJF-týol, )q 67rOPF-, OOV'TO' K(Xt KWEEXtiTc0ý1EV 11REJ; EXOVT(X; T316-q C"CkXCCq 
rF- TCOXX('X; K(Xt' FIE'_kk(XV, TrEp ýLF, 7t'(TTIJ 'r6)V E'-V M(XKF-80Vt'(x TCO V- K(xt F- 0) 
A[t'UvTccv 6E faOccv'ýtF-Occ ' TcoXo)pobvu' -cF- 'K rCov 7u'kF-cOv Kcd "Gov o' n0 (X cc F, 0t0 10 K F-KnCTC-C(OKO'rOC 11611 EK 7UC'C(TIJ; MCCKF-80Vt'(X;. 7rE-'RWCCVTF,; 6E K(Xt TEPO; ljýt&; 'K(Xt 
' 3Ano/; U(ovt ", r(x; oi 'Ok'vOtot npodnov '-"5 Tupoq (X 1 '0 Tlj-ttv Orl F-I [t7l TrCCPE(7%IEOCC 
C51)(T'TP(X'UF-lO(YOýtF-VOI, F-KdVOt F-(P' %tdq 't'OtF-V. 
Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states, we think you are unaware that a 
great danger is springing up in Greece. To be sure, almost all of you know that 
Olynthus is the largest of the cities on the coast of Thrace. These Olynthians, in 
the first place, attached to themselves some of the cities with the provision that 
all should live under the same laws and be fellow citizens, and then they took 
over some of the larger cities also. After this they undertook, further, to free the 
cities of Macedonia from Amyntas, king of the Macedonians. And when the 
nearest of them gave their alliance, they speedily proceeded against those which 
are further away and larger: and we left them already in possession of a great 
number of Macedonian cities, including especially Pella, which is the largest of 
the cities in Macedonia. We also had information that Amyntas was withdrawing 
from his cities and had already been all but driven out of all Macedonia. The 
Olynthians, furthermore, sent to us and to the Apollonians and announced to us 
that if we did not present ourselves to join them in their campaigns, they would 
come against us. (5.2.11-13) 
Xenophon's information here supplements that of Diodorus, and allows us to conceive 
of the dispute over the return of Amyntas' land, handed over in 393, as the second full 
scale invasion of his reign. We might suppose, although neither source specifically 
informs us that this was the case, that Amyntas followed a similar strategy to that which 
he had used in the face of the Illyrian invasion - that is, withdrawal to a fortified point 
from whence assistance could be requested and assistance organised. 
Amyntas was, on this occasion, exceptionally fortunate that current Spartan foreign 
48 
policy included an interest in affairs in the area of Thrace . Hellenica 5.2.20 reports how the decision to send out an army of ten thousand was taken, and a Spartan 
commander Eudamidas, set out immediately with an advance force of two thousand 
helots. This force was able to gain control of Potidaea 49 and to make this town the basis 
of operations against Olynthus. 5.2.37 reports the fulfilment of the decision to send out 
a force of ten thousand Spartans, along with allied contingents, with Teleutias, brother 
of king Agesilaus, at the head of the force. 50 
48 For a Spartan perspective on this episode, see, for example, Forrest (1968) p127 and, for an excellent 
discussion of the Spartan position following the King's Peace, Ryder (1965) ppI ff. 
495.2.24. C) 
50 Macedon's military capacity was evidently not held in especially high regard by this time. Teleutias' 
., 
on this point: instructions to Amyntas are telling 
npObCZýL71F- 5ý KOCi Tcp6ý 'Aýiý)vTocv, Kai ý4ioi) ocin6v Kcci 4ývouq [n(TOob(30ccl Koci ro-L; 
, 
ýv nkflaiov P(X(YLXF-b(Yl Xpý[Icvra &60vat, d)q G'JVLII&Xo-oq F-'IV(Xt, F-ýIrp POUot-ro 'Týv 6cpy 
avaXapdv. ýnqtim 6ý Kai np6; Aýp6av -cO'v 'EXtVii(xq ('X'pXovrcc, &66(ymov O"Ti oi 
'0M)vOtot 
IIIIII K(XTc(5, rpccj, [, ývot Týv VtEiýo) M)V(XýItv M(XKF-50viccq EtEv, K(Xl OJ'K (XVTJ(Yol, )(Yt T11V ýk&TTQ), Ei 
ýJý 'rtq CC-6'r0b; 71(X-6(YFI Tý; bppF-O)q. 
He[Teleutias] ... sent word on ahead to 
Amyntas and asked him not only to hire mercenaries, but 
likewise to give money to the kings in his neighbourhood, that they micght become allies, If he I-D 
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The Spartans pursued this war with remarkable vigour. The first major battle (in the 
account of which, we note, Derdas of ElImea plays a heroic role, while Amyntas does 
not figure at all -a fact which is perhaps genuinely indicative of Amyntas' military 4- insignificance) was fought in 382,51 while in the second in 381 the Spartans suffered Z: ) 
very heavy losses, their commander Teleutias amongst the casualties. 52 Rather than 
lessening their commitment in the area due to this set back, however, they redoubled it: 
5.3-8-9 relates how the king Agesipolis, along with thirty spartiates and a large force of 
perioikoi set out following this disaster, and how upon their arrival they were joined 
once more by Amyntas and Derdas. Agesipolis died of illness without seeing the end of 
the campaign, however and was replaced by the general Polybiades 
Olynthus could not withstand such determination on Sparta's behalf, and Xenophon 
5.3.26 tells how, following a siege which reduced the city to a state of desperation, 
Olynthus treated with Sparta. Xenophon's account of the terms of this treaty leaves us 
in no doubt that the relief of the crisis in Amyntas' reign was not the main objective of 
Sparta's campaign: 
Kal 0 I-loX1, )ßiCC8-qý ör'- 8-q', nccvc' - 5/ C(7[C(Gt KC(K0)ý EXOVTCCý Toll)ý 'Oý, 1, )VOIO1. )ý, 
To' ýLIIT, EX Tfiý Yfiý X(XýtßavF-tv glITE K(XTC'( aiTov 
llv('x7, KCCCYF- 7uF-ýtycct etý A(xxF-5(xiýtov(x nept F-iplIvTlý. ot ex0ovTEý 
7[PF-CyßF-Ig (XI)'uOxp(, XTOPEý cyl)vOllK(Xý F-notllcy(xvT0 TO'V (xi)To, v ýtev Exopo\V xat, 
'Xov Acc-KF-Ö(xiýtoviotý voRiýF-tv, ' -Koý, oi)OF-iv 89' O'not '\ (Pt (X (XV 117wVT(XI KM 
a1, )ýtýLuxot EIV(Xt. IC(Xt oýLoaavu-ý T(X£)T(X F, ýtýLF-VF-iv 
olMoý (xnj; ýOOV Oi'K(XÖF-. 
At this time also Polybiades compelled the Olynthians, who were in an 
exceedingly wretched state from famine, in as much as they got no food from 
their own land and none was brought in to them by sea, to send to Lacedaemon 
to treat for peace; and those who went thither, being ambassadors with full 
power concluded a compact to count the same people as enemies and friends as 
the Lacedaernonians did, to follow wherever they led the way, and to be their 
allies. Then after taking an oath that they would abide by this compact, they 
went back home. (5.3.26) 
We note that there is no mention of Amyntas' land, its return, nor any clause pertaining 
to future relations with him. 53 In spite, however, of this sense that the security of 
Amyntas' kingdom and throne was peripheral to the Spartan agenda, however, there is 
no doubt that Amyntas was able to profit from the outcome of the Spartan campaign. 
Neither Djodorus nor Xenophon elucidates the immediate aften-nath of this treaty, but 
really wanted to recover his dominions. Furthermore he sent to Derdas, the ruler of Elimea, 
pointing out to him that the Olynthians had already subdued the greater power, Macedonia, and 
would not let the lesser escape unless someone put an end to their presumption. (Hellenica 
5.2.38). 
Evidently either the quality or size of Amyntas' army did not convince Teleutias that they would be 
sufficient to ensure the success of the enterprise. 5'5.2.40 f 
52 See Hellenica 5.22.40ff and Diodorus 15.211.2-3, which gives twelve hundred as the number of Spartan 
casualties. 
53 On the other hand, it is also worth noting that Xenophon was not much interested Macedonian affairs 
at all, a point made in Chapter I under the subsection on his work. 
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we might safely assume that Amyntas, with Olynthus defeated, was free to reclaim the 
disputed territory at leisure. 
Several observations might be made about this episode. The first and perhaps the most 
obvious point is that, in relying upon Sparta's aid, Amyntas' actions are very 
reminiscent of those of Perdiccas in 424 when, due to the existence of other Spartan 
interests in the area of Macedon, the Macedonian king was able to take advantage of a 
Spartan military presence to address problems of his own. A further similarity between 
Perdiccas' association with Sparta and that of Amyntas is the implicit recognition on 
behalf of both kings (though Amyntas' position in 383 was, if Xenophon was not 
exaggerating the extent of the invasion, far more serious than Perdiccas' had been) that 
their own military capacity was not sufficient to deal with the current crisis. In spite of 
Archelaus' military improvements 54 in the interim between the reign of Perdiccas and 
that of Amyntas, the years of instability which had followed Archelaus' death had 
obviously been detrimental to Macedon's strength. Without any numbers pertaining to 
manpower or to cavalry during this period, no more specific observations can be made 
on this point - however, the superficial similanties between Perdiccas' collaboration 
with Sparta and that of Amyntas leave the reader with the impression that Macedon had 
deteriorated, in a military sense, from the peak it may be thought to have reached under 
Archelaus, to resemble its state before Archelaus' reign. 
Secondly, we might note that the cooperation between Amyntas and Sparta at this point 
marked a turning point in relations between them, which had been tepid and 
occasionally openly hostile 55 since the final defection of Perdiccas from Brasidas in 
423. The importance of this shift in foreign policy on behalf of either state, however, 
ought not to be overestimated. The acceptance of the assistance of a foreign power by a 
Macedonian king in such desperate straits as those in which Amyntas found himself in 
383 can barely be considered to be the active practice of a reasoned foreign policy - in 
short, Amyntas was in no position to refuse Spartan help once it was offered, although 
we note that it was not Amyntas but representatives from Apollonia and Acanthus who 
made the request for assistance. Similarly, Xenophon and Diodorus leave their reader in 
no doubt that it was no altruistic desire to help Amyntas which led Sparta to intervene, 
but instead a desire to extend Spartan hegemony into Thrace and put down a potentially 
hostile federation. Indeed, so circumstantial does the cooperation between them seem to 
have been that it seems that as soon as Olynthus was reduced, Amyntas returned to a 
policy which served to negate his closeness with Sparta - alliance with Athens. 
The Rise of Jason and a Return to the Athenian Fold 
Hamilton 56 raises the question of why, when we might reasonably expect him to feel 
indebted to Sparta over her assistance at Olynthus, there is evidence that Amyntas 
instead inclined towards Athens. He finds both this evidence and the reasoning behind 
the change of heart it represents in the appeal made to Sparta by Polydamus recorded in 
54 See Chapter 3 for discussion. 
55 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of two occasions on which Spartan relations with Macedon had flared 
up - namely the Spartan intervention in Thessaly at the end of the reign of Archelaus (Pseudo Herodes) Z- 
and the occasion upon which Aeropus attempted to prevent a Spartan force from inarchIrtzg, throurgh his 
territory (Polyaenos 2.1.17). 
56 1986 
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Xenophon's Hellenica 6.1.2 ff. When Polydamus is surnmarising Jason's threat to him, 
he reports the following speech: 
i "(P71, 'KCC't T(XbT(X. El c10t0 8' F-'Ic "M X07'ý%Uxl, (YK'TEF-1,6 F-XOV'UF-q ýtCv 7E 
MCCKF-60V'(XV, "VOEV K(X' 'AOqvcciot T' 4'Xoc " tEt (X 1) cc70vT(xt, TCOXI') 817010 TCXF-101)ý 
F--KF-IV(I)V tl<(Xvot F-CF0ý1F-0a vccf)q Tcolý(Yccaoat. (, )cv6pcov 'YF- ýtýv vxlý 71 11 I)Tocq 
k9pobv 7rOrF-pov 'AOilvccto-o; ýýt&q eiK6q ýt&Uov 81ývwyOat, Tocyoý) (X 10 
K(Xt Totol. )TOI); EXOVT(X; TEF-VF-(Fr(x;; 
"To see whether my calculations are reasonable, " he said "consider these points 
also. With Macedon in our possession, the place from which the Athenians get 
their timber, we shall of course be able to construct far more ships than they. 
Again, who are likely to be able to supply these ships with men, the Athenians 
or ourselves, who have so many serfs of so excellent a sort? (6.1.11) 
Hamilton uses this passage to come to the following mutually dependent conclusions 
upon why Sparta was disinclined to intervene in Thessaly and why Amyntas was more 
inclined towards Jason and Athens: 
I suggest that it was the policy of Agesilaus, [that is, not to intervene in Thessaly 
at this point, and was] intended to keep Sparta free from additional commitments 
in order that she should concentrate on the objective of reducing Thebes to 
subjugation. Aiding Polydamus would be costly, with little to gain. The fact that 
Amyntas had been inclining towards Athens, as suggested by timber sales, 
would have done little to persuade Sparta that she should intervene in Thessaly 
on behalf of neighbouring lands. The decision to decline Polydamus' request 
thus was based in part on an assessment of the situation elsewhere in Greece, 
and it represented a lack of concern about the situation in Macedon or even 
about the prospect of an Athenian maritime resurgence... 
In any case, [whatever the motives behind this Spartan foreign policy were] the 
result was the same for Macedon: Sparta either could not, or would not, 
intervene in Thessaly on her behalf as well as on behalf of other neighbours of 
Thessaly against the encroachments of Jason, and the area was abandoned to 
Thessalian expansion. Amyntas would have been right to conclude that Sparta 
would be of no significant aid in the future, as she had been in the past, e. g. 
against Olynthus. Thus, soon after, Amyntas entered into alliance with Jason of 
Pherae and also with Athens. Common hostility towards the Chalcidian cities on 
the part of Athens and Macedon was one of the factors in this alliance, common 
interest in the timber trade was another. (pp243f) 
While Hamilton's argument is illuminating on the issue of Sparta's decision against 
aiding Polydamus against Jason, it raises a further question (given that Hamilton set out 
to discuss why Macedon turned from alliance with Sparta to alliance with Athens 
57) 
which it neglects to answer; that is, what prompted Amyntas to reinitiate the timber 
trade in the first place? For an answer to this question, we might briefly turn to the 
numismatic evidence from Amyntas' reign, upon which Greenwalt 
58 is helpful: 
57 p24 1. 
58 1994 
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The silver of Amyntas III initially marked a rebound from that of Pausanias 
before itself quickly degenerating. It recovered somewhat, only to degenerate 
again over a somewhat longer period. The earlier of Amyntas' two stater issues Z: ) 
[which] portrays a rider with a spear striking downwards on a rearing horse 
(obverse) and a facing (when the coin is read in a wrap around fashion) lion 
gnawing a spear... tested at about 75% silver... it is clear that Amyntas 
optimistically began his reign by attempting to revive the weight and silver 
standard of Archelaus. A rapid decline, however, apparently set in: repeated tests 
... indicate that at least one specimen [of the group tested] ... was minted with less than ten percent silver. (p 121) 
Given that Amyntas' reign saw two large scale invasions, it need hardly surprise us that 
the prosperity of his reign suffered, nor that this financial distress was reflected in his 
coinage. A desire to supplement Macedonian revenues by pursuit of the lucrative timber 
trade with Athens had always to be balanced, in the mind of the Macedonian king, with 
the dangers of contributing to the development of a powerful Athenian fleet and with 
reawakening a general interest in Athens in the north. The decline in Macedon's 
coinage indicates that, for Amyntas, the need to relieve financial problems, a natural 
consequence of the turbulent years of his reign, were tugging harder at him than any 
desire for distance from Athens. Perhaps too the example of Archelaus' reign reminded 
him that peaceful relations with Athens were possible. This being so, Amyntas took the 
step of reinitiating a substantial timber trade with Athens, thus distancing himself from 
Sparta. 
On other counts, Hamilton's argument is convincing. It does indeed seem to be the case 
that both Macedon and Sparta recognised that their cooperation had been little more 
than a brief marriage of convenience, and neither side sought to prolong the relationship 
through alliance. Hamilton's assessment of the threat to Macedon posed by Jason of 
Pherae, on the other hand, might be seriously doubted. When considering the speech of 
Polydamus, it is worth recalling that Xenophon did not claim to record speeches word 
for word and indeed even if he did report Polydamus verbatim, Polydamus himself was 
reporting the speech of Jason, thus this reference to Macedon arrives on our page third 
hand. This being so, we might suggest that the veiled threat to Macedon in Jason's 
words, upon which this part of Hamilton's argument is based, ought not in fact be given 
too much credence. Indeed, given that it was in Polydamus' interests to portray Jason in 
as aggressive a light as possible so as to support a request for assistance against him, 
then it should perhaps even be disregarded as evidence for a threat to Macedon from 
Jason. It seems unlikely that Jason's plans included an invasion of Macedon (and 
certainly no such invasion is recorded in our sources) and likely instead that the sense of 
the reference in Xenophon should be associated not with a military threat to Macedon, 
but instead with an alliance between the two states - in all likelihood that recorded by 
Diodorus 15-60.2 under the year 370/69: 
5107tEp 
oi OF-, [Tccxo\t 7upoaTilGccýLevot TCOV O'XCOV lj-YgýtOVCC 'IOCGOVCC, TOUTý) TCC 
0 F- -yccv. 0 (0 11 11 
kE TPF 'KCCT c Tov no -ýtov En 
8 e\ icca(ov nccpccxCcß 'v -c' v "YF-40vtav lrwv 
, uF- nlil(5iov £-'Ov(ýv Ttvcc npocyi17(x-yETo xat npoý 'Aýti, ')vT(xv Tov To)v 
M(XICF-ÖOVWV ßCCOIXF-CC Gl)gý1(XXI(XV 971011IG(XTO. 
So the Thessalians put Jason forwards as leader of the whole country, and as 
such gave him supreme command in war. Jason accepted the command, won 
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over some tribes nearby, and entered into alliance with Amyntas king of the 
Macedonians. 
Thus it appears that Jason, if he did indeed express any intentions of controlling the 
trade in timber, hoped to do so by exerting influence through this alliance. 
This renewed intimacy between Macedon and Thessaly 59 leaves us with two possible 
interpretations of Amyntas' foreign policy at this point, neither of which can be 
preferred over the other due to a lack of evidence on the identity of the Thessalians who 
assisted Amyntas on the occasion of the Illyrian invasion of 392. If his champions on 
that occasion were indeed the Aleuadae, his alliance with Jason (placed by Diodorus 
under the year 370/69) marked a change of heart, abandoning his old allies in favour of 
the new power in Thessaly. If, on the other hand the Thessalians who had championed 
AmYntas' cause in 392 were connected to the then rising power of Jason, as suggested 
above, then this alliance should be seen as the fruition of this friendship (that with the 
Aleuadae having been rekindled following the dispute over land during the final years 
of Archelaus' reign). Twenty three years later, both leaders were in power and an 
alliance between them was potentially a powerful one. 
Whatever the precise nature of Amyntas' foreign policy at this point, there can be little 
doubt regarding the reasoning behind it. He almost certainly made this alliance in the 
hope of securing his territory, which was, it appears, again under threat. Diodorus 
16.2.1-2, in his introduction to the reign of Philip, informs us of the final threat to 
AmYntas' reign from Illyria: 
'AýLIL')VTOU K(XT(XT[O/XF-RljOE'-V'UOq I)TIO, 'IXXI)pt6v KOdt (POPOIL)q Toiq Kp(xrll(y(x(yl 
'UF, XdV ('XV(X7KOKYOE'VTOq 01 [tF'IV 'IXX1)PIOl' k(XPOV'rF-q FI'q OgIlp'tCCV (Dt'xtlrnOV 
, rov vF-(j), r(xrov r6v ut'Cov ir(xpF-OF-vro -coiq E)-qpcciotq. 
After Amyntas had been defeated by the Illyrians and forced to pay tribute to his 
conquerors, the Illyrians who had taken Philip, the youngest son of Amyntas, as 
a hostage, placed him in the care of the Thebans. 
Diodorus is obviously not referring to the original Illyrian invasion of Macedon in 393, 
as Philip was not bom at that time. If our identification of Sirras as the leader of that 
invasion (following Mortensen 1991) is correct, then it becomes even clearer that the 
original invasion is not the one to which Diodorus now refers, as that dispute was in all 
likelihood sealed by a marriage alliance in which Amyntas married Sirra's daughter, 
Eurydice. It seems likely instead that the occasion to which Diodorus now refers came 
much later in Amyntas' reign, prompting him to seek security in new alliances. Indeed, 
as both the alliance with Jason and that with Athens seem likely to have been connected 
with fears for Macedon's security, and, in continuation of a theme which characterised 
Amyntas' reign, necessary reliance upon foreign military aid, it seems that we should 
date this last Illyrian attack to the very final years of Amyntas reign. As the alliance 
with Jason is placed by Diodorus in the last year of Amyntas' life, it is possible that it 
post dated or immediately pre dated this attack. It seems reasonable to place all three 
events - the alliance with Jason, the Illyrian attack and Amyntas' death in the year 
59 see previous chapters for di 111 iscussion of earlier relations with Thessaly. 
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370/69. Both the renewed intimacy with Thessaly and the Illyrian interest in Macedon 60 were to have repercussions in the years following Amyntas' death . 
In addition to the alliance with Thessaly, the last years of Amyntas' reign also saw an 
alliance with Athens, which is recorded by Tod 129.6 1 The stele recording the alliance Is 
damaged 62 and the text of it has been heavily restored, leaving us with little more than 
the names of those who swore to the decree and the basic terms of an alliance. A 
fragment of information which supplements our knowledge of the nature of this 
relationship is given by Aeschines 2.32 
-y('xp AccKF-8(xiýtovtwv icat Tüüv c'cXXü)v 'EXXilv(. üv 
Eý Dv Toll), zcov 1) 0 t 'Aýt'vT(xý ' (DtXt1Z7[01, ) IEC(Tllp XCU nF-ýinü)V (Y1. )VE8P0V 'K(X%t Týý 
im0' (x-ouo'v WA(po-L) moptoý o)v, F-V-q(ptcyccro 'Ag(pinoXiv -cýv 'AOllvccl(t)v 
a, i)vF-ýccipF-iv ýtF-, u('X u6)v C"CkX(ov 'E; ý; ýliv(t)v 'AOilvcciotý. Kocl col), Tcov To' 1. Cotvo'v 8o7ýt(x T(i)v 'Eý, 2, ilv(ov -K(xt' To-'uý yilgtcy(xgEvo-()ý eic rüov öilýioat'cov yp(xgýt(xT(J)v 
ýL(XPTI)Pccý lc(Xpecyxoýtilv. 
At a congress of the Lacedaemonian allies and the other Greeks, in which 
Amyntas, the father of Philip being entitled to a seat, was represented by a 
delegate whose vote was absolutely under his control, he joined the other Greeks 
in voting to help Athens to recover possession of Amphipolis. As proof of this I 
presented from the public records the resolution of the Greek congress, and the 
names of those who voted. 
While we have raised some doubts over the reliability of evidence from the orators, we 
might suppose that if Aeschines could produce written proof of the vote, he was telling 
the truth over this matter. Hammond's suggestion as to why Amyntas was prepared to 
vote Amphipolis to Athens is worth considering; he comments: 
It is surprising to find Macedon at a conference of Greek states at all, because 
Macedon was not regarded as a Greek state, and it is also surprising to find him 
voting Amphipolis to Athens. Perhaps the two are to be connected. Athens may 
have arranged with Sparta that Amyntas should attend as an ally of Athens, and 
Athens' object was to use Amyntas as a stalking horse for her claim to 
60 Diodorus speaks of a defeat - it seems likely that this episode, rather than that reported at 14.92.3-4, 
marked the outset of Bardylis' interest in Macedon - an interest which was to prove disastrous for 
Macedon until it was finally ended by Philip. 
61 Aeschines 2.28 records the adoption of Iphicrates, the Athenian commander, by Amyntas as a son. This 
episode is associated by both Ellis and March (1969 p7 and 1995 p273 respectively) with personal 
assistance given by Iphicrates to Amyntas to remove Algaeus from the throne. This connection is, 
however, entirely unsupported by ancient evidence, and, while accepting that the adoption could in fact 
have been made for any number of reasons, it seems possible that Iphicrates may have played a role 
similar to that of Nymphodorus in 431 when he negotiated an alliance between Perdiccas, the Thracian 
leader Sitalces and Athens. Indeed, if Iphicrates did have a personal hand in the creation of this alliance, 
even the Thracian connection of 431 is mirrored in this new alliance. as Iphicrates was married to a 
daughter of Cotys of Thrace. Evidently this similarity is no more than coincidence, and a serious 
connection between Amyntas and Cotys ought not, perhaps, be assumed, although if Amyntas was indeed 
concerned about the security of his kingdom it seems likely that he would be anxious to establish links 
with as many other powers as possible, Cotys included. However if any such links did exist, perhaps they 
did so on a personal level rather than a formal one, as no alliance between Cotys and Amyntas is recorded 
by our sources. 
0-' The prescript and therefore the date are missing C)* 
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Amphipolis; it is an indication of Amyntas' dependence upon Athens that he 
was prepared to play this part. (p17 9)63 
As with the terms of the treaty with Olynthus recorded by Tod I 11, a subtext is clearly 
discernible here. Amyntas is likely to have been aware of the threat from Illyria which, 
at the time of his alliance with Athens, was looming. With several examples of the 
ineffectuality of his own army in resisting a determined attack before him. ) 
he was once Z-: ) 
more obliged to put his trust in the force of others and, having secured an alliance with 
Athens he would not have then jeopardised it by voting against her claim to 
Amphipolis, which (despite Hammond's statement) was independent and thus not 
Amyntas' to vote to Athens in any case. The most that such a congress would be able 
to do would be to send a force to Amphipolis, a force which would in all likelihood 
have taken months to organise and far longer to actually reduce and resettle Amphipolis 
to Athens' liking. In Macedon, the fear of the fulfilment of these long term plans was 
dwarfed by the looming threat from Illyna. Amyntas, no doubt, was more than willing 
to theoretically sign away Amphipolis if it would guarantee him actual Athenian 
support in case of an Illyrian attack. With reference to our previous consideration of the 
argument put forwards by Hamilton on why Macedon was inclining towards Athens, we 
might conclude that the evidence suggests that rather than the threat to Amyntas which 
prompted him to seek new alliances coming from Jason of Pherae, it instead came from 
Illyria. 
In spite of Amyntas, ' precautions, however, the attack from the Illyrians did come and 
no help is recorded as having arrived either from Athens or Jason (possibly because the 
latter had already died by this point). Amyntas died leaving Maecdon impoverished, 
militarily weak and in fealty to Bardylis. His reign had been one of great insecunty, 
witnessing two major invasions and a period of financial decline - Amyntas himself had 
managed to survive it through a series of judicious alliances and good luck - the 
outlook did not, however, look bright for his heirs. 
63 On this, see also Ryder (1965) pp127ff. 
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Chapter 7 
The Turbulent Decade; 370/69 -300/59 
The death of Amyntas III in 370/69 of natural causes, and the transition of the throne to 
his eldest son Alexander marked a moment of calm which might be thought of as the 
eye of the stormy period of the 370s and 60s. However, the stability of which the ease 
of the death of one king and the accession of another seems to speak was not destined to 
be long lived. It was not long before strife both external and Internal had overwhelmed 
the fragile equilibrium which expressed the Macedonian monarchy at the moment of the 
accession of Alexander 11, setting in motion once again the murderous competition for 
the throne which had characterised the days before the reign of Amyntas 111. Four states, 
Athens, Thessaly, 111yria and, for the first time, Thebes, took an interest in events in 
Macedon, and were able, as a result of the extreme instability of the royal house, to 
exert their influence there during the years following the death of Amyntas and before 
the accession of Philip. This chapter will examine how the foreign policy of each of the 
three kings of this period struggled to cope with the challenges which he faced and how, 
on several occasions, the necessity, born from the weakness of the royal house and the 
insecurity of the position of each king on the throne, of relying upon foreign support 
attracted unwelcome foreign attention to Macedon. 
The Reign of Alexander 11,370/69-368/7 
As we are informed by Didorus 15.60.3, Amyntas died in 370/69, leaving four children 
by Eurydice, Alexander, Perdiccas and Philip while Justin 7.4.2-7 informs us of the 
existence of a daughter, Eurynoe, who was married to Ptolemy of Alorus, a prominent 
nobleman. ' Of these children, the eldest, Alexander, succeeded to the throne on his 
father's death. 
The chronology of Alexander's reign appears to be relatively straightforward, except for 
one minor inconsistency in Diodorus' account of it. At 15.60.3-4 he records the 
following events: 
"18tov U rt auvýpij mxr6c cobrov T6v ývtwox6v- cCov 7&p ýv 6-ovcc(yrF-icctq 
6V, T(, Ov rpp-iq kF-XF--brljcTccv np-pi x6v cci), r6v ic(xtp6v. 'Aýtý)vvx; ýtýv 6 'Appt8(xio-o 
P(XGtXF-ý)O)V Tfiq M(X-KF-8OVi(X; kEkEý)VIOEV 6CP4(Xq 9'Tll EýKO(yt -K(Xi 'rkvxp(X, 
i)ioi)q 6cnoktTc6)v cpp-iq, 'Aký4(xv6pov MA 
rlEp8i'KICOCV 'K(Xi (DiXtn7cOV- 6tFU4(XrO 
U riv PaatkEiav 6 1)i6q 'AXý4ccv8po; imi fip4Ev ývtwor6v. TI 
A perculiar coincidence befell in this year [370/69] for three of those in positions 
of power died about the same time. Amyntas, son of Arrhidaeus, king of 
Macedonia, died after a rule of twenty four years, leaving behind him three sons, 
Alexander, Perdiccas and Philip. The son Alexander succeeded to the throne and 
ruled for one year. 
Ptolemy's name appears in Tod 129 as one of the emissaries from Amyntas at the making of alliance I 
agests that he was probably already married to her at the time of this alliance, c with Athens, which su,,,, -., 
I 
375-3. See the previous chapter for a discussion of this decree. 
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This narrative is slightly complicated, however, by the fact that the following entry 
occurs under the same year: 
t F- (X »v (j)F-pccioý eYF-ýt'v 'PllýLE'-VOý T% 'K(X' ÖOK(i)V TP, Tog 8' 'l'cyc 0 11 0) 11 11 
2-W-c 'öoko(pov'Oil, fflý gF'-v "E(popoý E7C1F-Müý (XPYF-IV TO)v F- q 
YF-7P(X(Pgv, lo-no TIVO)V F-IZT(X VECCVICYKCOV CYI, )VOýtoccC4F-Vcüv öoýIlý F-VF-'K(X, wý 
F-VIOI 7P(X(Pol, )atv, uno, r107,1)8C0PO1) TGCÖEX(Poi). OUV: )ý ÖE KM ccloTäý 
81cC8F-ýcc ýLFVoý 'rýV 8-üvccaZF-Iccv ýpýF-v F"vtcc"), cov. 
Jason of Pherae, who had been chosen ruler of Thessaly and was reputed to have 
been governing his subjects with moderation, was assassinated, either, as Ephorus 
writes, by seven young men who conspired together for the repute it would bring, 
or, as some historians say, by his brother Polydorus. This Polydorus himself, after 
succeeding to the position of leader, ruled forJust one year. 
These entries are somewhat problematic, and the period of one year for the reign of 
Alexander cannot, on the basis of them, be accepted. Alexander's brief reign saw a 
confrontation between himself and the man whom Diodorus 15.61.3 names as 
Polydorus' assassin and successor, Alexander of Pherae. Evidently, if Jason and 
AmYntas died at about the same time, and both their successors (Polydorus and 
Alexander 11 respectively) ruled for a year each, then it would have been impossible for 
Alexander 11 to clash with Alexander of Pherae, who in turn succeeded Polydorus, 
never mind to undertake to respond to an appeal made by Larissa, lay siege to some 
cities, garrison them, withdraw from them, face a challenge to his rule by Ptolemy of 
Alorus and ally with Thebes before being assassinated. 2 
It seems apparent that the best option is to reject Diodorus' one year as the length of 
Alexander's reign, and instead suggest the following sequence. Jason of Pherae's death 
preceded that of Amyntas by some time - not more than a year but perhaps by a few 
months. 3 Jason was thus succeeded by Polydorus in the last months of Amyntas' reign 
and his rule spanned the first few months of Alexander 11's reign after Amyntas' death. 
Polydorus was then assassinated and Alexander of Pherae took power in Thessaly. The 
events of Alexander 11's reign following the accession of Alexander of Pherae are not 
those of a few weeks, and thus his reign should be considered to have lasted rather more 
than a year, perhaps being almost two years long. 
This suggestion is supported by the fact that Diodorus 15.71.1-2 puts Alexander's death 
in 368/7 and does not disturb the chronology of the period 370/69-60/59.15.59.3 puts 
Amyntas' death in 370/69 while 16.1.2 puts Philip's accession in 360/59, and he allots a 
three year reign to Ptolemy of Alorus and a five year reign to Perdiccas 11, .4 An eight 
year period in the decade between Amyntas' death and Philip's accession is thus 
accounted for, leaving us with a leeway of as much as two years for the reign of 
Alexander 11. 
2 These events are discussed at length below. Z-- 3 agestion complements that made the previous chapter, that Amyntas, fear' This su,,,, ine, an attack by 
Bardylis, allied with Jason in the hope of bolstering his security. It was pointed out there that no help 
came from Jason when this attack arrived, despite this treaty, perhaps because Jason was already dead. 
4 15.71.1 and 15.77.5 respectively. 
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Alexander's foreign policy was nothing short of disastrous for Macedon, and for the 
young king himself. ' Thesssaly, having been b C) 1 riefly united for the first time under Jason 
of Pherae, 6 was now in the painful process of realignIng itself under new leaders, first, 
as we are informed by Diodorus 15.60.6, Polydorus and then Alexander of Pherae, 7 
who, if Diodorus is to be believed, was a brutal and unpopular leader. The intimacy 
which Amyntas' reign had fostered between Macedon and Thessaly led certain 
Thessalian factions to request the help of the new Macedonian king, as Diodorus 
informs us: 
01-)Toý 8 g\ lt(XP(xv04(J)ý KM ßWIcoý XTTIGUýtEvoý Tllv 5, t)V(X(YTF-1(XV, (XX0X01000)ý 
TU Til Tfi nP0(Xip£, -aFt 
ÖtcoKet T(\x K(YT(x Tl\ V PX V. Tü V 7' P UP \ TO£) 11) 0 a' 1 (X 0 1) 
npoo(PEPOýte'_VCOV To% luý, 110F-01, KM Ö1(\X TAT' 
CC'Y(X7[CüýLF, VO)V, 01)Toý ßt(Xt(og KM X(XXEIZ(i)ý (xpxcov F-ýt1CY9iTo. 0 \lv 5 51 \X Xt TY 
ImpavoýLiav (poßll()evrF-ý -co)v A(xptGcycct'ü)v Ttv£'-ý, ot' öt' F-10', y£-'vF-tccv 'AXF-1, )C'Cö(xi 
7EPOCCC-Yopgl)oýLEVOI, (5-Ove 0 (X 11 11 OEVTO Irp X.; k ' ý'01)ý K(XT(Xkiba(XI T\V 51)VCCG'UEt'ccv. 
j £'1-K Aapt'aallý etiý M(x-KF-Öovt(xv einacav 'AXEý(xvöpov 
TOV ß(XG12, F'-(X 01)7K(XUCCý, i)CYOCI TO%V Tl)P(XVVOV. 
Having acquired the rule illegally and by force, he [Alexander of Pherae] 
administered it consistently with the policy he had chosen to follow. For while 
the rulers before him had treated the peoples with moderation and were therefore 
loved, he was hated for his violent and severe rule. Accordingly, in fear of his 
lawlessness, some Larisseans, called Aleuadae, because of their noble descent, 
conspired together to overthrow the overlordship. Journeying from Larissa to 
Macedonia, they prevailed upon the King Alexander to join them in 
overthrowing the tyrant. (15.61.2-3) 
5A brief note upon the whereabouts of Philips is relevant at this point. We noted in the previous chapter 
that Diodorus 16.2.1-2 had Amyntas defeated in battle by Illyrians and, as a result, forced to pay tribute to 
Illyria and to hand over Philip as a hostage. The passage then has the Illyrians hand Philip over to Thebes 
but is non specific about why or when this occurred. Justin 7.5.1-2 instead has Alexander as the king who 
was obliged to pacify the Illyrians with the payment of tribute and the handing over of Philip as a 
hostaae, but then continues " some time later, he again used Philip as a hostage to re-establish peace with 
the Thebans... " without having explained when or under what circumstances Philip was returned to 0 
Macedon. Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas 26 (the contents of which are discussed below) notes that, on the 
occasion of Ptolemy's first abortive attempt on the Macedonian throne, Pelopidas settled the dispute in 
favour of Alexander 11, taking Philip as a hostage. While it is impossible to state beyond doubt which of 
these conflicting reports is true, certain suggestions can be made. Firstly, Plutarch's Life of Pelopidas is 
the most detailed of these sources and its information fits well with what we know of the historical 
context of the events which it describes, therefore the statement that it was Alexander who handed Philip 
over as a guarantee of good behaviour to Thebes, supported by Justin, should be preferred to Diodorus' C, 4D 
account. Acceptance that it was Alexander rather than the Illyrians who handed Philip over to Thebes, 
however, also requires us to accept that at some point prior to this, Philip had been returned by the 
Illyrians. Diodorus' statement that it was Amyntas who was defeated by the Illyrians and forced to hand 
over tribute and his youngest son should be preferred to the account of Justin (who maintained that it was 
Alexander instead) because an imminent Illyrian attack provides the reasoning behind the foreign policy 
of the latter years of Amyntas' reign. No definite date for the return of Philip by the Illyrians may be 
fixed - however, one possible explanation might be that Philip, having been taken hostage during C) Cý C, tý 
Amyntas' reign, was returned on Amyntas' death, perhaps in recognition of the fact that he was a 4: 1 2: ) 
otential heir to the throne. 
Xenophon Hellenica 6.1.4-19 and 4.20-37. See also previous chapter for bibliography and brief Z-1 
discussion. 
7 Diodorus 15.61.3. 
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The very fact of Alexander's agreeing to help the Aleuadae at all is worthy of some 
comment. As discussed in previous chapters, relations between the Argeadae and the 
Aleuadae had already undergone some drastic fluctuations in the period covered by this 
thesis. Since Archelaus' betrayal of the trust of certain Thessallans who had handed 
over land to him, perhaps the Aleuadae, and his assassination, which was ýlanned in 
part by a man from Larissa, perhaps, again, a representative of the Aleuadae, relations 
between the Argeadae and the Aleuadae had been somewhat obscure. It is possible that 
the Aleuadae assisted Amyntas III by driving out the invading Illyrians in 393/2; 
definite, however, that Amyntas betrayed their cause by allying at the end of his reign 
with Jason of Pherae. 9 Undoubtedly, then, Alexander's foreign policy here in supporting 
them against the man who was, in effect, Jason's successor, marked a shift from his 
father's foreign policy and a return to a more traditional royal policy. 10 Taking the 
following events into account, however, it appears that Alexander saw the situation in 
Thessaly not so much as an opportunity to assist his Aleuad friends but as an 
opportunity to prove himself on the battlefield. Diodorus continues: 
, coll), rcov 66, 'TCEP't 'C(Ana 81(xrplpovr(ov, o (DF-p(x-toq 'Aý, F-ýccv8poq nl)OORF-vo; 'TI)v 
KCCO' Ec(Xl)TOb IU(XP(X(TKF-I)ýV, K(XTF-XF-7F- 'rO'oq F-ti; 'T7'JV (TrpCCTEjCCV F-1, )OE"rol)q, 
8t(xvoo^L)[tp-voq E'-v rfi Ma-KE80VICE muavlaccaoccl ci'jv ýLccxljv. 0 6e TO)v 
M(X-KF-80V(OV PCCC70, F-lO;, F'-'XO)V ýtF-6' uxlwcob co'u'q F--K A(xptc5(: Yilq (P-07c'c6(x;, 
(PO('XCY(Xq TO'b; nOkF-ýUOU; ý-KE RF-'r(x rýq 61, )v('xgF-o)q F-tiý rýv Ac'cpt(ycyccv- 
nccpF-t(TccXOF-t'; 5' bno' r6v A(xpt(ycy(xt'(ov E'-vuo'; rob TEt'Xo'uq cKpocT11CFE 
Tý; nOkE(O; nXýV 'Tý; C"CKPCC;. [LET(X 6F\- 'C(xi)"Ccc rl'lv 'EF- (XICP(XV E, -4E7coxtopl<-qcTE 
imi Kp(xvv6vec noktv nPOCT(X'Y(x7OgF-vO; WgOX0711(YF- [tF\-v Toi; E)F-T'UCCkO-; 
(XnO80)(TEtV V\X; nOXF-I;, IMr(X(PPOV1j(YCC; 8F\- -Cý; 604-q;, 1<(X\t (Ppo-op(\X; 
(X41AO70-0; F-t'(ycc-Y(x7(0v, WO"T 0\; -K(XCFiXF- 'rC\C; nOXFI;. 0 8F\- (DEP(XiO; 
'AU'4(xv8po; lccc'r(x6t(I)XOF-\t; c'c[tcc Kcct Kcc'r(XnX(x7F-\t; Fn(XV7-1kOF-v Et; 'r(X; 
4)F-PCC;. 
But while they [Alexander and the Aleuadae] were occupied with these matters, 
Alexander of Pherae, learning of the preparations against him, gathered such 
men as were conveniently situated for the campaign, intending to give battle in 
Macedonia. But the Macedonian king, accompanied by the refugees from 
Larissa, anticipated the enemy by invading Larissa with the army, and having 
been secretly admitted by the Larissaeans within the fortifications, he mastered 
the city with the exception of the citadel. Later he took the citadel by siege, and 
having also won the city of Crannon, at first covenanted to restore the cities to 
the Thessalians, but then in contempt of public opinion he brought into them 
garrisons of considerable strength and held the cities himself. Alexander of 
Pherae, hotly pursued and alarmed at the same time, returned to Pherae. 
In a classic case of history repeating itself, then, we see Alexander H taking almost 
precisely the same steps in Thessaly as Archelaus had taken (and with an identical 
result; indirectly, the intervention of both kings in Thessaly led to their assassination). 
On this decision, we might firstly note that Alexander's ability to intervene at all in 
Thessaly speaks of some military confidence and capacity, an element which was 
almost wholly absent from the reign of Amyntas, which saw no military success 
8 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of these events. 
9 See Chapter 4. 
10 See Chapters 2 and 3 for discussion of relations between Macedon and Thessaly during the reigns of Z:, Z: ý 
Alexander I and Perdiccas 11. 
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whatsoever. ' 'This is not something to which, however, a great amount of importance 
ought to be attributed. WhIlst Alexander evidently had the manpower and the technical 
skill to conduct a (relatively small scale) siege, the events which followed his decision 
to hold the land inform us that Alexander's confidence in his military capacity was 
entirely unfounded. The Thessalians, perhaps the very Aleuadae whose trust Alexander 
had betrayed by seeking to keep the land they had handed over to him on trust, involved 
the city which was by now the main player on the Greek stage - Thebes. 
Botw-cot 5' E)p-, cU(Xxcov ýxi)oep, % 9, ýtF-T(X7UF-ýtIZOýt9V0)V (X1)TOI)ý F, F- (OGEI ýtev T(OV 
n0 c)v, Kcc-cccX' cyF-t 8' cýý 'AXF-ý' v8po-o TO£) (DEPCC' ' x£ 1, ) F- (X 10-0 TI)P(Xvvtöoý 
Fý-ýCmEau-Ixe(V rIF-ý, onlöccv ýtp-, u(, x F-iý OF-'Z'T(XXIGCV, 80vwý E'vCoý. (, xý 
(Xi)T(i) Elý TO' (yi, )ýt(p£pov T(i)v BotcoT(i)v 8totKý(: Y(xi T(x K(xT(x Tijv e)ETT(Xxt(Xv. 
01i)Toý Ör\- K(xT(xvTilcy(xý F-iý AccptacY(xv, Kcc\t KccT(xk(xß(ov Tilv (xKponoxiv 
E l)no (X (ppol, )pol)ýt' výp iä 'AXeý ýv8poi) Toi) M(xKF-Öovog, T(X1)TIIV ýtF-V 7CCCPF-X(XßgV... 
The Boeotians, summoned by the Thessalians to liberate their cities and 
overthrow the tyranny of Alexander of Pherae, dispatched Pelopidas with an 
army to Thessaly, after giving him instructions to arrange Thessalian affairs in 
the interests of the Boeotians. Having arrived in Larissa and found the acropolis 
garrisoned by Alexander of Macedon, he obtained its surrender. (15.67.3) 
Precisely what Alexander had envisaged the likeliest outcome of the situation to be 
when he chose to garrison Larissa is unclear. What is evident, however, is that the 
decision was a fatal -error of judgement on his behalf. Rather than proving himself in the 
eyes of the Greeks, Alexander suffered a humiliating reminder of the limitations of his 
military capacity. Unwilling and indeed unable to challenge Thebes for possession of 
the Thessalian cities, Alexander, no doubt chastised, returned home. 12 He h ad 
" See Chapter 3. On the subject of Alexander and his army, some brief consideration of the fragment of 
Anaximenes, discussed at some length in Chapter 2, is worthwhile. The fragment connects a kinc, named C, Alexander with some important military reforms, namely the creation of the Macedonian companion 
cavalry and the organisation of the infantry into lochoi and decades. P. A. Brunt in 1976 rejected the Cý 
Possibility of Alexander II having been the author of these reforms on the grounds that his reign was too :D Cý tý 
short for them to have been implemented during it. In spite of having argued the case for Alexander's 
reign having been rather longer than the one year stated by Diodorus, and in spite too of the recognition tD ZD Z_: ý 
that Alexander took a areater interest in the military capacity of Macedon than his father had, this chapter ZD 
concurs with Brunt in concluding that the brevity of his reign, even if we accept two years instead of one, t: ) Z: ý 
precludes us from attributing Anaximenes' military reforms to him. It appears that, rather than being C> ZD 
based upon military reform, Alexander's decision to intervene in Thessaly was the hot-headed impulse of 
a youthful and newly acceded king to prove himself on the international stage. týl ZD 
12 The sequence of events suggested here (namely, that Alexander seized the land given to him by the ZDZID 
Larissaeans and held it against their will until it was taken from him by the Thebans) is that followed by 
most modern historians, including Hammond (1979) p 181, Borza (1991) pp 189ff, and Ellis (1976) p43. 
Buckler (1980) provides an alternative suggestion. He (pI13) accepts that Alexander was unable to C, 4-1 
remain in Thessaly on the arrival of the Theban force, but rather than considering that this was because 
Alexander was no match for Thebes, Buckler suggests that this was because a threat had arisen in 
Macedon from Ptolemy of Alorus, obliging Alexander to return and defend his throne. (The threat to : 1: 1 Cý 
Alexander's reign from Ptolemy which did, it appears, arise at this point, is discussed below). Buckler Zý 
goes on to conclude that far from posing an imminent threat to Alexander's presence in Thessaly, the D Cý Theban presence there was actually engineered by him: tn 
In the face of these difficulties, king Alexander and the Thessalians hit upon a solution beneficial C1 I 
to them all. They could salvage the situation by arranging an agreement with the Thebans, to L-1 L- 
whom the Thessalians would appeal for assistance against Alexander of Pherae. King Alexander I= C) 
would then keep his garrisons in the Thessalian cities until the Thebans arrived, and in return C, 
would receive from the Thebans support against Ptolemalos should he ever require it. (p 113) Z' 
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succeeded only in alienating his Aleuad allies and broadcasting Macedon's military 
weakness. As a foreign policy manoeuvre, his intervention in Thessaly had been ill 
judgedindeed. 
On a personal level, Alexander's sojourn in Thessaly had had yet further repercussions. 
It appears that Ptolemy of Alorus had been able to capitalise on the young king's 4: ) absence to challenge his rule, as Plutarch's Life of Pelopiclas informs us: 
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- flekoniöaý ('X'öel(Xv 'TF- noxxllv (X ' TOI) C")P(Xvvolj To% ecccm; ýoiý 
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7lOkF-ýtOi)V'COý, ('Xýt(POTF'-p0)V ÖE ýLEM7rEýtIroýtEvo)v F-1<F-IVOV, 0)ý ÖMUCCKTýv KM 
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' XO xV 5' K(X' 81(X; ý' EY(Xý cäcý ÖICC(POP' ý K(X' -ycvilaoýLF-VOV. F- Co E1 1) (X 1 K(XT(X'Y(X'Y(J)V Tobý 
(P F-1, )70VT(Xý, 0gIlpov EA'UßE T o\V ('XÖF-, krg o\V Toi) ß(XcytxE, coý (DixIlt710v K(Xt\ 
TPICCKOVT(X TC(xi8(Xý c"clý, 0'0ý T(i)V 97U1(PCCVF-CYT(xTü)V KM 'K(XTF-CYTIICYF-V Etý 
Glißccý 
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Pelopidas left the Thessalians secure against the threat of the tyrant, and after he 
had united them in harmony, he set out for Macedonia. Here Ptolemy was at war 
with Alexander, the king of Macedon, and on this occasion both parties had 
invited Pelopidas to act as arbitrator, judge between their claims, and then give 
his help and support to whichever party proved to have been wronged. He came 
and settled their dispute, and after he had restored the exiles to their homes, he 
took Philip, the king's brother, and thirty other sons of leading men in the state 
and brought them to Thebes as hostages. (26) 13 
Certain inferences may be drawn from this passage, the first being a chronological one 
which allows us to form a clear impression of this episode. Plutarch makes it clear that 
Pelopidas travelled directly from Thessaly into Macedon to settle the dispute which had 
arisen during his time in Thessaly. If we assume that Pelopidas' stay in Thessaly had 
been relatively brief, at most a few months, it seems evident that Alexander, on his 
return from Thessaly, found that Ptolemy had used his absence and perhaps also his 
spectacular failure in Thessaly to gain political ground on him and to make a challenge 
for the throne. 
Buckler's suggestion is not accepted here, for three main reasons; firstly, there is no ancient evidence to 2: ) 
support the idea that Alexander was in alliance with Thebes over this issue, and secondly because 
Buckler's araument would necessitate our believing that Alexander remained on friendly terms with the 1= C) 
Aleuadae, or at least some section of the Thessalian society throughout this episode, conspiring with them C, Cý 
to involve Thebes. If this was the case, why did Alexander not invite the Thebans into the Thessalian 
cities which he had taken himself? We hear of no such invitation from Diodorus. Lastly, and perhaps 
most importantly, this interpretation would necessitate our ignoring the implications of treachery in Z: ) t1n 
Diodorus 15.61.3-6, to maintain that Alexander's friendship with the Aleuadae was undamaged by this 
episode. Thirdly, when Pelopidas was invited to Macedon to settle the dispute between Alexander and 
Ptolemy, he sealed his decision to allow Alexander to keep the throne by taking Philip, his youngest 
brother, as a hostage back to Thebes (Plutarch Life of Pelopidas 26, discussed below). The taking of C) C) 
hostages does not imply friendly relations - indeed, throughout history it has served as a guarantee of t-- t: ) C) 
good behaviour. This being so, we might conclude that Alexander was restored to the throne on the L, r) t: 1 
proviso that he would not abuse his position through hostile intervention in other states, and his brother 
was a guarantee against his doing so. This interpretation is more straiohtforward than that offered by 
Buckler, and appears to better accommodate the evidence of the ancient sources. 
13 This passage supplements the account given by Diodorus at 15.67.4, which records only the alliance C 4-- 
with Alexander and the taking of Philip as a hostage. Zý 0 
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The extent and the implications of the insecurity of the royal house are made clear by 
this episode. Macedon had actually deteriorated to a point at which her very leadership 
was being settled by a foreign power, paving the way for future foreign intervention. 
The Theban settlement was shortlived. Under the year 368/7, Diodorus 15.71.1 records 
the following entry: 
3n' 6' ro'-c(I)v FjcoXFqi(xio; 6 'AX(Op"Til; 16 'Aýt'vTou I)c';! '80XO(P' EIE 1) 010 10 to F- OVII(5F-V 
AXE'-ý(xv8pov jTo'v 6'c6cX(povj, K(Xj F'-P(XCYt'kEl, )(YF- Týq M(X-KF, 60Vt'(X; E'TTJ TPI(X. 
Ptolemy of Alorus, son of Amyntas, assassinated Alexander, his brother-in-law, 
and was king of Macedon for three years. 
Alexander died as an indirect result of his ill-conceived foreign policy, which had, 
through his absence, allowed his brother-in-law to gain a toehold on the throne. His 
brief and turbulent rule had come to an end, and the crown was in the hands of a 
pretender. 
The Reign of Ptolemy of Alorus, 368/7- 365/4 
The manner of Ptolemy's accession and the insecurity of his position upon the throne 
led to his brief reign being beset by crises. However, whatever his moral credentials, we 
are obliged to recognise his astuteness in the handling of foreign policy during his three 
year reign to negotiate the problems faced by it. 
The first crisis of his rule arose immediately on his accession. The position of 
Alexander 11 on the throne had, as noted above, been ratified by Pelopidas, and by 
assassinating Alexander, Ptolemy incurred the wrath of Thebes, as Plutarch informs us: 
EV Toll)TCP 8F'- lc('Xktv TÜOV -K(XT(\x M(XKFÖovt(XV T(XP(YTTOýtF-VO)V, 0 -f(Yp 
31 'kOt rIToxeýLMoý (XVI 
ýnplIKEt 
TOV ß(XGIXF'-(X K(X\t 'CT\JV ('XP)CljV K(XTE-'G)CEV, Ot 89 (PI 
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81(X(PoEip(xý F, -, nF-ICYF-v coý (X', )TOV ýtEmaTilvat, 
Toü öe rIF-koltt'. 801, ) vjv 8O4(XV 
(xi)TI1V KM TO'1)VOýL(X 59botxcoý, (X7[11VTTJCYF-V fflý 'KPF-t(YGOVt, 'K(Xt\ 
ÖEýt(0C5CiýUF-Voý 
KM ÖF-TJOEt\ý (ýüýtox07, ylaF- TTIV ýlEv (, XPX-qv Toig Toi) TEOVIIKOTOý (XÖF-ý(Poiý 
öt(X(PI)k(X, 4F-tV, E)ilß(Xt, otý öF, - To, v ccl, )To, v F, -xop o\V F', 
*nv -K(Xt (Pt,; ýov- opIpo-oý 
Ent Toll)-Cotý Tov -otov (DtxoýF-VOV E"ÖCO'KF- 'K(Xt% IZF-VTIIKOVTCC TO)v F-Tcctp(ov. 
In the following year, Macedonia was also in a state of disorder. King Alexander 
had been murdered by Ptolemy, who had then seized power, and the dead ruler's 
friends had then appealed to Pelopidas to intervene. Pelopidas wished to support 
their cause, and as he had no troops of his own he recruited some mercenaries on 
the spot and took the field against Ptolemy. As the two forces converged 
Ptolemy was able to subvert the mercenaries and bribe them to come over to his 
side, but as he was afraid of Pelopidas'mere name and reputation, he went to pay 
his respects to him. At their meeting, he greeted Pelopidas as his superior, 
begged for his favour and agreed to act as a regent for the brothers of the dead 
king, and to conclude an alliance with Thebes, to confirm the undertakings. he 
1 '13 
handed over as hostages his own son Philoxenos and fifty of his followers. (Life 
of Pelopicicis 27) 14 
One can't help but admire Ptolemy's audacity. Having bought off Pelopidas' 
mercenaries and thus ensured that no battle would be given, he was astute enough not to 
simply ignore the Theban interest in his reign, but to formally submit to PelopIdas and 
contract an alliance with Thebes, the second in two years between the two states. By 
doing so, he managed to ensure that his reign was not troubled by further hostile 
intervention from Thebes. 
Thebes was not the only state, however, to take a hostile interest in Macedon during 
Ptolemy's reign. Athens too was experiencing a revival of interest in the north (perhaps 
not unconnected to Thebes' intervention there) and at this juncture sent off a force to 
investigate the state of affairs at Arnphipolis. Even this, however, Ptolemy was able to 
turn to his advantage. We recall that towards the end of the reign of Amyntas, he had 
taken part in a congress of Greek states which had "voted" Amphipolis to Athens, 
ratifying the sending of an Athenain force there with the aim of reducing the city and 
handing it over to Athens for colonisation. Aeschines 2.26-8 informs us that the reign of 
Ptolemy saw the fulfilment of that decision, and puts this move on Athens' behalf into a 
Macedonian context: 
'A[t'üvTo, u ýt F\IV -Yccp VEO)CY'Tt -Kcct 'AIF-4C'Cvöpou -coü 
npF-aß")TC, CTO-() TCOV (, xöEý, (P(i)V, rIF-Pöti. Cwot) öp\- Kai n(Xt, öcov O'VTCOV, 
ElO'p-oö't-Kilý öF-\ uýý pycp O\ý (xi)-c6)v npo5F-8oýtývilý b7cä TG)v bo-Koi vum (A F- 
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ov-Coý, T(i) KCCIPCO 8' t, oxl)OVTOý, ]TOUCOV 8' CC', )T(O cy-L)ýtlcp(XTTOVT(ov, F-XOVTOý 89, 
'EXXilvt-Ki\lv öi)v(xýitv, F-t'X-q(pocoý 8 F\- 'AvOF-ýtoý-)vT(x 'KM OF'-PýLOW MXI DrPE'VUV 
Km UU, (X'U'T(X 7, (»Pt(X, M(XKF-öovcov 8F'- oll)y, oýtovool)VC(t)V, ('XXX('X T(-i)V 
nýxiGT(OV TU 1-1(Xucy(xvt, ou (PPOVO1. )Vrcov, Ult T(OV K(Xtp(ov TO'L)T(OV 
F-XF-tpoTovlla(xv Et 3 'AOilv(xiot CYTP(XTI17o, v ' n' 'Aýt(p'itoXiv I(ptKpc, cTllv, 
'Aýt(pinoXt, r(i)v cc-L)'TO)V F-XovUÜ)v 'TOTF- TIIV noxtv Kal\ TIIV xü)Pccv 
K(Xpnol)ýLF-V(OV. E no-üý -KP(XUol)ý ýIF-T 01 'A(pt-Koýtývol) 5' ctiý Touý To lpt äki-YO)v 'co, 
14 The position of Ptolemy as a regent, as opposed to full king in his own right, is also attested by C, Aeschines 2.29. If Ptolemy was in fact known as regent and not king, the use of this title might have been 
an attempt to somehow legitimise his position, given that he was not in any obvious sense an heir to the ZD 
throne, while both Perdiccas and Philip were the sons of Amyntas and young adults at the time. C) Aeschines' testimony that Ptolemy was regent and not king might be thought of as being supported by the tý tD tD fact that no coins have survived which bear his name. This may, on the other hand, be due to other 
factors. Ptolemy's reign was short and turbulent, conditions which may not have been conducive to 
changes coinage, or perhaps, if such changes were indeed made, the output was small and no examples 
of it have survived or yet been discovered. Given that information on Ptolemy's regency comes 
exclusively from Aeschines, however, and that the reliability of the information from the orators is often 
doubtful (see Chapter 5 for discussion) we might be inclined to question it. Aeschines was trying, in this C) z:: ) 
passage, to bolster relations between Philip and Macedon, and, when addressing Philip, he would have Z-- C been ill advised to dwell upon Athens' assistance to Ptolemy, who had after all murdered Philip's elder 
brother, usurped the throne and later been murdered himself by Philip's other brother. We might safely ZD 
say that Ptolemy was probably persona non grata with Philip. If Ptolemy could be characterised, 
however, as a regent for Perdiccas III and Philip, the memory of assistance to him could perhaps be 
blurred into a memory of assistance to Philip himself, albeit indirect assistance. On the whole it seems 
gard the evidence of Ptolemy's regency, especially as Diodorus 15.77.5 (discussed below) wiser to disre, I'D 
informs us that Ptolemy retained his position of control in Macedon well into the adulthood of both of 
Amyntas' sons and ultimately had to be removed by assassination. Ultimately, however, we might Zý 
conclude that whether Ptolemy was known as kincy or was a rather stubborn regent, it made very little Z-1 C 
difference to his practice of foreign policy. z: 1 
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Shortly after the death of Alexander, the eldest of the brothers, while Perdiccas 
and Philip were still children, when their mother Eurydice had been betrayed by 
those who professed to be their friends, and when Pausanias was coming back to 
contend for the throne, an exile then but favoured by opportunity and the support 
of many of the people, and bringing a Greek force with him, and when he had 
already seized Anthemon, Therme, Strepsa and certain other places, at a time 
when the Macedonians were not united but, but most of them favoured 
Pausanias: at this crisis the Athenians elected Iphicrates as their general to go 
against Amphipolis - for at this time the people of Amphipolis were holding 
their city themselves and enjoying the products of the land. When lphicrates had 
come into this region - with a few ships at first for the purpose of examining the 
situation rather than of laying siege to the city - "Then, " said I [to Philip 11] " 
Your mother Eurydice sent for him, and according to the testimony of all who 
were present, she put your brother Perdiccas into the arms of Iphicrates and set 
you upon his knees - for you were a little boy- and said "Amyntas, the father of 
these little children, when he was alive, made you his son, ' 5 and enjoyed the 
friendship of the city of Athens; we have a right therefore to consider you in 
your private capacity a brother of these boys and in your public capacity a friend 
to us. " After this she at once began to make earnest entreaty in your behalf and 
in her own, and for the maintinance of the throne - in a word for full protection. 
When lphicrates had heard all this, he drove Pausanias out of Macedonia and 
preserved the dynasty for you. 
Aeschines' narrative of these events is somewhat heavily embroidered for effect. 16 In 
spite of this, however, it is possible to discern a certain substructure of facts in his 
narrative. Clearly the reign of Ptolemy had been challenged by a rival claim to the 
throne by one Pausanias. Exactly who Pausanias was is unclear, ' 7 but the eastern 
15 See Chapter 6 note 61 for discussion of the adoption of Iphicrates by Amyntas. 
16 Not least of Aeschines' exaggerations here being the manner in which the appeal to Iphicrates was C> Zý 
made by Eurydice. If Philip was twenty four when he took the throne in 360/59, he could have been no 
younger than sixteen and in fact was probably closer to twenty when this appeal was made, and his Cý 
brother Perdiccas older. An appeal on the grounds of the infancy and helplessness of the heirs to the 
throne should be disregarded, then - perhaps, besides stressing this point for theatrical effect, Aeschines 0 Z-1 
was skirting around the potentially sensitive issue of Ptolemy, who had killed Philip's eldest brother, 1-1 
married his mother and was later murdered by Perdiccas. To suggest that Athens had assisted Ptolemy Z: )I=) 
would hardly have endeared Athens to Philip - better to stress that it was Perdiccas and Philip for whom 
Iphicrates had preserved the throne. 
17 Although see Hammond 1979 p184 for a discussion of his identity. Pausanias' later attempt on the L, 
throne. supported by a Thracian king, perhaps (see Hammond's Philip of Macedon p24) Cotys, is 
discussed in the following chapter. It seems highly likely that this Pausamas, and the one mentioned by C, Z. 1; 1 
Diodorus 16.2.6 in connection with this later attempt were one and the same. 
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location of his conquests suggests that his claim had found support in that strongly anti 
Macedonian city, Olynthus. 18 Ptolemy, unable to rely upon the support of the 
Macedonjans, was unable to counter this claim alone, but was able to capitalise upon 
the happy coincidence which led Athens to send Iphicrates, a firm friend of the royal 
family, although not specifically of Ptolemy himself, at the head of their advance force 
to Amphipolis. As a result of the appeal made to Iphicrates, the threat of Pausanias was 
driven from Macedon and Ptolemy was able to retain his position on the throne, thus 
preserving it for Perdiccas and then Philip. 
Two elements which pertain to these events require further discussion here. The first is 
the role of Eurydice. She receives what may only be described as a bad press in some 
ancient sources. Justin lays foul crimes indeed at her feet, accusing her first of a plot to 
kill Amyntas, in conjunction with Ptolemy, supposedly her lover, and then continuing: 
Shortly after... [the agreement with Thebes discussed above] Alexander 
succumbed to the treachery of his mother Eurydice. Although Eurydice had been 
caught red-handed [in a plot against him], Amyntas had nevertheless spared her 
life for the sake of the children they had in common, unaware that she would one 
day prove their undoing. Alexander's brother Perdiccas likewise became the 
victim of a treacherous plot on her part. It was indeed a cruel blow that these 
children should have been murdered and sacrificed to her lust when it was 
consideration of these same children which had once rescued her from 
punishment -for her crimes. The murder of Perdiccas seemed all the more 
scandalous in that the mother's pity was not stirred even by the fact that he had 
an infant son. (7.5.4-7) 
This version of events is accepted by some modem authors. 19 Others, however, are less 
credulous (especially Hammond, who memorably summanses the whole tale as 
"poppycock' )20). Mortensen (1992) offers a plausible suggestion as to what Eurydice's 
agenda may have been in marrying Ptolemy: 
18 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of how Amyntas had contributed to the downfall of Olynthus in 381. 
The fact that Perdiccas assisted Athens against Olynthus during his five year reign and that in 348 Philip C) ZD 0 
enslaved it, dismantling its powerbase once and for all, suggests that a threat from Olynthus, whether a CC 
greater or a lesser one, was perceived in Macedon from the occasion of its invasion in 383 to its ultimate C> 
downfall in 348. 
19 Most notably Borza: 
We can only guess at the reason why the strong-willed Eurydice established a liaison with Z: ) t) Ptolemy, whether to challenge Alexander's succession on some political ground unknown to us, 
or to overthrow the house of Amyntas as part of a foreign plot, or to put Ptolemy on the throne as 
a feature of a simple lovers' plot. (p190) 
None of Borza's three options are especially tempting. The idea that she was opposed to Alexander's 
accession on unknown political c(),, rounds is untenable, given that Aeschines 2.27 
has her vehemently 
supporting Perdiccas' right to the throne - why would she support the accession of her middle son but not C, C> I 
that of her eldest? The suggestion that she was attempting to overthrow the house of Amyntas as part of a C)C) Z-1) 
foreign plot is equally dubious, as no other sign of a foreign plot surfaces over the death of Alexander, r: I C: ý ZD 
and we might recall too that the house of Amyntas in fact consisted of her own sons. Lastly, the idea of a 
simple lovers' plot seems highly unlikely. as carrying it out would have necessitated her conniving at her Zý Cý C) 
first born son's murder. 
20 P183. 
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It is not necessary to suppose that [Eurydice] lusted after [Ptolemy] as Justin 
narrates, or that she loved him. The important fact is that she was mother of the 
heir apparent: an heir who commanded the support of a large faction within 
Macedon and more importantly had the support of Thebes. Perdiccas' chances of 
becoming king were therefore extremely good provided he could avoid being C) 
murdered by Ptolemy... Eurydice had no need to protect Philip, for he was safe 
in Thebes as a hostage during Ptolemy's reign, but Perdiccas was in a very 
vulnerable position. By marrying Ptolemy, Eurydice would remain as the "first 
lady" at the Macedonian court and thus be in the best possible position to protect 
Perdiccas' back and ensure that he, as rightful heir, remained prominent... This 
marriage could hardly have taken place if it did not benefit Ptolemy. It would in 
fact have helped to reconcile the large faction which had supported Alexander 
and reassured both it and Thebes that he was merely acting as regent and that 
Perdiccas, now his step son, would become king. (pp165f) 
Mortensen rightly perceives that there were advantages to both parties in this marriage. 
Ptolemy was greatly in need of securing his position, a fact which had been recently 
illustrated by the interventions of Thebes against him in Macedon, and by the attempt 
on the throne by Pausanias. One way to consolidate his position was by marriage to the 
dowager queen .21 By doing so, he could hope to assimilate some of the political support 
which she and her sons clearly enjoyed, and, along with it, some semblance of 
legitimacy for his rule. Evidently, especially valuable was her connection to Iphicrates, 
which allowed Ptolemy to use Athenian support to expel Pausanias and keep the throne. 
For Eurydice, the prospect of marriage to the man who had murdered her eldest son can 
hardly have been a pleasant one. 22 However, she chose it over the alternatives - 
obscurity in the Macedonian court and the extreme likelihood that her remaining sons, 
who, as the legitimate heirs of Amyntas, would pose a constant threat to Ptolemy's 
reign if allowed to live, would also be murdered; or exile. Ptolemy too had a son. She 
must have recognised that if she withdrew from the situation, the throne would simply 
pass out of her family, and she was not prepared to permit that. 
Eurydice's appeal to lphicrates marks the only moment in the period covered by this 
thesis at which we see a woman take part in the shaping of Macedonian foreign policy, 
albeit in a personal rather than a formal setting. Her appeal to lphicrates resulted in the 
successful preservation of the throne for her two remaining sons. 
In assisting her and her sons, Iphicrates and Athens presumably hoped that they would 
have, in return and in accordance with the vote cast by Amyntas at the congress of 
Greek states, the assistance of the reinstated royal family for the Athenian campaign at 
21A 
precedent for this occurred during the reign of Archelaus, who married the widow of Perdiccas, 
Cleopatra. See Chapter 3 for discussion. The fact that two kings, both of whom might be thought of as Z: ý tý C) 
having had a more or less tenuous grasp on the throne (see Chapter 3 for discussion of allegations that L- Zý r) 
Archelaus murdered his way to the throne, and, more plausibly, that there were other royal candidates for 
the throne at least during the early part of his reign) both appear to have married the dowager queen might Z-- ? -ý C, C) 
lead us to suppose that such a marriage carried some political advantages - perhaps by marriage to the Cý Zý Cý 
last king, 's wife the new king might be thought of as assuming an element of legitimacy. See Carney lzý V) rý zn 
2000 for an extensive discussion of the role of Macedonian women in the political framework of the time. 
22 Although one further possibility remains - that she was married to Ptolemy before the murder of Z-- 
Alexander. ff so, she found herself in an intolerable situation but had no option but to remain at court with 
her husband - not least so that she might protect her living sons. LI z: I 
127 
Amphipolis. Ptolemy, however, was too pragmatic a politician to allow the owing of a 
favour to so drastically sway his judgement. Aeschlines 2.29, having related how 
lphicrates drove Pausanias out of Macedon, continues: 
09 ITPO7coý 'KCCOECYTTIK 'ý Výv Kul ýtF-T6 Tccý)T(x Einov nept 'xý Av 7c/ (i) 
ÖFIV' v "P'YOV ÖIF-7cp, ýUTO, 818 ' CY'KO)V OTI 7[P(Y-7ýt(Xlu(OVI wý (xxccplcyTov x10 F- (X (X 
npCO'Cov ýtZ'v 'L)ng'p 'Aýt(purOkaoý ('XVTE7EP(XTTE Tfi 7U0kEl, KM' 7EP0, ý ellß(Xlol)ý 
bt(x(pF, poýtgvcov 'AO-qv(xi(»v ci)ýtýt(xXt(xv 97tOllIG(XTO... 
Next I spoke about Ptolemaeus, who had been made regent, 23 telling what an 
ungrateful and outrageous thing he had done: I explained how, in the first place 
he continually worked against our city in the interests of Amphipolls, and when 
we were in controversy with the Thebans, made alliance with them. 
Friendship with Athens over the restoration of the throne had, then, been very short 
lived. Ptolemy was aware that an Athenian presence at Amphipolis meant an increased 
interest in the north, something which in the past had invariably caused problems for 
Macedon, especially at times of instability in the royal house. This awareness led him to 
run the gauntlet of distancing himself from Athens by contributing to Amphipolitan 
resistance. 
Aeschines' statement that, contrary to Athens' interests, Ptolemy allied with Thebes, 
has led some modem sources to invert the order of the two main foreign interventions in 
Macedon during Ptolemy's reign. Ellis [1976] for example, suggests the following 
sequence of events: 
Ptolemaios... married the queen mother Eurydice and reigned legitimately as a 
regent for her second son Perdiccas. During this reign, there seems to have been 
a temporary renewal of alliance with Athens, for we hear of the intervention of 
lphicrates to prevent an attack on the throne by a certain Pausanias. But a second 
northern campaign by Pelopidas in the summer of 367 brought Ptolemaios back 
into line with Thebes, which is reflected by his combination with the people of 
Amphipols to resist Athenian ambitions there. (p43) 
This inversion seems unnecessary. First and foremost, the Theban intervention during 
Ptolemy's reign appears to have taken place as a direct result of his having assassinated 
Alexander, thus rejecting the settlement made by Thebes in favour of Alexander and by 
implication rejecting Theban dictates for the area. This being so, it seems natural for 
Thebes to have responded straight away by reaffirming their connection with Macedon 
and forming a new alliance with the new king. Secondly, as has been suggested above, 
there is no need to attribute Ptolemy's support of Amphipolitan resistance to a new 
treaty with Thebes - he would have been amply aware that Athenian interest 
in the area 
was unlikely to benefit Macedon. 
In the foreign policy of Ptolemy, we have seen a new strand evolving which had been 
absent from the rules of the recent kings and which was to develop during the reigns of 
both Perdiccas III and Philip H. Despite the continued military weakness of Macedon 
which precluded total autonomy, in that whatever new crisis arose had to 
be addressed 
through the use of whatever foreign aid was at hand, Ptolemy's reign had displayed an t: ) 
23 See note 14, above, for discussion. 
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inclination towards independence, in his willingness to use Athenian aid in spite of his 
alliance with Thebes, and his support of Amphipolis in spite of his apparent friendship 
(no formal alliance is recorded) with Athens through the intervention of Eurydice. This 
tendency was to develop in the following years, while the reign of Perdiccas saw an 
increase in attention to Macedon's military which laid the foundations for Philip's 
military success. 
The Reign of Perdiccas 111365/4-360/59 
In spite of Ptolemy's ability to use his foreign policy to negotiate the various threats to 
his reign, he was unable to survive in the turbulent climate of the royal house of the 
360s. Perdiccas acceded to the throne in what was, by this point, almost the traditional 
manner: 
"AýLcc 8 c\ rolicotq 7cpcvcro[tEvot; K(xrcc Ti\lv MccKF-8ovt(xv FI-cokE[tcdtoq ýLF-v o 
'Ako)pt', cil; E-'6oko(povijOq -07c o\ jrc'c8Ek(pof)j rIEp8iK-Kcc, poccTikelOacc; E"Til -Cptcc* 
T-qv 6E (, Xpxllv 5t(x8F, 4c4tF-Voq 0 rlF-p6tKK(X; E-'PCC(Yt'kEl-)CYF, Tfiq MCCKF-6OVtCC; E"TIJ 
'nEVTE. 
While these things were going on, in Macedon Ptolemy of Alorus was 
assassinated by his brother-in-law Perdiccas, after ruling three years; and 
Perdiccas succeeded to the throne and ruled Macedon for five years. (15.77.5) 
Perdiccas' accession marked a brief change in foreign policy towards Athens. Diodorus 
15.81.6 informs us that during the year 364/3, the Athenian general Timotheus 
commanded a force which seized Torone and Potidaea. This might initially appear to 
represent an alarming increase in Athenian interest in the north, and one which 
Perdiccas was unlikely to support, were it not for a comment from Demosthenes which 
allows us a deeper insight: 
a ll'KQ RF-Ptq R F\-V 7(\XP 11 M(X'KF-80vtKl\l 810'v(xPq 'K(xl (XPXll Ev It" 7EPO 01 
c F-(Txl Ttq Olb pKpcc, Otov b7rýp4E, - 7roo, b[tiv E'-nt\ 
Tt[toOF'-ou npo\ q 'OX1)vOt'ol)q- 
Yes, the power and sovereignty of Macedon is indeed, as an adjunct, no slight 
contribution, as you found it when on your side against Olynthus in the days of 
Timotheus. (Second Olynthiac 14) 
Given that Diodorus places the capture of Torone and Potidaea under the same year and 
that Timotheus is connected with Athenian assaults upon all three of the cities 
mentioned, it seems wise to consider the attacks upon all three cities to have been part 24 
of the same northern campaign to reduce Theban influence in the north . Perdiccas, it 
appears, then, had temporarily put aside any doubts over more negative implications for 
Macedon from this Athenian interest in the area, and was contributing to her campaign 
against Olynthus. We need not look too far back into history for the reasoning behind 
this decision. A large scale invasion had come from Olynthus in 383 during the reign of I'D t) 
Perdiccas' father, and, more recently it seems likely that Olynthus had supported the 
claim of Pausanias to the Macedonian throne. It is little wonder, then, that Perdiccas 
24 See Diodorus 15-79.1, which tells how, under Theban pressure, Byzantium had withdrawn from the 
Athenian confederacy, a worrying occurence for Athens as Byzantium controlled the corn route through 
the Hellespont. 
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took advantage of Athenian military interest in the north to reduce the threat felt in 
Macedon from Olynthus. 
However, the collusion between Macedon and Athens over what was, briefly, a 
common interest, was short lived. Aeschines informs us of how, by continuing the I C) 
support of Amphipolis which Ptolemy had initiated, Perdiccas provoked Athens: 
Ic 7ro(ktV Wq 0 rlF-p6t-K-K(Xq F-1; rllv ()Cpxllv Kourocu'ra; -L)irF-p 'Aýt(ptrcAF-o)q 
Vloktpjae cý Tcoka. Koct Ti\ v 1)[tEzc'p(xv 1)8i-Kljýtcv(ov 6ý1(oq Tik(XvOp(07ctccv 
Ftv, kE-'7(ov 6"ci Kp(xrol, )vrE; rCo iroXE'-Rq) 1-1; Ep5tmc(Xv KWAt(TOF-vob; 
117014tEvOl), OcvOXCC; TCPOq (xi)rO\v F-7rOtllc7cc(yOF-, ('XEli TtVO; JTPOCT6OK6v'UF-; Tv 
8ti, ccc't(t)v wo4ca0m. Kodt ri\lv 61(XPOXi V 'UOC1, )r'nV F'-T[F-tp(I)RIJV ýMCIV, 8t8(X(TK(OV TI 
urt KcckktcyOE'-vilv o' 5ýýtoq ('x7cE'-, KrF-tVFV OIL) 6tC\C 'r(\Xq 7CPO'q rlF-p8'tKK(XV O'CVOXU. ý, 
51 6t' F'-, zE-'poc; (xt', r"L(x;. Kcc\t n(xXtv oi')-K c'oxvoi)v KaT ccl, )Tob Xý (X (X F-7Flv 
OtkitTETC010,2'-7UITI[tCOV O'TI VIV EK6OXl\lV F'-7UOtTI(Y(XTO 7UPOq TIJV T[OktV TOij 
71oke, ýtou. 
I explained... how Perdiccas, when he came to the throne, fought for 
Amphipolis against our city. And I showed that, wronged as you were, you 
maintained your friendly attitude; for I told how, when you had conquered 
Perdiccas in the war under the generalship of Callisthenes, you made a truce 
with him, ever expecting to receive some just return. And I tried to remove the 
ill feeling that was connected with this affair by showing that it was not the truce 
with Perdiccas that led the people to put Callisthenes to death, but other causes. 
And yet I did not hesitate to complain of Philip himself, blaming him for having 
taken up in his turn the war against our state. (Aeschines 2.29-30) 
Three points may be derived from this narrative, the first being that Perdiccas, like 
Ptolemy, recognised that, in spite of the restoration of the Macedonian throne being 
owed to Athens, an Athenian presence at Amphipolis was unlikely to be beneficial to 
Macedon. This being so, he readily abandoned the short lived friendship which had seen 
Macedonian and Athenian troops fight together at Olynthus to return to a hostile foreign 
policy towards Athens. 
Secondly, we might note that, when his support of Amphipolis prompted an attack upon 
him from Athens, Perdiccas was able to put up some military resistance to it, and while 
Aeschines speaks of a defeat, the fact that truce was then concluded between Perdiccas 
and Callistenes (a truce which evidently angered the Athenian people, in spite of the 
fact that Aeschines was tactfully non-specific about the reasons for Callisthenes' death 
sentence) implies that the defeat was not definitive and that Callisthenes, as well as 
Perdiccas, wished for assurance of no further hostilities. The fact that Perdiccas was 
able to offer any resistance at all marks a change from the military situation of recent 
years. The defeat Perdiccas suffered at the hands of Callisthenes indicates that his army 
was not yet especially significant, but some implication that Perdiccas was aware of the 
necessity of augmenting the Macedonian army, and had been making some movements 
in the direction of doing so, should be derived from this passage. 25 
Lastly, we might briefly note that relations between Macedon and Athens evidently Z7) 
closed during Perdiccas' reign on a markedly sour note. Having concluded a truce with 4- 1 
25 Further developments of the Macedonian army and their implications for forel1gn policy in the years to 
come will be discussed below in the following chapters, 1-1 
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Perdiccas, Callisthenes returned to Athens, where he was put to death. Exactly what the 
grievance against him was from the Athenian people is unclear, but that a negative 
implication had been drawn from it in Macedon is evident from the fact that Aeschines 
found himself in need of explaining away this awkward episode in the course of his 
embassy to Phi lip. 26 Needless to say, these events had future implications during the 
reign of Philip. 
Before closing our discussion of Perdiccas' reign, we might consider a possible further 
strand of a defensive foreign policy which emerged during it. Sources on the accession 
of Philip contain some discrepancies regarding precisely how Philip was able to take the 
throne, given that he was by no means the only contender for it, and given that some of 
the other claimants could boast the support of powerful allies such as Athens or one of 
the Thracian kings. 27 This chapter presents the theory that the apparent ease with which 
Philip was able to take the throne, and the political support for him within Macedon 
which this denotes, may have been connected to a defensive foreign policy 
implemented during the latter part of Perdiccas' reign. 
Diodorus' account of Philip's accession is relatively straightforward: 
T010'rou 6F, - lr(xpocc , ýEt [tE7 , ki -L)Pt& t F, t (X an XF-, (POE'vro; b7co' "XX )v Kcd TCF-Cyovro; 
, R, 
, rýq XPF-tCcq (DIXtnnoq 0 686ý(Po' ; 8t(x8p(xq E-K 'rý; %Lljpt(xq Tuxff COE rl, lv 'X P(Xcyt; ýEti(xv K(X]4ccoq 8t(XKEtýtEvljv. 
When he [Perdiccas] was defeated in a great battle by the Illyrians and fell in the 
action, Philip his brother, who had escaped from detention as a hostage, 
succeeded to the kingdom, now in a bad way. (16.2.4) 
In his version, then, Philip simply acceded to the throne on Perdiccas' death, and 
although in later passages he mentions the attempts of Pausanias and Argaeus on the 
throne28 Diodorus implies that Philip had the advantage over these men not only in his 
blood relationship to Perdiccas but also in being poised to take the kingship on 
Perdiccas' death, while they were in exile and obliged to call upon foreign support. 
Justin provides a hint as to one possible explanation for Philip's existing power base: 
The murder of Perdiccas [by, according to Justin, his mother Eurydice] seemed 
all the more scandalous in that the mother's pity was not stirred even by the fact 
that he had an infant son. So it was that for a long period Philip was guardian for 
the minor rather than king himself but, facing the threat of more serious wars, 
and at a time when any assistance to be expected from the child was too far in 
the future, he was constrained by the people to take the throne. (7.5.8-10) 
According to Justin, then, the start of Philip's reign took the fon-n of a regency for his 
nephew, Perdiccas' baby son. He does not, however, clarify just how long a period this 
arrangement spanned, a situation which is yet further complicated by the fact that 
serious wars threatened immediately on Perdiccas' death . 
29 Neither does Justin 
26 On Callisthenes, see Devlin (1989) p263, who is in no doubt about the connection between 
Callisthenes' conclusion of a peace treaty with Perdiccas and his execution. See also Sealey (1967) and 
27 
isthenes' execution to the treaty with Perdiccas. Hansen (1965) who, pp9'1-4, like Devlin, connects Calli 1 
These events will be discussed at length in the following chapter. 
28 16.2.6 and 16.3.4-7. 
29 See the following chapter for a discussion of these events. 
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elaborate upon when exactly during the twenty five year reign allotted to him at 9.8.1 
Philip was upgraded from regent to king. Nor do we hear of a regency from any other 
source. 
The opacity of our ancient sources on this issue has led to some division of opinion in 
modem discussions of Philip's accession. An incisive position was taken by Heskel, ' '0 
who comments: 
Perhaps the problem of regency can be laid to rest by noting a point that is 
implicit in the failure of most of our sources to mention it: there was no 
discernible difference in Philip's powers during his regency and his reign. This 
is indicated by the accounts of Diodorus, Demosthenes, and the accounts 
concerning his early reign. 
In taking the attitude that whether or not we accept that Philip was a regent for his 
nephew makes little difference to our study of him, Heskel neatly sidesteps the problem. 
It is Griffith, however, who notes the connection between these events and the contents 
of a letter from Speusippus to Philip: 
ni-)voocv04evoý (I)iXinnov ßk(XG(PllgF-iv nF-P1 rlx(XTO)Voý, Elý 
F-ntaTokljv F, -"YP(X(pe ct Totoi)'UOV, O)'anF-p (, X7V001)VT(Xý Toi, )ý (, xV0P0)7[0-L)ý, oTt 
-K(xt rljv (xpXljv cýý ß(xatXF-to(ý ötcc rAccu)voý F-GXFv. Ei)(ppcciov 
-yccp (xnecyZF-tXF- cov 'OPF-t-cilv npoý 1-lep8i-K-Kccv rlxc, CTÜ)v, oý F-nF-t(YF-V 
ccnoýLF-Plc(xt Ttvcc X(ÜP(xv (DIA, 11zn(p. A1(X-UPF-(pcov 5' FE 
2 'vrccüooc öl)vccýttv, wý 
(XIUF- (X x '0 F- E 2 '0(XVE Zý UM PXO'(Yllý, lz, 7tF-GF- Toiý 
Whilst recognising, however, the usefulness of this fragment to a discussion of the 
events surrounding Philip's accession, Griffith is noncommittal as regards the 
interpretation of its contents: 
The explanation [given by Speusippus] is a little mysterious, because Macedonia 
at this time had no internal provinces to which governors or generals were 
appointed regularly. A prince of the royal house could expect to be given part of 
the royal estates to live on, one supposes, and it is not easy to see just what more 
this 6C assigning some territory to Philip" could possibly mean, or just what, in the 
way of a private army, Philip could maintain without becoming an object of 
suspicion. Perdiccas was an enterprising ruler, as his acquisition of Amphipolis 
shows; and he may have had some warning of the coming 111yrian invasion. FEs 
"assigning territory" to Philip may have been part of his preparations and 
precautions, and the training of an army ... Or 
is it possible even that the 
"assigning territory" had an element of euphemism, and means really that Philip 
was allowed to live on a royal estate instead of being arrested and chased into 
exile? (p207)31 
Griffith complains that Speusippus' explanation is "mysterious" because Macedon was 
not usually divided up into territories which were allotted to governors or generals on a 
30 1987 
31 fI ises some On the other hand, Grif ith pp514 is scathinza) about SpeusIppus' work In zgeneral, and rai 
serious doubts over its reliability. The suggestions made by this chapter based on the evidence of Z: )Zý 
Speusippus' letter are, it must be stressed, tentative ones only, 
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regular basis. While this is on the whole true, we do have at least one historical 
precedent for the Macedonian king allotting certain areas of Macedon to his sons in 
Alexander 1. In Chapter 2, we saw that when Perdiccas 11 acceded to the throne, two of 
his brothers, Alcetas and Philip, were in possession of an arche each, that of Philip at 
32 least being both large and strategically important. ' It was suggested there that the Zý decision to divide Macedon into archai may have been taken with the intention of 
11 contributing in some way to its security. " 
Ten years elapsed between the death of Amyntas and the accession of Philip, and in 
between much upheaval had taken place in the Argead family - it would seem 
nonsensical to argue that Amyntas had bequeathed his kingdom in equal shares to his 
sons as Cotys had done in Thrace. However, as we have a precedent for the heirs of the 
Macedonian king taking some form of kingdom in miniature in lieu of the actual throne 
of Macedon, we might tentatively suggest that this was what Philip had the right to as 
well. 
If we accept this theory, then the "mystery" of Speusippus' letter which troubled 
Griffith is solved. Certainly it was true that Macedon "at this time had no internal 
provinces to which governors or generals were appointed regularly. " But this need not 
put an insurmountable barrier in the way of our believing that Philip may have been 
given some territory to rule as a princeling, whose position may have been intended to 
guarantee his loyalty to the ruling king, Perdiccas, and whose presence in whatever area 
he was allotted may- have been designed, in turn, to ensure the loyalty of that region to 
the crown. 
If this was the case, we might tentatively suggest that some misunderstanding has taken 
place in our sources. Perhaps we could speculate that Justin's source, Trogus, found in 
his own, Greek sources, 34 some suggestion that before Philip had reigned as king, he 
had been an archon. Not considering the possibility that this archonship may have taken 
place before Perdiccas' death rather than after it, and seeing that Perdiccas had a baby 
son, Trogus assumed this archonship to refer to a regency on behalf of the infant. 
Perhaps we should consider the possibility that Trogus' sources recorded not a regency 
but an archonship in some area of Macedonian territory, an archonship which allowed 
Philip a military command and a political persona during his brother's reign, and thus 
the degree of preparedness on his death commented upon by Speusippus and hinted at 
by Justin. 
The suggestion that the regency of Philip came before, and not after the death of 
Perdiccas is highly speculative, and is supported by only a slim body of ancient 
evidence. Any suggestions as to exactly where Philip's arche was are purely 
speculative, as there is no ancient evidence at all which pertains to it - and yet it seems 
wise to suggest that it must have been in an area where some strategic benefit could be 
gained from it. If Perdiccas was indeed aware of a gathering threat from Illyna, as 
Griffith suggests in the passage quoted above, it seems possible that Philip may have 
32 Thucydides 2.100 for the size and position of Philip's arche, and Plato Gorglas 471B for that of 
Alcetas, although no size or location is given. ltý Zý 33 A similar division of a kingdom, although one which had no known implications for its security, took L- -- IIII 
place at around the same time as Philip's accession in Thrace, where king Cotys died, dividing his 
kingdom into three parts so that each of his three sons had a portion to rule. 
34 See Chapter 5 for discussion. 
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been posted to Upper Macedon, from whence an Illyrian attack could be countereýq, and 
given that Philip and Perd1ccas had some ancestral connections with Lyncestls'. 35 that 
area presents itself as a possibility. 
No certainty may be reached on this issue. However, an acceptance of this theory would 
go some way towards answering some otherwise puzzling questions. Three issues in 
particular may be thought of as pertaining to this possibility. The first of these, as 
mentioned above, is how it was that Philip was able to take control so authoritatively 
when his was not the only claim to the throne. The letter of Speusippus has been 
commented upon above and need not be reworked here. However, it is evident in the 
light of this theory that the elements which it emphasises are connected and show a 
clear line of logic. Speusippus says that Philip owed his throne and kingdom to Plato, 
because Plato's pupil Euphraeus persuaded Perdiccas to give Philip land, and therefore 
when Perdiccas died Philip was "ready" to "overcome the problems" facing him, 
presumably meaning that Philip was able to take the throne. Speusippus seems clear that 
there was a strong connection between the giving of the land to Philip and, as a direct 
consequence, his preparedness on Perdiccas' death. 
This preparedness was what gave Philip the upper hand over his rivals. Perdiccas' son 
was a baby and therefore posed little threat. The other candidates, although adult and 
eager for the kingship, were in exile and were only as strong as whatever state they 
could persuade to help them. The solution to the problem of how it was that Philip was 
able, on the death of Perdiccas, to gain the upper hand over other claimants to the 
throne, lies in accepting that part of Perdiccas' defensive foreign policy took the form of 
issuing Philip with an arche in a strategically important position. Through this, Philip 
was able to consolidate support for himself, establish some kind of force, and thus be 
poised to take the throne when Perdiccas was killed in battle. 
Secondly, by accepting the theory that Philip had an arche in the north we might come a 
little closer to understanding the answer to another, apparently unrelated question. How 
was it that Philip, a mere year after the annihilation of four thousand Macedonian 
soldiers, could field the vast army of ten thousand which conquered Bardyli S? 36 It seems 
unlikely that Perdiccas, had he had these large manpower resources at his disposal, 
would have failed to draw upon them when faced by the numerous and much feared 
Illyrians. Accepting this point, obliges us to further accept that Philip had access to 
manpower reserves that Perdiccas did not. A possible explanation for this may have 
been that he was able to draw on some area of Macedon for troops, owing to some 
personal loyalty felt towards him but not felt towards Perdiccas. An early pricipality in 
some area (some populous area, we might add) could provide the necessary connection 
to such a place. 
Thirdly and lastly, we might also use such a suggestion to explain why it was that 
Bardylis, following his victory over Perdiccas, did not press home his advantage and 
invade Macedon. A tentative suggestion as to why this was may be supplied by 
considering that Bardylis may have been aware that some area of Macedon was strongly 
loyal to the crown, perhaps as a result of a local connection to the family of the dead 
king, and to the new one. If this was so, he would have been obliged to recognise that 
" See previous chapter for a discussion of Eurydice's origins, and the suggestion that her mother was zD Z-- C 
Lyncestian. 
36 See the following chapter for discussion of these events. M- 
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not only would his entry, through the mountainous region of Upper Macedon, be 
difficult, but that once it was achieved, he may have been forced to defend his rear. 
Even taking all of these arguments into account, however, no absolute certainty may be C) It) reached upon the issue of whether or not Perdiccas took the decision to hand over some 
territory to Philip, with the dual purpose of allowing his younger brother his hereditary 
right to an arche and enhancing the defence of that area with the presence of an army 
and Philip as a commander. We might, however, tentatively suggest that this possibility 
ought not to be ruled out of our concept of Perdiccas' reign and consider it as a possibly facet to his defensive foreign policy. 
The reign of the vigorous young king Perdiccas was cut short by his death - not, as according to Justin, at the hands of his mother, but, as Diodorus 16.2.4-5 informs us, in battle: 
Perdiccas, during his five year reign, had addressed all three of the main concerns of 
contemporary foreign policy - the threat posed by Olynthus, Athenian interest in Amphipolis, and the ever present Illyrians. These last had overwhelmed him and the 
throne was once again open to competition. 
To conclude our consideration of the 360s, some threads which have emerged from our 
discussion might be drawn together before we embark upon the years of Philip's reign. 
The conduct of a reasoned and cohesive foreign policy during this period was seriously 
hampered by two main obstacles: the brevity of the reigns of each of the three kings of 
this decade and, a not unconnected factor, the extreme instability of the royal house 
during these years. Both of these elements are exemplified by the rule of Alexander 11, 
with his disastrous incursion into Thessaly on behalf of the Aleuadae. Macedon did not 
have either the military presence or the political stability to support such an incursion, 
and, predictably enough, the campaign was unsuccessful: the young king's absence 
resulted in the development and execution of a plot to assassinate him. Macedon's 
extreme weakness and profound instability could hardly have been more clearly 
exemplified than by the brief reign and the death of Alexander. His reestablishment of 
the connection with the Aleuadae, however, is an element which we see further 
developed during the reign of Philip 11.37 
The reign of Ptolemy of Alorus again exemplified the profound weakness of Macedon, 
not least by the fact that his very position on the throne was ratified by Thebes, a clear 
indication that Macedon was perceived by Thebes as a state whose political instability 
could be exploited to extend her own influence. An interesting comparison may be 
made by looking ahead to a time when Thebes, wrung dry by the Sacred War, appealed 
to Philip for assistance, 38 a situation which would have been more or less inconceivable 
to the Thebans who queried the legitimacy of Ptolemy's rule and then granted him the 
right to power. Once again, however, Ptolemy's rule too saw the development of some 
elements which were later to have an impact on Philip's reign - most notably the 
reawakening, along with Iphicrates' intervention against Pausanias on Ptolemy's behalf, 
of Athenian interest in the north, and, coupled with this tendency, Macedonian 
resistance to it, in the shape of Ptolemy's assistance to Amphipolis against Athens. 
37 See following chapter for discussion. r-I 38 See Chapter 9 for discussion. 
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In spite of Perdiccas' opposition to Ptolemy, which led him to assassinate him, the reign 
of Perdiccas saw a continuation of this policy. Perdiccas too leant his support to 
Amphipolis, in resistance to an Athenian encroachment on Macedonian borders. This 
policy was, as discussed at length in the following chapter, vigorously pursed by Philip 
as well. The reign of Perdiccas, however, also saw the alarming growth of a threat far C) 
more worrying than the unrealistic attempts of Athens to re-establish herself in the 
north, and one which Philip inherited on his death - that from Illyria. 
The 360s was a decade of extreme upheaval in Macedon, and its conclusion had every 
appearance of leaving Macedon on the brink of yet further war and political instability. 
The turbulence of the royal house, the unprecedented degree of foreign intervention 
exemplified by the ratification by Thebes of the rules of Alexander II and Ptolemy of 
Alorus, a reawakening of Athenian interest in the north and a renewal of Illyrian 
aggression towards Macedon conspired to make the prospects for the 350s look dim 
indeed. There was nothing, at this juncture, to suggest that the following decade would 
see Macedon metamorphose into a super power with a dominant and aggressive foreign 
policy. 
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Chapter 8 
Back From the Brink; The Early Years of Philip's Reign 
At the moment of Philip's accession in 360/59, ' Macedon had every appearance of 
being on the brink of disaster. Aside from the Inherent problems within the royal 
family, 2 various external threats were crowding in on a weak and highly unstable 
Macedon. A brief resume of the nature of these threats will illustrate the profundity of 
the crisis which Philip faced on his accession. 
Perhaps the most pressing of Macedon's concerns at this point was Illyria. Diodorus 
16.2.4-5 informs us of the circumstances surrounding Perdiccas' death under the year 
360/59: 
ýLF-Tüc 'YCCP TIIV 'Aýil)vTot TF-XF-1)Tliv *A/'ý£-'4ocv5poý o npF-cyßorazog rC»v 1)t'üov 
81F-U-ýUT0 TI\lv ('XPXIIV. coi)', cov 8F'- 1-1, cokP-4ccioý 0 'A; ý(üpt'Cilý Öoko(Povll(Y(Xý 
n(XPFý-ý, (XßF- T )V ß(X(YtXF-t'(XV K(X\t Toi), TOV OýtOt'O)ý 1-IF-PÖ1"KK(Xý £'-n(XVF-kOýLF-VOý 
Toll)TOI) se' MPUT', ýEI ýLE7U1 kE c 1-) 0t A _t(PO'VTOý 
'n 'lý. XI)PLCOV 'K(X\ 
71; EluovToý CM Tjý xPet(xý (1)t, xtlI7Z0ý 0 (MEX(Poý 8t(XÖP(\xý Ex T% 04lIpt'aý 
ýx(XßF- T ýv ß(Xcyt; ýF-t'(XV KUK(i)ý Öt(X'KF-týt£'-Vllv. avl , 7C(Xpg 11 q9 (X 9 
, 
IplIVT0 ýtýV 7 ýp ýv Tý 
ir(XPCCT(ýX4F-1 MOCKP-80vwv 7CXF-t, oL)ý T(i)V TF-TP(xKtcyxtxt, (OV, Ot' 89' kolnoti 
KCCT(X7cElckll, yýLF'-Vot Vxý T(i)V 'lkkl, )PICOV 51)V(XýtF-Iý 'RF-Pt(poßot K(xoEt(Y'ZIIKF-tG(XV 
KOct npoý To Öt(XnoxF-ýLF-iv ccoug(oý F-txov. 
For after the death of Amyntas, Alexander, the eldest of the sons of Amyntas, 
succeeded to the throne. But Ptolemy of Alorus assassinated him and succeeded 
to the throne and then in a similar fashion Perdiccas disposed of him and ruled 
as king. But when he was defeated in a great battle by the Illyrians and fell in the 
action, Philip his brother, who had escaped from detention as a hostage, 
succeeded to the kingdom, now in a bad way. For the Macedonians had lost 
more than four thousand men in the battle, and the remainder, panic stricken, 
had become exceedingly afraid of the Illyrian armies and had lost heart for 
continuing the war. 
In this defeat, then, Macedon had suffered a highly significant loss, and one which was 
potentially fatal to its future. Besides the deaths of its king and the sizeable number of 
men who had also fallen, 3 Macedonian morale had suffered a massive blow, rendering 
its land and people easy prey for the Illyrian coup de grace which must have seemed 
1 Diodorus 16.1.2 
2 See previous chapter for di I 
last decade. 
iscussion of the disastrous effects of the instability of the throne within the 
3 Exactly what proportion of Macedon's potential muster this number represented is unclear. However, 
some estimation might be made by considering the implications of the size of Philip's army when =1 C) 
confronting Bardylis to redeem the land lost following this battle and to reduce the threat from Illyria (see C) C) 
below), a force of ten thousand men plus six hundred cavalry. It seems likely that Philip would have 
called upon the full extent of the manpower available to him to confront this formidable foe, and 
therefore we might make a very rough estimate that the four thousand men who fell in 360/59 represented Cý L- 
approximately slightly less than one third of Macedon's full manpower potential, and extremely sizeable C, 
loss. See below for a discussion of the army under Philip. 
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inevitable. Bardylis had remained in possession of some Macedonian territory 
4 
and his 
5 troops were massing on the borders A full invasion seemed both Imminent and 
inevitable. 
Diodorus 16.2.6 goes on to further elaborate upon the various problems which faced the 
new king. 
c'8, T' v a' -c' v -Kcctp, v rla, oveý ýt, v nxllc, ov M(XI<F-ÖOV' 2 ")no g0 11) 0019t Uxý otKol, )vTcý 2'--8E 
enopoo")v Týv XCOP(XV K(XT(X(PPOV01-)VTF-ý T(OV M(XKF-ÖOVCÜV, 'IXXI)ptOt 
ýu-, Yocx, ccý 81, )VC6CýtF--uý fiopolýOV -KCC\t cyTPCC-CEI)F-tv F-lý Tqv MCCKF-80v1(XV 
71(XPF-(Y'KE'1)C'CýOVTO, 1-1(xl, )cyccvi(xý ÖE' Tlý Tfiý ß(MYOUKýý Kolve)vo)v 
EIZF-ß('XXXF-TO Ö1(X TOi) E)pýXX(i)V ß(XCYIXE'-(üý F-7Ct% TI\IV M(XICF-ÖOVIKýV ß(XCYIk, 91'(XV 
KccTtev(xi. oýtoto)ý ÖF\- xcct\ 'AOilvcciot np äý (Dt'Xtnnov ('xXkoupiwý F-XovcF-ý 
KocTý-yov e-'nt\ ri\lv ß(xcytý, r-i(xv 'Apy(xioV K(X\t GTPCCTII'YOV (XIUF-CYTOCXKEICY(XV 
M(XV-Ut, (xv £, -, XOVT(X Tptaxtý, t'o-oý ýtEv oluxitTaý, V(X-OTIKTJV 8F\- 5-OV(Xýtiv 
(x410; ýoyov. 
About the same time the Paeonians, who lived near Macedonia, began to pillage 
their territory, showing contempt for the Macedonians, and the Illyrians began to 
assemble large armies and prepare for an invasion of Macedonian, while a 
certain Pausanias, who was related to the royal line of Macedon, was planning 
with the aid of the Thracian king to join the contest for the throne of Macedon. 
Similarly, the Athenians too, being hostile to Philip, were attempting to restore 
Argaeus to th 
'e 
throne and had dispatched Mantias as general with three thousand 
hoplites and a considerable naval force. 
The combination of the massing Illyrian forces and Paeonian interest in the area could 
alone have proved fatal for Macedon's survival; the two further elements mentioned 
here by Diodorus constituted yet further complications. 
Quite who Pausanias was and which Thracian king was supporting him is unclear. 6 
However, the presence of the claims of both Pausanias and Argaeus can only have 
further undermined the stability of the royal house at this critical time, especially as 
both were supported by foreign powers and were therefore trailing complicated 
connections to foreign policy. The support of Pausanias by the Thracian king appears to 
have been little more than an opportunist attempt by that king to take advantage of 
Macedonian instability to exert his influence there. The fact that he was easily detached 
from PausaniaS7 supports the theory that his commitment to the plan and to whatever 
goals it sought to achieve was not especially deep rooted. Athenian support of Argaeus, 
however, was another matter entirely. 
To consider the nature of Athens' interest in Macedon, we must look back to the last 
years of the reign of Amyntas, which saw that king voting his support of Athens' right 
4 Diodorus 16.4.4. 
5 Diodorus 16.2-6. 
6 Although see Hammond, Philip of Macedon for the suggestion that both Pausanias and Argaeus were 
sons of Archelaus (a suggestion which he originally made in A History of Macedonia pp175 and that Zý'. ) tl 
the Thracian king in question was Cotys. See previous chapter for a discussion of an earlier attempt on 
the throne by a man named Pausanias, in all likelihood the same person. On that occasion, it seem likely 
that his support came from Olynthus. 
7 See below for discussion. 
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to Amphipol, S. 8 This vote reflected the reawakening of Athenian aspirations to 
possession of Amphipolis and the decade preceding Philip's accession had seen the 
pursuit of this cause by Athens. Both Ptolemy and Perdiccas had, contrary to Amyntas' 
vote on the matter, 9 supported Amphipolitan resistance against Athenslo and in 
promoting a rival claimant to the throne, Athens was displaying worrying tendencies 
towards large scale interference in Macedonian affairs, evidently with the goal of 
furthering her own interests in the north. Like the threats from Illyria and Paeonia, a 
renewal of Athenian interest in Macedon did not bode at all well for the future. 
This chapter will examine how Philip, on his accession, set about stabilizing the 
situation in Macedon and took the first steps down a path which would ultimately lead 
him to a position of dominance in Greece, a position which in 360/59 must have seemed 
far beyond the grasp of any Macedonian king, whose primary goal was not hegemony, 
but survival. 
Securing Macedonian Survival and the Throne; 360/59-358/7. 
A plethora of problems faced Philip when he acceded to the throne in 360/5911 at the 
age of twenty three or four. 12 Of the assorted enemies ranged before him, perhaps the 
one which threatened Philip the most was the pressure of time. With the Illyrians 
already in possession of some temtory and massing on his borders, the Paeonians 
carrying out raids, the Thracians supporting one pretender and the Athenians another, 
invasion from one quarter or another must have seemed imminent. Philip, however, 
sorely needed a breathing space in which to firmly establish himself as king, call his 
panic stricken country to order, and decide which threat must be dealt with first. His 
first act on the throne was, therefore, to establish a practice for which his reign was to 
become notorious - bribery. 
13 
Plutarch records an anecdote in which Philip commented upon the use of bribery: 
8 Aeschines 2.32. See Chapter 3 for discussion. 
9 See Chapter 6 for discussion. 
10 See previous chapter for discussion. 
11 This is the date generally accepted by modern scholars for the beginning of Philip's reign. See M. B. 1-1) t: > t: 1 b Hatozopulos 1982 for a discussion of Philip's dates based on the information supplied by the Oleveni 
inscription. Some modern scholars (Hammond p23, for example) believe that Philip was appointed as a 
regent to the infant son of Perdiccas in 360/59, rather than having been acclaimed as king immediately. 
The positions of Griffith (pp208f), Cawkwell (pp27ff) and Borza (pp200f) seem more acceptable, 
however - they point out that the crisis situation in which Macedon found itself on Perdiccas' death 
called for a competent, adult king as opposed the a renewal of instability, as would potentially be caused Z13 
by having an infant king and a regent, and that Philip provided the necessary credentials. We might add C) Z: ) Z: ) 
that the troubled recent history of the royal house may have served to underline the necessity for a king 
who was capable of governing his family as well as his country - as Griffith puts it, "this was the moment 
for a man, and not for a collection of court cliques or factions scheming around a boy king. " (p208). It is 
significant that Philip's most vocal critic, Demosthenes, never accused Philip of having usurped the 
throne from a nephew. 
12 Justin 9.8.1 puts Philip's birth in 383 while Pausamas gives 382. z: 1 13 See Chapters 2 and 3 for other occasions on which bribery (or claims to having bribed a foe) surface in Z: ý 
the context of earlier Macedonian foreign policy. Alexander I claimed to have bribed Bubares with his 4: ý 
sister, Gygaea, although in fact their marriage appears rather to have been a facet of an alliance instead, 1=1 ZD -D 
and Perdiccas used his sister Stratonice to bribe his way out of the Thracian invasion of 429. It appears to 
have been Philip, however, who initiated the use of money - more accessible and, in his reign, plentiful, 
than royal women - as bait in foreign dealings. C) t: 1 
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(DPOý)PtOV 6C Tt PWOXOýLEVOq XC(PdV O'X'I)Pov, O)q ('x7rll77F-t?,, (Xv Ot K(X-C('x(Y'Kolrot 
X(Xi%F-7UO\V EIVOCI TE(XVr(X7t(XCTI K(X\t ('XV(X/ X(XXF-71 v olo-cco; 'kOYCOV, Vur9a" F- 0 
E(Y, rtv, co(TTF- ýLIJU OVOV 7rpoCyF_XOEjV XP'L)(Y'OV K%dý0VT(X. 
When he was desirous of capturing a certain stronghold, his scouts reported that 
it was altogether difficult and quite Impregnable, whereupon he asked if It were 
so difficult that not even an ass laden with gold could approach it. ("Sayings of 
Kings and Commanders, Philip the Father of Alexander", 14) 
In the situation in which he found himself on his accession, we might invert his remark 
and note that no country is ever so beset with foes that an ass laden with gold might not 
find its way out. While the threats posed by Athens and Illyria, whilst clearly pending in 
the near future, were both, it seems, subject to some delay ( that from Bardylis perhaps 
held up in the borderlands, which, it was argued in the previous chapter, may have been 
strongly loyal to Philip, and perhaps by the necessity of waiting for further troops, while 
that from Athens was presumably subject to the usual bureaucratic process which 
preceded and delayed any action and which Philip was to take ample advantage of later 
in his reign. ) those from Paeonia and Thrace could, Philip discovered, be deferred with 
cash. Diodorus 16.3.4 (still under the year 360/59) comments: 
Tcpoq 6p- rl(xl, ov(x; 6t(XT1PF-(5PE-OcT(, X[tEvoq Kat TOA); [tEv 6(OPF-(Xi; 6tmpktipaý, 
'UO")q 8' E'-n(x77EX't(xt; (Plk(XVOP(OnOt; nP-t(y(x; KCCU(X TO T[(XPOV F-IpllVlIV (x7F-lv 
TCP60; (X'Lb)Toil)q CTIOVFý-OETO. ORO1/(1)q 8F\- K(Xl\ To\v rl(x^ocyavt/ccv (, x7cE(7Tll(yE Til; 
K(XO08010, TO\v K(XT('x7F-tv RE'-XXOV'T(X P(X(TtkF-(X 8(L)PF-(Xi; 
The he sent an embassy to the Paeonians, and by corrupting some with gifts and 
persuading others with generous promises he made an agreement with them to 
maintain peace for the present. In similar fashion he prevented the return of 
Pausanias by winning over with gifts the king who was on the point of 
attempting his restoration. 
Griffith makes some rather drastic assumptions about the precise nature of the deal 
which Philip made with these kings. 
A little money and a lot of talk, this is probably what Philip's ambassadors 
carried with them to Paeonia and Thrace, the talk no doubt including promises, 
promises which would have been a great disgrace if they had ever been kept. 
Meanwhile, better to be disgraced than dead, or a fugitive from the kingdom. 
(p21 1) 
Quite what sort of disgrace Griffith had in mind is unclear, and in fact our sources offer 
us no material to feed speculation on the exact nature of the negotiations which took 
place. However, as we hear no more of Pausanias, we might guess at the agreement 
which Philip came to with the Thracian king who was supporting him, and suppose that 
Philip paid in whatever currency was available to him for the disappearance of his rival 
for the throne. As briefly noted above, the ease with which the Thracian king was 
detached from this affiliation suggests that his goals in the venture were either indistinct 
or ones which Philip himself could accommodate with relative ease. At any rate, 
whatever the precise nature of the arrangements which Philip was able to make with the 
Thracian and Paeonian kings, he was able to shelve the threats from these countries for 
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the immediate future, and turn his attention to the remaining aggressors - first Athens, 
and then 111yria. 
Athens was, in fact, the only state which struck out at Philip during these potentially 
explosive early years, in the curious episode surrounding the attempt on the throne by 
Argaeus. Diodorus 16.2.6 reports the despatch of an Athenian force in support of 
Argaeus' claim in the passage quoted above. 
4 The brevity of this notice, and that which tells of the arrival of Argaeus in Macedon , might give the impression that this episode was a minor one in Philip's early history. 
The numbers stated here, however, go some way towards proving that this was not the 
case, a point worth noting before we embark on a full discussion of the campaign. A 
force of three thousand hoplites was a sizeable one, and in addition to these and the 
46 considerable" naval force under Mantias, Diodorus 16.3.5 also records the presence of 
a mercenary force. The Athenian attempt to restore Argaeus to the throne should, 
therefore, be considered to represent a substantial Athenian intervention in Macedonian 
internal affairs at this point. 15 
Philip was quick to respond. 
OF-cop6)v yCtp ToxK 'Affilvmoloý unep coi) uýv 'A4(pinoXiv ('xvecKcA(YccaOccl 'Tljv 
7[äG(XV (PIXOTIýtt/ccv F-i(Y(PF-POýIF'-VOUý K(X%t Ötc'c coi)'UO KCCTCC-YOVT(Xý uov AP7cciov 
Ent Tliv ß(X(: ytxF-tccv EýF-X(ÜPYlcyF- 'Týý noxF-0)ý, 6(PF-tiý ocl), rljv 
()c 
-L) rov%L0V... 
M(xv-ciccý 8' 0 u(i)v 'AOllvcct'(t)v CYTP(XTII'YOý KUTMEXEUGUý Eliý MF-00)VIIV (Xiowý 
ýtev evT(xÜO(x xccTF'-ýtF-tvF-, u o\v 'Apy(xiov ÖF'- ýtp-Tc'c r(i)v ýtt00o(pop(Ov Ent' riký 
u'Vioý 5F'- 7upocyF-XOW\ v uj irOXF-t n(xpF--KC'Cý, F-t 'coi)ý E, _v ccciý 
Ai7cciý npo(yö£-'ý(xaO(xt v\Iv i«x'Ooöov Kcct 7eveaO(xt Tfiý (xi, ), roi) ß(xcytxet, ccý 
(XPXII-YO ý. oböev'ý 8' (X"CG) npoa, xovCoý ' ýt'v 'v' TI)v 11) 10 0 1. ) F- 0 F, CC EK(XýtlUTEV 91 
MEOCOV1IV, 0 89 (DUU7C7loý EIC1(PUVElý ýtEM CYTPCCTI(0'UO)V KUI MOV' CCW(Xý ýLoCXIIV 
7roxkoll)ý gF\-v C'CVF-iX9 T(i)V ýttGoo(pop(ov, Toll)ý ÖFE, x0t7C0, \oý Eiý UM ý, 0(Pov 
KCCT(X(PI)7 VT(xý ICOEY7Z0V501)ý ix(pýKEV, k(Xßc\ov 71(XP' (X1)T( V To\ 0 11) i) E0 uý ' 8(Xý. ýX, (pl, ), Y(x xtn7roý ýte, v 01)V T(XlÜ'TIIV 7[PCOTllv pýXXI1V vtxllcy(xý 
E 1) E 1) E (X i 0(XPEYEGTýpoloý F'-luoill(yg Toll)ý M(XKF-ÖOV(Xý IUP o\ý Toi ý ý(PEý% ý7(i)V(Xý. 
He observed that the Athenians were centring all their ambition upon trying to 
recover Amphipolis and for this reason were trying to bring Argaeus back to the 
throne, he voluntarily withdrew from the city after first making it 
autonomous.... 
Mantias, the Athenian general, who had sailed into Methone, stayed behind there 
himself but sent Argaeus with his mercenaries to Aegae. And Argaeus 
approached the city and invited the population of Aegae to welcome his return 
and become the founders of his own kingship. When no one paid any attention 
to him, he turned back to Methone, but Philip, who suddenly appeared with his 
soldiers engaged him in battle slew many of his mercenaries, and released the 
14 16.3-3-6, discussed below. 
15 A discussion of Athenian policy would be out of place here - however, it mentincy is perhaps worth com tl- 
that this Athenian intervention in Macedon might be thought of as mirroring and perhaps even responding C) C> C_ 
to the recent Thracian ratification of the rules of Alexander 11 and Ptolemy of Alorus (see previous 
chapter for discussion. ) Whilst this Athenian attempt was, it seems., connected to more far reaching plans 
to further their interests in the north (see below) and Thebes apparently had no such long term agenda, 
both states may be thought of as attempting to show-case military and political superiority through this C, C> C. ) 
intrusive foreign policy. Both attempts are indicative of a perception of Macedon as weak and politically C) III 
unstable in contemporary Greece. 
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rest under a truce the rest, who had fled for refuge to a certain hill, after he had 
first obtained from them the exiles, whom they delivered to him. Now Philip by 
his success in this first battle encouraged the Macedonians to meet the 
succeeding contests with greater temerity. (Diodorus 16-3.3-7) 
As pointed out above, in spite of its brevity, this episode constitutes an important 
moment in Macedonian history. Several points may be made in comment upon it. 
Firstly, we might note that Philip's decision to renounce all claim to Amphipolls was 
important on two counts - it showed that he took the threat from Athens very seriously 
indeed (as well he might, given the size of the Athenian force and the recent instability 
of the throne) and, casting an eye to the future, it was to establish a negative reputation 
for him in Athens, given that a mere two years later he besieged it. By doing so, he was 
to earn the lifelong mistrust of Athens, a point which, although secondary at the 
moment of his renunciation of the claim to Athens, was to have drastic effects upon his 
later foreign policy. 
The fact that Athens was not content to abandon her support of Argaeus in return for 
Philip's abandonment of claims to Amphipolis throws some light upon the question of 
Athenian goals in the endeavour to install Argaeus on the throne. Heskel 16 offers the 
following two reasons for this: 
It is... evident that despite Philip's efforts at appeasement, the Athenians 
proceeded to send forces to Macedonia as originally planned. Polyainos 
indicates why: Philip did not "give back" Amphipolis to Athens; rather, he left it 
autonomous. The Athenians wanted him not only to withdraw his troops from 
Amphipolis but to restore the city to their control as well. But that was not the 
Athenians' only demand. They also wanted Methone returned to them. Philip 
had not offered to hand it over because it was a major harbour and crucial to 
Macedonian security. Since the king had not proved completely compliant, the 
Athenians decided to replace him with someone who would be. (p46) 
In spite of the use of the word apodidomi by Polyaenos in this context) 17 with its 
connotations of return ( the implication here being the return to rightful ownership), 
some caution is required in approaching the issue of Philip's position regarding 
Amphipolis here. The fact is that when Amyntas voted for Athens' light to Amphipolis, 
the city was not in fact his to deliver, but was autonomous, 18 as it had been since its loss 
to Athens during the Peloponnesian war. 19 Amyntas voted, not to hand the city over, but 
in ratification of Athens' right to attack it. Athens could hardly demand that Philip hand 
over a city which was not, in fact, his, and thus the only concession which Philip could 
in fact have made was the one he did make - to withdraw his support for Amphipolitan 
resistance to Athens. 
The case of Methone was rather different. Methone was within Macedonian territory 
(although it had always shown inclinations towards Athenian sympathieS20). While it is 
16 1996 
Strategems 4.2.17. 
18 See Chapter 5 for discussion. 
19 Discussed in Chapter 3. 
20 See for example Chapter 33 for a discussion of the invasion of Sitalces and the proposed Athenian 
contribution from Methone. 
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true, as Heskel points out, that Philip did not hand Methone over to Athens, equally 
there is no ancient evidence that suggests that any such request was made to him. Some 
Athenian interest in Methone, however, is apparent from the fact that Mantias chose it 
as his base. Indeed, the very fact that Athens was able to use it as a base at all strongly 
indicates that Philip had little or no influence there, while Athens, by contrast, was a 
strong presence. 
As far as we can see, then, Philip was entirely compliant with Athenian wishes on the 
eve of the incursion in support of Argaeus. Why then did Athens pursue Ar gaeus' cause 
and, to return to an earlier point, commit a sizeable force of both ships and hoplites to 
it? 
The manner in which the episode unfolded, as recounted by Diodorus 16-3.3-6 sheds 
some light upon these questions. The division of the forces, the mercenaries and 
Argaeus making for Aegae while Mantias and the hoplites and fleet remained in 
Methone, is cunous and supports the notion that Methone might indeed have been a 
primary object in Athens' pursuit of the affair, in spite of our rejection of the idea that a 
request was made by Athens for the actual handing over of Methone by Philip. Indeed, 
any such handing over would have been redundant - it is clear that the relationship between Athens and Methone was already intimate enough for Methone to receive the 
Athenian fleet without it having been an Athenian "possession" in any formal sense. 21 
We might note that, once in Macedon, Athenian support of Argaeus was half-hearted to 
say the least. He was sent off alone to Aegae to proclaim a triumphal return - when no 
uprising greeted him, he lacked either the manpower or the courage of his convictions 
to enforce his claim there and somewhat sheepishly turned back towards Methone. En 
route., he and his force were met by Philip and his army, and after a skirmish in which 
many mercenaries were killed, the rest surrendered Argaeus and, presumably, an inner 
core of his supporters. 22 
We might reasonably question why it was that Mantias and his hoplites did not come to 
the rescue of Argaeus and the mercenaries, either when no welcome was offered to 
21 Heskel makes the followinc, suu-jestion as to the intentions of the force under Mantias: C) Z: )ý 
Topographical considerations raise the possibility that there was another element in the 
Athenians' strategy that Diodorus does not mention. As a result of the silting up of the coast ZI) 
since antiquity, it is easy to overlook the fact that in 360 one could sail from Methone to Pella 
via Lake Ludias. This voyage, approximately thirteen and a half sea miles, could have been C, 
made in a few hours, whereas the forty or so miles by land would have been a two day march. 
Since speed would have been of paramount importance, we may speculate that Mantias 
originally had intended to sail directly to Pella rather than march there via Aegae; at Pella he t) Z-) 
would meet up with Argaios, who was to collect additional force along the way. (p47) 
While this suggestion ought not to be entirely ruled out as a possibility, it is worth recalling the points : _ýZ: ) Z: ) 11111. ý 
made in Chapter 4, where Archelaus' moti for relocating the capital were discussed. It was pointed out ves 
there that according to Greenwalt's detailed discussion of 1999 the river from Lake Ludias to the sea was zD 
easily defensible, even by an essentially land based force, because of the comparative narrowness of the 
river and the fact that it was difficult to navicyate due to frequently shifting sandbanks. Lake Ludias itself L, Z: ý 
was apparently defended by a military installation which extended into the water. If indeed the original 
plan was, then, for Mantias to take the fleet up river to Pella, it would no doubt have been abandoned 
once a reconnaissance had been made. 
22 Diodorus 16-3.6 speaks of To-os (pi), y(1X5(xs, indicating that Argaeus was not the only "exile" to be 
delivered to Philip. 
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Argaeus at Aegae or when they were under attack from Philip's men. Greek history 
might have taken a dramatically different form had Mantias and three thousand hopl1tes 
appeared in Philip's rear during the battle with the mercenaries. But no such assistance t: ) 
for Argaeus appeared, and one explanation might be that, having secured Philip's 
withdrawal from Amphipolis and re-established contact with Methone - the exact 
events of Mantias' stay in Methone are unclear, but the presence of such a large force 
there seems to indicate that pressure of some sort was being brought to bear on the city 
- the Athenians no longer had any need of Argaeus. If this was indeed the case - and no 
other explanation readily presents itself for either the division of the force or the lack of 
support offered to Argaeus by Mantias when his attempt floundered, we must modify 
the interpretation of the affair presented by Heskel. While it seems unwise to consider 
the affair to have been an insignificant one in Macedonian history, as the dismissive 
treatment of it in some modem sources seems to imply, 23 neither is it acceptable to 
consider this episode to have constituted a potential Athenian invasion of Macedon, 
following Heskel's argument. It appears that the Athenian objectives were fairly well 
defined - to enhance the position regarding Amphipolls and to increase the Athenian 
presence in Macedon, either by installing a puppet king or by increasing the bond with 
Methone. With both the first and the last of these objectives secured without requiring 
the added effort of replacing Argaeus on the throne, the Athenians had no qualms about 
surrendering him to Philip's tender mercies. 
Griffith neatly summarises the probable fate of Argaeus: "What became of Argaeus we 
are not told, but we -can guess. " (p212). Indeed, as Argaeus is not mentioned again by 
our sources and was caught red-handed by Philip in an attempt upon the throne, it seems 
more than likely that this episode saw the end of his non-too-bnlllant career in 
Macedonian politics. 
Philip's release of the remaining mercenaries is noteworthy and should be interpreted as 
yet a further placatory gesture towards Athens. Thus far in Philip's reign, at no point 
had he done anything to oppose Athens, whilst Athens had gone so far as to support a 
pretender against him - as Borza comments "it surely must have stuck in the young 
king's mind that the first Greeks to oppose him at the moment of his accession were 
Athenian. " (p201). The ill will he bore to Athens over the episode, however, was slow 
to show itself. Diodorus 16.4.1, under the year 359/8 reports that his subsequent contact 
with the city was once again to make a placatory gesture: 
In' c"cpXovroq 8' 'AOTlv-q(ytv Ei')Xapiarou 'Po)ýtcdtot ýttv K(xTccyrll(yccv 1, )Ir(xTol-)q 
K(t)tv, uov IF-pouitXtov Kcc\t Kotvrov FF-vobictov- E'-7r't 5F'- ro'Or(Ov o (DtxtTcTcoq 
TcpFý-(Tpaq E'-KiTF'4tW(x; F-1; 'AOllv(xq F'-'IEF-t(YF, TO\V 6ý[WV F--'LPIJV'qV TCPO\q CC'I')rO\V 
G-ovOE'(30(xt 6icc uo\ [til6E\v F'-, r-L npoanotdaOat rýv'AR(ptinoktv. 
When Eucharistas was archon at Athens, the Romans elected as consuls Quintus 
Servilius and Quintus Genucius. During their term of office Philip sent 
ambassadors to Athens and persuaded the assembly to make peace with him on 
the ground that he abandoned for all time any claim to Amphipolis. 
See for example Griffith, who comments that "the attempt of Argaeus was a small affair in itself, and 0 
its military details merit small attention"(p2l I). Most scholars are brief on the episode and do not offer 
discussion of the Athenian motivations behind the attack. 
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The conclusion of this peace marked the closure of the first round of hostilities between 
Athens and Philip. It also left Phillp free to turn his attention to the states which had 
threatened Macedon on his accession and which remained to be dealt with. 
In this endeavour Philip was, as so often happened during his reign, assisted by good 
luck and by his own natural Inclination to take advantage of whatever opportunity luck 
sent his way. Diodorus 16.4.2 (359/8) continues: 
emok-00eitý ÖE' Tob np o\ý 'Affilvatoloý 7rok, £'-ýto-L) Km ni, )v0(xvo4F-voý Tov 
ß(xcitý, £'-(x T(i)v 1-1(xiOvo)v'Ay1V TS'UZXF, 1)TllKF-V(XI 'K(Xtp0\ V E', xEtV 
Toiý I-1(Xt'oatv. cTPUTEloGaý ouv stý Ti\IV 1-1(Xlovt, (XV K(X\t lu(XP(XT('XýEt 
, coi. ) (xpolL)ý VI'KIIEY(Xý IIVCC'YK(XCYE TO Fi-, Ovoý 7[FIO(XPXgiv To% M(XKFÖOCYIV. ý ß(Y-Pß, 
Now that he was relieved of the war with the Athenians and had information that 
the king of the Paeonians, Agis, was dead, he conceived that he had the 
opportunity to attack the Paeonians. Accordingly, having conducted an 
expedition into Paeonia and defeated the barbarians in a battle, he compelled the 
tribes to acknowledge allegiance to the Macedonians. 
The death of Agis had come at a perfect moment for Philip. With Argaeus and probably 
also Pausanias dead, he was free of threats from pretenders and was therefore secure on 
the throne. The conclusion of peace with Athens meant that he was also secure from 
incursion from that quarter. The death of the Paeonian king and the consequent 
weakening of the Pdeonian kingdom offered Philip a perfect opportunity to field his 
new model army for the first time. 24 
Diodorus does not inform us of the particulars of this campaign, and we know only that 
Philip was successful in defeating the neighbours who, on his accession, had been 
plundering Macedonian territory. Neither is Diodorus specific on what settlement was 
reached following the defeat - we may safely assume, however, that no new Paeonian 
king was installed and that from then on, the Paeonians were obliged to recognise 
Macedonian sovereignty and that their land was absorbed into Philip's domain. 
The lesser foes having been defeated, then, Philip turned his attention and his arrny, 
flush with the victory over Paeonia, to the greater ones. The Illyrians had, as noted 
above, remained in possession of some Macedonian territory and had dealt a severe 
blow to Macedonian morale in the battle in which Perdiccas had fallen. Since then their 
forces had been massing on Philip's borders. Diodorus 16.4.3-7 informs us of the 
outcome of the encounter between Philip and Bardylis (359/8): 
c 1)IzokF-1710ýtF'-V(ÜV ÖE 7to; ýEýtt'ü)V TÜN 1; ýk'OPI(i)V F, -(ptkoTtýLF-iT0 KM TouToi)ý 
'K(XT(X7EOXF-ýtj(Y(Xt. 9,0,011)ý 01)v (YI)V(x7(X7(OV EK-Kkilat'ccv KM Tol-)ý CYTP(XTI(OT(Xý 
otKetotý ; ý07otg npoTPF-Vaýtevoý etý To\V noý, F-ýtov F-, cyTpocTF-1. )CYF-V Etý -u-rjv -C(OV 
'IXXI)Pt(i)V x(J)pocv, neýOll)ý ýtF\-v F, -, X(ov 0-o"K ýLuptcov, tn71F-iý 
5F\- 
Fc\ (1)IX'tlz7101, ) ýLEM T(OV (xpt(YTCOV IIPCOI'KWý (X'«3)VI(5(XýLEVOI) -ýUKOGioUg... 
TO£) 89 
(Yl)VIIV(X7K(XcyOll To 71xýOoý Ti-bv lk; ý")plo)v 7[Poý (P-L)7I1V opýt-q(T(X-u. YF-VoýIF-Vilý 
Týý 814E0)ý 2-, 711 Tcoki)v Toltov 'K(XI 7uOkx(i)V K(XT(\x T\ liv (pu711v 
(XV(XIPF-OF-'VT(t)V 0 ýt F\-V ('XV(XK(X2. ECY('X4F-VOý -cý (: y(, xknlyyt Toi. )ý 
M(XKF-ÖOV(Xý KM CY'UII(Y(Xý CPOTC(Xtov e'0(XYF-V Vi)v iÖtü)V Toi)ý TETF-XF--0'T'9'KOTCCý, 
01 8' 'IXX'Uploi 81(XnpF-CißF-1, )cyc, cýIF-VOI KM Vi)v MCC'KF-ÖovtK(i)V 7Z0, ý. F-(. ÜV nCCG(i)V 
24 See below for discussion of the military innovations made by Philip towards the beginning of his reign. C) -- Cý 
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wol* 
, 
QPF-011CY(XV 5E 'C6)V IXX-Opt(OV EV F-KX(I)PIJCYOCVTF-q ETIOXOV -Cllq EtpIlVllq. (XVI 
Y nnXEtO-L); T6)V E'7ET(XKtCYXt t(J)V. L Xi 
X, 
Since the Illyrians were still left as enemies, he was ambitious to defeat them in 
war also. So, having quickly called an assembly and exhorted his soldiers to war 
in a fitting speech, he led an expedition into the Illyrian territory, having no less 
than ten thousand foot soldiers and six hundred horsemen... Philip with the 
flower of his troops fought with true heroism, [and] the mass of the Illyrians was 
compelled to take hastily to flight. When the pursuit had been kept up for a 
considerable distance and many had been slain in their flight, Philip recalled the 
Macedonians with a trumpet and erecting a trophy of victory buried his own 
dead, while the Illyrians, having sent ambassadors and withdrawn from all the 
Macedonian cities, obtained peace. But more than seven thousand Illyrians were 
slain in this battle. 
In winning this victory, Philip had successfully cleared his kingdom of all the threats 
which had loomed over it on his accession, throwing the very survival of his kingdom 
into doubt. Diodorus 16.8.1 states that Philip now entered into a long term agreement 
with Bardylis and we might assume that this occasion saw the first of the several 
marriage alliances which Philip was to enter into during his reign, that with Audata, a 
close female relative of Bardylls. Each of the enemies which had threatened Macedon 
on Philip's accession had been negated, and Philip could turn his attention to a change 
in the tone of his foreign policy. 
Philip's Military Reforms 
Before we turn our attention to the shift from defensive to aggressive foreign policy 
which marked the coming years, we must pause for a brief examination of the military 
innovations which made such a step possible. To do so, we will consider the changes to 
the army which Philip made in the early years, the success of which was to form the 
keystone of the course of his future foreign policy. Diodorus' account, although brief 
and not especially detailed, is enlightening: 
01 E0 ec F- pxXil al, )g(POP(xv Km (X 0 F- m(X-KF-ö' veý 51 ' re Tljv 'v 'rý 81, T -YF-00ý TG)v 
c71i(PF-PoýLF-VCOV Ktv8-L)VCOV ev (xnopt(X TI 11 
TIIXII<Oll)T(1)V (Poß(OV xcc\t Ktv81, )vcov F-(pgcyTO)T(ov 0 (I)txt7U7C0ý TO 
ýt9, YE0oý TG)v IZPOCYÖOKCOýtl£-'VO)V 59tv(i)V, 6U6 Toi)ý M(X'KEÖOV(Xý F'-V GI, )VF-xe, -cytv 
(Yl, )VF-'X(J)v K(X\t Tfi TO£) Xo'YO1-) 5F-tvoTilT1 IZPOTPF-7coýtevoý eitt TIIV 
(XV8PF-1(XV F-100apaeiý F'-notll(JF-, v\xý öE mpaTtcoTtwaý T(, xýF-tg £, -7Et, To\ KpEtTTOV 
8topocoG('Xýtevoý xal Toi)ý (XV8paý 'Coiý luoxp-ýttxoiý o'ný. Olý öF-OVTCOý 
Ko(yýUlaccý, cyl)VF-XF-iý F-ýOIZXUGt'(Xý K(Xt\ -yl. )ýtv(mytaý F-V(x7(OV-uo")ý F-7rotF-1'TO. 
F-TEF-VO, ncyF- ÖE KM Tiv Týý (P(, xxcc^fyoý IZ*1)KVO'TTIT(X 'K(XI K(XT(XCYKF-1)Ilv, 
PWn(yaýIF, Voý rov F-v Tpotgc cCov ilpc't)cov cyov(x(: Yntcyýtov, Km npa)Toý 
CYI)VF-CY'ZII(: YCCTO Viv M(XKF-ÖovtKl\lv (P(, XX(x7, Y(x. E-V 59 TC(ilý oýU; Ualý llpo(: yllvljý AV 
KM ÖtoC TF, T(i)V 80)PF-(i)V KM T(i)V Ellr(X^YYF-ý, t6)V Etý Týv ýtE'Y'tGT1IV F-1)VOI(xv T(\x 
Icklioll IrpollYET0, lZpoý TE To\ 71; ýýooý T(i)V F-7U1(PF-Poýte'_VCOV Ktv81)V(ov VokToxwý 
5- (XVTF-ýLllx(xv(XTO. 
The Macedonians because of the disaster sustained in the battle [against Bardylis 
in 360/59] and the magnitude of the dangers pressing in upon them were In the 
greatest perplexity. Yet even so, with such fears and dangers threatening them, C) t: ) Philip was not panic stricken by the magnitude of the expected perils, but, 
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bringing the Macedonians together in a series of assemblies and exhorting them 
with eloquent speeches to be men, he built up their morale, and having improved 
the organisation of his forces and equipped the men suitably with weapons of 
war, he held constant manoeuvres of the men under arms and competitive drills. 
Indeed he devised the compact order and the equipment of the phalanx, imitating 
the close order fighting with overlapping shields of the warriors at Troy, and was 
the first to organise the Macedonian phalanx. He was courteous in his 
intercourse with men and sought to win over the multitudes by his gifts and his 
promises to the fullest loyalty, and endeavoured to counteract by clever moves 
the crowd of impending dangers. (16.3.1-3) 
Diodorus covers a multitude of changes to the Macedonian army in this short passage, 
all of which conspired to make it, by the end of Philip's life, the best in the Greek 
world. A brief discussion of these changes at this point in our study of Philip, when the 
initial benefits of these improvements were beginning to emerge in the early defeats of 
the Paeonians and Bardylis, will illuminate how these changes came about and will lay 
the foundations for the remaining discussion of Philip's foreign policy, which was 
characterised (with few, though noteworthy, exceptions) by unprecedented military 
success as a result of the ongoing maturation of these reforms. 
Our discussion of these improvements will be divided into three parts, beginning with 
that reform which is the easiest to quantify - the improvement in military equipment. 
To date, infantry battles in Greece had been fought in a manner which had undergone 
only minor changes in equipment since Homeric times - that is, that is, the standard 
Greek hoplite was equipped with a shield and a spear, consisting of a shaft and an iron 
head and designed for stabbing. This standard equipment for the Greek infantry and, 
with a slightly modified, smaller shield, cavalry, enlightens us, to some degree, as to 
what the method of fighting in a standard battle would be. 25 When Diodorus speaks here 
of the "equipment of the phalanx, " it may be safely assumed that he is referring to the 
introduction of the weapon for which the armies of both Philip and Alexander were to 
become famous - the sarissa. 
26 This pike, said by TheophrastuS27 to have been up to 
eighteen feet long and by AsclepiodotuS28 never to have been shorter than fifteen feet 
long, by necessity revolutionised the method by which both the cavalry and infantry 
functioned 
'29requiring also a closely packed formation and a highly amalgamated force. The great length of the sarissa and the fact that it required two hands to wield it 30 meant 
25 A plethora of modern sources exist upon the subject of the hoplite battle and how it was fought. Some 
extremely helpful discussions can be found in H. Van Wees (1994), P. Krentz (1985), G. L. Cawkwell, 
(1989) and War and Violence in Ancient Greece (2000 ed. H. van Wees), especially Hanson's article 
(pp201-232) "Hoplite Battle as Ancient Greek Warfare". 
2 See Theophrastus Hist. P1 3.12.2, Asclepiodotus Tact. 5.5, Aelian 12 and Arrian Tact. 12.7. The 
statements of these ancient authors are supported by the archaeological evidence regarding the sarissa - Zý zn Zý 
see for example M. Andronicus (1970) for the publication of a sarissa head from Vergina. M. Markle C) 
(1977) provides the definitive study of the likeliest dimensions and method of construction of the sarissa, 
and in a subsequent article (1978) discusses its use by the army. 
27 Hist. P1.3.1 " -21 28 Tact. 5.1. 
29 Although see M. Markle (1978) for the suggestion that the sarissa was not, in fact, used by the cavalry 
until late in Philip's reign, making its debut at the battle of Chaeronaea in 338. r-I Cý 30 M. Markle 1977 pp323f for the existence of a butt spike, which served as a counter-balance to the heavy 
sarissa head and to implant the pike in the ground to ward off an enemy charge, a manoeuvre which CI C-1 
would undoubtedly have required the use of both of the infantry man's hands, and, p 326 for the assertion 
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that a phalanx wielding sanssas would have been highly dependent upon close 
formation for defence and would have needed to maintain excellent discipline and order 
during fighting. Along with the new equipment, then, it seems likely that Philip 
introduced a new formation and a new, far higher, degree of discipline, as shall be 
discussed below. 
The cavalry had traditionally formed a highly important element of the Macedonian 
fighting force. 31 In addition to altering the formation of the infantry, it seems likely too C) I 
that Philip made a drastic and highly successful change to the formation of the cavalry, 
as Griffith pointed out, also clearly identifying the benefits of such a change: 
The "wedge formation" is said to have been invented by the Scythians and the 
Thracians, and then taken up by the Macedonians as more effective than the 
square formation because the front of the wedge tapers just as it does in the 
rhombus formation, of which the wedge is one half. This makes it easier for 
them to break through the enemy, as well as throwing forward the officers in 
front of the rest. It also made far easier wheeling than in square formation, 
because every man kept his eyes fixed on the one leader, the ilarch, "as happens 
in the flight of cranes. " Thus Asclepiodotus 32 and Aelian adds that it was "Philip 
of Macedon" who introduced the wedge formation. 33 There is no reason to doubt 
this, really. Though we are never given a description of the cavalry in action 
under Philip, as it happens we can see that in the first important battle (Bardylis) 
and again in his last (Chaeronaea), he overcame the problem of "breaking 
through" an enemy in a defensive position, the cavalry each time clinching the 
victory. The wedge formation may have been among the innovations of Philip's 
first year. (pp413-4) 
Griffith's supposition here that this change in the formation of the cavalry was amongst 
the first of Philip's innovations is tacitly, though not directly, supported by the sources. 
The fact that, as we saw above in Diodorus' detailed account of the battle between 
Philip and Bardylis, the sides were evenly matched, and yet that Philip managed to 
outflank that enemy and win a resounding victory, suggests that already at this early 
stage in his military development, he had a tactical advantage of some kind over the 
Illyrians. While several explanations of this advantage and the subsequent victory are, 
of course, possible, the emphasis placed by Diodorus on the role of the cavalry might, 
as Griffith notes, be interpreted as implying that this advantage lay with them. 
Having touched upon the introduction of new arms and new formatIons within both the 
infantry and cavalry wings of the Macedonian army, we might move on to briefly 
discuss the broader social implications in Macedon of Philip's innovations. Even the 
briefest review of Philip's career cannot fall to point up one very striking element in it, 
that being that from his accession in 360/59 until his death in 336, the king and his army 
(an ever increasing army at that, if Diodorus' figures of ten thousand infantry and six 
that, as both hands were occupied with the sarissa, a shield would have to have been Munro, from around 
the infantryman's neck. 
31 See for example Chapter 2 for the effective use of a comparatively small cavalr, ý agal I Sitalces' 
massive invading army. Z-- 32 7.3. 
33 Aelian Tact. 18.4. 
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hundred cavalry in 360/5 93" and twenty four thousand infantry and three thousand three 
35 hundred cavalry under Alexander in 334) are to be believed) were almost constantly on 
campaign. The social implications of this massive increase in and constant use of the 
Macedonian army are large. This increase in number must have been partly due to the 
increase in Macedon's territory under Philip 36 _ however, it seems unavoidably true that Philip must have been raising levies of men to serve in his army from throughout his 
kingdom. Given that Diodorus, in the passage quoted above, makes specific mention of 
ongoing training, and that, as pointed out above, the introduction of the sarissa would 
have rendered such training fundamental to the success of the army, we may only 
conclude that the men levied for the new army would have had to have been almost 
constantly in barracks, always available for training and for Philip's constant 
campaigns. 
When addressing his rebellious troops at Opis, Alexander made the following speech 
regarding his father's changes in Macedon. 
Kal 7[P(OT(x 76 WCO (DikiltirOIL) To'L) 7taTPO jn7rEp K(Xl EtKo;, Tob ko7o-L) 
ap4o[tat. (DikiTuro; 7(\xp napakapobv 1)[LCxq 7rk(xvllTcc; K(Xt' O'c7copo"); q E'V 6t(POEP(XI; TOIL)q 7COkk0l, ); VE'-ýLOVMq O'CVC\t T& O'pll IEPOP(XT(X O'kl7(X KCCI IXCEP 
TOA')TCOV K(XK(oq ývxxogtvouq 'Ikkl)Ptoiq -K(X\t Tp-LP(XkXOi; 'K(X\t TOi; OROPOt; 
Opq4tVq X/k(XRL)60C; g6V UgiV O'CVTI TCOV 6t(pOF-p6V (POPP-iV E"6(OICF-Vg K(XTT'17(Y7F- 
6F\- E, K rcov O'Pcov F'-q C(\x IEF-61(X, cc4l%mxolj; ICCCT(X(TT1j(y(x; Tolý 7rpocyxcopot; 
, r6)V P(Xppccp(ov, (0; R) X(OPt'(OV z"'Cl o'Xl. )POTIJTI Tcl(yrF-I)OVT(X; ýLakxov ý Qc Til 
OIKF-I'(X (')CPF-Tl- CK/42-00M, 7COXF-0)V TE Ot'Ki'TOP()Cq ('X7CE'-(PlIVF- K(Xt' VO[tOt; Kcct 
cI "Oeal XP 6 0(7[til(TEV. 1) ap(ov, -o(P (OV -qcycoiq , X, cc''rcov 8E E'KEt'V(I)V 'TCOV P(XPP' 
cc 
TIPOGOEV /7E(TOE K(Xl\ E, -(PEPF-(TOE (XI)TOt TE K(xl Vx lL4tETF-P(X, 117EROv(y-ý 11 c K(XTECFTII(YEV EK 80'L)X(I)V K(Xt 1-)Itllxo(l)v, K(x\t rýq E)pc'cKlIq T(\x TEAVY. Tfi 
M(XKE80vi(x 7UPO(TE011KEV, K(Xl\ 'TCOV F'-711' 0O. &TTI \I n xcopt(, )v Ta E7ttKcctpoT(xT(x 
K(XT(XX(XPOREvoq TIjV EýVcopl(xv Tj kx(ov rl'lv n x(, )Pg (XVF-7[ET(X(TF-, K(Xl TOW [t E CC cc&-ý iTotp'cFXF,, E)F-(5(5(xkCov 8\ " C\ , koct "EF-OV 6P7ccGl(xv F- F- (XPXOVT(xq, 0I)q Im E il-KF-ITE 
, rco 6E, F-t, (, XT1z, (PljVF-, Kcct To\ (1)(OKE'(ov E'-'Ovoq Twcavcoacc; c)v ýq rýv cEU68a I 'n 
F- 71 
JTccpo6ov 7c/, kcV[F-i(XV lccc\L E^'OTCOPOV C, CVTI (Y'TEvllq rF- Kal alropol) I)Rtv ETEOIII(TEV, 
'AO, qvcctol, )q u, K(x\t O'TJP(Xt'Ol, )q E-'(PF, 8pFI, )OV'T(Xq ('XFl\ 'Uý M(XKE60Vt'(X E'; TOGOV& 
c3 olovaov, (oq CCVTI Tou F, T(XJTEI'V(0(5EV, 11'811 'C(xf)Tc'c 7F- MA 1'1[tCOV (XIACO 4'OWCOv ' 
(pOpo'k)q TF-XF-iv 'AOllv(xt'O'L; K(XL lcL)TC(XK01)EtV E)71PU. I(t)V, lr(Xp' CR6V E-'V TCO gF-, PEI 
1 
71 
1 F-Icelvo-L); ET\lv (, X(Y(P(, XXE-I(, Xv (T(Ptcyt Tloplýuyoat. E-'; r10,07lowiluov 8E\ TC(XPF-ko(\I)v 
Vx EKd CCA) E-'KO(Y[tll(TF- K(XI T17ERCOV (XVrOKPCCT(Op (FI)RTCCCC711; 'Ell; OCXXIJ; 
Ic 'EkVx8o; ('xiro8F-tXOF-L; Tfi; E'-ir\t ro\v I-IF'-p(T-ov (5, Tp(xriu-; 01OX tavup ýL&Xkov TI 
64(XV T'V5E -' T6 KOIVCO T&)V MCCK66OV(OV ICPOCYE-'OII-KF-V. TTJV 50 71 91 
I shall begin my speech with Philip, my father, as is only fair. Philip took you 
over when you were helpless vagabonds, mostly clothed in skins, feeding a few 
animals on the mountains and engaged in their defence in unsuccessful fighting 
with Illyrians, Triballians and the neighbouring Thracians. He gave you cloaks 
to wear instead of skins, he brought you down from the mountains to the plains; 
he made you a match in battle for the barbarians on your borders, so that you no 
longer trusted for your safety to the strength of your positions so much as to 
your natural courage. He made you city dwellers and established the order that 
comes from good laws and customs. It was due to him that you became masters 
and not slaves and subjects of those very barbanans who used previously to 
34 Diodorus 16.4.3. 
35 Diodorus 17.17.3 ff. 
36 See below and following chapter for discussion. 
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plunder your possessions and carry off your persons. He annexed the greater part 
of Thrace to Macedonia and, by capturing the best placed positions by the sea, 
he opened up the country to trade, he enabled you to work the mines in safety, 
he made you the rulers of the Thessalians, who in the old days made you dead 
with terror; he humbled the Phocian people and gave you access into Greece that 
was broad and easy instead of being narrow and hard. The Athenians and 
Thebans were always lying in wait to attack Macedonia; Philip reduced them so 
low, at a time when we were actually sharing in his exertions, that instead of our 
paying tribute to the Athenians and taking orders from the Thebans it was we in 
our turn who gave them security. He entered the Peloponnese and there too he 
settled affairs, and his recognition as leader with full powers over the whole of 
the rest of Greece in the expedition against the Persians did not perhaps confer 
more glory on himself than on the commonwealth of the Macedonians. (Arrian 
Anabasis 7.9.2-6) 
Whilst this speech was not, of course, a verbatim rendition of Alexander's words but 
those attributed to him by Arrian, and while this passage is generalised and somewhat 
exaggerated, the gist of the speech in nonetheless interesting and relevant to our 
discussion here. Its implication is clear - that it was Philip who focused the necessary 
energies on the Macedonian army and made innovation which rendered Macedon, like 
Sparta, a martial society, where a major national occupation and preoccupation was the 
training for and pursuit of war. This, perhaps more than the technical innovations to 
equipment and formation, was partly responsible for the devastating efficiency of 
Philip's army. Thirdly and lastly, we might briefly consider a factor which is far harder 
to quantify than the innovations in equipment and training discussed above, and yet 
which clearly emerges from Diodorus' summary of the reasons behind Philip's success 
- that is, his own character. 
Both Philip and Alexander seem to have been endowed with an unidentifiable quality 
which gave them the ability to win the unquestioning loyalty of their men. This 
particular aspect of Philip's command is almost impossible to discuss in historical 
terms 37 but his personal charm and affability are mentioned by many ancient sources, 
the most renowned evidence of his ability to persuade and convince being documented 
at some length by the court case between Aeschines and Demosthenes. In Diodorus' 
discussion of Philip's changes to his army, evidence of this factor is clearly discernible 
in the fact that in the panic which ensued following the initial defeat- by Bardylis in 
360/59, Philip was able to calm his terror-stricken troops, lead them back to battle with 
the same enemy a mere two years later, and win a definitive victory. The examples of 
Philiý's skill in leadership are so plentiful that no detailed discussion can be attempted 
here, 8 however, this factor ought not to be discounted from a general consideration of 
the massive changes which Philip's army underwent on Philip's accession. 
On the whole, then, it seems that we should consider this early period of Philip's reign 
to have been a period of significant military innovation. As pointed out above, these 
changes ought not to be thought of as happening, as it were, in one fell swoop; however, 
their introduction early in Philip's reign and their subsequent development ought to be 
thought of as responsible for the notable improvement in Macedon's security and Z: ) 
military presence which Philip's accession initiated. In the context of his foreign policy, 
37 Although see Cawkwell 1981 for a helpful attempt to do so. 
38 For a thought provoking discussion of the issues of leadership and discipline, see Carney 1986. L- Z: ) II 
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one area in which this development was especially noteworthy was in his dealing with 
Athens. 
The Elimination of Athenian Influence in the North 
Philip's relationship with Athens inevitably forms a key part of any discussion of his 
reign, largely because of the Athenocentiic, ty of our sources, -)9 but also because 
Athens, as a naval power, was essentially the only Greek state which had both the 
means and the will to attempt to exploit the perceived weakness of Macedon in the early 
years of Philip's reign, an interest which we have briefly examined above in our 
discussion of Athens' continued interest in Amphipolis and Methone and her 
promotion, half hearted though it ultimately was, of Argaeus' attempt on the throne. 
A brief resume of Athens' recent history, however, clearly illustrates that, objectively 
speaking, Athens was in fact in no position to be harbouring empirical designs upon 
northern cities - in fact, she was hard pressed to keep those allies which she had. The 
painful and unrewarding conflict in Greece which culminated in 362 with the battle of 
Mantinaea 40 had taken a heavy toll on Athenian manpower, whilst soon after Philip's 
accession a new struggle broke out, the three year Social War 41 which cost Athens 
Chios, Cos, Rhodes and Byzantium. If Athens had any hope of restoring her powerbase 
in the north, alternative ports and allies would have to be found, and her interest in 
Potidaea, Methone and Amphipolis early in Philip's reign ought to be connected with a 
desire to maintain and, if possible, increase her influence in the area of the Thermaic 
Gulf. 
The ancient evidence suggests that Philip was aware of this trend and devoted all his 
energies to resisting it. The focus of our discussion of the period following Philip's 
initial stabilisation of Macedon will be to examine the combination of caution and 
aggression with which he treated Athens during this period, and the shift in the power 
balance between the two states, which occurred surprisingly early in Philip's reign and 
in which Philip defined himself as the aggressor in the relationship. We will suggest 
that a chronological examination of the events of the following year reveal a coherent 
trend of manoeuvres to reduce Athenian presence in the north which has gone largely 
unnoticed by modem scholars. 
The first step on the route down this path of aggression towards Athens came in 358/7, 
only a year after Philip had made peace with Athens "on the ground that he abandoned 
for all time any claim to Amphipolis. , 42 
39 See Chapter 5 for discussion. 
40 Xenophon Hellenica 7.5.1. 
41 Diodorus 16.7.3-4 and 21-22. 
42 16.4.1. A note here upon the chronology of the conquests which are discussed under this subheading is Z: ) t-: ý 
worthwhile, as Diodorus' narrative cannot be accepted as it stands. 16.8-9 places the capture of 
Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidaea and Crenides under the year 358/7, while the year 357/6 is almost totally 
filled up with events in Sicily. Even for the vigorous Philip we cannot accept that he took four cities in C) 
one year and it seems that this state of affairs is not acceptable - indeed, thanks to Plutarch's Life of 
Ale, vander 3 we are able to firmly date the siege of Potidaea to summer 356, with a simultaneous victory 
over the Thracian, Paeonian and Illyrian kings. These events are discussed at some length below. The Cý 
attack on Crenides ought to be thought of as following the fall of Potidaea, partly because Diodorus Vý Zý Cý 
himself places it there and partly because it make the most sense in the context of the aftermath of 
Cr I Parmenio s victory over the triple alliance of kin s. The slege of Amphipolis, on the other hand, ought to C, t) r_- 
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ýtevx 6F- r(x--or(x m)v vIv 'A[apITCOXIV otKol)vu(')v (X Wq TCPO ov XXOTPt' \q ()CUT' 
8t(XTF-OEVT(0V 'K(X\t TCOXX(\Xq ('X(POPýU\X; 60VTO)V F-t; 7WXF, ýWV F-C7TP(XTF-lL)(FF-V F- IU 
XK (xl)'rO'L); 6c4tOXO7(P 6A)v(4tEt- T[POCTOC7(x7(Ov 8 E\ TOt; 'CF-tXF-ut RI X(xv( ; Oct 
TCPO(5pOXC\C; F-VF-P70l'); K(Xt C51, )VF-XF-i; 7COtIlCT('XRF-VOq K(XrE-'P(XkF, RF\, V TOi; Kpt0i; 
[týpOq Tt TOý) 'rF-tXol, );, Jr(Xp6t(TCkOO\)V 6' Et; TIJV TCO/'ýtV 8W TOb 7ET('%L(X'rOq K(Xt 
TCOV (, XvTt(5T(X'VT(I)V 7roxxoL)q K(XT(XP(Xi%cov E, -, Kl, )p 7 
tEl, )(YF- Týq 7[OkF-(O; K(Xt T01); R F\-V 
(XUOTPt'(O; 7[p 0\; (Xl, )C O\V 6MKF-týLEVOI); E(pl, )7('X6F, L)CTF,, TOi; 6' (XXXOtq 
(PtXCCVOP(j)T[Q); T[po(511VE'-XO11.11 8E TCO/kt; (X^'O"rll KF-t[tF'-Vll K(XT(\x Tý; E)P('xKTI; Koct\ 
T6)V (: Y^L)VF-77L)q TOTROV El, )(Pl-)(Oq 7EOkA, (\)C C51. )VEPOCkETO T6 (Dtkt'T[7c(O 7rpoq 
... finding that the people of Amphipolis were ill disposed towards him and 
offered many pretexts for war, he entered upon a campaign against them with a 
considerable force. By bringing siege engines against the walls and launching 
severe and continuous assaults, he succeeded in breaking a portion of the wall 
with his battering rams, whereupon, having entered the city through the breach 
and struck down many of his opponents he obtained mastery of the city and 
exiled those who were disaffected towards him, but treated the rest 
considerately. Since the city was favourably situated with regard to Thrace and 
the neighbouring regions, it contributed greatly to the aggrandisement of Philip. 
(16.8.2-3) 
Modem sources are divided upon the issue of whether or not the Social War had broken 
out by the time that Philip attacked Amphipolis in 358/7. It seems likely, however, that 
it had either already erupted or was just about to, as Philip consistently displayed, 
during his reign, a great skill in taking advantage of moments when his opponent's 
attention was focused elsewhere and, with an eye already upon Amphipolis, the 
outbreak of the Social War would have been too good an opportunity for him to have 
missed. 
Philip's capture of the city of Amphipolis was loaded with political significance. The 
very fact that he had overpowered it at all was itself a snub to Athens, as he had 
succeeded where Athens had for so long failed , but this early indication of military 
superiority evidently (given that Athens showed no sign of being at all wary of Philip's 
strength until much later in his reign) went unnoticed in Athens. Amphipolis was, 
however, much more to Athens that an ordinary ally and Philip's capture of it carried 
much weight. Founded by Athens in 437, the city had claimed autonomy in 424 during 
the northern campaigns of the Peloponnesian war and had since been free. In recent 
years, Amphipolis had been the focus of some debate between Athens and Macedon. 
Amyntas III had voted for Athens' right to attack the city, but both Alexander 11 and 
Ptolemy of Alorus had supported Amphipolitan resistance to Athens and Perdiccas III's 
occupation of it had led to a war footing between the two states . 
43 just two years earlier 
Philip had permanently and publicly renounced his claims to Amphipolis in the making 
of a peace with Athens. Perhaps even more important than the definitive end to the 
wrangling over the city, or Philip so openly proving his word to be false, was the body 
blow he was dealing to Athens' self image as a great power. Athens had hankered after 
be dated prior to these events in 357, on the basis of Demosthenes 1.8, which shows that envoys from 
Amphipolis were at Athens requestinto-., help when the Athenians had just returned from an expedi ion to t 
Euboea. As the treaty between Athens and Euboea (Tod 153) was sworn to by the Boule of 357/6, we 
ought to date the slege and fall of Amphipolis to 357 and that of Pydna following it. See Appendix I for a C, 1-1 =1 
chronology of the entire period. 
43 See Chapters 6 and 7 for discussion of these events. 
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Amphipolis unceasingly since its bitterly regretted loss, and in the Athenian mentality, 1-: 1 as far as such a thing can be considered to have existed, the city had come to epitomise 
all that was desirable in imperial acquisition. This was a wound which would smart for 
many years in Athen S44 and Philip cannot have been unaware of this aspect of his new 
conquest. Already in Philip's reign, then, two simultaneous and apparently 4t) 
contradictory strands may be identified: conciliatory gestures such as the initial 
renunciation of his claim to Amphipolis and the return of the mercenaries who had 
supported Argaeus, and, beneath such gestures, an underlying determination to resist 
Athenian encroachment, expressed in aggression towards Athenian interests in the 
north. 
Several benefits accrued to Philip through this conquest. Amphipolis was now yet 
further out of Athenian reach than it had been as an independent state - no guarantee of future secunty, but certainly a step towards it. Additionally, the attributes which had 
attracted Athens to Amphipolis drew Philip as well. The rich supplies of silver fir in the 
area were of less interest to Philip than they were to the seafaring Athenians, but the 
excellent mines of Mt Pangaeum were of fundamental importance to Philip throughout 
his reign and the security of the region of Amphipolis (given its proximity to the vital 
mining area of Crenides, resettled and renamed Philippi, and indication of its centrality 
to Philip's reign 45) was of paramount importance to the subsequent prospenty of 
Macedon as a whole. 
Athens' reaction to-Philip's capture of Amphipolis betrays all too clearly the strain 
which Athens was under during this period, due to the Social War and the short lived 
but disturbing conflict in Euboea. Diodorus does not record any military response at all, 
but an inscription 46, generally dated to 356 implies that a declaration of war with Philip 
had been made at an earlier date, possibly the previous year. The date of this decree 
coincides with the outbreak of the Sacred War and has often been connected with it, but 
the evidence of the orators is persuasive and suggests that the inscription may refer to a 
longer standing conflict with Philip instead. References to a war with Philip over 
Amphipolis can be found in Aeschines 2.21,70 and 71, and Against Ctesiphon 54 and 
also in Isocrates To Philip, which begins with a lengthy discussion of the state of affairs 
regarding Amphipolis. The actual historical material of this passage, however, is slim 
and leaves us with little indication as to how the war proceeded, and only the vaguest of 
references to its outcome: 
OVTOý 8' 0"L)v E4L0--0 nEPt Tllv TIP(x79(xTgt(xv T(xl)TI1V F, -, (PO'qTp- notilcy(y,. ýtEvol Tijv 
F-Ipilvilv nptv 9 -P-Y(Xaojv(xt To, v 
koyov, (: YCO(Ppovoi)V'TF-g- 
But in any case, while I was still occupied with this endeavour, you and Athens 
anticipated me by making peace before I had completed my discourse, and you 
were wise in doing so... (To Philip 7) 
The peace to which he refers can only conceivably have been the Peace of Philocrates 
made in 346, which coincides with the end of the Sacred War, in which Athens had lent 
its support to the Phocians against Philip. Isocrates' words then appear to point towards 
44 Indeed Aeschines was to consistently refer to future hostilities against Philip as "the war for 
Amphipolis, " 2.21,70, and 72. 
45 See below for discussion. 
46 IG2.2.127 
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the conclusion that Isocrates himself perceived the war status between Athens and 
Philip to have been in existence from the time of Ph I lip's seizure of Amphipol IsIn 357 
until the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates in 346. The evidence of the orators 
implies that hostility towards Philip in Athens appears to have been considered to have 
originated from ill feeling over the capture of Amphipolis. 
Other sources contain some reference to some rather insignificant actions against Philip. 
Demosthenes makes vague references to Thasos being a useful base against Macedon, 
and in the Second Olynthiac refers to discontent amongst Philip's subjects, who are 
unable to share in his glory and unable to trade, " all the markets in the land being 
closed as a result of the war. " (2.16-17). Demosthenes is evidently referring here to 
some form of blockade, but the nature and the extent of it are not detailed. Indeed, 
Demosthenes' version smacks rather of exaggeration and it is tempting to scale down 
our estimation of the effects of such a blockade on Philip accordingly. Indeed, 
Demosthenes himself complains of the lack of interest in this war in Athens: 
T(Xll)T(DC Ocooýu, 4(-O, -K('X'TI Tcpoq 'rovrotq, F-t ýtijfttiq -L)[t(ov, (o ('xv6pEq 'AOTIvociot, 
8'0v(x'r(xt kO7'1(5(X(YO(xt nO(YOV nOkEýLdtTF- XPOVOV (I)tkt'TCTC(O, K(Xt 'Ut nOtO-L)V'c(OV 
WLCOV 0 xpovoq 6tEkllkA)OF-v Olb-coq. 
I wonder that no one here, men of Athens, can count up how many years you 
have been at war with Philip, and what you have been doing all that long time. 
(Second Olynthiac 25) 
Theopompus provides us with a further nugget of information on the subject of war 
with Macedon, in a fragment of his work entitled To Chares. 47 The fact that the 
Athenian general was the addressee suggests that his duties in the Hellespont also 
embraced the war with Macedon: 
Ev öE T(i)t £-, lut-Ypcc(PoýLF-VCOI TA OF-Onognoi) Gl, )'Y'YPCCýtýt(XUt riepi TWV F, -X 
AF-X(pCüv al, )kilOF'-vT(ov )(pilýt(xTcov X c'c p ilr x (pilat c (o t 'A 0, q v ccit co t8t ('x 
A lo G oc v8p01, ) r c'c k (X vr (X F- ý 11 x0vT (X, (X (P (0 v e' 8 F- 't lz v1a9v 
'A Orl v (x io 1) F, vZý16 -y 0pG (X ýT OC E 7u 1ViKt (X Z 
10\nn01, ) ý' -ll c 79voýtEvilý PxXilý npoý T lo F-VO-Oý- wv 117F-1, to 
ýI F\-v 'Aöccioý 0' 'AkF-i-zTpi)cov F'-IZI'Kccxol")ýLF-VOý. 
In the work of Theopompus entitled To Chares 48 it says: "The Athenians sixty 
talents from Lysander. With them he dined the Athenians in the marketplace 
after he made the victory sacrifice after the battle against Philip's mercenaries. 
Their leader was Adaeus, nicknamed Alectryon [the rooster]. " (fragment 249, 
translation from Shrimpton 1991. ) 
This informs us, then, that in at least one skirmish, the Athenians had the better of 
Philip's troops. All in all, however, the Athenian campaign against Philip appears to 
have left but scant traces upon our sources, and appears to have been rather half - 
hearted -a reflection, perhaps, more of Athens current situation than the profundity of 
her sense of loss over Amphipolis. 
47 Although there is no direct indication of the date to which this passage refers, we might suppose that Cl 0 C) 
Chares' efforts in the Hellespont extended to Macedon, in the light of the geographical proximity of the ZI) Z: ) Z-- 
areas and hostility towards Philip over the recent capture of Amphipolis. 
48 In fact, the title appears to be On the Money Robbed Froin Delphi. 
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ow, 
There is some evidence, also from Theopompus, that Athens engaged in some rather 
more underhand methods to stake their claim on Amphipolis whilst it was under siege 
by Philip: 
Kal neýtnzt npoý Tov (I)tXtnnov npF-cyßF--occ'cý 'AvTi(pG)vToc 
K (X 1X (Y p 18 11 ýt 0vnp640 vu (X ýx (X 1nEpt (P tk1 (X ý, 0t 
71 
(X p (X -y Ev0 ýt F- v01 CY 1) g TC F- 10 F- 1v (X i) T \O v Eir F- X F- 1p0 lo v F- v 
'AOqv(xiotý, on(oý (XV k(X (xnoppTiTo)t cyl, )4irpccTTF-iv ' ß(OCYIV 
'A4(pinoktv, i)iztcyXvoi)ýtF-vol I-Ii, )övccv. ot öF, - npF-Cyßp-tý oi TCOV 'AOilv(xt'wv elý ýtEv Z o\V ÖfiýLOV 0U8F-v C, Cnll-Y-YF-Xxov, 
2 ß0 lo k0 ýt F- v0tX (X v06vE1vT Ob ý rl u8v (X 10 1, ) ý F- X8 18 0v (X 1 
ýt-Exkov, reý F--KF-tvouý, F, v (XiloppilT(D1 öe ýtET6 'Týý ß0-Oxýý 
e/ Enp (X T -c 0 v. 
He also sent Antiphon and Charidemus as ambassadors to Philip to treat for 
friendship. When they arrived, they tried to persuade him to make a secret 
bargain with the Athenians, promising Pydna in order that they get Amphipolis. 
The Athenian ambassadors reported nothing of this to the people because they 
did not want the Pydnaeans to know that they were going to turn them over but 
arranged it secretly with the council. (Fragment 30a, Shrimpton . )49 
This piece of evidence is very telling as concerns the Athenian mentality at this point. It 
clearly illustrates a total miscalculation of Philip's aims in the north (by what logic, one 
wonders, did they arrive at the conclusion that Philip might docilely hand Amphipolis 
over to them, once it was captured? ) and in general of the position of both sides. 
Cawkwel 150 accurately points out: 
The sorry truth was that, given Athens' resources in men and money, she could 
not stop the progress of Philip on the northern Aegean, a situation roughly 
comparable to that of Great Britain in the post war world in relation to former 
interests east of Suez. In the fifth century when Athens was strong and the king 
of Macedon was weak, she had been unable to reduce Amphipolis. In the 350s, 
when the position was reversed, she could only lose what she still had. (pp8Of) 
Cawkwell's point here is undeniably sound. Athens would undoubtedly have been well 
advised to renounce her claims to Amphipolis many years earlier, and had she done so 
she would have save much expense and heartache. However, given the attachments to 
imperial ideal which Amphipolis seems to have carried for the Athenians, a 
renunciation of this claim was out of the question, as Philip was no doubt aware. His 
first move against Athens, then, was a cruel one and one which struck right at the heart 
of Athens attitude towards the north. 
49 Theopompus has had some modern doubters on the subject of the "secret pact, " notably G. de ste Croix 
(1973) and Mornighano (1934) who both suggest that this negotiation is unlikely to have taken place, r: ) C) Cý ZI) 
partly because in a democracy secret negotiations were impossible. While this is a very relevant 
araument, it does seem likely that some such offer was made, as Philip proceeded directly from Z1- 
Amphipolis to Pydna. His campaign there is discussed below, but in the context of this argument, its 
relevance seems to be that he did not want Athens to be able to either fix any future hopes of another 
northern base on their presence at Pydna, nor be deluded enough to think that they were in a position to 
be able to use it as a bargaining tool. His campaign there should be considered in the context of some Z: ý C) Zý 
indication by Athens, whether made in secret or not, that they had some such intentions or delusions. 
50 1978. 
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However, Philip's subsequent conquests show that he was by no means content with 
disillusioning Athens of any hopes of recovering Amphipolis; that this, in fact, was only 
the first step in the series of conquests designed to remove Athenian influence from 
Macedon and bordering territories. His next move was towards Pydna, taken by Athens, 
or allied to it c364 .51 Demosthenes informs us of the manner 
in which Pydna was taken: 
01 npoöovTF-ý -cl'v I-Iý)övocv 1«XI X(OPI(X 'TCO (I)tý, tirnco T(i) nor' 
1, F-7t(XPOE, VTF-ý lUtäý 1j81x01)v; (X IZ&CYI ITPO5IIXC)v ToiüTo, 0T1, Talý 7E(xp EKEIV01, ) 
c- 80)PF-1(Xiý, ('X'ý 816 T(Xf)'C' E(YF-(: YÖ(XI G(Pt, cytv il-yol)VTO; 
The men who betrayed Pydna and the other places to Philip - what prompted 
them to injure us? Is it not obvious to everyone that it was the reward which they 
calculated on receiving from Philip for their services? (Against Leptines 63) 
Some brief attention to the city's history is relevant here. In 432 the Athenians had laid 
siege to Pydna, then situated on the west coast of the Thermaic gulf, but, unable to take 
it, they had come to terms with Perdiccas and turned their attention to Potidaea 52 instead 
. Hammond suggests that Pydna, as a coastal town, would have been attractive 
to Athens in that it would have offered a useful naval base in the area, and perhaps it 
was with the same thought in mind that Archelaus not only besieged and reduced the 
rebellious town in 410, but also took the precautionary measure of relocating it "some 
twenty stades distant from the sea. , 53 
It appears that Pydna had reinstated its close ties with Athens in the recent past, perhaps 
in 364 on the occasion of the capture of Torone and Potidaea by Timotheus. As 
Dinarchus 1.14 and 3.17 has Pydna as one of Timotheus' conquests as well, we might 
suppose that it was taken in the same campaign. The fact that Athens was able to offer 
the city to Philip certainly suggests that some degree of proprietorship was felt over it 
by Athens -a sentiment which Philip was not prepared to tolerate in connection with a 
city so strategically located with regard to his own kingdom. The capture of Pydna was 
a further step towards removing Athenian influence from the area. 
Once Pydna had fallen, Philip moved on again, this time to Potidaea. 
F, 1, )01\) 'YC(P TljV ýtEV 1-Il, )ÖV(XV F'-XF-tp(O(: YCCTO, 7EPO, ý 8 F\- 'Okl. )voi0-0ý GlügtaxIav 
"()F-'UO KM rIOTI8(XI(xv wýtox0-YllETF- np-PI7Z0111(YF--uv (XI), Tolý, 1. )IEF-p Tlý 'OXI-)vOlol 
izoký, liv (Y7U01)81\IV ecyxov xl)ptF-1)G(XI Týý 
Indeed he immediately reduced Pydna, and made an alliance with the Olynthians 
in the terms of which he agreed to take over for them Potidaea, a city which the 
Olynthians had set their hearts on possessing. (Diodorus 16.8.3,358/7) 
His interest in Potidaea comes as no surprise when we recall that Athens had had a long 
standing interest in it. Until 432, Potidaea had been an Athenian ally, but she revolted in t: ý 
this year and remained under an Athenian siege for some time. She came to terms in 
51 See previous chapter for discussion. Diodorus 15.81.6 informs us that in 364 Timotheus took Torone 
and Potidaea, and Hammond assumes that Pydna was part of the conquest too, probably correctly - see 
Dinarchus 1.14 and 33.17. 
52 See Chapter 33 for discussion. 
53 Diodorus 1-3) . 49.1. 
See Chapter 4 for discussion. 
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430/29 and the city was resettled. 54 The Atheni an operations against Brasidas in the late 
twenties illustrate Potidaea's potential usefulness for a sea based power such as Athens 
(Thucydides 4.129, for example). Indeed, as a naval base for operations in the north, 
Potidaea was almost as favourably situated as Amphipolis. 
The city had given Athens some cause for complaint, and Timotheus had besieged and 
captured it in 364, and thus when Philip came to the throne, it was once again 
potentially useable to Athens as a naval base, a situation which Philip could not allow to 
continue. 
The capture of Potidaea saw a further example of the development of both strands of 
foreign policy regarding Athens' interests in the north, identified above. It had been 
made clear that Athenian influence would not be tolerated at Potidaea, as we have seen, 
but simultaneously, outright hostility to Athens was avoided: 
01) ýtl)jv 6CCXX' 60 (I)itXtTcTcoq rIout'6(xiccv F'-KnAtopKýcYaq ci'lv ýtev T6v 'AOllv(xto)v 
5 
71 
1- (Ppol)p(xv F- 117(x7F-v EK '[fiq TEOXF, (Oq K(Xl' (PIX(XVOP(07ro)q (Xl-)'CTJ 
nPO(TF-vF-7K(' 'ý(xTcF'-(TcF-tXF-v P-t'q u('Xq 'AOIJV(X;. a(po6Pcc 76P F-', )k(XPF-I'rO XRF-vO; C 
, ro'v 8fi[tov rCov 'AOqv(xt'(ov 6t('x To' P('xpOq XCdt TO' ('X4't(O[L(X Tfi; TCO/k6(0; - Tl'IV 
8E' 
'ý. tv E, 4(xv8pccTco8l(ycc[tFvo; Tca E-, cc %ux Tco P 8(OKE Toiq 'WA)VOl'ot;, 8(OPIJ(T' [tEvo; 
K(Xl Tcc; K(XT(x T11V X(op(xv KTil(YEtq. 
Philip, when he had forced Potidaea to surrender, led the Athenian garrison out 
of the city and, treating it considerately, sent it back to Athens - for he was 
particularly solicitous toward the people of Athens on account of the importance 
and repute of their city - but, having sold the inhabitants into slavery, he handed 
it over to the Olynthians, presenting them also at the same time with all the 
properties in the territory of Potidaea. (Diodorus 16.8.5) 
Perhaps Diodorus' suggestion as to the motivation behind this courtesy is correct and 
Philip, despite his firm approach to Athenian encroachment, was unwilling to give the 
Athenians a direct cause for war against him. This courteous treatment of the Athenians 
is highlighted by the sharp contrast with his attitude to the luckless Potidaeans 
themselves, whom he enslaved. We might, on the other hand, recall that this attitude 
towards Athens continued throughout Philip's reign, even after his army had defeated 
Athens at the battle of Chaeronea; this being so it seems reasonable to suggest that this 
attitude sprang not only from a fear of Athens but perhaps also from a genuine respect 
for her. 
Diodorus 16.8.3-4 tells us that, owing to the large population (and hence, military 
potential) of Olynthus, Philip and Athens had been rivals for the alliance of the city. 
Perhaps its strategic position with regards to Philip's kingdom had added to its 
attractions to both parties as an ally as well. Philip's actions here are therefore 
complicated by more than one strand of foreign policy, and in handing over the defeated 
Potidaea to Olynthus, he was killing three birds with one stone. He had added Potidaea 
to the list of cities where Athenian influence was felt which he had conquered, thereby 
contributing to his programme of reducing Athenian influence on and near his territory. 
He had cemented his alliance with a large and influential city which had previously 
been, if not exactly hostile, at least an uncomfortable neighbour to have had, as Philip's Z: ý 
54 Thucydides 1.56 ff. 
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55 And finally, besides, augmenting his own father could no doubt have affirmed .4 t) friendship with Olynthus, Philip had sabotaged that between Athens and Olynthus, III ZD 
because if Athens now wanted Potidaea back, it was Olynthus and not Philip whom she 
would have to contend with for it. Perhaps it is not too fanciful to also suggest that 4-: ) 
Philip might also have had an eye upon a distant moment when, with Athenian power 
on his borders contained, he might have the potential to turn to Olynthus and add both 56 that great city and his generous gift of Potidaea to his territories as well. 
Although Philip's progress from Potidaea to Crenides is not strictly related to the 
subject of this subheading, the elimination of Athenian influence from the north, it did, 
it appears, have some bearing upon his future relations with Athens 57 and as Diodorus 
relates its capture immediately after the fall of Potidaea it ought to be placed here in our 
chronology. 16.8.6-7 reports the following events: 
[tF-, r(x 6F- T(x--orcc mxpF-ý, Odov Fict\ noktv KpTlvt8(x; rcci), rqv [tF\-v E'-nccl. )41j(T(x; 
otx, q, cOp(ov irXýOF-t [tF,, r(ov%tcc(TF, (Dt. X't7cTcou;, c'c(p' F-'ccl)'rob nPOG(X70PF-1)(TcC;, 'CCC 
8F\- 'KCCTcc Ti\IV noXtV Xpl, )GF-tCC IUCCVTF-kCO; O'VTOC kt'TC\C KOR 6'6040C Tai; 
KCC'C(XCT'KF-, O(xi; 2, -Tc\t 'ro(yof), rov Tjbý11(76V 
6UTE 81, )V(X(70(Xt (PE'-PF-tV (X'OcCo npO(7080V 
IrXF-iOV 6)'C T(Xk('XVT(I)V Xtk't(t)V. F'-K 8F- TOUT(OV 'T(XXi) (Y(OPF, 'O(Y(X; TCýObTOV (xt'F-t\ 
ýIakkov Iv 7(' v 11 (X7 7\1 v 8t(\)c 'ul\lv F-', )7cOPt'(xv 'CCJ)v XP11[L()'c'rcOv Eli; ', )nEPOX'\ ýtE All 'y E 'r 
MOUKE80VVKýV P(X(Yt/%F-t'(XV' VO[tl(Y[t(X 'Y(\)CP Xpl, )(70f)V KOWO(; TO\ npO(Y(X70 p F- 10 0 F\- V 
cm F--KF-tvol-) (Dtk'tnnF-tov pa0o(pop(ov cF- 61)v%ttv ('x4tO/XO7Ov 
KOCI rCov 'Ukilwov noXko^\o; 8toc -COUTO-O TIPOETPEWCTO TCP050'Cccq 7F-VEGOCct 
-ccov nccrp, t6o)v. 
After this [that is, the capture of Potidaea] he went to the city of Crenides and 
having increased its size with a large number of inhabitants, changed its name to 
Philippi, giving it his own name, and then, turning to the gold mines in its 
territory, which were very scanty and insignificant, he increased their output so 
much by his improvements that they could bring him a revenue of more than a 
thousand talents. And because from these mines he had soon amassed a fortune, 
with the abundance of money he raised the Macedonian kingdom higher and 
higher to a greatly superior position, for with the gold coins which he struck, 
which came to be known as Philippeioi, he organised a large force of 
55 See Chapter 6 for discussion of the invasion of Macedon by Olynthus in 382. 
56 Plutarch's life of Alexander gives us a brief glimpse of some further developments which, although ZID zn t: ' 
unrelated to Philip's endeavours to remove Athenian influence from the north, nonetheless have some 
bearing on our discussion of his foreign policy: Cý 
II (DtXiT[IUO) 6' &PTI rIOTF-i6(XtCCV pqK6Tt 'TPF-iq ý'KOV 6c77F-Xi(Xl, K(xr& c6v ain6v Xpovov, Tj ýiF-v TI 
, Ikx-optol, )q TIvula0at R6cXil RF7&XT CC rI(XpýIF-Vi(J)VOq, 8' 'Okl)ýiTli(X(YtV ZRTI(t) KE'XTI'rt I 6t\ 
VEVUKTJ'KýVat, TpiTTJ 5E\ 7cF-pi -cý; 'AXF-4ocv6po-O 7F-vF'-(YF-o)q. 
To Philip... who had just taken Potidaea there came three messages at the same time: the first C> 
that Parmenio had conquered the Illyrians in a great battle, the second that his racehorse had won Zý 
a victory at the Olympic games, while a third announced the birth of Alexander. (Plutarch Life of 
Alexander 3.8) 
Parmenio's victory over the Illyrians should be thought of as a precursor to the trouble which surfaced in C) 
Illyria in 356/5, discussed below. Philip's participation in the Olympic g games is especially interesting as 
it appears to denote a development in his interest in Greece, particularly relevant in the context of 
zD 
the 
outbreak of the Sacred War, discussed at lenzgth in the followinc():,, chapter. 57 See below for discussion. 
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mercenaries, and by using these coins for bribes induced many Greeks to 
become betrayers of their native lands. (16.8.6-7, under the year 358/7) 
Again, Diodorus is vague upon the details of Philip's capture of Crenides - he does not, 
for example, inform us of whether a military campaign 
i 
was involved or if the place 
came over of Its own free will. However, the acquisition of Crenides, henceforth 
Philippi, was of enormous value to Philip. By far the most important aspect of this 
conquest was the financial gain of the gold mines - as Diodorus points out, it was to 
furnish the means of hiring mercenaries and of providing bribes, two factors which were 
both to have a massive impact upon Philip's future foreign policy. 
Philip's capture of Crenides provoked the aggression of the Thracian king from whom it 
had been taken, however, and Tod 157 records a later alliance between Athens and the 
triple alliance of northern kings who had earlier allied against him and been defeated by 
Parmenio at the time of the siege of Potidaea. 58 Besides the obvious advantages of a 
massive increase in revenue for Philip, then, the capture of Crenides also fuelled some 
later hostility towards hi M. 59 
The fall of Methone in 354/3 completed Philip's clearance of Athenian bases from his 
borders and territory. While this event falls outwith the chronological boundaries of this 
chapter, some mention of it is necessary here, because it marked the end of the process 
which Philip had initiated with the capture of Amphipolls. The goals of this process 
were crystal clear from the outset, and are visible in the unfailing accuracy with which 
Philip proceeded directly from one site of Athenian interest in his territory or near his 
borders to the next. His aim was to leave Athens no naval base from which she could 
interfere in internal affairs in Macedon, as had happened with her attempt to support 
Argaeus, or contend with him for control over any of his cities. The message to Athens 
was clear - that her influence would not be tolerated on Macedonian shores. 
Having thus taken the definitive steps of first ensuring that Macedon was safe from the 
enemies which had threatened on his accession, and then securing against future 
intervention from Athens, Philip was able to turn his attention, for the first time, to an 
active practice of foreign policy abroad. 
Thessaly, 357/6. 
Under the initial subheading of this chapter, we noted how Philip, having subdued the 
Paeonians and defeated the Illyrians subsumed their land into Macedonian territory, and 
in the previous subsection we saw how the cities of Amphipolis, Pydna and Potidaea, 
which had fallen to Macedonian siege craft, were now also Macedonian property. 
However, Macedonian expansion during this period was not confined to such 
straightforward operations in which a city or a territory was attacked, taken, and placed 
directly under Macedonian control. The case of Thessaly provides an example in which, 
rather than Macedonian influence taking the form of simple military domination, it 
instead consisted of a firm political affiliation which lasted throughout the lives of both 
Philip and his son. 
58 Both this decree and the earlier alliance are discussed below. 
59 See Head (1879) and Le Rider (1977) for a catalotgue and discussion of Philip's coins. Hammond and 
Griffith (1979) also offer a brief discussion, pp662ff. 
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The recent history of relations between Macedon and Thessaly had been, to say the 60 least, chequered. Considering that both previous attempts to call in a Macedonian king 
to assist with internal struggles in Thessaly (c 400/399 and 369/8) had resulted in his 
seizing the land handed to hi t and refusing to return it, it comes as something t) im on trus Z-- 
of a surprise to find the Aleuadae trustingly repeating the same process once again. As 
Diodorus informs us under the year 357/6, however, on this occasion it appears that the 
Thesslians' trust in Philip was well founded, and that extremely positive results accrued 
to both sides as a result of their actions: 
cN 181 K(x-cc'c 8p- -cijv 'Eý, k(xö(x 'Aý, £'-ýccvÖpoý 0 (DEPCOV Tl)P(XVVOý 101Z0 Tilý 1 Mý 
-yl)V(XIICOý 0 ýßqý -K(XI TÜ)V 'MÜTIlý ýÖEX(PCÜV AUKÖ Tiai(povol, ) 11 1 '0 (X 0(Ppovoý ]«xi 
c1 F-80ý, 0(POV11011. OIUTOI 8F'- 'co, gp, -v nP(i)TOV 0)ý Tl)P(XVVOK'UOVOI ýtE7düUlý 
e, u-O-Yxccvov (xnoöoy, ýý, 'L)GZF-Pov öE gF-, cccvOll(y(XVTEý K(XI '101)ý ýtIG0o(Popol, )ý 
XP, CY(XV'CF-ý (' '8£-t4(XV E(xl), uo\ ýuV T(i)V liýt(XGI nF-t XVE 1) -op(, xvvol, )ý 'K(XI 
(xv, rI7UP(X, ZTOýtF-VO)v CCVFixov, 'K(X'TCCCYKF-'1)(XCY('XýtF-Vot Öe Ti\IV 81)V(Xýttv ('Xýtox070v ßM K(X'ZF-iXov u ýv ýpX ýv. oi 8' 'Ake-ü('x8(xi K(xkoi)ýtF-vot nccpoc w% E)Fru(xXoiý, 11 (X n 81, 
F-'D'-YE, -vp-I(xv 
8p, 
- FXovCF-ý nF-Pißo-nZov C, CV-CEIZPCCUTOVTO 'Colý 
T, OP()CVVOIý. 01)K OVTF-ý 8F'- 'K(XO' Ewo'Toloý ('Xýtoýt(XXOI npoaF-X(, xßovco (I)txtnnov 
01. )ýtýt(XXOV TOV M(XKFöovcov ß(Xatxz, (X. oi)Toý 8 g\ nccpFXO(ov eiý Tijv E)F-, rc(xXtccv 
K(XTF-710ý, F-'ýLIIEYE TO1)ý Tl, )POCVV01, )ý 'KM Wtý n0; ýF-CYtV ('XV(XKTIICY()CýteVOý T-p 
Fý-ý, E-OOF-Pit(XV ýIE'Ydcckllv eilýMIav eitý Tolijý occC(X/koli, )ý ýEVF-öF-ilý(XTO- ötöonF-p Fý_v 
TOCiý ýLET(\X T(Xi)-C(X np('XýF-GtV ('XF-t (Y1)V(X'YO)VtGT(Xý EGXEV 0-0 ýLOVOV (XioTOý, ('XX9ý, (\X 
xcct ýtF-, rCC c(xibccc 0 ütiOý 'AXE-ýccvöpoý. 
In Greece Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, was assassinated by his own wife Thebe 
and her brothers Lycophron and Tisophonus. 61 The brothers at first received 
great acclaim as tyrannicides, but later, having changed their purpose and bribed 
the mercenaries, they disclosed themselves as tyrants, slew many of their 
opponents, and, having contrived to make their forces imposing, retained the 
government by force. Now the faction among the Thessalians called Aleuadae, 
who enjoyed a far flung reputation by reason of their noble birth, began to 
oppose the tyrants. But not being of sufficient strength to fight by themselves, 
they took on Philip, the king of the Macedonians, as ally. And he, entering 
Thessaly, 62 defeated the tyrants and, when he had vindicated the independence 
60 See Chapter 4 for the disastrous attempt to intervene there by Archelaus, c 400/399, which resulted in 
his assassination, Chapter 6 for a Thessalian rescue mission to Macedon when Amyntas III had been 
driven from his throne in c 393 by an Illyrian invasion, and Chapter 7 for a betrayal of Thesslian trust by 
Alexander 11 in 369/8 in an episode which curiously mirrored Archelaus' involvement there some thirty 
years earlier. These periods of alienation between Macedon and Thessaly came about in spite of the 
traditional closeness between the two states - see Chapters 2 and 3 for discussion. 61 For a fuller version of the story of Alexander's assassination see Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.35 ff and 
Plutarch Pelopidas 35. In a style similar to that which he used at 14.92.3 and 15.19.2-3, reminding his 1-D 
reader of previous events before bringing him/her up to date with current ones, Diodorus now informs us 
of the manner of Alexander of Pherae's death, having already informed us (15.61.2) that he came to 
power in 369/8 and ruled for eleven years. It seems clear that we are intended to place Alexander's death 
in 358/7, consider the brief rule of Lycophron and Tisophonus, the gathering public discontent and the 
appeal to Philip as the events of the following months, and place Philip's intervention on behalf of the 
Aleuadae in 357/6 as Diodorus does. There is no need to shift the date of these events to 358 as Griffith 
does in his chronology p722. zD 62 Some modern debate has arisen over the translation of this word as "entering" as opposed to ZD 
"returning". This point was first raised by Sordi in 1958 (p349) and was discussed by both Ehrhardt 
(1967) and Griffith (1970 and 1979 pp224-5). While Ehrhardt rejected the notion of a campaign in 
Thessaly any earlier than 35313C, Griffith used the evidence of Justin 7.6.6-9 to support a shift of the 
entire chronology of Philip's relationship with Thessaly and proposes the insertion of an initial campaign 
in 358. Martin (1981 and 1982), however, convincingly rejects Griffith's arguments, pointing out that the t: 1 Z: ) Cý 
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of their cities, showed himself very friendly to the Thessalians. Wherefore in the 
course of subsequent events not merely Philip himself but also his son 
Alexander after him had the Thessalians always as confederates. (16.14.1-2) 
If we consider the contents of this passage, we are obliged to recognise that this was a 
curious episode indeed. Diodorus' account is not especially detailed and leaves many 
gaps in our comprehension of the affair. We note that the events recorded by Diodorus 
here bear striking similarities to the events following the requests for assistance by the 
Aleuadae to Archelaus and to Alexander 11 - in both cases, as now, the Macedonian 
king responded with force (although how much force and where, if any, fighting took 
place, Diodorus omits to tell us on this occasion) and drove out the tyrants, and here 
too, as before, the Macedonian king retained control in some form over the part of 
Thessaly from which he had cleared the influence of the tyrants. On this occasion, 
however, it seems that the Thessalians, far from resenting the king's continued 
connection with the country, welcomed him, and proved to be faithful allies throughout 
his reign and that of his son. This remarkable about face with regards to Macedonian 
involvement appears, from what we can discern from Diodorus' account, to have been 
due to two main factors. Firstly and perhaps most importantly, we might point out that 
Philip succeeded, albeit over a period of years, where both Archelaus and Alexander 
had failed, in that he put an end to Thessalian stasis and tyranny from Pherae. Given 
that, as both Diodorus as Xenophon testify, 63 Alexander's rule had been noteworthy for 
its cruelty, perhaps this factor alone might be thought of as justifying to some degree the 
subsequent closeness between Macedon and Thessaly. 
Further. explanations must also be sought, however, and the second important factor to 
present itself is an issue touched upon above - that is, the personality of Philip himself 
and, in this case, his diplomatic skill. 
It appears that Thessalian culture may not have been too far removed from that of 
Macedon, and perhaps as a result Philip was able to find ways to appeal to the 
Thessalian populace which were not so readily available to him in his dealings with 
states which were rather otherwise culturally inclined, such as Athens. The fragment of 
Satyrus which records Philip's marriages preserves for us the names of two Thessalian 
brides, the first of whom, Philinna, he probably married on this occasion in 357/6. It 
seems likely that these two marriages were part of a conscious effort on Philip's behalf 
to illustrate his connection with Thessaly and the hoi polloi of Thessaly and a typical 
example of Philip's use of marriage to symbolise bonds created by his foreign policy. 64 
Ultimately, though, exactly how it was that Philip was able to achieve this degree of 
intimacy with Thessaly must remain in the realms of speculation, although it seems 
highly likely that both his success in ending the tyranny and his ability to appeal to 
verb ýtF-, ra-KockF-w ought not necessarily to mean "recalled" (a translation from which the suggestion that Z-- ZD CI 
Philip returned to Thessaly ofirginated) but micght be translated "to call away or to another place" (Martin 
1981 p189). Martin thus associates the date of Philip's first intervention with the time of his siege of 
Methone, suggesting that Philip was "called away" from that event. Griffith's arguments, based as they 
are on this translation and on Justin 7.6.6-9 which shows little regard for chronology, are therefore not Z: ) t; 
accepted here. 
63 Diodorus in the passage quoted above, Xenophon Hellenica 6.4.35. 0 64 For discussion of the role of royal women in Macedonian politics, see Carney 2000. The sugg gestion 
made by Justin that one of these brides was a prostitute is a typical example of Justin's taste for scandal 
and ought not to be taken seriously. 
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Thessalian popular support played a part. A factor of this episode which none could 
doubt, however, is the importance of its outcome, both at the time of Philip's success 
there and in the future. 
The immediate implications of the new connection with Thessaly are clear. Philip had 
displayed that his new military ability had application in Greece as well as in defending 
his own borders, and, perhaps even more importantly, the young king had, besides the 
ability to do so, displayed an interest in dabbling in Greek affairs. One might have 
thought that the attention of Greece would have been alerted to these abilities and 
inclinations in this direction, but, as the following years were to show, this was not so. 
Casting a brief glance at the subject of the first part of the following chapter, the Sacred 
War, we might also briefly note that Philip's new status In Thessaly was to have long 
term implications for the future. It was his connection to Thessaly which gave him his 
first footholds in Greece and allowed him to take part in the Sacred War with a degree 
of legitimacy. The repercussions of the Aleuadae's appeal for help in 357/6 were, then, 
to be felt for many years afterwards in Greece. 
A Prosperous Year; 356/5 
If Philip's ever increasing potential had failed to arouse much suspicion in Greece, 
elsewhere an attempt to curb the growth of Macedonian influence was brewing, as 
Diodorus informs us-: 
Kam ag rilv MOCKFöovt, ccv TPF-% ß(X(: yt2, Fiý 0'1)VF, -cyTllcy(xv Ent\ Z o\V 
(Dt, xtlulcov, 0, 
TE T(7)V OPýXKCOV K(Xt\ rl(Xtovo)v KM 'lý, kl, )Pt(i)V. olL)TOI 7(\xp ohTeý o'ýtopot 'Co% 
M(XKF-80(Yt K(Xt\ Ti\IV CCX')ýllatv 11)(popo)ýUF-V0t TOi) (I)tkt'IE7101) XCCO ECCIOTO1L)ý ýLEV 
OUK 11(YCCV OC OýtC(XOI 7zpollTTTIýUF-VOI, KotvA E 1) 9 7rokF-ýtOýÜVTEý IZ' X(Xßov 
Pýx8i(oý OCI)TOý) IIF-ptE'-GF-(YO(Xt. ÖtolzF-p (, xopotýOVTCÜV Tixý 81)vaýtetý Ent(Pavetý 
CCG'L)VTCCKTotý Kat 'KCCT(X7ckllý(, X4Evoý llvcc7K(Xcye 7[POCYOECYO(Xt To% M(XKEÖO(Ytv. 
In Macedon., three kings combined against Philip, the kings of the Thracians, 
Paeonians and Illyrians. For these peoples, inasmuch as they bordered upon 
Macedonia, eyed with suspicion the aggrandisement of Philip; singly, however, 
they were not capable of sustaining a combat, having each suffered defeat in the 
past, but they supposed that, if they should join forces in a war, they would 
easily have the better of Philip. So it was that, while they were still gathering 
their armies, Philip appeared before their dispositions were made, struck terror 
into them and compelled them to join forces with the Macedonians. (16.22.3, 
356/5) 
The simplicity of Diodorus' account here is perhaps misleading, as two other pieces of 
evidence might lead us to believe that this coalition was not as unconnected to Philip's 
other actions, as its narration in isolation in Diodorus might lead us to believe. Firstly, 
we are able to suggest a clear date for this victory. Plutarch's Life of Alexander 3 
records that Philip received, at the siege of Potidaea, three pieces of good news at once: 
that of the birth of Alexander, that of an Olympic victory for his racehorse, and that of a 
victory by Parmenio over the Illynans. As the Olympic games in question were held in 
the summer of 356 65 we might firmly date this victory to the same time. 
65 See following chapter for some discussion of the significance of Philip's participation in the games. 
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In the light of this information on Parmenio's victory, however, we are obliged to 
modify Diodorus' information in some way. Either the victory he records was 
indecisive, and the Illyrians still had to be subdued at a later date, that is, in the victory 
under Parmenio which Plutarch records, or the victories referred to by both authors are 
one and the same, only Diodorus has failed to note that Parmenio, not Philip himself, 
was in command of the victorious Macedonian army. This interpretation allows us 
somewhat more freedom in our chronology; thus Philip could have been occupied with 
the siege of Potidaea and this brief campaign been carried out simultaneously. It also 
allows us to conceive of the capture of Crenides (which followed that of Potidaea and 
which was briefly mentioned above) as the aftermath of this campaign - in taking 
Crenides, Philip was thus pressing home the advantage of this victory. 
Diodorus also fails to record an agreement which was apparently the aftermath of the 
campaign from the point of view of the losing side. Tod 157 records an alliance 
between Athens and the kings of Thrace, Paeonia and Illyria against Philip, which 
includes a pledge to capture Crenides (a note which evidently implies that that this 
agreement was made following Philip's resettlement of that place) and to contribute to 
their efforts to reduce the places occupied by Philip. In spite, then, of the simplicity of 
this event in Diodorus' narrative, we might note that it was in fact relatively significant. 
The growth of Philip's power and his inclination towards using it in an aggressive way 
had evidently been noted by Philip's neighbours, and their alarm over it was gradually 
filtering through into Greek, or, more specifically, Athenian consciousness. This 
tendency for northern powers which felt harassed by Philip's attentions to turn to his 
long established enemy, Athens, is a theme which becomes very significant in the 
context of the following chapter. 66 At any rate, for now Parmenio's victory had diffused 
the immediate state of affairs with regard to these three kings, and their later 
machinations against Philip, including the resolution recorded by Tod 157, do not 
appear from our sources to have given him any significant cause for concern. 
The years between Philip's accession in 360/59 and 356/5, the eve of the outbreak of 
the Sacred War which was to herald a new era in relations between Philip and Greece, 
had seen the transformation of Macedon from a peripheral northern state ter-rorised by 
its more powerful neighbours to an embryonic form of the super state it was to be by the 
time of the Peace of Philocrates. Philip's intelligent use of foreign policy, changing very 
early on in his reign from a defensive to an aggressive stance, had been almost wholly 
responsible for this change. In the following chapter, we will examine the impact of this 
newly powerful Macedon on Greece, rent by civil war, and how Philip arrived at the 
dominant position he had achieved by 34613C. 
66 See specifically the appeals made by Olynthus and Cersobleptes to Athens in the context of the period 
of the Peace of Philocrates. 
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Chapter 9 
The Years of the Sacred War; 
Extension of Philip's Influence into Greece 
The period which constitutes the last chapter of this thesis saw a remarkable and unique 
opportunity open up for the Macedonian king, the civil war in Greece known as the 
Sacred War. Philip's Macedon had developed to a point which, perhaps for the first time 
in the period covered by this thesis, allowed the king to fully extend the perimeters of his 
foreign policy into Greece. ' This process saw a drastic change in the attitude towards 
Philip and the only period of crisis in Philip's reign which appeared to represent a major 
setback in the stability of the various settlements which Philip's foreign policy to date 
had put in place. In spite of this, however, Philip was able to consolidate a victory in the 
Sacred War and, through doing so, ultimately establish himself as a major power in 
Greece and to conclude the Peace of Philocrates with Athens. This chapter will examine 
how, by 346 BC, this position had been reached. 
Sources and Chronology for the Sacred War 
The sources on the-fourth century have been discussed at some length in Chapter 5; 
however, our main source on this period, Diodorus, gives us an unusually detailed 
insight into his information on this specific period: 
Tüüv öe al, )-f'YP(X(pecov Allýto(piXoý ýt F\, v o 'E(popoi) -coi, ) tcyTopto-YP(X(Pol) utoý TOV 
n(Xpccý, F-1(Por'_VT(X no; ýF-ýtov 1) n 0' rof) nuTpoý, ovoýtccao£-, vCcc 
25F, - 
iF-Pov, 
0-ov, UF"U(X, YýliEvoý F-VrEiüoev AP-KTccl Uno 'T% ]ýcacakilye0)ý 'Coý) ev AF_x(po% 
1F-Poi) i-ccci Týý (Y-OklIcaüý 'TOI) ýtOtvcaou lulzo roß 
F--YF-VF-, ro 8,0 noý. F-ýtoý olL), coý F, -, vöF-Kcc Fi-, wý u% (poopötý '16)V 
öt(XVF-I[tccýtF-VO)V 
, rCC iF-p(X yplig(xT(x. Kccký, taOr'-zvilý U- Tilv TCov 'Eý. kilvi-Kcov np(x7ýt('xT0)v 
t(YTOPI(XV 7F-7pot(PF-v EV ßUßkOlý 82-IM KUL K(X'Te-cyZpo(PF-v F-tý TI\lv 1«XZ(D, ýk-qytv 
'CO£) liEpob lc(X\t nocp(Xvoýtt(XV (I)tikoýtlikoi) To, £) 8' 0 'AOilv(xioý 
APKTCCI Tfiý tia'ropiocý 67co, T% tiEpoGtýAIGE0)ý K(Xt\ 7£, -7pcc(PE ßlOßkol)ý 
F-'t"KOat 
01)gIEF-Ptý, aß v lc' Gaý Tv w% xPovotý Co' 1. C(XI Ew (X (X E 1)Tolý yevoýtEV(Xý 
np(xgF-tý nept' re r )v 'EXXccboc iccci Ti\lv liKF-. ki(xv. 11 
Amongst historians Demophilus, the son of the chronicler Ephorus, who treated 
in his work the history of what is known as the Sacred War, which had been 
passed over by his father, began his account with the capture of the shrine at 
Delphi and the pillaging of the oracle by Philomelus the Phocian. This war lasted 
eleven years until the annihilation of those who had divided amongst themselves 
the sacred property. And Callisthenes wrote the history of the events in the 
Hellenic world in ten books and closed with the capture of the shrine and the 
IS 
i 
ee Chapter 2 for a discussion of Alexander I's relatively successful but ultimately peripheral attempts 
to influence the progress of the Persian Wars, and Chapter 3 for PerdIccas' Involvement In Greek affairs 
during the Peloponnesian War, confined though they were to Macedon and the surrounding area. Z= C> C) 
Chapters 4 and 7 document the disastrous attempts of Archelaus and Alexander 11 to extend their 
influence into Thessaly. These examples illustrate that in his endeavours during the Sacred War, Philip 
was unique in that his efforts were both successful and central to the subsequent development of the 
situation in Greece. 
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impious act of Philomelus the Phocian. Diyllus the Athenian began his history 
with the pillaging of the shrine and wrote twenty six books in which he included 
all the events which occurred in this period both in Greece and in Sicily. 
(16.14.3-5, under the year 357/6)2 
While the nature of these sources and Diodorus' relationship with them has been 
discussed in Chapter 5, a brief consideration of the nature and quality of the information 
we have on the Sacred War is relevant to our discussion here. 
The degree of detail in Diodorus' report of the Sacred War is unusually high, rendering 
our view of the participants, its progress and conclusion very clear. This clarity is 
augmented by a passage from Polyaenus, -) which describes the only serious defeat of 
Philip's military career, and a comment from Justin, 4 which informs us of the laurel 
wreaths of Philip's soldiers at the battle of the Crocus Field, details which are 
fundamental to our grasp of Philip's foreign policy during this period. Despite this 
degree of detail, however, our understanding of the events of this period is clouded by 
the chronological quagmire into which Diodorus leads us. Quite apart from the actual 
progress of the war, Diodorus gives us three separate durations for it, informing us of the 
existence of the war under 357/6 and stating that it lasted eleven years, placing its 
outbreak in 355/4 and stating that it was to last nine years, and finishing it in 346/5, 
asserting that it had been going on for ten years by this point. 5 This disparity has, 
naturally given rise to some scholarly debate. 
A brief summary of Diodorus' chronology for Philip himself during this period will 
illustrate how this confusion develops during his narrative. It has its root in the fact that 
Diodorus does not space his reports of Philip's activities evenly throughout his narrative 
of these years - that is, he does not report on Philip regularly every year. The years 
360/59,359/8,358/7 and 357/6 all have a mention of Philip in them, although the last 6 
is somewhat chronologically problematic as its entry on Philip seems to refer to a period 
of time rather than a single event. 356/5 contains 7 the coalition and defeat of the three 
kings against Philip, but 355/4 contains no reference to him and indeed he does not 
appear again until Diodorus' summary of 354/3 8 when the first notice of his capture of 
Methone is given. This is repeated in more detail in 353/2 at 16.34.2, followed by 
Philip's first entry into the Sacred War. 9 In the following passage, Philip is defeated by 
Onomarchus, withdraws to Macedon, almost immediately reappears and wins the battle 
of the Crocus Field. In 352/1, Pherae is surrendered to Philip, who then marches on 
Thermopylae and finally returns to Macedon. 10 The remaining chronology of Philip's 
activities is hardly less complicated, as Philip's withdrawal to Macedon marks the 
beginning of a two year hiatus in Diodorus' narrative of his activities; Philip does not 
2 See Chapter 5 for some discussion of the writers mentioned here and bibliography on them. Of Cl 
particular interest, however, are Hammond "The Sources of Diodorus Siculus XVF 1937 and Markle 
1994. 
3 Strategenis 2.38.2, discussed below. 
4 8.2.3, quoted and discussed below. 
5 16.14.3-5,23.1 and 59.1 respectively. 
6 16.14. ". 
7 16.22.3, discussed in the previous chapter. 
8 16.31.6 
9 16.35.1 
10 16.37.3 and 38.1-2 respectively. The events which are summaries here are discussed at some length Z-1 
below. 
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feature again until the year 349/8 where he reappears besieging the towns of the 
Chalcidice. 11 Quite evidently, this series of events was not Intended by Dodorus to be 
read as a full and comprehensive account of Philip's activities during these years, but a 
summary, interspersed with the focal narrative of this section of his work, that of the 
Sacred War. This being the case, much modem controversy has arisen over the correct 
chronology of both the Sacred War itself 12 and of Philip's involvement in it. zn 
An early article by Hammond" provided the basis for the most widely accepted theory 
regarding the chronology to date. 14 H argues that no doublet in fact exists in Diodorus' 
narrative of the Sacred War and that, as far as possible, the chronology given by 
Diodorus ought to be accepted. Hammond's lengthy and extremely detailed article 
cannot be usefully paraphrased here - however, using the siege of Methone as a key 
point in his chronology due to its connection to IG 2 IL 1.130, which is datable to 355 15 
he dates the fall of Methone to 354, the battle of Neon immediately after it, and the 
involvement of Philip immediately after this. ' 6 
Certainty on the issues raised by these chronological arguments is impossible, given the 
slippery nature of Diodorus' account and the difficulty of dating it via any other source 
on the period, and complete confidence on the issue is impossible. However, 
Hammond's arguments are full and convincing and as a result the chronology which he 
proposes will be tentatively accepted here. In any case, the precise chronology adopted 
on the events of the Sacred War does not affect the validity of Philip's aims, methods or 
policies during these years to any significant degree. 
The Early Years of the Sacred War 
Because of the importance of the Sacred War for Philip's subsequent position in Greece, 
it is easy to forget that much of it took place without him. This is certainly true of the 
outbreak of the Sacred War, of which we shall now give a brief account, with particular 
reference to the positions of Philip's allies and enemies in relation to it. We will then 
11 16.52.1 
12 See for example the landmark work of ClocM, 1915, the front runner of the early twentieth century 
scholars who detected a doublet in Diodorus' narrative of the Sacred War. This theory has been discussed 
and refuted by Hammond (discussed below) and has no direct bearing on our examination of Philip's 
foreign policy. 
13 1937 
14 Although see Martin 1981, discussed briefly below, and Buckler 1996, discussed in our subsection on zD 
the peace for some arguments against Hammond's sequence. C) Z: I 
15 See Hammond 1937 p58- 
16 Martin 1981 ppl-93f is uncomfortable with the insertion in Hammond's chronology of a winter between 
Philip's having come to terms with Methone and setting out for Thessaly. There is no need, however, for :D t> 
such discomfort. As Buckler pointed out (pp63ff) it seems likely that Philip's settlement at Methone 
ought to be associated with the arrival of an appeal for assistance from Thessaly (discussed below), but CI 
this need not have necessitated Philip's leaving Methone and proceeding straight into Thessaly. Had he zn Z. 1ý1 Zý 
known that an expedition to Thessaly, with a chance of entering more fully into Greek affairs, was 2: ý 
pending in the following campaigning season he may well have seen the benefits of coming to a swift Z-1 
Zý Cý Z: I 
agreement with Methone and concluding his costly and wearing siege there in favour of having the winter Cý C) ZI 
in which to build up financial resources and, if necessary, organise his resources for the Thessalian 
expedition. Also contrary to Hammond, Martin proposes a shift of the events reported by Diodorus for 
Philip under the year -3353/2 
backwards into the year 354/3 and those of 352/1 into 353/2. Martin's 
rearranaement seems unnecessary and Hammond's thesis is accepted here, as in most modern studies, 
including that of Griffith. Cý 
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consider Philip's activities during this period and how he was placed on the eve of his 4- 
intervention in the war. ' 7 
Diodorus 16.23.1 begins the war under the year 355/4 when the Phocians, indignant 
about a prejudicial judgement against them by the AmphIctyonic council, seized the J 2-: ' Delphic oracle, with Philomelus as their energetic commander. They defeated the 
Locrians in battle and, under the following year and following a second defeat in battle, 
Diodorus records how Locris appealed for help to the Thebans, who in turn passed the 
matter over to the Amphictyonic council, with the suggestion that war should be 
prosecuted against the Phocians on behalf of the god. The matter became complicated, 
however, as certain of the Amphictyons came out in support of the Phocians. 
EE (ixiýoýt' vilý 8\ Týý Tcov F-0v(i)v -K(xt lzoxF-Cov (xipp-, Gewý To) ýtev IF-P(iü ßoilOF-iv 
F-7vwaccv Bot(oTot\ -Kcc\t AoKpot Km GETc(x; ý01 'K(X\t FIF-PPcclßoi, npo\ý & rouTolý 
AcoptE% Kal AOXonF-ý, F'-', ut 8E 'AO(xýt&vF-ý Km 'AX(xto\t Km M(xl-yvilTF-ý, 
en ÖF\- Aivt&vF-ý Kcci Ttveý e"TF-pot, To% öe' cyl)vF-ýt('xXo'L)v 'AOrjv(xiot 
Kal A(xxeÖ(xtýtoviot Km Tiveý eTF-pot To)v 11eXonovvTlcytwv. 
As tribes and cities were divided in their choice, the Boeotians, Locrians, 
Thessalians and Perrhaebians decided to aid the shrine, and in addition the 
Dorians and Dolopians, likewise the Athamanians, Acheans of Phthiotis, and the 
Magnesians, also the Aenianians and some others; while the Athenians, 
Lacedaemonians, and some of the other Peloponnesians fought on the side of the 
Phocians. (16.29.1, under the year 354/3) 
Under the same year, Diodorus records the first large scale battle between Philomelus at 
the head of a large mercenary force and the assembled armies of Thebes, Locris and 
Thessaly. After bitter fighting, during which the Thessalians were routed, 18 the Phocians 
were eventually put to flight and Philomelus killed. Onomarchus then took over 
command of the Phocian army. 
Besides noting, then, that the outbreak of the Sacred War and what might be thought of 
as its first phase had taken place without any input from Philip, one issue is of especial 
interest to us from this narrative, and that is the positions of Athens and Thessaly in 
relation to this new conflict, which was to have an important bearing on Philip's later 
involvement in it. Athens, we note, because of her long standing alliance with Phocis, 
had ranged herself on the "wrong" side of the war, 19 perhaps because of her enmity 
17 Here only a brief outline of the situation in Greece is given, to facilitate a discussion of Philip's foreign zn tD 
policy during his involvement in the war. For an excellent modern discussion of this period, see Buckler 
1989. 
18 16.30.4 
19 Exactly what the attitude towards the religious and hence moral aspect of the war was will be discussed Z-: ) 
more fully in the context of the claim to religious righteousness explicit to Philip's gesture of equipping zn 1-ý ZD 
his soldiers with laurel wreath at the battle of the Crocus Field. Buckler, however, is in no doubt about the 
issue of the legality of Philomelus' plundering of the shrine: I::, Zý 
Apollo's sanctuary at Delphi was not a polls, and most of the dedications there came from the 
broader Greek world. They were the possessions of the god, not of the Phocians, and the Z-1 
illaging of them was an affront to those, whether states or individuals, who had made them. pi C- C, 
(p38) 
Even if Griffith's rubbishing of the idea that Philip's laurel wreaths had any real religious significance tD C) 
(discussed below) is accepted, Buckler's point here is unarzo,,, uably correct. The Phocian side of the war 
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towards Thebes, which opposed Phocis, whilst Thessaly had opted to come to the 
defence of the god. This arrangement, while it came about through no engineering from , =)I n Philip himself, could hardly have suited him better. It was to allow him great freedom in 
the coming years. He would be able to enter the Sacred War legitimately as the 
representative of Thessaly (and later as ally of Thebes during the second phase of his 
involvement in the war, discussed below) and having done so he would be able to pursue 
a policy of hostility towards his long established enemy, Athens, under the aegis of the 
Amphictyony. 
At the time of these events, however, Philip had his mind on affairs closer to home. The 
years following Philip's accession had seen the pursuit of an active program designed to 
eliminate centres of Athenian interest or influence from Philip's territory. 20 The 
completion of this project necessitated the reduction of one last city - Methone. 
Our first notice of the siege of Methone comes at Diodorus 16.31.6 the year 354/3: 
"AýLa & col, )TOt; TCPCCTTORF-Votq (1), kt7ciroq , r6v MCC-KE-6 , V(OV P(X(Ttkp-, 00 -0 q 
MF-O(I)Vllv RE, v ýIuloktop-Kljacc; imt, 8t(XpTcoc(ycc; rlccY(X(Y(, X; 6F'- 
xEtp(O(Y(4tF-Voq llv(xY-K(X(5F-V UTCOra7ýVat. 
While these things were going on, Philip, king of Macedon, after taking Methone 
by storm and pillaging it, razed it to the ground, and having subdued Pagasae 
forced it to submit. 
A more detailed account, however, comes at 16.34.4-5, under the following year: 
(1)t, xtnnoý 8' OP6)v Toi)ý ME0(Ovato-oý OpýtrlTllptov ir(xpexoýtF- 11 0 vol)ý/ T' v n' ýav 
To% 7[OXEýtiotý 9(Xl. )Toi) 7zoý, topxi(xv 01)VF-CYTIIEY(XTO. KM ýt£-, xpt ýtev Ttvoý oi 
MF-OCOV(Xiot ötex(xpTepo")v, F, -, nE1T (X K(xTtcyxl, )oýtF-VOI 01)Vilv(XY. K(XGOIICY(XV 
nccpccöo£)VCCI cljv noxiv TCO ßccEytxzi noxt', mý F'-'K TTlý 
meoýOvilý E, XOVT(Xý ov t4(xTtov EK(XEYTOV. 0 89' (Dixinnoý Tljv ýLev noxiv 
K(XTF-crK(XYF-, TIIV 59 XO)P(XV Öt£-VF-týLE To% M(XKF, 50(: ytv. E-V 59 Tý 7roxtopKt(X 
'C(X Ti 10 F- ßil r\v (DiÄtnnov etiý cov 0(PO(X; ýgbv nxll-yýVT(X Toý 1) 
ýq 
G")VF- 0 ei)ýtaTt 
8m(PoapýVat v\IV o'pccatv. 
Philip, perceiving that the people of Methone were permitting their city to 
become a base of operations for his enemies, began a siege. And although for a 
time the people of Methone held out, later, being overpowered, they were 
compelled to hand the city over to the king on the terms that the citizens should 
leave Methone with a single garment each. Philip then razed the city and 
distributed its territory among the Macedonians. In this siege it so happened that 
Philip was struck in the eye by an arrow and lost the sight of that eye. 
Methone, Athens I last bastion of influence on the Macedonian coast had, then, been 
destroyed. Athenian hopes of control in the north or, the greatest prize, of recapturing 
Amphipolis, lived on only in the realms of wishful thinking now (if, indeed, it could ever 
was undoubtedly in some sense the "wrong, " side. For examples of Athenian support of Phocis, see 
Chares' presence at the Battle of the Crocus Field, 16.35.5, the massive Athenian contribution to the 
Phocian war effort followingr the defeat in this battle, 16.37.3 and the Athenian defence of Thermopylae, 
16.38.1-2, ostensibly to prevent Philip's pursuit of the war into Phocis itself but almost certainly made 
with an eye on domestic security as well. 
20 See previous chapter for discussion. 
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be said to have existed anywhere else). Philip's gradual eradication of potential Athenian 
bases which could threaten his territory, initiated with the capture of Amphipolis in 21 357ý was complete. 
As pointed out above in our discussion of chronology, Buckler, probably correctly, 
associates this sudden conclusion of the siege of Methone with a change in the political 
climate in the Greek world: 
Methone gave Philip a personal grievance, when a defender blinded his right eye 
with an arrow. Now given an excellent reason for revenge, he continued the siege 
with his usual patience and tenacity while his wound healed. Yet he suddenly 
came to terms with Methone, and spared its inhabitants. The simplest explanation 
for his behaviour is the arrival of the Thessalian embassy. The Aleuadae gave 
him an opportunity that he could scarcely ignore. (p63) 
Philip, with his own territory settled, his unbeaten new army to showcase, and with 
Thessaly behind him, was ready to move into Greece. 
The First Phase of Philip's Involvement in the Sacred War 
Diodorus 16.35.1ff informs us of the circumstances under which Philip entered Thessaly 
for a second time, 22 and became embroiled in the Sacred War: 
MF-, r('x 6F'- rocý)O' o (Dikurno; lbiro' E)&rrcc. 2&6-)v ýt&rccl-ckijftit; i'IKEv Et; E)F-, rT(xXiocv 
[tE, T(x rfiq 6-uv&ýLF-wq, -K(xt To [iEv irp(bcov Tcpo; AuKo(ppova r 6\v (DF-p6v 
, rl, )pccvvov 8tF-noXE[tF-t po, 906v roi; E)F-, rc(xXoi; - 
5 E\ rccina rof) 
Alwcoypovo; ýtF-, r(xTcFqtWa[tFvou ir(xpc\c r&)v (1)(01c8aw auýt[taXlccv (x7rE(YT(, Xxll 
c (Dcci)XXo; o ('x8F-X(p 6\; 'Ovoýi&pXou ýtmc uTpourtcoTew F-TcTccKt(YXtX't(Ov. o 66 
(Dt'XtTcTco; coi\)q (Dawd; VtKll(Y(X; 6'4E-'POCXFV E-'K Tý; E)F-TToCX't(X;. 'OVO[t(XPXO; 6' 
OCVOCX(Xp(\t)V TC&(YCCV 'TI\IV 616V(YýUV KCCI VORI'ýWV O'Xlj; 'Uý; E)F-'CroCXI'(X; 100PIF-1)(YEIV 
IlKev Ev U(XXF-t PO'Tjollmov roi; RF-P\t ro'v Ai)wo(ppov(x. 'Toi) 8 F\- (Dtk'tTcTcol) ýtF-vx 
e , rcov Oevc(Acov c, cvrt71(xpcvrccý%tE'-vo-L) uo-t; (Dwiccý)(Ttv 'OvoR(xpXoq bTcEpeX(ov 
'TOiq TCXIIOF-Gt 81001 [tO'CX(Xtq F-VtKII(YE K(Xt 7EAkOlOg T6)V MCCKF-60V(I)V ('XVF-ikFV. 
(Dt'ktnTcoq 5' F-tiq rob; caX&Touq Ktv6l)vol)q TcEptKkEt(TOF-tq -Kcct\ r6)v 
G, rpcc, rt(O'CCOV 8t(\x Tl\lv (, XO-L)[t't(XV K(XTCCXtTcovr(ov (X-L)T O\v TC()Cp()Co(xp(yl, )Vccq TO 
TCA, ýOoq [toytq F-Tcot, TjGF-v (X-L)'COI)q FbTcF-tOF-iq. ýL&r& U c(xf), c(x o (Dt'kt7u7coq [tEv 
'Ovo[t(xpXo; 6F- (7, cpocTF-1)(T(x; F-t'q Bot(wriew (XVF-X(I)Pll(TF-v Et; M(XKF-60vt/Ocv, 
; Boto), ro\ q -K(x\ n'ktv F-'XF- Kop' EvtKll(YF- [t(xxln roli 11) t0t (OVEMV. 
After this Philip in response to a summons from the Thessalians entered Thessaly 
with his army, and at first carried on a war against Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae, 
in support of the Thessalians; but later, when Lycophron summoned an auxiliary 
force from his allies the Phocians, Phayllus, the brother of Onomarchus, was 
dispatched with seven thousand men. But Philip defeated the Phocians and drove 
them out of Thessaly. Then Onomarchus came in haste with his entire military 
strength to the support of Lycophron, believing that he would dominate all 
Thessaly. When Philip in company with the Thessallans joined battle against the 
Phocians, Onomarchus with his superior numbers defeated him in two battles and 
slew many of the Macedonians. As for Philip, he was reduced to the utten-nost 
2' Discussed in the previous chapter. 
22 See previous chapter for a discussion of his first campaign in Thessaly. 
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perils and his soldiers were so despondent that they had deserted him, but by 
arousing the courage of the majority, he got them with great difficulty to obey his C) Z: ) 
orders. Later Philip withdrew to Macedonia, and Onomarchus, marching into 
Boeotia, defeated the Boeotians in battle and took the city of Coroneia. (16.35.1- 
3,353/2)23 
Several theories have arisen over why Philip involved himself in Thessaly at this point. 
Buckler expresses one commonly held view: 
There is no need to speculate about Philip's reasons for responding to the 
Aleuadae's appeal. Thessaly was rich in land, produce, cities and men. 
Thessalian cavalry was the best in Greece and the mountainous country 
surrounding Thessaly supplied numerous peltasts. Success in Thessaly would 
provide Philip with a whole new army and additional revenues. Nor could he 
wisely stand idly by only to watch the tyrants of Pherae overwhelm the 
Thessalian confederacy. Jason of Pherae had given the Greek world a glimpse of 
a united Thessaly's potential might, and no Macedonian king could afford to 
forget the lesson. (pp63 f)24 
Some of Buckler's arguments are worth taking into consideration. Firstly, it is certainly 
true that Thessaly was wealthy and had many resources it could offer to Philip for the 
conduct of the Sacred War. However, a concern far more pressing than any sense of 
threat from Thessaly, hinted at by Buckler, must surely have been a sense of 
responsibility to it. Philip had previously undertaken to drive the tyrants out of Thessaly, 
and while he had been successful to some degree, had been given the title of archon, a 
Thessalian bride and the support of the Thessalian people, evidently the tyrants were still 
at large and now had some very powerful allies, the Phocians, whose forces and 
resources were swollen by the plundering of the shrine and the preparations for the 
Sacred War. Philip could not allow this new Greek war to spill over and saturate his 
earlier settlements in Thessaly to the extent that he might lose his influence there. That 
being so, it appears that Philip had little option but to involve himself in Thessaly now. 
This point of view renders the issue of Philip's attitude yet more complex, challenging as 
it does the widely held belief that the Sacred War formed, for Philip, little more than a 25 
gateway through which he could march his army into Greece . Indeed, the nature of 
23 We might note here that in the original text of 16.31.6, quoted above, the name of the city taken by Zý C) Philip immediately following the siege of Methone was given as Pagai. This version is accepted by some t) Cý ? -ý C) II 
modern scholars (for example Ellis p76); however, the emendation to Pagasae is more widely recognised Z: ) 
as correct, and indeed the fact that Pagasae was the name of the harbour of Pherae (see Hammond's C> 
maps) and that Philip then moved against Pherae, the name Pagasae seems the more likely of the two. Cý tý 
The campaign related here, then, should be considered as having been preceded by Philip's capture of C) zn 
Pagasae. C, 24 In hinting at the dangers inherent to Macedon of a united Thessaly, Buckler seems to be echoing Zý Cý C Cawkwell on Philip's first intervention in Thessaly earlier in his reign (Cawkwell pp58f). Given that 
Thessaly appears to have been rent by civil strife and political discord throughout the period covered by 
this thesis, with the exception only of the brief period of Jason's dominance, such a concern does not, in 
fact, seem likely to have been a central one for Philip now. 
25 Borza's viewpoint on Philip is especially helpful to bear in mind now, although he intended this 
principle to be applied to the whole of Philip's reign and not just the Sacred War 
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Philip's defeat at the hands of Onomarchus carries the sense of an expedition planned 
with more parochial concerns in mind, defence of the settlements he had made earlier in 
Greece, only to be faced with the full might of the most dominant and aggressive an-ny 
in Greece at this time. 
Polyaenus' account of one of Philip's two defeats at the hands of Onomarchus allows us 
a fuller picture of this episode: 
'Ovo[t(xpxo; M(X-KF-80(71 impavX(TC70ý1EVO; opo; [tljVoF-I8F, -; IC(X'T(X V(O'CO1. ) 
xc(p6v 
K(XI T(xi; E'K(XTE'TO)OEV Kopl, )(P(xi; E, -7K(XT(XKP")Wccq IrErpol, ); -K(XI IrF-, Tpopoxol-); 
TEPOfi7F- 'TI\IV 8-L)V(X[ttV E'-; TO' WCOKF-IýLF-Vov IEF-8t, ov. (0; 8F, - Ot 
M(XKF-60VF,; 
(XV, UE7rtov, TF-; ý-Kpopoxtimxvuo, ot 4)(O-Kd; TcPoGF-7rot-q(T(XVTO (PF-1, L)7F-lv E'l; ro, c 
ýLFkFOC TOi) O'PO'L);. Oti RF', V 8ý M(XKF-60VF-; Ol0R&) K(Xt' PlO[tl E EKF- -C I 6t(J)KOVrEq -, 7r/, tV 0, 8F T&)V Kopl. )(PCOV Tol)q IrF, XXOV-CF-; (T-L)VE- v Ot Wuo _'TPO"); 
"rptpov rTj 
(1) E f) M(XICF-80vtK"lv (P('XX(x77(x. TOTE 6ý 'OVO[t(XPXO; EullltllvF-V TOi; (D ic (Ytv 
F-ITt(YTPF-(PF-tV K(Xt TOi; lUOXF-[tt'Ot; 9ýtp(AkEtV. Ot' 8F'- M(XKF-50VFq, TOW ýLEV 
V Ont(TOF-V F-'ýLP(XXXOYROV, T6V 8F'- ('X'VQ)OF-V TOU; nF'-'UPOU; P(XXXOV'U(OV, (TOV rcOxx, 6) 
TCOV(P (PI)70V'rF-; (XVF-XO)Pll(5(XV. EV 'T(Xl)'Ul 
ýj 
Tl (p -0 T 'rov PoccTtxE-(x TCOV n 7,1 M(XKF-60VO)V 4)tXtTC7[OV (PCC(YtV EtTCdV ýOUK F-'(PI)70v, ('x vF-X(I)Pq(y()c (")(TTEF- P 
oc ,", 'Ot; not " Tj F- 11 I Kpt0l, IV WO 'q(y(%LocI (T(po6porE' Pow 'r, v, ýLpox' V, 
When Onomarchus commanded against the Macedonians, he covered his rear 
with a steep and craggy mountain; and on the tops of it he placed in ambush a 
number of men expert in throwing stones, furnished them with huge stones and 
pieces of ragged rocks for the purpose. He then advanced and formed his army on 
the plain. The Macedonians began the attack with their javelins; which the 
Phocians pretending themselves to be unable to sustain, retreated halfway up the 
mountain. The Macedonians briskly pursued them; till they came within reach of 
the ambuscade: who then discovered themselves: and with huge stones annoyed 
the Macedonian phalanx. Onomarchus then gave the signal for the Phocian force 
to face about, and renew the charge. The Macedonians vigorously attacked by the 
troops next to them and annoyed by those above, with great difficulty made good 
a precipitate retreat: on which occasion Philip king of Macedon is said to have 
cried out " we do not fly, but retreat like rams, to renew the attack with greater 
power. " Stratagems 2.38.2 26 
This moment marked the onset of a period of genuine crisis in Philip's reign, and for a 
time it looked as if two fundamental threads in the work of his reign to date had come 
loose and were unravelling. The first element of this crisis is clear from Diodorus' 
narrative, quoted above: Philip, totally dependent as he was upon the strength of his 
army, was suffering from a situation of near mutiny amongst his men. Ellis comments 
upon the gravity of this situation: tý 
This is the only know occasion on which Philip's relations with his subjects were 
put under strain. Although DemostheneS27 was to claim only three years after this 
that the Macedonian people were exhausted by Philip's ambition and tired of the 
demands he made upon them, he was unable on any occasion to cite any single 
One underlying principle must be kept in mind: there is insufficient evidence to suggest that t-- C zn 
Philip's career followed a predestined or predetermined path leading to the conquest of Greece 
and the plan for an Asian expedition. (p209) 
26 Translation A. Shepherd 1974. 
27 ". 15 f. 
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example of such dissatisfaction. Significantly, the only occasion on which Philip 
appears to have lost control, if temporarily, this lapse was brought about by a 
remarkable military error on his part - something of which he was rarely, if ever, 
guilty otherwise. Disillusionment of course was not new to the Macedonians but 
one can well imagine the effects of this defeat when, after six years of 
unmitigated military success, it must have appeared, at first, as if their buoyant 
new balloon had burst. (p79) 
In spite, however, of the shock to the Macedonian system of this defeat, and in spite of 
the humiliation of it, the commander who was undismayed by the massed forces of the 
Illyrians or any other force he met in his life was not to be discouraged now. Whatever 
trick of rhetoric or generalship he used is lost to us now, but somehow Philip was able to 
shepherd the remainder of his force back safely to Macedon, encourage and reinforce his 
troops during the winter and, ultimately, lead them back to defeat Onomarchus and his 
army in the following campaigning season. 28 No matter how close to mutiny his forces 
came, then, or what fluctuations Philip's relations with his subjects underwent during the 
following winter, Philip's generalship eventually won out. 
The second element of crisis which followed this defeat for Philip struck at an even more 
profound vein in the position which he had been building since his accession, and 
resulted in losses which were far more difficult to recoup. Settlements which Philip had 
made earlier in his reign appeared to be cracking 
Although Hammond, in his chronology, appears to associate Cersobleptes' alliance with 
Athens with Chares' presence at SeStOS29 it seems inconceivable that some knowledge of 
Philip's defeat had not reached Thrace and been taken into account in this move by 
Cersobleptes. Indeed, Philip's Thracian campaign, following his retreat from 
Thermopylae (discussed below) seems a clear indication of his awareness of his need to 
re-establish himself there. Precisely what Philip's earlier relationship with Cersobleptes 
had been is unclear, but, as discussed in the previous chapter, Philip's early campaigns 
following the defeat of the three kings by Parmenio had included some incursions into 
Thracian territory, most notably his capture of the wealthy mining town of Crenides, 
from which a large portion of Philip's income was derived . 
30 It seems likely that 
Cersobleptes was attempting to exploit Philip's recent defeat to pry lose his grip on the 
areas of Thrace which he had taken earlier. 
Diodorus 16.34.4 informs us (in spite of erroneously placing it immediately before the 
siege of Methone in his chronology) of the magnitude of the repercussions of 
Cersobleptes' actions: 
KF-pcyopXE'-Tc, rol) 6E' cob Koruoq 6tcc rE 'Týv Tcpo, q (DI, 
xtTc7cov (, XxxoTptoTllrcc Icat 
,c IV Tcpoq (piXI(xv '7XF-tpt(yccvroq -coiq 'AOilvcc'otq c' q' 'AOllvcct'oi. )q Et cc EV 7 
XF-ppov ý(Y(p iu6XF-tq nX )v Kccp8t'aq C'CnE-'G'CF-IXF-V 0 6ýýWq ICX'qpOlJXO-Oq Eliq '[C'Cq 'I ,0 
nOXF-I;. 
And when Cersobleptes, son of Cotys, because of his hostility to Philip and his 
alliance of friendship with the Athenians, had turned over to the Athenians the 
28 This campaign is discussed below. C 29Hammond 1937 p78. 
30 For bibliography on Philip's coinage, see Chapter 8 note 58. C Z-1 
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cities on the Chersonese except Cardia, the assembly sent out colonists to these 
cities. 
In spite, then, of all of Philip's endeavours in the early years of his reign, to eliminate 
Athenian influence from the north, it appeared that Athens was once again gaining some 
northern footholds and, even more worrying than the capitulation of Cersobleptes, an 
ally far closer to home seemed to be showing signs of inclining towards Athens too. 
Demosthenes 23.107ff records the first feelers to have been extended from Olynthus to 
Athens, and it seems very likely that this change of heart towards Philip should be 
considered as a part of the immediate aften-nath of his defeat. 31 
Far beyond the depth of crisis that a mutiny could have brought to Philip, then, his defeat 
at the hands of Onomarchus had some very serious consequences indeed. It really 
appeared that much of what Philip's foreign policy had so far achieved - the elimination 
of Athenian influence from the north, a settlement in Thrace, a position of influence, if 
not dominance, in Thessaly, were all under threat. A defeated army with an 
unpredictable degree of discipline can only have consolidated the uncertainty of the 
future at this point. This was without doubt a moment of genuine crisis for Philip, and in 
extricating himself from it he displayed the remarkable resilience which marked him out 
as an exceptional general and king. The only outcome which could save face for Philip 
in Greece, bolster the confidence of his army and stop the rot of defections to Athens 
amongst his allies was a bnlliant victory in Thessaly, and that is precisely what Philip 
delivered at the Battle of the Crocus Field the following spring. 32 
C9 VI(Xý ýtEM TTlý KOCT(x ÖE Tilv E)F-TT(Xý, 1(XV (I)tiXtlulloý ýL, VX Týý M(X'K980 
81, )VC'CýtF, COý äCPTI K(XTIIVTII'KO)ý EGTPCCTF-1, )GF-V Ellt AUKO(pPOV(X TOV (1)EPCOV 
,c/- ') IIC \' ýI, N -L)P(XVVOV. 0-L)TOý 8' 01 WV CC Oýt(XXOý ýLETE7lEýtWUT0 (JUýtýt(Xxt(XV 7cocp(x 
£-'nccy-YF, ý, XOýLEVOý CYI)7'K(XT(XGKEI)(xcygtv (xl)Tolý TU K(XTCC TIIV 
E)F-TT(Xý, ' (XV. Öto'TCF-P 'OVOýt(, xpxoo 1rEýý ET \ 7rEý(i)V ÖIGýLl, )P' ßollOyl(: yccvToý ýt (X 1(I)v 
KM IZF-VT(XKOEYIO)V 1717rEM 0 EV (1)'kI1Z1Z0ý nF-'GCCý TOi ý OF-'rC(XXO 'KOIVfi T' ov 
n09ýEgov c"cP(XciOcct (: YI)VljY(XYE TO1L)ý IE(XVT(Xý 11F-ýObý ýtF\, v lc, )71F\-p Tobý 
t7[7t£iý 8F'- Tptcyxtk1'01, )ý. 'YeVoýLEVIlý 59, IMPUT(, xýCO)ý KM T(J)V 
E)F-TT(XXCOV i7171£, -cov T(i) TIXIIOF-t KM Uctý (, XPEC(Xiý 
Öt(X(PF-POVT(OV £'-VI"GF-v 0 
(I)txtnIroý. TCOV ÖE nEpl T o\V 'OVOýt(XPXOV K(XT(X(Pl, )'YOVT(OV Etý Tn\v 0('Xý, (XT'U(XV 'K(XI 
TuXuAý ir(xp(x7rý. F'-ovToý Toi) 'AOllvocio-o X(X'PIITOý ýtET6 nox2. J)v TPIIIP(t)V 
nUuý F'-, y£-'VF-, co (povoý TWV 01 'Y(XP (PF-1, )'10vTF-ý ptwOCVTF-ý Vxý 
nu. VonýJaý 8tF-vlIxovT0 npoý Tücý TPIIIpgtý, F'-V Olý ýv K(X\t (xibTäý 'OVOýt(XPXOý. 
ýn 
PE (3 E 1, ) F- Uý_kOý &- TCOV (I)(j)'KE'-(OV 'K(Xti 4tGO0(P0p(1)V (XVI All (XV ýtýV ilZýp TO1)ý 
F-ý(xKt(YXIxtol, )ý, EV 0% AV KM (x-oToý 0 CYTPUT1170ý, lIX(0(: Y(xv 89 01')1-C EkUTTOIL)ý 
T(i)V Tptaxt; ý10)V. 0 ÖF\- (I)iktlzlc(DH; To\V ýtF', V 'OVOýL(XPXOV EXpeýLW: ye, Tobý 
(XXX0loý coý tEpo(y11)1; ý0-0ý K(X'UF-IUOVTtaev. 
As for Thessaly, however, Philip had just at that time returned with his army 
from Macedonia and had taken the field against Lycophron, tyrant of Pherae. 
Lycophron, however, since he was no match for him in strength, summoned 
reinforcements from his allies the Phocians, promising jointly with them to 
organise the government of all Thessaly. So when Onomarchus in haste came to 
his support with twenty thousand foot and five hundred horse, Philip, having 
31 So Ellis, p8l. He also identifies Epiros, Paeonia and Illyria as places where previous arrangements with 
Philip may have been breaki 
C, ing down. The evidence on this, however, Demosthenes 1.12, is too slim and 
too imprecise for much weight to rest upon i Z: ) it. 
32 That is, spring 3552, following Hammond. 9-1- - 1-: 1 
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persuaded the Thessalians to prosecute the war in common, grathered them all C together, numbering more than twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse. A 
severe battle took place and since the Thessallan cavalry were superior In 
numbers and valour, Philip won. Because Onomarchus had fled towards the sea 
and Chares the Athenian was by chance sailing by with many triremes, a great Z: ý 
slaughter of the Phocians took place, for the men in their effort to escape would 
strip off their armour and try to swim out to the triremes, and amongst them was 
Onomarchus. Finally more than six thousand of the Phocians and mercenaries 
were slain, and among them the general himself; and no less than three thousand 
were taken captive. Philip hanged Onomarchus; the rest he threw into the sea as 
33 temple robbers. (16.35.3-5,353/2)) 
A potentially controversial element from our narrative of the battle of the Crocus Field is 
the way in which Philip chose to style his men explicitly as defenders of the god, a detail 
which is added for us by Justin 8.2.3: 
Philip, as if he were the avenger not of the Thebans but of sacrilege, ordered all 
his soldiers to wear crowns of laurel and he proceeded to battle, under the 
leadership, as it were, of the god... at the sight of the divine symbols [the 
Phocians] terrified by their guilty consciences, threw away their arms. 34 
The most outspoken point of view on this curiously strong appeal to Greek religious 
sympathies comes, in modem sources, from Griffith, who roundly concludes: 
Everybody in Greece knew that the "sacredness of the Sacred War was a ramp, 
that the Phocians had only become "impious" because the Boeotians had 
practically forced them to and even had become "temple robbers" only when they 
really had no other means of surviving. People who had suffered from the 
Phocians, like the Boeotians, Locrians and Thessalians and others, were no doubt 
delighted when Philip did something nasty to them, while the Athenians, 
Spartans and other friends of Phocis thought it disgusting. But a neutral, 
unpolitical public opinion of ordinary people who were genuinely shocked by the 
"impiety" of the Phocians probably did not exist. (pp274f) 
33 Some confusion has arisen here in Diodorus over the manner of Onomarchus' death. Ouaht we to take r: 1 him here to mean that Onomarchus drowned and his body was hanged, or that he was captured whilst 
trying to swim out to sea and put to death by hangin, (),,? Our concept of Onomarchus' death is yet further 0 r) n* 
confused by the 16.61.2, which has him "cut to pieces in battle in Thessaly along with the Phocians and 
the mercenaries of his command and crucified". Pausamas 10.2.5 has him shot down by his own men. 
Little progress may be made by discussion of these varying accounts, except to say that it seems likely, in 
view of the pious representation of his actions that Philip appears to have sought for (discussed below) 
that he may have displayed Onomarchus' body, thereby denying him funeral rites. The manner of the 
deaths of the soldiers is equally unsure. Buckler (1989 pp76ff) suggests that they were drowned by Philip 
as punishment for sacrilege, but this seems very difficult to believe, because (besides the lack of any other 
example of such behaviour in ancient society) of the sheer difficulty of drowning several thousand men (a 
point raised by Griffith p276). It seems more likely that they drowned or were killed in the chaos of their 
attempts to swim out to Chares' fleet. 
" Perhaps we should put this last image, of the Phocians throwing away their arms in terror at the sight of 2-=ý 
the divine symbols, down to over enthusiasm on behalf of Justin or his source. The Phocians had after all 
seen divine symbols before - during the looting of the shrine, for instance. On the other hand. perhaps the L- L- 
combination of these symbols and a large, well disciplined and armed force might have struck a fresh Cý ZD 
nerve in the Phocian conscience and provoked this reaction! 
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Any such discussion is, of course, highly problematic. We have no way of measuring the 
degree of piety Greece at this time. Griffith's point of view, however, seems rather 
? 35 extreme. Is it possible that Philip s actions could have been so entirely cynical -) 
Three small incidents might be sufficient to persuade us that there is, at least, room for 
the possibility that this was not so, insignificant as they might separately seem. The first 
is the reference to Delphi and the emphasis placed on religion in the inscription 
-36 recording Philip's alliance with Olynthus. 
Secondly, in this context, the reference to Philip's participation in the Olympic games, 37 
recorded by Plutarch , might 
be considered to have extra significance. After all, the 
Olympic games were essentially a religious festival and participation in them might be 
considered accordingly. And thirdly, perhaps the most significant of these small 
incidents, is that curious episode related by Demosthenes in the First Philippic: "to 
crown it all, when he landed at Marathon and bore away from our land the Sacred 
Tfireme" (34). 38 
The fact that this ship was connected with the worship of Apollo can have been no 
coincidence. The First Philippic is notoriously difficult to date; however, whatever the 
date of Philip's capture of the Sacred Trireme, it appears to have been an obvious 
reference to the connection between Athens and the Phocian disrespect towards the 
35 Cawkwell too is sceptical of Philip's religious sensibilities, commenting: tý 4D 
It is fruitless to ask whether Philip shared any of this feeling,, although one may suspect that his 
comparative leniency to the Phocians after 346 argues that he did not... [he] must have seen that 
under the banner of the aod he could win the (Yoodwill of all right thinking Greeks the better to 4D C) 
master them. (p66) 
Buckler's point of view initially appears to be different: 
Philip's treatment of the corpse [of Onomarchus] was not an act of savagery or arrogance. It was 
the visible sign that he was truly acting as the avenger of Apollo. Philip was presenting himself t) ZD 
as a pious leader to the entire Greek world... dreadful indeed was the punishment [of the 
drowned mercenaries], but it was entirely consistent with Philip's role as Apollo's champion and 
with his other acts of calculated terrorism. (pp76f) 
He ultimately concludes, however, (on the following page) that Philip's religious role was entirely 
assumed, allowing him to establish a "disinterested, pious, and essentially Greek" identity for himself, t-:, 
which was especially useful for his pursuit of hostility with Athens. 
36 Tod 158. The wording of the alliance is unusually pious and contains a specific reference (lines 13-14) C, 
to the approval of Apollo of the agreement. The significance of this pious tone is not entirely clear. ZID ZD 
However, given Philip's later use of a religious persona as champion of the Sacred War, perhaps we C> C, 
ought to associate the wording of this treaty with an early inclination towards the use of firmly Greek t: ý 
religious structures. Z) 37 Quoted in the previous chapter. 38-, 
T& TEkF-IOTCCV Eiq M(XP(XO6)V' a7EE'-PTI Kai c'q'v iEpav O'MO' cfiq X(bp(x; (ýXF-, C F'-X(ov -rpLýpq, - The history 
and significance of this trireme is recorded by Plato, Phaedo 58alO-58b4: Cý 
Phaedo: This is the ship, as the Athenians say, in which Theseus once went to Crete with 
fourteen youths and maids and saved them and himself. Now the Athenians made a vow to 
Apollo, as the story goes, that if they were saved they would send a mission every year to Delos. C> 
And from that time even to the present day they send it. 
The connection between the trii-eme and Marathon is unclear, but it seems a reasonable conjecture that it 
might have been stored there. 
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shrine. In the context of our consideration of the position of Athens in this conflict, we 
might briefly note Chares appearance at the periphery of the battle ZID I of the Crocus Field. None but the most gullible historian could believe that, as Diodorus states, Chares was 
"by chance sailing by with many triremes. " Chares' presence here in fact constituted a 
precursor to the first armed encounter between Philip and Athens at Thermopylae . 39 and 
served as a clear indicator of Athens' support for Phocis. Perhaps Philip, in this gesture 
of the removal of the Sacred Trireme, whether it occurred before or after his victory, was 
attempting to draw the fact of the impiety of Athens to public attention in Greece, 
thereby legitimising hostility towards her in the context of the Sacred War. It appears, 
then, that it is at least possible to make the case that Philip's actions were no mere 
assumption of a veneer of piety, but actually expressed a genuine religious belief. 40 
Whatever we make, however, of these seemingly devout actions, there is no denying that 
the conventional recognition of the usefulness of the Sacred War to Philip's foreign 
policy, in that it allowed him legitimate military access to Greece, is unavoidably 
correct. The Sacred War had indeed offered Philip precisely the bridge he needed into 
Greek affairs, and the crisis which he had suffered following his defeat by Onomarchus 
was obliterated by the resounding victory he won on the Crocus Field. 
An illuminating episode followed, however. Diodorus 16.37.3 records the handing over 
of Pherae to Philip, and 16.38.1-2 goes on to inform us that: 
01-OTOq 7('XP Vt0l(yccq TO'v 'OVO[t(XPXOV E-'Tct(p(xvF-i irocpovc&ýF-t r )v c' E-'v (DEpai; 11 
1 Tl)pOcvvti8(x K(xOEiXz Kai rfi iE60XF-t 'rq)V Fý-XEIAF-PiOCV (6xC7Co8oAbq K(Xt r(6cxx(x T& 
Ko('r(x 'rllv E)E'CT(XXt'(xv -K(X'E(X(5'rll(y(xq nPOI17F-V F-n\t 'Z(\Xq 1-10')X(Xq IZOXE[LIJ(Y(OV TOiq 
8 E\ T6V 'AOilv(xt'(j)v 8tF-XOc-tv T(x; ir(xpo8oi)q E'-TuxvýXOF-v 
Etq MCCKE8OVtCCV, 1110ýTJKO\); F', (X^L)TOi)' TýV P(X(YtXF-tCCV TCCiq TE 7rp('X4F, (Yt K(X\ Tý t 
npO\q TO\ 060V ElOGEPEig. 
Philip, after his defeat of Onomarchus in a noteworthy battle, put an end to the 
tyranny in Pherae, and, after restoring its freedom to the city and settling all other 
matters in Thessaly, advanced to Then-nopylae, intending to make war upon the 
Phocians. But since the Athenians prevented him from penetrating the Pass, he 
returned to Macedonia, having enlarged his kingdom not only by his 
achievements but also by his reverence towards the god. (352/ If 
39 Discussed below. 
40 It is also worth noting, in this context, the tone of Diodorus' narrative of the end of the Sacred War, t) 
especially 16.61.1 ff, which relates the divine punishments for sacrilege which were visited upon each of 
the Phocian commanders, usually in the shape of a horrible death. It seems that at least one of Diodorus' 
sources took a sincerely pious view of the events of the Sacred War and the seriousness of the pillaging of Zý C) 
the shrine. 
41 This entry marks the beginning of the chronological hiatus in Diodorus' narrative on Philip mentioned Zý 
above in our subsection on chronology. His narrative might be a little confused here, because in the Cý 4-: ) 
previous paragn-aphs (16.37.1-3) he informs us of a large force under Phocian command, including a 
thousand Spartans and five thousand foot and a hundred horse from Athens. It is unclear, however, if he 
meant that this massive force was the one that cut Philip off at Thermopylae, rather than a solely 
Athenian one, as 38.1 states. On the other hand, it also seems possible that the force of 37.1-3 should be 
associated with the actions described by 37.4-6, a Phocian led campaign into Boeotia, rather than the 
defence of Thermopylae, which we should then assume was undertaken by Athens alone. On reflection, 
the latter possibility seems the more likely, as there is no obvious reason for Diodorus to refer to an 
amalgamated force as "Athenians" as opposed to "Phocians" or "the Phocians and their allies". L, 
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This incident illuminates two main factors in the development of Philip's foreign policy 
at this point. First, it gives us a rare glimpse into the intentions of the Macedonian king I C), 
Philip was evidently not content with the victory he had just won, but sought to press his 
advantage home beyond Thessaly and onto southern Greek soil. To what extent his 
endeavours would have been confined to Phocis had he been allowed to do so is, of 
course, a matter of speculation. 
Secondly, perhaps with this latter point in mind and laurel wreaths notwithstanding, It 
shows us that Philip had not, in fact, won the trust of the Greeks, or rather, that Athens 
was unprepared to allow Philip, with an army, beyond Thermopylae and into a position 
from which he could potentially strike at her. In spite of the rather behind-the-scenes 
way in which Athens had so far leant her support to Phocis, she was prepared to commit 
to a full show of force rather than tolerate his presence so close to home. 
Having learnt his own limitations at the hands of Onomarchus, Philip did not seek to 
challenge Athens on this, the first occasion when an Athenian and a Macedonian army 
met under arms, not even in the name of Apollo. He turned for home, leaving behind his 
new repute in Greece, to turn his attention to the cracks which had appeared in his 
foreign affairs before victory had re-established his prominence. 
Dealing with the Defectors: Thrace, Olynthus, and a Post Scriptum on 
Euboea 
As noted above, Diodorus' comment on Philip's return to Thessaly at 16.38.1-2 marks 
the beginning of a two year chronological gap in Diodorus' narration on Philip, placing 
his return to Macedon in 352/1 and not informing us of any actions by Philip again until 42 349/8 . The scrap of information offered to us by Demosthenes in the Third Olynthiac 4-5 helps us to fill in this gap to some degree: 
'Av(x, yK(xiov 8' 1)noý, ocýtß' c- (XVO) ýtIKPU T(OV 7F-'[Evl149v(I)v 7upo)TOV 1)ýt(xý 
unoýtvýa(xt. ýtE'ýtvilc0', W ('Xv8pF-ý 'AO1IV(Xiot, ok, ('Xnil'y'yF-kOll (Dikinnoý 14tiv ev 
E)P(X, KI Tov ö' 'Toý TouTit 'Hpeciov u-iXoý noktopKCüv. TÖTF- coivl. )v 
,l 
Tpl x TE-TupTov F- 
X' 70)v Kcd Oop, ßol) yl7voýt' VO'l) nap, W1V ýLEV ljv ýtoctýt(xxTllpto)v» TCOUA)v 5ex 01 11) 9 
14tiv E'YII(Pia(XGOF- '[F-'Z'T(XP('XKOVT(X TPIllpElý K(XOE-'iýKEtv Keci Toliý ýtexpt nF-VTF- 
C(PE' 91 KM TF-TT(XP(XI<OVT ETCOV (x11), rotý EO(XtvF-tv K(X\l T(X'X(XVO' FC-ý11'KOVT' Eti -p v. 
KM ýtF-TU T(Xb'C(X ötexoovToý Tolo F-Vt(Xl, )Tol, ) Tol, )Tol. ) EK(XTOýtßcclü)v, 
ýtF-T(X-YF-t'TVI(Ov, ßoilöpoýtto)VToL), ro") Toi) p1voý ýLO7lý ýtem Tcc ýtioaTilpta 8£-'K(X 
voci)ý E, XOVT(X Kevaý XCCPt'811ýLOV Kcct\ 7CF/-vTp- T('Xk(XVT' (, xpyl-)pioo. coý 
7 ix p 1) kurTroý ('X(YOEVÜOV (X TE0VE0)ý £fik09 7(\xp ('XýtgoTF-P(xj, 01)KF'-TI 1'Y'Y£Xoll (Dt 3-, - 2/ 'AO - 'K(XIP6ov Olil)5ýEVCC TOÜ ßolloFiv v04tCYCCVTF, ý MPEILT, 0) (XV8peý -qv(Xtot, 'Co'v 
(XI (X7E0(YTokov. ýv 8,01)Toý 0 K(XIPO -)Toý, Et Y(\xp TOT' Eß011011(: Y(xgEv, 
wanF-p Eyil(pt(: Y(XýtF-0(X, npoftýtcoý, 0-OK ccv llv(OxkF-t vi)v liýtiv 0 Xinnoý 
crwOF-ig. 
I must first refresh your memory with a little history. You remember, men of 
Athens, when news came three or four years ago that Philip was in Thrace 
besieging the fortress of Heraeum. Well, it was in the month of Mamacterion and 
there was a long and excited debate in the assembly, and you finally decided to 
launch a fleet of forty vessels, manned by citizens under the age of forty five, and 
to raise forty talents by a special tax. That year passed and Hecatombaeon came 
4' Discussed below. 
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and Megdageineion and Boedromion. In that month with great effort, after the 
celebration of the mysteries you dispatched Charidemus with ten ships, 
unmanned, and a sum of five talents of silver. When news came that Philip was 
ill or dead - both reports reached us - you Athenians, thinking that help was no 
longer needed, abandoned the expedition. But that was just your opportunity. If 
we had carried out our resolution in earnest and sailed to Thrace then, Philip 
would not have survived to trouble us today. 433 
Demosthenes' information here allows us to fill in some of the gap in our knowledge of Z: ) 
Philip's movements during this period. Given that Cersobleptes had, during the winter 
between Philip's defeat at the hands of Onomarchus and his subsequent victory over him 
the following spring, apparently defected to the Athenian cause, handing over "the cities 
on the Chersonese except Cardia, 44 it seems highly probable that Philip went from 
Thermopylae on to Thrace, to re-establish himself there. 
Our lack of information on the progress of his campaign is frustrating. One certainty is 
that whatever punishment befell Cersobleptes for his inclination towards Athens, it was 
not a definitive one, as he was destined to reappear in 346, again troubling Philip, and 
was defeated on this occasion. 
Philip's campaign was hampered by illness. That reports of his death were reaching 
Athen S45 serves to inform us of the seriousness of his illness and in considering the two 
year gap in our information on him, this factor ought to be taken into account. We have 
no way of knowing precisely what arrangements were ultimately reached in Thrace, nor 
indeed what became of Heraeum, mentioned by Demosthenes, but a possible 
reconstruction might be that Philip, hurried by his illness, reached a generous settlement 
with Cersobleptes and returned to Macedon to recuperate. Olynthus was less fortunate. 
A brief review of the history of relations between Macedon and Olynthus highlights the 
fact that seen simply in local terms, the fall of Olynthus drew the definitive line under a 
long history of changeable and often hostile relations between the two states. In recent 
history the reign of Philip's father, Amyntas 111, had seen the donation of land to 
Olynthus along with an alliance between the two states, followed by an invasion by 
Olynthus and reprisal attack by Amyntas with Macedonian aid. Although the exact 
outcome of this campaign is unclear, it seems likely that Amyntas was able to regain his 
46 territory when Spartan force had humbled the Olynthians . 
The eastern location of the cities which were taken by Pausanias during his attempt on 47 
the throne during the reign of Ptolemy, Anthemon, Therme and Strepsa , suggests that 
his claim to the throne might have had backing from Olynthus. The impression that some 
hostility existed between the two states, presumably as a residue of the defeat of 
Olynthus under a combined Spartan/ Macedonian force in the reign of Amyntas is 
further confirmed by the fact that Philip's elder brother Perdiccas III participated in an 
Athenian attack on Olynthus in 365/4. Again, the result of this attack is unknown to us, 
43 Ellis 1977 is very useful on this passaige and on the chronoloto, )y of the expediti 1 44 16.34.4, discussed above. 
mentioned. 
45 Demosthenes First Philippic 10. 
46 These events are discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
47 Aeschines On the Embassy 27. These events are discussed in Chapter 7, as is Perdiccas' later attack on 
Olynthus. 
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but whatever it was it can hardly have fostered goodwill between Macedon and 
Olynthus. 
The alliance made between Philip and Olynthus in 357/6,48 then, marked a respite in the 
hostilities which had recently characterised this relationship. It is unsurprising, when 
seen in this context, that the sweetener of Potidaea was needed to win the trust of 
Olynthus in the making of this treaty - this was the first time since the handing over of 
land by Amyntas in 393, almost forty years earlier, that we could call relations between 
Macedon and Olynthus friendly. 
Our sources allow us a fascinating insight into why this alliance broke down. 
Demosthenes lays his finger upon what must have been the heart of the matter in 
Olynthian terms: 
-ivol, P(OV ccil)TO ogwý E9 90) 11 X' 
' ýL, v'V Tl]XIKOÜTOV i' X' Koý (i')V TCIEYTo'ý 
11) 11 F- 11 F- 9 F, 11 1 -07uýPXF-V, 0ý ýtg(Xxoi T' A(Y(XV KC(I Öt' ýKF-ivov )g1v ý7[OXýýto1-)VI ý7CE18 ý 8, - 
c- rli8()V 
ýtEit(co Týý np60ý cci), coi)ý nicTec)ý 7t7voýLF-VOV, TOCYOI)T (XIUEXO-L)GI Toi, ) 
Yll(Pta(Xcyf)(Xt, ýh Ttý ('X7[0'KTFIVI TIV(X T(i)V ExEtva) TIIV 
2D C/ 0' c- (xpxllv, EX T(i)V 9C(X1)T(i)V (Y1)ýtýt(, XXÜ)v (X7(O71ýtov Etval, wa 1)4(Xý, 01, )ý ICY(XCYIV 
(Xn(xvTcov (XV0p(ono)v 118taT, C'(v -Km 'Col)ý EKFIvol, ) giXotý Kat, (XI), uo, v 'Cov 
(1)t, xtlITIOV ('XIUO'KTF-iv(XVT(Xý, (ptkoloý nenot'ilvTcct, (P(XCYt, Öe'- KM 
7u0111(YF-(YO(xl. 
Nevertheless, although so long as they saw that he was not too powerful to be 
trusted, they were his allies and fought us on his account) when they found that 
his strength had grown too great for their confidence, they did not make a decree 
that whosoever should kill any man who had helped to consolidate Philip's power 
should be liable to seizure in the country of their allies. No, indeed; they have 
made friendship, and promise to make alliance, with you, you who of all men in 
the world would be delighted to kill Philip's friends or even Philip himself. 
(Against Aristocrates 108-9) 
Given that hostility, as we have seen, had been the main characteristic of the relationship 
between Macedon and Olynthus for the preceding forty years, perhaps we need not be 
too surprised that Olynthus regarded Philip's increasing power with some alarm. This 
alarm suggests that the Olynthians had never placed much trust in Philip in spite of their 
alliance. 
Philip's increasing mistrust of the sincerity of the Olynthians, on the other hand, was 
based upon far more tangible factors. Olynthus had taken the step which was fatal for 
any of Philip's neighbours to take - she was gravitating towards Athens, whose 
influence in the north he had worked so hard to undermine. 
The exact chronology and details of this new friendship have been so thoroughly and 
well discussed elsewhere 49 that any close examination of how the alliance came about 
seems redundant here. In any consideration of why Philip's relationship with Olynthus 
deteriorated, the very fact that this friendship was in the air constituted ample reason for 
Philip to attack Olynthus. All his years of campaigning to remove Athenian influence 
48 Tod 158, discussed above. 
49 See especially Griffith in A History of Macedonia (p305) and Cawkwell (1962) for excellent 
discussions. 
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from the north could not be allowed to go to waste by allowing Athens to gain control in 
any sense of a city as relevant to Macedonian security as Olynthus. Athens had proved 
time and time again from the moment of her support of Argaeus and his claim to the 
throne in 360/59 onwards that her feelings towards Philip were hostile, and through his 
annexation of Amphipolis in 357 he had gained their lasting enmity. 50 Athens would not 
be a comfortable influence to have in Olynthus and from the moment that some ill- 
omened instinct led the Olynthians to ask for Athenian support, their fate was surely 
sealed. 
Justin 8.10-11 allows us a further insight into why Philip's friendly feelings towards 
Olynthus had degenerated into hostility: 
After this Philip attacked the people of Olynthus for having shown compassion 
and given shelter to two of his half brothers after he had murdered the third. 
These were the sons of his step mother, and Philip desperately wanted to do away 
with them since he saw them as potential claimants to the throne. For this reason 
he annihilated a famous old city, subjected his brothers to the fate for which he 
had long before marked them out and indulged himself with a huge amount of 
plunder as well as the fratricide which he had prayed for. 
Historians are divided on the issue of how seriously to take this evidence: Cawkwell and 
Borza 51 both regard the matter of the stepbrothers as peripheral to the conflict between 
Olynthus and Philip- over the gravitation of the former towards Athens, and even Ellis, 
who examines the question of the half brothers in great detai 152 is non committal as 
regards their actual role in the conflict. Griffith is less dismissive, however: 
This surrender of the brothers was his demand on the Chalcidean league now. It 
was neither a trivial matter, nor the mere trumped up pretext of an imperialist 
embarking on a war of conquest, for the brothers were his enemies now in an 
important way - and the Chalcideans were his allies. (p315) 
Although Griffith's logic here might be questioned over whether or not Olynthus could 
still realistically be considered as an ally of Philip, given that both their inclinations 
towards Athens and their harbouring of the half brothers surely marked a very serious 
crack in the friendship, his suggestion that this question of the brothers is no trivial 
matter seems reasonable. The fact was that Olynthus' protection of these two men 
(probably correctly identified as Arrhidaeus and Menelaus by Ellis (1973)) was probably 
the second instance of Olynthus having harboured potential claimants to the throne 
within a decade - as mentioned above, Philip's brother Perdiccas attacked the city as a 
reprisal for the previous episode. That the combination of Olynthus and a secondary 
branch of the royal family was of concem to Philip need not surprise us, then. Any 
tendency towards the support of a rival claim to the throne needed to be nipped in the 
bud before it could come to anything at. 
It does not seem correct to argue that the presence of the two half brothers at Olynthus 
was of anything other than secondary importance by comparison to Olynthus' 
gravitation towards Athens; however, we simply cannot dismiss it (as Borza does) as a 
50 These events are discussed in the previous chapter. 
51 Philip of Macedon pp84-5 and Under the Shadow of Oývrnptis p217 respectively. 
52 1973 
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pretext for an attack upon Olynthus. The strength and solidarity of Philip's reign to date 
makes it easy for us to forget what an unstable seat the Macedonian throne had, until 
very recently, been. Philip had seen his brother and his stepfather assassinated, the 
former by the latter and the latter by his other brother - he was no stranger to court and 41-D family intrigue. Having two living half brothers supported by a large, wealthy and 
nearby city was simply not a risk that Philip was prepared to take. 
Three factors, then, to put the matter in brief, may be identified as the issues at the root 
of the hostilities between Macedon and Olynthus on this particular occasion: the 
Olynthian mistrust of the growth of Philip's power, against a backdrop of thirty years of 
war or latent hostility; the presence in Olynthus of two of Philip's step brothers, 
combined with a recent history of Olynthian sympathy for pretenders to the Macedonian 
throne, and finally the ideological shift in Olynthus towards Athenian sympathies -a 
move towards the powerbase which Philip had devoted himself to eradicating from his 
shores and for which, as is discussed below, he was currently at war on two counts, both 
in the context of the Sacred War and in terms of what Athens still insisted upon calling 
the war for Amphipolis. " (Aeschines 2.70 and Isocrates To Philip 2 ff) 
Far from being the out-of-the-blue attack that the reader of Diodorus might picture, then, 
Philip's attack upon Olynthus marked the final stages of a long series of hostilities, 
within which the peace of 357/6 marked a brief breathing space rather than a normal 
state. When Olynthus fell, its total annihilation had been predetermined both by its 
protection of Philip's half brothers and its friendliness towards Athens - neither of which 
tendencies Philip could tolerate on his borders. 
The campaign itself seems to have been, from Philip's point of view, reasonably 
straightforward. Diodorus 16.52.9 informs us of its beginning, placing this notice under 
the year 349/8: 
Kcc, rcc 8E Ti'lv E^o'p(D'lrTlv (Dtkucnoý ýLE'v o Mcocz6ovo)v PocatXxi0q (YTP(XTE-L)(Yccq 
ETCt T(Xq XCC/%Kt6t'KO'tq TCOjkF-tq l: T(X'yCtp(XV [LEV (PPO-L)PtOV F-KTCOktOpKll(Y(Xq 
K(XTF-(: F-K(XWE, TCOV 6' (')'Ckk(OV 7UAtCYWX''r(Ov F'-'Vt(x KoCT(xTckll4('X[tF-vOq Tlvcc7K(X(TF-V 
c 1wro, r(x, r, uF, (T0cct- F-7ct' 8F- rc'cq (DF-p('xq rýq OF-, rT(xkt'(xq TC(xpEkO6)v I-IF-tookaov 
81)V(XG'rF-'O'OV'r(X Týq TCOkF-(Oq E4F'-P(XkF-V. 
In Europe Philip, the Macedonian king, marched against the cities of the 
Chalcidice, took the fortress of Zereia by siege and razed it. He then intimidated 
some of the other towns and compelled them to submit. Then coming against 
Pherae in Thessaly he expelled Peitholaus, who was in control of the city. 
Philip's strategy, then, appears to have been to set about a systematic dismantling of the 
Chalcidean league before attacking its nerve centre, Olynthus. 53 The fact that a brief 
campaign to expel Peitholaus from Pherae ( he had evidently re-established himself there 
without our being notified of this by Diodorus) interrupted Philip's activities in the 
Chalcidice did little to slow his progress there. 54 
53 The attack upon Zereia is also attested by Philochorus fra 132 and Demosthenes 19.266. Z-1 54 Borza's hypothesis, that at this point "Philip began to test his Chalcidic alliance by some small 
interventions in the region... " (p217) cannot be accepted. The razing, and capture of towns of the =1 1-n 
Chalcidic league can only reasonably be interpreted as aggression on Philip's behalf. C) ZD11- II 
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IIs The campaign at Olynthus may, in some sense, be used as a case study of Philip' 
methods, given that we have so much information on it from the orators and in spite of 
the fact that some of this information is doubtful - the date and order of the Olynthiacs, 55 1 -e were not for example . Some indication might lead us to suppose that his efforts thei limited to the battlefield - Demosthenes, for example, would have us believe that Philip 
actively mislead the Olynthians as regards his intentions there: 
C/ JN c-c 
Kcci ýtilv eii ýteXpt coi), roi) nF-piýiF-vo o4F-v, mý ccv IlýLIV oýtoko-Ylloln n09£F-ýLF-iV, 
nccvTcov gaýtF-v F-1)TIOP-aTaTot. OUÖg, 7C, cp O, \cv E'7rt\ Ti\lv 'ATTtKl\lv (xliTilv ß(x8iýl 1 1 'n 
KM 
0 T' V I-lE-Ip(x16t, TAT, F, -PF-i, EUCEP olý Irpo, ý Toll)ý ('X'Xý, 01, )ý IIF-noillKF- 
8ei 
TF-Kýt(Xtpecyo(xt. Toi)TO gF-v -Y(\xp 'Oý, 1, )Vot, otý, TF-TT(XP(XKOVT (XIZEX(OV Týý luoxF-(J)g 
, öm, F-, nF-v ', 'n 86 81, )oiv 0' 'CF-POV, ''5 'Oý, ý)VOO) - CYT(x t0 ec ýx F--KF-tvol. )ý ev ýt11 OIKF-IV (ý 
GC'1)TOV EV M(XK980vtýX, 7r(/XVT(X To\V ('x'x; £ov xpovov, ei Tiý (XUTOV (XITI(XCYUITO Ti 
Totol, )TOV, CC7(XVU-KT(J)V KM TCPFGßF-Iý lz£-, ýt7[(1)V Toloý 
If we are going to wait for him to acknowledge a state of war with us, we are 
indeed the simplest of mortals; for even if he marches straight against Athens and 
the Piraeus, he will not admit it, if we may judge from his treatment of other 
states. For take the case of the Olynthians; when he was five miles from their 
city, he told them there must be one of two thing, either they must cease to reside 
in Olynthus or he in Macedonia, though on all previous occasions, when accused 
of hostile intentions, he indignantly sent ambassadors to justify his conduct. 
Third Philippic 11)56 
While Demosthenes' information here must be taken into account, we might also recall 
that it was in the interests of his intentions here and in all of his speeches regarding 
Philip - to persuade the Athenians of Philip's unreliability and the need for active 
resistance to him - to suggest that overtures from Philip were not to be trusted. While the 
exact contents of Philip's embassies to the Olynthians according to Demosthenes might 
be doubted, other elements of this campaign ought to be taken into account. 
No modem discussion exists on the fate of the citizens of the smaller towns which Philip 
took during this campaign, or the implications of Philip's actions here. Griffith rightly 
comments that Olynthus cannot have been any more difficult to take than Amphipolis, 
and that there was nothing to stop him from marching on Olynthus without the prelude 
in the other Chalcidic towns; what, then, prevented him from doing so? 
Our sources are silent upon the fate of the inhabitants of the smaller towns. It is, 
however, an important factor on our understanding of Philip's campaign against 
Olynthus. We may be quite certain that these smaller cities were not subjected to the 
same Draconian treatment as the unfortunate Olynthians. It seems far more likely that 
they were treated well by Philip in the hope of seducing Olynthus into a quick and easy 
surrender. While Griffith is surely right in noting that the capture of Olynthus will have 
posed no greater difficulties to Philip than those posed by other places, we must also 
recognise that Olynthus was no backwater - its substantial remains and the volume of 
archaeological discoveries on the site prove that it was a large and prosperous town at 
the time of its collapse. Philip had various com-nutments at this point which were quite 
geographically scattered, and could not have afforded a lengthy campaign. As it is, we 
are told that his velvet glove tactics in the rest of the Chalcidice paid dividends in that he -1: 1 
55 Although see Ellis and Milns 1970 for useful discussion. 
ý6 See also On the Chersonnese 59. 
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was eventually able to take the town by treachery - surely Euthycrates and Lasthenes, in 
opening the gates to him, could not have believed that slavery and total destruction 
awaited their fellow citizens and town as a result of their actions. 
Diodorus 16.53.1ff informs us of Philip's final assault on the League - that which took 
Olynthus itself: 
2' 8' To', u(, ov (D'Xtnnoý 4'v aneý)öü)v TC'Cý E'-(p' 'EXXilanvTco n 'Xetý Ent Eb1F, 0 
X F- tp (J)cycc(YO(xi Mil-KI)ßr-pvccv ýt9v -K(xt'Top(ßvilv Xwp'Lý x-tv8'Ovcov ÖtC'c npoöo(ilocý 
7[CCPF, k(XßF-v, g'm öe zljv ýtF-'Yi(Y'Cllv vi)v nepi 'Coi. )ý ron01)ý roi), roloý noxF-O)v 
"Oki-)VOOV CY'UP(X'TF-1)Cyccý ýlerix nokxig 81, )Vc'cýLF-COý ro, ýLF, _v npcocov VIKI1(Yaý Toi-)ý , oxi. )v0t, oi)ý 81, )CYt' ýt(, XX(Xtý Eiý noixtopKt, (XV, npocyßox(, xý öF, - 
notoýb4EVOý 7C0; ý; £01)ý T(i)V cyTpccTtü)T(i)V c'clrr_z'ßccxF-v F-, v ccciý 
'UF-ty, Oýtccxtcctý- 'ro öE 'ZF-XE', )'UC(iOv (poEtpaý xp114cc(yt '101, )ý npoecyTIJKOTCCý T(1)V 
'Okl)v0t'cov, El)OuxpccTilv TE K(xt' Acccy0£-, vllv, Ötc'c 'ZOI')'U(OV npoöooF-i(YGCV vjv "okl, )voov F-IXF-V. ÖICCPIZ(, XCY(Xý 8, (Xi)Tljv KM TOIK F, -VotxobvT(Xý 
Tüi)'CO 89 np(Xýccý )CPrlg(XT(J)V TE 
TIOAM0V etý T o\V noxF-ýtov F-'1')TCOPIIEYE KM T(xg (X' U, (X 7r0/ýX-tý Tocý 
F-V(xvTtoi)4EV(Xý 1<CCTF-nxllýCCTO. TolL)ý 89, (xvöp(X-Y(XOIjcy(XVT(Xý vi)v (ý-"GTP(XTIO)TÜ)V 
KocTec T1IV 4(Yxllv (Xýictlý ÖC()PF-(Xiý TIýtiloccý KM XPIIýt('XTWV lIxýOoý Ötcc801)ý 
To% e, v Talý 7co; ýF-aiv icyyI)01)at 710; ý2,01\-)ý E'GXE Tcp080T(Xý TWV 71(XTPt'8(OV. 1c(xi 
(xl, )Toý öE (, X7EF-(pcctvFTO öt(\x XPI)(: 7101, ) 7u02,16 ýLÜCU0V (X 81(\x T(i)V ölzx(ov 
IligT1KýV(XI Týv i8i(XV ß(XCYIIF-t'ccv. 
During their term of office [348/7] Philip, whose aim was to subdue the cities on 
the Hellespont, acquired without battle Mecyberna and Torone by treasonable 
surrender, and then, having taken the field with a large army against the most 
important city in this region, Olynthus, he first defeated the Olynthians in two 
battles and confined them to the defence of their walls; then in the continuous 
assaults that he made he lost many of his men in encounters at the walls, but 
finally bribed the chief officials of the Olynthians, Euthycrates and Lasthenes, 
and captured Olynthus through their treachery. After plundering it and enslaving 
the inhabitants he sold both men and property as booty. By doing so he procured 
large sums for prosecuting the war and intimidated the other cities that were 
opposed to him. Having rewarded with appropriate gifts such soldiers as had 
behaved gallantly in the battle and distributed a sum of money to men of 
influence in the cities, he gained many tools ready to betray their countries. 
Indeed he was wont to declare that it was far more by the use of gold than of 
arms that he had enlarged his kingdom. 57 
Consensus appears to exist between the main modem treatments of this period on the 
progress of the war in terms of contributions made by Athens, according to 
Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and the passage quoted above from Against Aristocrates 
regarding the friendship between Athens and Olynthus. Libanius' Hypothesis to the 
First Olynthiac informs us that the Olynthians waited until Philip was abroad (perhaps in 
Thrace) to send embassies to Athens. Philochorus (FrGH 328 frgs 49-5 1) also contribute 
to our understanding of the war from an Athenian point of view. On the doings of the 
three thousand peltasts and the thirty eight ships of fragment 49, sent in response to the 
57 The battle for Olynthus was hard fought: See Robinson (1941) part 10 for a discussion of a series of Z: D 
arrow heads marked Filippo, which support Diodorus' account of a siez(: )>re of the city. The treachery of 
Euthycrates and Lasthenes became a byword in Demosthenes: see On the Chersonnese 40, the Third 
Philippic 66 and especially De Falsa Legatione 265 and 342. 
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original appeal, we know nothing - not necessarily because they achieved nothing but 
perhaps because the fragment is truncated. However, it would be unwise to attribute any 
significant achievements to them, as none are recorded elsewhere and no pause seems to 
have occurred in Philip's campaign. 
The four thousand peltasts, eighteen triremes and one hundred and fifty cavalry of 
Philochorus fragment 50 seem to have been engaged In some desperate acton: we find 
them ravaging what had once been Chalcidic territory: 
X0 F- v E't qT F- T 71 v rl cc XX 11 v 11 vK cc tT 11 vB oru t cc t cc v ýt Er 
'Okiivot(ov, lccci rl\lv X(op(xv E7ropo-q(YF-V. 
We may only assume that this land had fallen into Philip's hands through conquest or 
defection, and now counted as enemy territory. 
The final expedition consisted of seventeen triremes, three thousand citizen hoplites and 
three hundred cavalry. This force arrived too late to save Olynthus. 
On this subject, historians are unanimous in the view that Athens' help to Olynthus was 
ineffectual, in spite of the fact, as pointed out by Cawkwell in both Philip of Macedon 
and "The Defence of Olynthus" the forces sent were actually quite large. His voice, 
however, is the loudest in the opinion that the sending of Athenian aid to Olynthus was a 
pointless exercise. He points out that the Chalcidean cities were mostly inland and 
therefore inaccessible to an Athenian, sea based force, concluding on a resounding note: 
The unpalatable strategic fact was that the Chalcideans could not be saved and 
the Athenians were fortunate that no large number of their citizens was ever 
landed there to attempt the impossible. (p88 (197 8))58 
Philip's severe treatment of the Olynthians caused waves of public opinions against him 
throughout Greece. Carter, in his thoughtful and thorough discussion of the Euboean and 
Olynthian expeditions mounted at this time 59 comments that the lacklustre efforts to save 
Olynthus - in which, according to his arguments, the majority of forces sent out were 
composed of mercenaries skimmed from operations elsewhere, contrasts with the 
vigorous efforts in Euboea . 
60 His conclusion makes the following suggestion: 
This [level of effort] does not suggest that the defence of Olynthus was very high 
on the Athenian list of priorities. Nor, historically, had the Athenians any great 
cause to love the Olynthians; in particular, they resented their meddling in the 
affairs of Amphipolis, always a sore point with the Athenians. Could it be that the 
fall of Olynthus became important to Athens rather as a symbol after the event, 
than as a strategic or political fact at the time? (p429) 
58 It also seems likely that, durina the assaults on Olynthus, Philip took advantage of the Etesian winds to 
attack when Athenian forces were unable to set sail. The Suda, Karanos mentions one force under 
Chares which was caught by storms, and this may have been the occasion which Demosthenes was 
referring to when he commented: Z: ) 
He waits for the Etesian winds or the winter and attacks at a time when we could not possibly 
reach the seat of war. (First Philippic 3 1) 
59 1971 
60 Events in Euboea are discussed below. 
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This conclusion seems a very sensible one. From being a relatively low priority on the 
Athenian agenda, Olynthus rocketed to symbol status, as Carter suggests, after its fall. It 4D 
became a byword for the enslavement of a free people, for the collapse of a previously 
powerful league and, in short, for what might happen to those who failed to protect their 
eleutheria and autononfia from Philip. 
It seems, then, that at Olynthus, we might trace some of Philip's strategies in taking the 
city. Perhaps the most striking element of the observations made on this issue is that his 
efforts were by no means confined to the actual siege of the city, formidable though this 
seems to have been. If we take into account the possibility that he used a combination of 
disinformation, perhaps bribery and definitely diplomacy on an individual level, through 
Euthycrates and Lasthenes, 61 and perhaps also a divide-and-conquer policy by choosing 
times when Athens would be unable to intervene., the full scope and complexity of his 
campaign begins to emerge. The fall of Olynthus does indeed take shape in our 
unusually detailed sources as a case study of Philip's military and diplomatic skill. 
Having considered, then, the last days of Olynthus, we must now briefly turn to a curious 
episode which occurred during the same time period as Philip's Chalcidic campaign and 
which might or might not be relevant to our discussion of his relationship with Athens 
during this period: that is, the events in Euboea of 348. 
Seen purely in Euboean terms, what occurred was not, in fact, curious at all: 
Demosthenes 9.57 and 21.110 tell us of the rule, supported by mercenary troops, of one 
Plutarchus as the tyrant of Eretreia, whilst the Scholiast to Demosthenes 5.5 informs us 
of the civil war which broke out when Cleitarchus, posing originally as a democratic 
leader although later ruling as a tyrant, led a revolt against him. Am appeal was made to 
Athens for support by Plutarchus, and the Athenian general Phocion was sent out, as we 
are informed by Plutarch's Life of Phocion 12-14 and expelled the general Plutarchus 
when his alliance proved false. Affairs deteriorated dramatically from an Athenian point 
of view when Phocion was withdrawn from Eretreia, leaving affairs in the hands of 
Molossus, who was less successful than his predecessor and in fact fell into enemy 
hands, 62 making an embarrassing conclusion to the war for Athens. 
Controversy arises when we try to ascertain whether Philip had a hand in these events. 
Certainly our sources give us reason to believe that the Macedonian king had at least a 
finger in the pie of the Euboean uprising; Plutarch, for instance, opens his account of 
Phocion's involvement there with the following words: 
I-Iccp(x8i)%tE'-vo-o 8' Ft; Tilv E-'opot(xv roý) (DiXiTc7co-L), -K(XI 810VCCýUV EK 
-0 & 'r lo ý M(XKF-60VI(Xq 81(Xplp('XýOV'VOq, K(Xt TcC; TIOXF-1; Ot-KF--LO-ORE-VO 8tcc P(XVV(I)V... 
61 See Plutarch's Sayings of Kings and Commanders 178 B: 
T&)v 8ý irF-p't Aa(50ýwjv -cO'v '0? ý, ý)Atov ýpc(Aobv ccov imi 6cyavccicTolývvov, oki 7Epo86T(Xq 
(Xl)TOi); E"VtOt T6V TCF-pi TO'V (Dikt7ITIOV CC*TCOKCCXOi)(Yt, (YKCCtO-bq E'(P'q (PýYYF-t -K(Xi 6VYpOjlcO-O; 
FtVoCt M(XICE56Vaq TýV CYlC6C(PTIV (Y'K&(PIJV Xý'YOVVX;. 
When the men associated with Lasthenes, the Olynthian, complained with indignation because C, 
some of Philip's associates called them traitors, he said that the Macedonians are by nature a 
rou2h and rustic people who call a spade a spade. 
02 Scholia Demosthenica 7 and 9. 
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When Philip was stealing into Euboea and bringing a force across from 1 =ý tl. ý I 
Macedonia and making the cities his own by means of a tyrant... (12.1) 
While Demosthenes comments: 
ýv 'EpF-, upigc, ýica8 ) ýnaUcc7ýVIoý rIX01)TCCPY, 0'0 Km -CCOV ý, vcov CC., 919 11 (X 9 FE 0 
-lop()ýtov, Ot' ýtev sýO, 'Uýtcxý ý70v T('X 7rpc ÖýýLoý Fixe Tip lZO/kIV KM To' V 
oit 8' F-Tit (1)11innov. 
At Eretria, when the democrats, ridding themselves of Plutarch and his 
mercenaries, held the city together with Perthenus, some of them were for 
handing the government over to you, others for Philip. (Third Philippic 57) 
Philip's involvement, at one level or another, is assumed by both of these sources, and 
indeed throughout our sources on the period many references to some connection 
between Philip and the Eretrians arise; Demosthenes, in the First Philippic, even cites a 
letter from Philip to the Eretrians and it is noted below in our subheading on the Peace of 
Philocrates that the first peace feelers came from Philip to others via the Euboean 
ambassadors. 
Modem historians are, however, divided upon the issue, perhaps because in spite if the 
several references to it, none of our sources are specific upon the nature of Philip's 
involvement in the uprising. Cawkwell and Brunt 
63 both reject the notion of an 
involvement in 348'. Brunt's argument supports that of Cawkwell, who reached his 
conclusion via the emendation of the text of Aeschines 3.87, originally published as 
ITCCP(X (DtXt7rT[O-O 61)V(X[ttv ýLF"r(XTCF-R(P(X[tEVos to TECCP(X (DCCkCCtKo-0... using the statement 
of the Scholiast to 3.86, that Cleitarchus took n(xp(x (D(xk(xtico1, ) rol-) (D(OKF-(. Ov 
, r, upp(xvvo1) 8i)v%L-Lv. He also notes that Aeschines himself then refers to the 
transportation of rolis (DwKt-Ko-os ýFvo-os. Brunt supports this, adding that even if this 
emendation is not accepted, then we must conclude that Cleitarchus' appeal, though in 
fact sent to Philip, was not successful, as we hear of no Macedonian troops in Euboea. 
Griffith, on the other hand, benignly concludes that "it would be surprising if he had no 
hand in it" (p275), while Momigliano reaches a more extreme conclusion: 
Comunque andassero, precisamente le cose per noi molto oscure, certo e che 
Filippo nusciva a prendere il sopravvento sul Faleco a guidare da lontano la 
ribellione scoppiata in Eretria, poi a Calcide ea Oreo. (p I 11) 
However opaque these matters are to us, it is certain that Philip managed to get 
the upper hand over Phalaecus and to steer from afar the rebellion which began in 
Eretria and spread to Chalcis and Oreus. 64 
Cawkwell's account, though thorough and logical, fails to take into account that both 
Plutarch and Demosthenes add their voices to that of Aeschines in connecting Philip to 
the rebellion in Eretria. Brunt's position makes the same error and we might also accuse 
him of taking the idea of support for the rebellion somewhat too literally. We need not 
assume that the lack of Macedonian infantry on the island meant that Philip had no hand 
63 1969 
64 Momigliano 1934. translation my own. 
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in the affair. Heskel, in her thorough study of Philip's reign65 suggests that Philip's 
support (presumably of Callimachus) might have been financial in nature, a very 
plausible suggestion if we consider that Philip's forces were committed in the Chalcidice 
at the time. 
Whatever the precise nature of Philip's support, the time of the uprising seems just too 
fortuitous to the final push on Olynthus for us to decide after Cawkwell and Brunt that 
the outset of Philip's involvement in Euboea must be placed at a later date. 
Momigliano's position is perhaps a little too extreme - amply more attractive is the 
ground occupied by Griffith and shared by Heskel, that Philip's support if the rebellion 
must have been at least tacit and may have been financial. Exactly what the object of his 
involvement was, however, is less sure. 66 We might theorise that his main objective was 
to create a distraction for Athens while he delivered the coup de grace to Olynthus. He 
must also have had an eye upon the potential future usefulness of contacts in states 
neighbounng with Athens - and indeed as already pointed out we see the Euboeans 
playing their part in the peace negotiations and, rather bizarrely, Euboea itself on offer 
from Philip to Athens later on. In spite of our rejection of Cawkwell's scenario in which 
Euboea could act as a gateway into southern Greece for Philip, he must have been aware 
that Euboea was a sensitive point in Athenian defence and that influence there could be 
used as a lever on Athens. 
The Euboean affair of 348, though imprecisely reported to us and therefore blurry in our 
picture of the period., is nonetheless a segment of the history of relations during this time 
between Philip and Athens, and must be treated as such. Although we are unable to 
conclude exactly what Philip's involvement was or precisely what his intentions were 
when he entangled himself in affairs so far from his own base, we must at any rate grant 
that it gave him further leverage on Athens, given Euboea's proximity and political 
connections to his long term enemy. 
The Conclusion of the Sacred War 
In the years following Philip's victory at the Battle of the Crocus Field and his 
withdrawal from Thermopylae, a last, desperate phase in the Sacred War had been 
fought in Greece. Philip's defeat of Onomarchus had not marked the end of the Phocian 
war effort, a further symptom of the fact that, as noted above, pivotal as the Sacred War 
was for Philip's future relations with Greece, much of it took place without his actual 
involvement. 
A brief summary of how things stood when Thebes appealed to Philip to intervene for a 
second time against Phocis will serve to illustrate the situation he found there on his 
return. Under the year 352/1, Diodorus reports the immediate aftermath of Philip's 
withdrawal from Then-nopylae in Greece: the Boeotians defeated Phayllus in a night 
65 PhD thesis, Harvard 1987. 
66 Cawkwell's argument must come under further attack here. He notes (p88) in Philip of Macedon that 
any Athenian decline would be of interest to Philip -a point which is without doubt true, but goes on to C, 
comment that Athens needed Euboea to be secure because "if he [Philip] were able to get an army across C) 
into Euboea, there was a serious danger of his being able to cross into Euboea, where he would be 
welcomed as Thebes' ally in the Sacred War and thence to march into Attica. " (p88). Although Griffith tý 
convincingly argued that Philip was in possession of a small fleet, we have no evidence at all that he 
would have been capable of undertaking such a large naval operation as the transportation of a C) C) 
Macedonian army by sea to Euboea, facing the threat of the still active Athenian fleet. Z: ý III 
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attack and proceeded into Phocis. They were, however, put to flight by Phayllus and 
driven back; Phayllus then died of disease, leaving Phocian command In the hands of 
Phalaecus, the young son of Onomarchus. 67 Phalaecus was defeated in battle by the 
Boeotians but then went on to seize Chaeronia, only to be expelled by the Boeotians, 
who proceeded once again into Phocis. 68 Under the following year, 351/0, Diodorus 
records an appeal from Thebes to Persia financial aid, and, following this notice, he 
embarks upon a different narrative, on the subject of Persia and Cyprus. He does not 
return again to the narrative of the Sacred War until the start of his year 347/6, which 
sees an indecisive campaign during which the Boeotians invaded Phocis and seized some 
territory, but were then defeated by the Phocians, who in turn seized some Boeotian 
territory. 
Two relevant factors may be derived from this narrative: the first being that the 
Boeotians were both bearing the brunt of the Phocian war effort and suffering some 
financial strain as a result, and secondly that neither side of the war had an upper hand - 
the conflict was indecisive and becoming exhausting. It was no doubt with a view to 
both of these factors that Thebes took the initiative in inviting Philip back into Greece. 
Kevra 6E ci'lv Boturiav o' ýLF'-v (Do)-KF-j; cpF-jq Tcoý, F-t; E"X ,X t "ovrF-; (0 , I-)P(OýJevccq, 'OPXOýtF-vO'v -K(x't Kop(ovp-tccv K(x't Kopat'ccq, bc rol), r(Ov E-'irotobvro ri'lv brt rol)q 
Botarob; (yTparF-t(xv. F-wropol)RF-vot ft' [tta0o(pop(ov c ýv rF- X(bpccv E', 61'1 nol)v 
KCCt KCCrCC 'CCC; F-7CtOF'-(YF-t; IC(X't (YlL4ITcXOKO'cq TcF-PtF-Yt'v0v'rO TCOv E'-7X(OPt'O)v. 8tOTcF-P 
ot Botarot' OXtpo[tFvot [LF'-v rCo TcoXE'ýap -Kcct' iToXXo-'o; Tcov cyTp(xrt(OT(Ov 
(XnOXO)XF-1-COTF-;, XpIlýMT(OV 8 E\ ('XItOPOI)REVOt 7[PECYPF-t; E'4E'-ItERw(XV TEPO; TOV 
(Dixurnov 64tobvrEq polloficat. 05 E\ PocatxEu; 716E? -(O; OP6)V 'Týv ral[F-t, v(o(ytv po-OXOýtF-vo; rC\C AEi)Krpt-Kc\c (ppov%muc (TuamiXat r6)v Bot(orCov ccil), r&)v Kca 
OXt7O'u; ('XRF-(T'UF-tXE (T'CP(X-ct(O'rcc;, (X'U''UO\ [tOvOv (P-L)XcVC'T%LF-vOq TO 6OKF-iv [tll 
REPtOP&V TO\ ýWCVT60V CTF-CT1, )XIj[tE'-VOV. 
In Boeotia the Phocians, who held three strongly fortified cities, Orchomenos, 
Coroneia and Corsiae, conducted from there their campaign against the 
Boeotians. Being well supplied with mercenaries they pillaged the country and in 
their thrusts and engagements proved superior to the inhabitants of the place. As 
a consequence the Boeotians, feeling the pinch of the war and the loss of great 
numbers of their men, but having no financial resources, sent envoys to Philip 
with a request for assistance. The king, pleased to see their discomfiture and 
disposed to humble the Boeotian's pride over Leuctra, dispatched few men, being 
on his guard against one thing only - lest he be thought to be indifferent to the 
pillaging of the oracle. (16.58.1-3 under the year 347/6) 
The very fact of this appeal being made at all was a milestone in Macedonian history and 
development. That Thebes, the very city which had had such unquestionable superiority 
as to have been able to ratify the reign of Alexander 11, Philip's elder brother, in the 
guise of political patron, was now applying to Philip for military aid was a clear 
indication that Philip had "arrived". Macedon was now the ally that Greek states were 
turning to for help in recognition of its military power. The day the Theban embassies 
am ved must have been a proud one for Philip. 
67 16.38.4ff 
68 16.39.7ff 
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And yet his response is very open to interpretation. As it stands in Diodorus, it Seems as 
though there were two Boeotian embassies to Philip and two Macedonian forces sent, the 
first being a very small one. 
69 Although this thesis has in the past rejected theories C) 
regarding serious doublets in Diodorus' narratives, it does look possible that he had 
indeed made just one such error here, the only additional information given in the second 
entry being that regarding the alliance which was made between Philip and Boeotia: 
Bot(oTCov Kat (D(j)KE'-(j)v TEr(XTcE-Lv(o[tF-V(Ov 81cc TO' W-TKOý TOA) TCOX4L01) (D(oKF-i; 
'ý(xnF'(YrFtX(xv FI; A(XKF-6(Xl[tovoc 7rF-pt poqoF-I, (X;, 171(xprlac(xt 6E ýtEv irpEopa; E- 
XtXt'o-L)q o7rXt', r(x; E-'ýE'TuqtWav cYTparll7 o\v E'-7riaTllcY(xvrF-; 'ApXt, 6%tov 'r O\v 
P(X(YtXE'-(x. Botw-c6v 6F\- Tc(xp(x7rX-q(YI'(oq 'rol'), rot; 6t(XKPF-cFPF-l, )G%tE'-V(ov 7rpo\; 
(Di'Xinnov nepit al)[týmXiccq o (Dt'Xt7c7ro; Tc(xp(xX(xp(t)v ro^'L); E)F-, rc(x/ko-\L); i'licEv F-ii; 
-cýv Ao-Kpt8(x ýtF-v\x nokkfiq 8i)v&ýtuoq. 
Since the Boeotians and the Phocians were utterly dejected by the length of the 
war, the Phocians despatched envoys to Lacedaemon asking for reinforcements, 
and the Spartans sent a thousand hoplites in charge of whom as a general they 
placed their king Archidamus. Similarly the Boeotians sent an embassy to Philip 
proposing an alliance, and Philip, after taking over the Thessalians, entered 
Locris with a large army. (16.59.1-2,346/5) 
Philip, it seems clear, was prepared to commit himself to ending the Sacred War only 
under certain circumstance. He had bided his time and must, by now, have been aware of 
an important factor - that Thebes and Phocis were both utterly exhausted by the war and 
that, as a result, he was not only almost guaranteed a victory over the bedraggled 
Phocians but also that he could essentially name his terms for stepping in. It is a rare 
insight into Philip's interests and ambitions that he chose to make an alliance with 
Thebes at this juncture. If he was to win it on behalf of "all right thinking Greeks' 70 then 
he would do so not in the guise of borrowed foreign strength (a lesson which he had 
perhaps learnt from his victory at the Battle of the Crocus Field, after which he withdrew 
to Macedon, having reaped only a very few discernable rewards for his victory there) but 
on equal term; as, in a sense, an honorary Greek. 
The long drawn out and desperately fought Sacred War ended on a surprisingly subdued 
note. Phalaecus and his associates declined to go down in a blaze of glory and instead 
surrendered to what was clearly the superior force. Diodorus 16.59.2 continues: 
'4t(0[IE Oc 1 11 8' (D, X(xtKov 7TAIV 'Tý; (YTP(XTIIY, cc; , VOV K(Xt' To, 'C&)V 
0E (X (X 00 ýtt(yoo(p' POW "XOV'COC 7ckfiooq TU(XPF-CFKF-'L)' ýETO ltocp(xr, 4F-t Kpivat T, v Tc' kFqlOv. 
c o 6F- (1)('xkcctKoq E-'v rfi NtK(xt'(x 81, occp'Lp(. ov 1-cu. 't OE(opcov aL), ro'v oluK okýtoRa)cov 
OVT(X 6lF-7UpF, (TPElL)(Y(XTO IrPOý TOV POC(YtkE-'CC TCEPI 51(AUCECOV. 'YEV%tF-Vljq 
c-I 0[tokoytcc; To\v (Dc'ck(XIKOV RET(X TOW (TTPCCTI(Or(ov CcIrEkOF-iv olrot 
PO'OkOITO, OUTOq ýLF\, V 'L)TCO(YICOV60q El; TýV rIF-kO7COVV-q(TOV CCTCF-X(Opil(TE ýtETCC 
, r&)v [tt(YOO(POP(ov, o'v'ro)v 0,1<T(XKI(yXtkt'(i)v, ot 6E' (D(oia-i; ai)vcptpE-'vrF-; c(x-iq 
F-kTCI(Yt IrCCPE-'8(1)'KCCV EcCOOTOU; rCo (Dikinic(p. o 6F\- PCCGI/%F-'L)q C"CV610 R(XXII; 
OCVCi%7El'(YT(Oq K(XT(Xkl')(Ya; TO\V IZPO\V 7COkF, [tOV (Y'UV^n'6pF--OF, ýt&rc\c BouocCov 'Kat 
69 Borza comes up with a strange conclusion on this episode, suggesting (pp 221 f) that Philip's lack of a ID Clzn Cý 
decisive response was due to a desire to avoid an alliance between Athens and Thebes. In spite of the fact 
that just such an unlikely partnership was to face him several years. later at the Battle of Chaeroneia, both 
Philip and Greece were to undergo several drastic changes before such a marriage could take place, and it 
is difficult to see how such an alliance could have threatened had Philip responded more decisively now. 
His lack of commitment must be ascribed to other factors. 
70 Cawkwell p66, quoted in full above. 
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OV(J)V (Yl, )VF-ÖPIOV KM (DgTT(Xý, (j)V. EKp1VgV 01)v cy'OVC(7(X'fF-IV TO TCOV 'AýtýDIKTU' 
TO'TW T'V 7UF-p' TÜN "XÜ)V 81'-YVCÜGIV D nlTP'Y(Xl. MOýF-V O'V TOiý CilLM8POlý 1) , 
-q 10 (X EE91, ) E 
4F-T(Xöo£)V(Xt T(i) (1), kinnc i Toiý ýno-y6votý (xý)-coü Týý 'A4(piKT)ovi(xý Kai j) K(XI (X 0 1. ) t1 
M)0 Nfll(POI)ý EXF-tV, (Xý 7UPOTEPOV 01 (D(OKEiý Eixov. 
And when he had overtaken Phalaecus, who had been granted the generalship 
and had the main body of the mercenaries, Philip prepared to decide the war by a 
pitched battle. But Phalaecus, who was tarrying in Nicaea and saw that he was no 
match for Philip, sent ambassadors to the king to treat for an armistice. An 
agreement was reached whereby Phalaecus with his men should depart 
whithersoever he wished, and he then, under the terms of the truce, withdrew to 
the Peloponnese with his mercenaries, to the number of eight thousand, but the 
Phocians, whose hopes were now completely crushed, surrendered to Philip. The 
king, having without a battle unexpectedly terminated the Sacred War, sat in 
council with the Boeotians and the Thessalians. As a result he decided to call a 
meeting of the Amphictyonic council and leave to it the final decision on all the 
issues at stake. 
The members of the council then passed a decree admitting Philip and his 
descendents to the Amphictyonic council and according him two votes which 
formerly had been held by the Phocians, now defeated in war. (16.59.2-60.1, 
346/5) 
The conclusion of the Sacred War could not, quite simply, have been more satisfactory 
for Philip. Without the need even for a battle, Phocis, and along with it her two places on 
the Amphictyonic council, that most Greek of bodies, had fallen into his hands. A 
generation ago - indeed, a mere few years ago - the very notion of a Macedonian king 
calling a meeting of the Amphictyonic council would have seemed an absurdity, and yet 
this was the point to which Philip's foreign policy had led him. Perhaps the crowning 
moment of this new acceptance was that recorded at 60.2-3: 
TIOEV(Xt ÖE KM Tov (xy(ovcc TCov rl-oOiwv (1)t'ktn7rov ýtF-, co'c BotcoTCov Kal 
eg, uT(XA, 6)V ötc\c c \O KoptvOt'0'0ý ýLF-TF-OX1lKF-V(XI w% (Dw-KF-f)at Tilý etiý To\ Odov 
& 'Aýt(ptKri)ov(xý Kcc' T\v (: ýannov T' "7Ü. (x TCov (I)coKecov n(XP(XvoýL1(Xý- Touý gt0t (X 0 
'K(XI TCOV ýtta@ogopcov K(XT(XICF-TPOKOTETICY(Xt K(Xt\ Tix kF-t, y(XV(x cc-OTO)v 
K(XT(Xxcci)CY(Xt K(Xt\ TO, \K cilulzolL)ý ('XIZOÖOCYO(Xt. 
Philip, furthermore, was to hold the Pythian games together with the Boeotians 
and Thessalians, since the Corinthians had shared with the Phocians in the 
sacrilege committed against the god. The Amphictyons and Philip were to hurl 
the arms of the Phocians and their mercenaries down the crags and bum what 
remained of them and sell the horses. 
Philip was, then, enjoying and unprecedented degree of intimacy with the Greek states. 
Just one remained to be dealt with, that is, of course, his long term sparring partner, 
Athens. 
The Peace of Philocrates 
Our discussion of the conclusion of the Sacred War has so far considered Philip's 
relations with the Amphictyony and the Phocians. Another facet to his foreign policy 
during this period was, of course, his troubled relationship with Athens, and the 
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conclusion of his hostilities with Phocis was influenced by the recent making of the 
Peace of Philocrates, the second peace and alliance to have been concluded between the 
two states since Philip's accession 71 and a name which has become synonymous with 
treachery and defeat. 
To consider the making of the peace, it is necessary for us to retrace our steps a little 
chronologically speaking, and perhaps a brief summary of the state of affairs as they 
stood at the time of Philip's second intervention in the Sacred War would be helpful. 
Athens was, in a manner of speaking, at war with Philip three times over, although these 
strands did not take the form of separate campaigns but rather bled together into an 
atmosphere of general indignation towards Philip in Athens. The first objection to him 
72 had arisen over his capture of Amphipolis in 357 . 
Indeed, ever since, Athens had been 
nominally at war with Philip (although the actual war effort against him had left few 
discernible traces on our sources and is therefore unlikely to have been very significant) 
and Aeschines claimed (2.28ff) that he had spoken at length to Philip regarding Philip's 
73 possession of Amphipolis. The Sacred War had opened a new front in hostility towards 
Philip, because, as discussed in the above subsection on Philip's participation in the war, 
while Philip was fighting for the Arnphictyons, Athens was the long standing ally of the 
Phocians, although this round of hostilities had not led to any armed confrontation 
between Philip and Athens bar the shadowy presence of Chares off the coast of the 
Battle of the Crocus Field and Philip's abortive expedition to Thermopylae. Philip's 
reduction of Olynthus, an Athenian ally at the time of her fall, caused outrage in Athens 
and created a third grievance against Phi lip. 74 The political situation was, then, 
complicated, and a grievance against Philip seemed to lie in every direction 
The approach taken to the making of the peace by this chapter requires some justification 
before we embark upon our discussion of it. Firstly, we might note that the exact 
chronology of the embassies has little bearing upon Macedonian foreign policy and has 
been amply discussed elsewhere. 75 As a result, this question will be largely passed over 
by this discussion, except where it becomes especially relevant. The same is true for 
other hotly debated issues in modem scholarship, such as which Athenian politician 
might be connected with which strand of the making of the peace. Equally, we will 
refrain from discussion on what Philip's long term goals in the making of the peace 
might have been for Philip. 76 
Aeschines 2.12ff informs us of the first olive branches to be extended by Philip towards 
Athens during the period of stasis in Euboea and hostilitles against Olynthus: 
71 The first having been that in which Philip renounced all claim to Amphipolis, discussed in the previous C) 
chapter. 
72 See previous chapter for discussion. Philip's possession of Pydna and Potidaea might also be thought of Z: ) C) 
as belonging to same group of grievances, but Amphipolis was undeniably the loss which rankled the Zý t: l L- C) 
most in Athens and the one around which a war effort of some sort focused. 
73 Discussed below. 
74 The aftermath of Philip's Olynthian campaign is discussed below. zn 
75 See for example, Markle, 1974, who suggests that Philip's primary aim was to humble Thebes with ZN-n 
Athenian assistance -a view which was rightly questioned by Cawkwell in 1978. Markle's argument 
seems far fetched and has little to support it by way of evidence. 
76 Markle, for example, p268, suggests that the domination of Greece was necessary to Philip's ultimate 
goal of invading Persia. C C) 
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AnavTaý -y' p 'ýtCxý o4(XI Tof)T' 7s (xl, )To' ýtvilýtovel. )EIV, -0' 01 np, (: yßetý 0' (X 1) 1001E1 
T(i)v Ei)ßoF'-cov, enp-tö \ nept Tilý irpoý c(1)Toi, )ý eiplivlig T&) ÖllýM ölr-Xgxoflc(Xv, 11 
X(X T XF-'C(X F-ITCOV OTI K(X\l (xi. )Toi)ý Ulliv (, X7Z0C77F-i tö, ßol, ) 
% 81(X; ý1, )GCCCYO(XI 7UPO'ý 1)4CCý KM EIPIIVIIV (X7EIV- Olb lEOU, (ý 8' UGTEPOV XPOVq) 
(I)pU'vcov 0 P(X4V0ý)GIOý Uno\ ki F'-V calý anoV8(Xiý 'Taiý ncy, rcov Fý-nF-18i 8, F-, 7U(XvýXOF- öF-£)PO 
e8eiT0 11)ýt(i)V npF-CyßEl, ), Tý v a' TCO lipo, ý (1)t'ý, litnov F'-ý. 9cY0c(1, "V(X, ei ne)ý 8, 1 1, )VC(tT0, 
(XTCO; £cc (X 11) Et1. ) 'ßol T\ iMTP(x. FIF-ICYO'V'TF-ý 8' ýLeiý F-"XF-CYÜ' cc'T&) KTilcyt(p(i)vTcc 
npF-CßF-i), rAv. 'EnF-tÖil ÖF\- F', n(xvýi<F- ÖE£)p' O'cn \O Tfiý iupzaßet'ccý o KTil(: YI(Pcov, 
(xnT17, (etxF- T[Poý 14taý 11)nE\P (J)v -K(X\l np0'ý TOUTOtý, O'Tt (P(XIII 
(DiýMITcoý ('X'lCCOV ýLF\-v 7UOXF-ýLýG(Xt 11päý 1)ýti-xý, ßoL, ). kF-(: yocct K(Xt\ Vi)V 
cc7uccXX(x, yýv(xi TA noXe'-ýto-o. EinovToý 8 e\ T(x£), ucc Tof) KTTlat(pwvToý, Kai 
710kiXllV TIV(X g'ý(X779t'ý, (XV'UOý lZpäý TOUTOtý (ptX(XV0p(O7Ut'(XV, KCCl' TOÜ 511ýt01) 
(7(PO t0E ÖÖP(x o'cTco8F-ý(xýtF/-voi) x(xi Täv Kuilat(pCovTcc ýnaivt'aavToý... 
There is one thing, at any rate, which I think you all remember: how the 
ambassadors from Euboea, after they had discussed with our assembly the 
question of making peace with them, told us that Philip had also asked them to 
report to you that he wished to come to terms and be at peace with you. Not long 
after this Phrynon of Rhamnus was captured by privateers, during the Olynthian 
truce, according to his own complaint. Now when he had been ransomed and had 
come home, he asked you to choose an envoy to go to Philip in his behalf, in 
order that, if possible, he might recover his ransom money. You were persuaded 
and chose Ctesiphon as envoy for him. When Ctesiphon returned from his 
mission, he first reported to you on the matters for which he was sent, and then in 
addition he said that Philip had declared that he had gone to war with you against 
his own will and that he wished, even now, to be rid of this war. When Ctesiphon 
had said this and had also told of the marked kindness of his reception, the people 
eagerly accepted his report and passed a vote of praise for Ctesiphon. 
These early flirtations with the idea of peace are noteworthy for two main points. The 
first of these is how early they occurred. Already during the time of the siege of 
Olynthus, Philip was casting an eye on the future of his relations with Athens, and had 
evidently reached the conclusion that drastic steps needed to be taken. The second issue 
reflects an offshoot of his conclusions, on which the informality of his approach to 
Athens is most enlightening. Philip appears to have been keen to use any individual or 
small state available to convey his good wishes to Athens under the cover of other 
business in a rather underhand manner, and it is not difficult to see why. Any attempts to 
extend the hand of friendship to Athens on his behalf was deeply contradictory to his 
position on the Sacred War (especially if we are inclined to take his religious gestures 
during it seriously) and to his embryonic friendship with Thebes, which was later to 
blossom into alliance. 77 
In spite of the friendly reception of Ctesiphon's news, the fall of Olynthus caused 
outrage in Athens and appears to have blown these early attempts at negotiation to 
smithereens. Diodorus 16.54.1 informs us of the upsurge of public feeling against Philip, 
placing this passage in 348/7, immediately following his notice of the fall of Olynthus: 
Oti 8' 'AOilvcciot iýv cc"o41jaiv i)(pope)4F-voi Toý) (Dtkiitno-o 'Totý ccel 
no; ýF-ýt01)4F-, votý Uno, 'TO£) ß(Xcyt; ýa_'Cüý e, ßollo01)vi c'c7[OCY'V£-, kxovTF-ý Eni 
T' UElg KCC't nccp(Xxccxoi)VTF-ý vIPF -0 F- 1 TJV c(ý Ito -iv Tljv (Xi)Tov041ccv -Kccl [0' ý' 71, Z' 
77 Discussed above. 
192 
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npoöocyt(xv oppi)v-Cccý 'UG)V lzoktTcov 0(XV(X, 1(0 xox(x, ýF-tv- brivy xxovuo 59 itix'at 
-c1 (X 1 vi) ß(XCYIý, Ei (Y1L)ýtýW. XIIGE1V KM (P(XVEPÜ)ý ecc-oToloý 710kEfflouý 
ölF-nox£, 
-ýtol, )v np bý (Dixin-nov. 
Since the Athenians viewed with alarm the rising power of Philip, they came to 
the assistance of any people who were attacked by the king, sending envoys to 
the cities and urging them to watch over their independence and punish with 
death those citizens who were bent on treason, and they promised them all that 
they would fight as their allies, and, after publicly declaring themselves the 
kings' enemies, they engaged in an out-and-out war against Philip. 
This diplomatic drive against Philip must have been the one which Aeschines claimed to 
have led in conjunction with EubuIuS78 and neither it nor the public feeling behind it can 
have escaped Philip's notice. And yet he persisted in his pursuit of peace with Athens in 
spite of his new friendship with Thebes and the renewal of his involvement in the Sacred 
War undismayed by this apparent rejection of his early overtures. Why? 
The reasons which may be distilled from a consideration of Macedonian foreign policy 
at this point are threefold. Firstly, the fact was that Athens was something of a problem 
for Philip. He can have had few doubts regarding his ability to conclude the Sacred War 
and is likely to have had the intention of handing over the settling of the whole affair, 
once it was over, to the Amphictyons, a solution which would reinforce the legitimacy of 
his actions in Greec e. If the Amphictyons were to march on Athens in reprisal for her 
support of Phocis dunng the war, then Philip would have the option of abandoning any 
alliance with Athens that he had made - if, however, he had reached no settlement with 
Athens by that time and the Amphictyons were more inclined towards leniency towards 
Athens (this latter in fact proving to be the case) then Philip, the actual victor of the war, 
would be left in an ambiguous position with regard to Athens, as the hostilities between 
them were not confined to the Sacred War. 
Secondly, peace with Athens would have a practical application in the context of the 
conclusion of the Sacred War. Although Athenian help to Phocis had so far been 
precious little, alliance between Athens and Philip would rob the Phocians of any hopes 
that they might have been nurturing that in some future eleventh hour the Athenians 
might come to their aid. In removing this hope, Philip would be yet further undermining 
the already desperate state of Phocian morale - and indeed the move towards peace did 
play a role in the ultimate Phocian surrender, as shall be briefly discussed in due course. 
Thirdly, we might note that Philip's persistence in pursuing the peace with Athens in 
spite of her hostility towards him conformed to a marked tendency which we have noted 
throughout our discussion of his reign - that is, the inclination towards mollification and 
conciliatory gestures towards her. Whether this sprang from a genuine respect for the 
city or from an unwillingness to provoke a confrontation with her, or a combination of 
both is a matter of speculation. 
In 1994, Hammond published an article which (although entitled "Philip's actions in 347 
and early 346BC") dealt with the reasons for peace from Athens' point of view. 
78 See Demosthenes 19-2-922 and 304 for some Comments regarding Eubulus' attitude i ip at 
this point. 
Zý Cý towards Ph*l' 
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Examining a passage of Justin 79 which reports on Philip's activities in Thessaly and 
Thrace, Hammond arrives at the following conclusions: t: ) 
An important place in Philip's policy was taken by Athens. He preferred to use 
persuasion rather than force in obtaining peace and alliance with her, but at the 
same time the chief factor of persuasion was the threat of force. The most 
immediate threat to Athens was by land. If Macedonia, Thessaly and Boeotia 
could act together, enter Phocis and defeat the mercenaries, there was nothing to 
stop them from proceeding to attack Athens as the ally and accomplice of Phocis 
in the Sacred War. ... The other threat to Athens was an attack on the corn ships 
as they sailed through the Bosporus and the Hellespont towards the Piraeus; for 
she relied upon them to feed her population. In 347 and early 346 Philip imposed 
his will on Thracian rulers and finally on Cersobleptes, as Isocrates noticed in 
Philippus 21. Thereby he controlled the coast road from Macedonia to the 
Bosporus. In February 346 he was well placed to intercept shipping in the 
Bosporus and to attack the Athenian cleruchies in the Chersonese. Moreover he 
enjoyed in that area the alliance of Perinthus and Byzantium, was negotiating 
with Chios, Rhodes and their allies (FGrH 115 [Theopompus] F164) and had 
himself built penteconters and tnaconters which were ideal for raiding merchant 
ships or, as the Athenians put it for "piracy" (Justin 8.3-12)... Philip could not 
have timed the double threat of force more skilfully. His approach to the 
Bosporus was initiated and conducted in accordance with his own will. The 
possibility of an overland attack by the combined forces of Macedonia, Thessaly 
and Boeotia was a constant danger for Athens in the early months of 346. But it 
was made immediate by events which were outside Philip's control, namely the 
party strife in Phocis which prevented Athens and Sparta from taking control of 
the pass of Thermopylae in February 346 and made it probable that Philip would 
attack a greatly weakened Phocis. It is no wonder that Athens dispatched her ten 
envoys post haste to Pella in that month. (pp372f) 
Hammond's article forms part of a debate which has become unusually animated, and 
Buckler's response, 80 in which he defends certain of his own earlier arguments, attacked 
by Hammond, vehemently rejects Hammond's chronology and thus his point of view on 
the influence of Philip's activities in Thrace and Thessaly upon Athenian motives for 
making the peace. Without getting too embroiled in this debate, peripheral as it is to our 
consideration of Philip's foreign policy, we might take certain elements of it into 
account; most importantly, the fact that, whatever our conclusions regarding Hammond's 
chronology and his possible exaggeration of the degree to which Philip exercised a reign 
of terror over Thessaly and Thrace 81 his basic thesis, that the spread of Philip's influence 
made some sort of settlement with him unavoidable for Athens, is undeniably true. The 
obviously imminent conclusion of the Sacred War alone forced Athens into a recognition 
that she was on the losing side and steps towards damage limitation needed to be taken. 
It was in this atmosphere that Philocrates' motion was passed and the first of the 
embassies sent to Philip. 
79 8.3.12-4 
80 1996 
8' Hammond pp368ff and Buckler p 38-3. 
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At this point the first casualty of the peace process - if we may really consider him as 
such - fell. As we have already noted, Philip's attentions had turned to the kingdom of 4- Cersobleptes in Thrace. Aeschines 2.82 informs us of the chronology of these events. C) 
Y-")VE, P(XtVF- 6' o''re 'Cýv TcporF"P(xv E-'7rpF-(YPF-1, )O[JEV TEPEOPEI(XV, 2-'ROt ýLEV ýLET& T6V 
aloprpkYPE(ov ('xirtE'-v(xt 5F-f)po, (DtXtTciro) 8' E-'Tct Op6loov E4tE-'v(xt, 
Now it happened on the occasion of the first embassy, that at the moment when I 
was leaving home with the rest of the ambassadors, Philip was setting out for 
Thrace... 
By the point at which the first embassy made their report to Athens, then, it seems likely 
that Philip's intentions towards Cersobleptes must have been clear to both Athens and 
Cersobleptes himself, who, in a last ditch attempt to save himself, tried to shelter under 
the umbrella terms of the peace, as Aeschines 2.83 then relates: 
'Ev 8F'- r(x', cl t000L (0 OTI un KptT'ßo-Okoý ' AccýtVccxllv"ý EinF- nccPF-ýý, O'v 
ýtev (xiirov KF-pcyoßý, £-'nTilý, o'cýtoiil ÖF- o'cnoÖoÜvcct Touý opKoloý 'Colý 
(DiXi7inob npe'aßFat, xett cy-ov(xv(x7p(x(pilvcci KF-pcyoßXc7ucllv F'-v wiý 
In that assembly Critobulus of Lampsacus came forward and said that 
Cersobleptes had sent him, and he demanded that he should be allowed to give 
his oath to the ambassadors of Philip and that Cersobleptes be enrolled among 
your allies. 82 
Cersobleptes was not successful in this last desperate attempt (and desperate indeed it 
was: we know from Aeschines 2.61 that the peace was decided in this assembly upon the 
nineteenth of Elaphebolion, and Aeschines 2.90 tells us that Cersobleptes lost his 
kingdom to Philip on the twenty fourth of the same month). 
According to Aeschines, it was Demosthenes, whose presidency fell on the nineteenth, 
who threw this motion out of the ekkIesia thereby sealing Cersobleptes' fate. But even if 
we do consider Demosthenes wholly personally responsible for the rejection of this plan 
and the subsequent defeat of Cersobleptes, we can hardly blame him - as Demosthenes 
himself remarked at the time, it was hardly worth bringing the peace to nothing for the 
sake of one "ally" who joined the negotiations only in time to pour the libations for 
peace. Cersobleptes' defeat, similar to that of Olynthus, took on an iconic status in the 
Athenian mentality as a symbol of what would happen to those who tried to resist Philip. 
Cersobleptes' plan to have himself protected by the peace was in theory a neat trick - but 
in practice it couldn't succeed. Athens was unlikely at this stage in the proceedings to 
take a step which was almost guaranteed to cause a breakdown in negotiations - likewise 
Philip was assuredly not going to allow the makings of the peace to stand in the way of 
his plans regarding Thrace. His conquest of the area went ahead, unhindered by the 
imminent peace. 
82 Although see Aeschines' rather different version of events at 3.73-4, where he accuses Demosthenes of Zý 
being personally responsible for Cersobleptes' fate. 
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The Athenians evidently entered the negotiations for peace under a se es of lusions 8 
regarding their own position and that of Phil, P. By the time of the second embassy, 
however, the moment for negotiation was past and it had become abundantly clear that 
any hopes of a koine eirene under which Phocis and also Halus, a Thessalian town 
currently under siege by Parmenio 84 could shelter must be abandoned. Philip wanted a 
peace with Athens, but was not prepared to allow the negotiations for peace to inhibit his 
broader foreign policy in any sense. 
It was, without doubt, precisely this element of disillusionment which caused the dismay 85 in Athens over the conclusion of the peace. While Athenian illusions over the scope of 
the peace had proved a friend to Philip during the negotiations, they rendered it almost 
wholly ineffectual from the moment of its making. Athens watched Philip absorb 
Cersobleptes, Halus and Phocis, and was dismayed. The peace seemed but a flimsy 
edifice to shield Athens from Philip's domination of Greece. 
If we consider the progress made by Philip since his accession in 360/59, we might note 
that by the time of the making of the Peace of Philocrates, immense progress had been 
made in terms of ensuring the security and prosperity of Macedon. States which had 
invaded Macedonian territory prior to or at the outset of Philip's reign, most notably 
Illyria, Olynthus and Paeonia, had been subdued or entirely eliminated. Macedonian 
territory had been expanded to include areas which had previously belonged to Illyria or 
Thrace. Its army had been totally overhauled, with dramatic results. In terms of relations 
with Greece, Philip had formed strong links with Thessaly and had devoted himself to 
eliminating areas of Athenian influence in the north, with the result that his coast was 
now secure against the Athenian incursions which had troubled earlier kings. 
To crown these already substantial achievements, his intervention, though his connection 
with Thessaly, in the Sacred War and his part in its conclusion had left him in a unique 
position as regards Greece. The making of the Peace of Philocrates might be seen as 
representative of that position, symbolising as it does not only the necessity, for the first 
time in recorded history, for a major Greek power, Athens, to consider the actions of a 
Macedonian king as a central factor in its own foreign policy, but also the ability of that 
king to dictate the terms of the ensuing negotiations. 
Our discussion of the reign of Philip has attempted to consider several issues. We have 
examined the contribution of the persona of Philip to his masterly practice of foreign 
policy, including his military reforms, his generalship, and his unrivalled diplomatic 
skills. A detailed examination of his relations with the states which played a significant 
role during the years of his reign had been undertaken, with particular reference to the 
manner in which, relatively early in Philip's reign, the underlying attitude of Philip's 
reign switched from defence to aggression, and our discussion has embraced the theme 
of the period as a whole, which saw Macedon make a gradual transition under Philip 
83 This much is clear from Aeschines' address to Philip in which he addressed the subject of Amphipolis, 
which Philip had been holding more or less unchallenged for over ten years and yet which Aeschines saw zn z-: 1 
fit to suggest that Philip hand over to Athens. ( Discussed above) It was precisely this kind of lack of CýC) 
contact with reality which provided Philip, the expert diplomat, with the opportunity to negotiate a peace Zý 
which suited him, perhaps leaving a few significant gaps in arrangements regarding other states which Zý C t> C> 
Athens then interpreted in accordance with what she wanted. 
84 See Hammond p368 for the plausible su, -og stion that some Thessalian cities had deserted the Thessalian 
.... 
e 
League in 35 -3 3 
fol lowing Philip's defeat by Onomarchus, and therefore needed to be subdued again. C. C., C, 85 See in particular Demosthenes' On the Peace. 
196 
r ppr, 
from being a weak and peripheral state which was an easy prey to its nelghbours, to 
being one of the leading powers in the Greek world. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion of our discussion, we might briefly consider the various themes which 
this study has Identified in the foreign policy of Macedon from the early sixth century 
BC until the making of the Peace of Philocrates in 346. Of these, three in particular 
played consistently important roles. Internal problems within the royal family created 
several moments of crisis in Macedon. These often arose at the time of the transition of 
the throne from one king to another, either because of the death of the reigning king or 
because of an attempt upon the throne by a rival claimant. Whatever the root cause of 
the instability which pervaded the royal house and rendered the throne a very insecure 
seat, however, it almost invariably created a breach in the integrity of Macedonian 
security which could be exploited by whatever foreign power currently had an interest 
there. As such, the consistent instability of the Macedonian throne prior to Philip's reign 
and during the early years of it has formed a significant theme in our discussion of the 
foreign policy of the period. 
A further two strands have surfaced during our discussion in connection with the issue 
of the exploitation of Macedonian weakness during these years. Border raids upon 
Macedonian territory posed a pressing problem for almost all of the kings whose reigns 
have been examined by this thesis, illustrating the general weakness of Macedon by 
contrast to its near' neighbours, whether Illyrian, Paeonian, Lyncestian, Elimiote or 
Olynthian. States which were further afield added a secondary and often more 
threatening aspect to the problem of the aggressive interest of foreign powers in general, 
as their interventions in Macedon tended to be politically motivated (as opposed to the 
more opportunist raids by closer neighbours) and, through the sheer necessity created 
by the logistics of launching an attack from further afield, better coordinated. Sparta and 
Thebes both intervened in Macedon in such a fashion, but it was Athens whose frequent 
incursions showed the greatest tendency towards exploitation of both the internal 
situation in Macedon and the current interests of her neighbouring states, so long as 
they coincided with Athenian alms in the area. As such, Athens in particular posed a 
threat which frequently absorbed the attention of the reigning king during the period 
covered by this thesis. 
In the First Philippic (40), Demosthenes likens the Athenian response to Philip to the 
reactions of a barbarian boxer, who defends himself only in response to a blow and 
never in anticipation of one. The same metaphor could usefully be applied to Macedon 
before the advent of Philip. Rather than taking any steps towards monitoring the 
situation in Greece or shaping it in the long term, its foreign policy consisted almost 
solely of a series of responses to the various crises created by the aggression of 
neighbouring states. During these defensive decades, the very few excursus taken into 
the realms of aggressive foreign policy undertaken by a Macedonian king (for example 
those in Thessaly under Archelaus and Alexander 1) invariably ended in calamity. 
We might thus conclude that the point at which Philip had arrived by the time of the Z-: ) I 
making of the Peace of Philocrates was not the fruition of many long decades of 
development. Rather, the main patterns identified by this study show that, prior to his 
reign, following every period of consolidation and improvement in Macedon brought 
about by one king's foreign policy (for example the reigns of Alexander I and 
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Archelaus, which both saw increases in prosperity and security) there was a period 
characterised by sharp decline in Macedonian conditions (the reign of Perdiccas and 
those of the successors of Archelaus, for example) which undermined the progress 
made by the preceding king. I'D 
The advent of Philip saw the reversal of the philosophy behind Macedonian foreign 
policy to a point at which it shaped, rather than merely responded to, the foreign 0 
policies of other states. By the time of the making of the Peace of Philocrates in spite of 
the defensive charactenstics of the early years of his reign, this reversal had been made, 
and the years which followed saw the development of this process into out and out 
aggression. Our study of the foreign policy of Macedon up until the making of the 
Peace of Philocrates therefore takes us up to a definitive moment in Macedonian 
history, in spite of the ultimately ineffective nature of the peace. We have covered the 
full span of Macedon's defensive decades and seen the metamorphosis of its foreign 
policy into a determining factor of Greek history. 
In our discussion, we have attempted to take into consideration as much source 
material, both ancient and modem, as possible, with a view towards establishing as full 
a picture of this period as is available. In doing so, it is hoped that a useful contribution 
towards modem studies of Macedon during this period has been made on two levels. 
Firstly, as is pointed out by the introduction, there is something of a dearth in the large 
scale studies of this period by Hammond and Griffith, Ellis, Errington and Cawkwell, of 
discussion of other. modem sources, either because the author was not inclined to 
provide any, or because interesting studies have been provided since the time of writing. 
In collating modem references and consistently engaging in discussion of their 
arguments, an attempt has been made in this thesis to take some steps towards 
addressing a significant gap in existing discussions. 
In addition, in advancing certain theories, this thesis has attempted to challenge the 
traditional view help by most modem scholars. Such challenges are often to be found in 
the details of the subject matter covered (for instance in our suggestion that the 
fragment of Anaximenes which refers to the reorganisation of the Macedonian army 
ought to be though of as referring to Alexander 1) but occasionally pervade our 
consideration of an. entire period. The chapter on Perdiccas, for example, in suggesting 
that his frequent changes of alliance ought to be thought of as the product of a reasoned 
foreign policy as opposed to untrustworthiness on his behalf, challenges a long held 
tradition amongst modem studies. Besides our extended discussion of other modem 
examinations of various aspects of the history of this period, then, this thesis has 
attempted to make some original suggestions regarding our concept of it. 
It is hoped, then, that a useful contribution towards modem studies of Macedon during 
this period has been made. 
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A Chronology in Brief 
c 512/11 Macedonian submission to Persia and probable date for acquisition of Paeonia. 
Marriage of Gygaea and Bubares. Z: ) 
506 The last appearance of Amyntas II in our sources; the accession of Alexander I 
must be dated at some point after this 
c 498 Possible date for Alexander's accession, if connection between Bubares' 
departure from Macedon and the Ionian revolt is accepted. At some point during the 
following years, Alexander is awarded the status of proxenos and eurgetes by Athens 
492 Reaffirmation of Macedonian submission to Persia 
470 Alexander's advice to the Greeks before Tempe 
469 Advice to the Greeks before the Battle of Platea 
463 The prosecution of Cimon at Athens 
c 452 Death of Alexander and likely date for accession of Perdiccas 11. Alexander's 
formal relationship with Athens still, perhaps, in existence 
437 Establishment of an Athenian colony at Nine Ways, henceforth Amphipolis 
432 At some point before this, Perdiccas' brother Philip had been relieved of his arche 
by Perdiccas and is now plotting with Athens - thus, the collapse of the formal 
friendship between Perdiccas and Athens. Perdiccas engaged in diplomacy which 
results in the revolt of Potidaea. The establishment of a large settlement at Olynthus. 
Invasion by Philip and Derdas, the capture of Therme and siege of Pydna by Athens. 
Alliance between Perdiccas and Athens. Immediate repudiation of the alliance by 
Perdiccas and defection to fight alongside the Potidaeans. Sparta declares war on 
Athens. 
431 Triple alliance between Perdiccas, Athens and Sitalces as a result of diplomatic 
activity by Nymphodorus. Perdiccas cooperating with Athens in operations against the 
Chalcideans. 
429/8 Perdiccas secretly aiding Sparta. Thracian invasion of Macedon under Sitalces. 
Marriage of Stratonice and Seuthes. 
424 Brasidas in Macedon in accordance with alliance with Perdiccas, having travelled 
through Thessaly under agreement. Abortive campaign against Arrhabaeus. Perdiccas 
continues to support Brasidas in the north. 
424/3, winter, Brasidas captures Amphipolis, following diplomacy by Perdiccas there 
and a Spartan campaign. Perdiccas also present for "mopping up" operations there. 
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423, spring, Armistice between Athens and Sparta. Second expedition by Perdiccas and 
Brasidas in Lyncestis. Perdiccas' Illyrian allies defect and his troops desert. Brasidas 
wins battle and pursues Perdiccas into Macedon. All relations between Perdiccas and 
Brasidas severed and Perdiccas allies with Athens. Likely date for IG 1.2.71 
418/7, winter, Athenian blockade of Macedon caused by Perdiccas' alliance with Argos 
and Sparta at some point prior to this. 
414 Perdiccas assisting Athens in attempt upon Amphipolis, presumably according to 
the terms of a new alliance. 
413 Probable date of death of Perdiccas and accession of Archelaus. 
410 Archelaus besieges Pydna and, when it falls, relocates it twenty stades inland. 
Possible date of start of timber trade with Athens. 
407/6 Possible award of status of proxenos and euergetes to Archelaus by Athens. 
c 401/400 At some point prior to this, possibly recently, a war had been fought by 
Archelaus with Lyncus and probably some portion of Illyria, or perhaps Elimea. 
Archelaus' intervention in Thessaly. 
400/399 The assassination of Archelaus, and the very brief rules of Crateuas and 
Orestes, follwed by their deaths. The accession of Aeropus. 
395/4 The death of Aeropus, possibly a short reign by Amyntas 11 (the Little) and the 
accession of Pausanias. 
394/3 Death of Pausanias and accession of Amyntas 111. Likely date for Tod 111, 
alliance with Olynthus. 
393/2 Land donations to Olynthus and large scale Illyrian invasion. Possible rule by 
Argaeus. 
392/1 Amyntas recovers his kingdom and throne with Thessalian assistance. Possible 
date for his marriage to Eurydice. 
383/2 OlYnthian invasion of Macedon. The birth of Philip. 
381 Olynthus defeated by Sparta and Amyntas free to reclaim his kingdom. 
370/69 Alliance between Amyntas and Jason of Pherae, death of Amyntas and 
accession of Alexander 11. 
369/8 Intervention by Alexander in Thessaly and a plot against his rule in Macedon by 
Ptolemy of Alorus. Arbitration in this dispute by Thebes. 
368/7 Assassination of Alexander H by Ptolemy of Alorus and accession of Ptolemy. 
Ratification of Ptolemy's rule by Thebes. Likely date for marriage between Ptolemy 
and Eurydice. 
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367/6 Challenge to the throne by Pausanias, reinstatement of Ptolemy by Iphicrates. In 
spite of this, Ptolemy lending support to Amphipolis In her resistance to Athens. 
365/4 Assassination of Ptolemy by Perdiccas III and his accession. 
364/3 Athens seizes Torone, Potidaea, Pydna and perhaps Methone and Perdiccas 
assists in a campaign by her against Olynthus- However, he continues to support 
Amphipolls. As a result of this, at some point following this, hostilities break out Z: ) 
between Athens and Macedon, including a defeat of Perdiccas by the Athenian general 
Callisthenes, followed by a truce. Callisthenes later put to death on his return to Athens. 
360/59 Perdiccas falls in battle with Bardylis in which four thousand men are lost. 
Philip accedes to a kingdom apparently on the verge of destruction. Pausanias, probably 
the same Pausanias as the one who challenged the throne in 367/6, now supported by a 
Thracian king (perhaps Cotys) and Argaeus, probably the same as the Argaeus who had 
perhaps enjoyed a brief spell on the throne c393/2, now supported by Athens, both also 
laid some claim to the throne. The Paeonians are pillaging neighbouring Macedonian 
territory, the Macedonian army is panic stricken by their recent defeat and an Athenian 
force under Mantias is dispatched to support Argaeus. Philip responds by bribing the 
Paeonians and the Thracian king supporting Pausanias. The Athenian force under 
Mantias is stationed at Methone - Philip withdraws any support from Amphipolis, and 
defeats Argaeus and his mercenaries in battle. 
359/8 Philip concludes a peace treaty with the Athenians. The king of Paeonia dies and 
Philip takes advantage of this opportunity to subdue the country. He then turns to the 
Illyrians and defeats Bardylis. Likely date for his marriage with Audata. 
From here onwards, calendar years as opposed to archon years are given for greater 
clarity. 
357 Philip captures Amphipolis (probably summer 357). Athens declares war upon him 
and some ill defined actions by her against Philip take place. He captures Pydna. 
356 Philip besieges and captures Potidaea, which he enslaves and hands over to 
Olynthus, sealing an alliance with that city. He wins a victory at Olympia, Alexander is 
born to Philip and Olympias, and Parmenio wins a victory over the kings of Thrace, 
Paeonia and Illyria. Philip progresses from Potidaea to Crenides, which he captures, 
resettles and names Philippi. Alliance of the three defeated kings with Athens. The 
seizure of the Delphic oracle by the Phocians. 
355 Philip moves on into Thessaly, where stasis has broken out. He is acclaimed archon 
of Thessaly and henceforth enjoys the support of the Thessalians. Likely date for his 
marriages with Thessalian women, Philinna and Nicesipolis. In Greece, the Sacred War 
breaks out. 
354 The siege and capture of Methone. The capture of Pagasae. 
353 Philip is invited into Thessaly for a second time-, defeating a coalition between 
Lycophron of Pherae and the Phoci I 
Onomarchus and withdraws. 
ian Phayllus, but is then defeated tw ce by 
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352 The Battle of the Crocus Field, Philip's defeat of Onomarchus. Philip is prevented 
from marching through Thermopylae by an Athenian force. He then proceeds into 
Thrace and carries out a campaign there. He falls sick with a serious illness and a hasty 
settlement with Cersobleptes is possible. 
349 Philip begins a campaign against the cities of the Chalcidice, the main city of Z7) Z) 
which, Olynthus, having recently allied with Athens, contrary to her alliance with C) 
Philip, and was harbouring his two half brothers. A series of unsuccessful expeditions 
are dispatched from Athens to aid Olynthus. 
348 Olynthus falls to Philip and is enslaved. Stasis in Euboea, possibly connected with 
Philip. 
347 The Boeotians appeal to Philip for assistance in the Sacred War. He concludes an 
alliance with Thebes. 
346 The Peace of Philocrates and the end of the Sacred War. Philip admitted into the 
Amphictyonic council and holds the Pythian games along with his new allies. 
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